With the meaning of trust, good faith and respect for promises made, protection, or assistance, fides in the non-exclusively religious sense of the word comes from the demand for ethical perfection: as such, it is omnipresent in human relations and in the dynamic of societies in the Middle Ages.

The theory of the square of opposition has been studied for over 2,000 years and has seen a resurgence in new theories and research since the second half of the twentieth century. This volume collects papers presented at the Sixth World Congress on the Square of Opposition, held in Crete in 2018, developing an interdisciplinary exploration of the theory. Chapter authors explore subjects such as Aristotle’s ontological square, logical oppositions in Avicenna’s hypothetical logic, and the power of the square of (...) opposition to solve theological problems regarding predestination and theodicy. Other topics covered include: Hegel’s opposition to diagrams De Morgan’s unpublished octagon of opposition turnstile figures of opposition institutional model-theoretic treatment of oppositions Lacan’s four formulas of sexuation the theory of oppositional poly-simplexes The Exoteric Square of Opposition will appeal to pure logicians, historians of logic, semioticians, philosophers, theologians, mathematicians, and psychoanalysts. (shrink)

The present book discusses all aspects of paraconsistent logic, including the latest findings, and its various systems. It includes papers by leading international researchers, which address the subject in many different ways: development of abstract paraconsistent systems and new theorems about them; studies of the connections between these systems and other non-classical logics, such as non-monotonic, many-valued, relevant, paracomplete and fuzzy logics; philosophical interpretations of these constructions; and applications to other sciences, in particular quantum physics and mathematics. Reasoning with contradictions (...) is the challenge of paraconsistent logic. The book will be of interest to graduate students and researchers working in mathematical logic, computer science, philosophical logic, linguistics and physics. (shrink)

The square of opposition is a diagram related to a theory of oppositions that goes back to Aristotle. Both the diagram and the theory have been discussed throughout the history of logic. Initially, the diagram was employed to present the Aristotelian theory of quantification, but extensions and criticisms of this theory have resulted in various other diagrams. The strength of the theory is that it is at the same time fairly simple and quite rich. The theory of oppositions has recently (...) become a topic of intense interest due to the development of a general geometry of opposition (polygons and polyhedra) with many applications. A congress on the square with an interdisciplinary character has been organized on a regular basis (Montreux 2007, Corsica 2010, Beirut 2012, Vatican 2014, Rapa Nui 2016). The volume at hand is a sequel to two successful books: The Square of Opposition - A General Framework of Cognition, ed. by J.-Y. Béziau & G. Payette, as well as Around and beyond the Square of Opposition, ed. by J.-Y. Béziau & D. Jacquette, and, like those, a collection of selected peer-reviewed papers. The idea of this new volume is to maintain a good equilibrium between history, technical developments and applications. The volume is likely to attract a wide spectrum of readers, mathematicians, philosophers, linguists, psychologists and computer scientists, who may range from undergraduate students to advanced researchers. (shrink)

Résumé Le principe de précaution est un principe pragmatique qui a trouvé une expression juridico-politique. C’est la réponse des sociétés démocratiques à de nouveaux risques. Cette intervention du principe de précaution dans la sphère démocratique explique également les controverses auxquelles il a pu donner lieu. Mais il n’est pas possible de s’en tenir aux controverses, car il y a aussi des enjeux proprement philosophiques du principe de précaution autour de trois questions majeures : le savoir, le temps et la Terre. (...) Si le principe de précaution, dans la forme constitutionnelle qu’il a prise en France, est bien la traduction, encore imparfaite et précaire, d’un principe cosmopolitique, dans le cadre d’un État particulier, on peut dire qu’il constitue un moment important dans la prise en charge politique et historique d’une responsabilité pour l’humanité. (shrink)

Although the historian confronts the question of what is not known in the same terms as does any other researcher no matter his or her discipline, the conditions of the debate are different for the historian because of the problematic nature of the science of history. While practically all the other sciences, including the social sciences, struggle against ignorance by seeking to discover and establish laws that will govern the facts, history must always face, in spite of its ever more (...) sophisticated techniques, the contingency of its materials, which are fundamentally human. The materials of history can not—in spite of what some have asserted—be contained within any single, all-encompassing mode of reasoning that would allow for the creation of constitutive abstract models. In spite of this reality the historian persists, like Sisyphus, in organizing knowledge. Man apparently has no choice but to believe that his activities have some logical basis. The historian therefore collates facts in order to develop cognitive and interpretive structures that will be durable. What gives the discipline of history its epistemological originality is the painfully central role it accords to the question, “What do we not know?” Man wants to know, believes he knows. The ignorance of historians thus seems especially upsetting when applied to our own century. How could the methodological progress of the science of history, along with the professionalization of the historian's craft, have led to an actual increase of uncertainty concerning a period so close to us in time? Today's man-in-the-street—endowed only with his memory, which seems so rich in “truths”—finds it hard to believe that any event or structure of the twentieth century could remain unknown. Limiting our inquiry to the twentieth century is not, however, justified solely by the practical consideration of trying to gain a better grasp of our times. Indeed in this brief article devoted to the relationship between ignorance and the history and historiography of the twentieth century, we will not attempt to inventory all the events, persons, mentalities or economic facts which historical knowledge has until now been incapable of explaining. Unlike the other sciences, whose struggle against ignorance is accomplished by a gradual process of nibbling at the margins of the unknown, the discipline of history must always keep in mind that the masses of granite that form the foundation of History are in fact but a body of statements that can only aspire to the status of truth. The aim of our inquiry— without of course claiming to be exhaustive—will therefore be to identify the nature of the obstacles that lie in the historian's path. These problems are of three kinds. The first concerns access to knowledge, and is tied—although not exclusively—to problems of the techniques of historical research. The second concerns the difficulties related to conceptualization and therefore to the uses of knowledge. There can be no knowing without know-how. Finally, the third pertains to the lack of permeability between history and the other human and social sciences, which creates for the historian the challenge of interdisciplinary exchange. (shrink)

At the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, change was fast and furious: the exploration of coastal Africa by the Portuguese, the exploration of the West Indies by the Spanish, the extermination of the island Indians, the importation of black slaves to the Iberian peninsula, then the expansion of the slave trade to the American colonies - in short, the much-heralded inauguration of European colonization overseas, with all of its attendant horrors. All of this is adequately known, it seems; (...) the purpose of the present article is not to rehearse this history, even in summary. But if chronology has any value here, it is in making clear that, while the massacre of the Arawaks and the Caribbean Indians quickly attracted attention, eliciting protests that were to be renewed in the following centuries, the black slave trade and black slavery began somewhat discreetly, as if it took quite some time for the esprits libres in Europe to take notice of it. Over the three centuries leading up to the French revolution, blacks were transferred from their native countries to the American colonies. In Europe, these three centuries saw the development of Enlightenment thought, the revolt against domination by the Church, the call for human rights, and the will to democracy. The parallel is superficial, but troubling nevertheless: four facts appear to be linked together, and not merely chronologically: the massacre or de facto subjugation of the Indians, the trade and enslavement of blacks, and colonization. Is the last of these not the cause of and the key to understanding the other three - as well as a number of other phenomena? (shrink)

For many years, M. Jean d'Ormesson has been doing me the honor of asking me to write for Diogenes. More recently, he suggested that I should coordinate an issue of this review that would be devoted to my extended discipline, History, but history in the way in which I understand it. It was certainly not for lack of interest that I did not reply to the first request but, no doubt, because of the sense of a chronic lack of time (...) - almost a pleonasm - from which I, like everyone else, suffer. It was not because I was cured that I accepted the second invitation but probably because I allowed myself, with full knowledge of the facts, to entertain the idea that editing an issue would take up less time than simply contributing. … In fact, as everyone knows, the opposite is true, especially when the occasional editor also volunteers to be one of the contributors. This issue is now completed and I sincerely thank M. Jean d'Ormesson for having wished to entrust me with this task that I have enjoyed very much. (shrink)

In order to tell the story of Man and understand our emergence better, we can readily follow on from Heinz Tobien, though we do not need to go back so far in time - just a few million years.Clearly, our fundamental origin is animal. Thus it is easy to understand that in the great genealogy (known as phylogeny), there was one vital (geological) moment when our line was forever detached from the animal “kingdom.” The evidence of palaeontology, like that of (...) molecular biology, today locates this point - which is, by definition, the very point of origin of our family, the hominids - in Eastern Africa around 8 million years ago. In order to state this, palaeontology rests on two sets of results. All the most ancient hominids, without exception, are East African, and the oldest of all goes back more than 7 million years. Through the study of various characteristics of the cells of contemporary primates, having arranged them in an order of increasing complexity and having hypothesized that this contemporary complexity may be a reflection of that which developed through time, molecular biology has, on the basis of palaeontological dating, calibrated this transformation and its different stages and constructed what is called a molecular clock. In this way, it has arrived at two conclusions. The primates closest to Man are by far the great African apes (chimpanzees, gorillas), and the “distance” that separates us - in other words the degree of difference that exists between them and us - situates the divergence of our two branches at just over 7 million years. (shrink)

The rich text by Roberte Hamayon can be viewed from several angles. I will limit myself to one by noting that this particular case offers a very interesting illustration of the treatment of ethnic questions in Russia following the collapse of the USSR.

We are again going through a period of expansion in biographical literature. There is an ever greater number of publications, demonstrating the libido biographica of the reading public and also showing the interest of authors for a genre that is often treated with a great deal of care and rigor. This is not the first time in the history of letters, and each of us can find in his library a quantity of ancient, classic or modern works proving the constancy (...) of this production. However, the contemporary phenomenon takes on a different meaning. The appetite for the biographical seems to be directly linked to its value as testimony. We are living in an era of distrust with regard to rules and codes. Every individual is called on to organize his conduct and invent his existence, from which comes, it seems, this need for an example that also expresses a taste for history and a need for more truth than entertainment from the author of biographies. (shrink)

Directeur de recherche au CNRS, où il dirige le Centre d’histoire de la philosophie moderne et le Centre Thomas-Hobbes. Il enseigne également la philosophie politique moderne et contemporaine à l’Université de Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne. Il est notamment l’auteur de La décision métaphysique de Hobbes. Conditions de la politique (Vrin, 1987, 2e éd.,..

The theory of action is a centerpiece of the philosophical thought of Ralph Cudworth. It is indeed in this theory that the fundamental, twofold operation of his thinking is played out: an overturning of necessitarian materialism and, correlatively, a reestablishment of the genuine idea of an intelligible system of the universe. The problem of action in Cudworth’s thought concerns his physical doctrine as much as his moral doctrine. It thus involves the theory of being and of value.

Pourquoi la démocratie qui, en son principe, est un régime de liberté peut-elle dériver vers la servitude? Cette question n'est pas nouvelle, elle figurait déjà en bonne place dans la pensée politique de Platon et d'Aristote, pour lesquels cette dérive était inscrite dans la nature du régime, lequel n'était donc pas viable. Elle se retrouve également chez les premiers penseurs de la démocratie réelle moderne, en particulier Alexis de Tocqueville, pour lequel la démocratie est perpétuellement confrontée à une redoutable alternative (...) : promouvoir le goût de la liberté ou, à l'inverse, se dégrader en servitude de mœurs et d'opinion. Or, que cette servitude démocratique, qui est une tendance interne par laquelle la démocratie se détruit elle-même, ne résulte pas d'un pouvoir de contrainte externe mais trouve ses ressorts dans la volonté des individus, nous savons le penser depuis longtemps avec le concept de servitude volontaire d'Etienne de La Boétie. Pourquoi donc parler de nouvelles servitudes? Parce qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'écrire aujourd'hui un " Contr'un ". La figure du maître a changé, ce n'est plus un maître personnel, un tyran, qui tiendrait sous son pouvoir une multitude effrayée, mais un maître anonyme, sans visage et sans nom propre qui, par de nouvelles voies, instaure une domination d'un nouveau genre et de nouvelles servitudes. Celles-ci sont analysées ici sur les plans de l'anthropologie, de l'éthique, de l'économie, ainsi que de l'analyse sociale et de la philosophie politique en vue de repenser une liberté civile à la mesure des problèmes de notre temps. Ce livre est une défense de la liberté issue de la convergence des vues, non d'un collectif, mais d'un certain nombre d'individus singuliers, auteurs libres et indépendants, disons intempestifs, qui entendent s'élever contre les formes larvées de servitudes qui se mettent en place dans les sociétés démocratiques. Il s'agit donc de retrouver l'esprit de liberté sans lequel la démocratie se dégrade et se meurt. (shrink)

Résumé Le principe de précaution est un principe pragmatique qui a trouvé une expression juridico-politique. C’est la réponse des sociétés démocratiques à de nouveaux risques. Cette intervention du principe de précaution dans la sphère démocratique explique également les controverses auxquelles il a pu donner lieu. Mais il n’est pas possible de s’en tenir aux controverses, car il y a aussi des enjeux proprement philosophiques du principe de précaution autour de trois questions majeures : le savoir, le temps et la Terre. (...) Si le principe de précaution, dans la forme constitutionnelle qu’il a prise en France, est bien la traduction, encore imparfaite et précaire, d’un principe cosmopolitique, dans le cadre d’un État particulier, on peut dire qu’il constitue un moment important dans la prise en charge politique et historique d’une responsabilité pour l’humanité. (shrink)

« En vertu de quoi la catégorie de l’Utopique possède donc à côté de son sens habituel et justement dépréciatif, cet autre sens qui, loin d’être nécessairement abstrait et détourné du monde, est au contraire centralement préoccupé du monde : celui du dépassement de la marche naturelle des événements »« Il n’y a guère, même parmi les économistes bourgeois, un savant..

L’aspect le plus profond de la crise qui affecte les sociétés contemporaines est probablement moral. Dire cela, ce n’est en aucune manière nier ou simplement considérer comme secondaires les autres aspects : mise en place d’un nouvel ordre économique et monétaire mondial, accroissement des clivages entre les sociétés par l’apparition de nouvelles technologies,..

Le secret est un savoir mais séparé des autres, caché, scellé, qu’il faut taire. Détenir un secret, tenir ou garder le secret, c’est aussi être détenu, tenu ou gardé par lui. Le secret est pesant, on aimerait s’en libérer. Mais cette libération n’est pas facile, parce que dévoiler un secret, c’est trahir les autres ou soi-même. Le secret s’oppose à la transparence, comme..

De civilisation à civilisation rien n’est simple ni univoque. On sait le regain d’intérêt pour la notion de civilisation aujourd’hui où l’on considère souvent, à la suite de Samuel P. Huntington, que la rivalité entre grandes puissances du XXe siècle a été remplacée au XXIe par le choc des civilisations. Voici l’une des formulations qu’il en donne : « En résumé,..

Il s’agit de déduire le concept de cosmopolitisme à partir de la notion d’humanité et de montrer le champ considérable qui s’ouvre ainsi à la pensée : le rapport à la nature et au monde vivant, l’idée d’une justice universelle pensée à partir de l’humanité comme sujet supérieure au peuple ou à l’État comme sujet. De cette hiérarchie peut être tirée l’idée d’un droit de résistance des peuples contre l’oppression, l’équité territoriale, le droit de vivre dignement des fruits de la (...) Terre au lieu où l’on habite. (shrink)

Paris, Palais de Tokyo, dimanche 7 juillet 2002. Lieu d’exposition, récemment inauguré, entre musée et squat, où l’on peut voir les œuvres d’artistes contemporains. Qu’y voit-on? Quelques exemples. Un grand rideau de velours noir. Derrière ce rideau, une grande pièce sombre. Il est indiqué, à l’entrée : « Merci de bien vouloir vous déchausser avant d’entrer »,..

Il a également publié : Raison et déraison d’État ; Jean Bodin : nature, histoire, droit et politique ; Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la philosophie politique moderne ; Comment..

L’État n’est plus aujourd’hui que l’ombre de lui-même. L’ombre de la figure du Léviathan dans laquelle Hobbes l’avait pensé en construisant son concept à l’aube de la modernité. Pouvoir, représentation, loi sont les trois catégories autour desquelles l’État était alors pensé. Pouvoir, parce que l’État était d’abord conçu comme la synthèse d’une puissance irrésistible..

L’inappropriabilité de la Terre comme principe fondamental du droit cosmopolitique, dont les autres droits et devoirs de l’humanité doivent êtres déduits, est susceptible de renouveler le contenu de l’idée du citoyen du monde qui relève d’un droit plus fondamental que celui de la citoyenneté étatique. Cela ne veut nullement dire qu’il faille remettre en cause le droit positif étatique, mais simplement que, au-dessus de celui-ci, il y a un droit du citoyen du monde, donc de l’humanité qui prévaut. Pour Kant, (...) le droit cosmopolitique du citoyen du monde avait pour unique contenu l’hospitalité que l’on doit à celui qui arrive et qui passe. A partir du concept d’inappropriabilité de la terre ce droit s’élargit considérablement : il comporte non seulement le devoir d’hospitalité, mais aussi les droits de l’homme et en outre le droit à bénéficier des fruits de la Terre en vue d’avoir une existence décente. Le tout définissant la responsabilité cosmopolitique pour l’humanité. (shrink)