Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristotle’s commentator par excellence, rarely engages with Plato. In the present paper, however, we see him at work as an exegete of a passage in the _Phaedrus_ (245c5-9), in which Plato argues for the immortality of the soul based on its self-motion. In this paper, I focus on two ways in which Alexander deals with the passage. In his commentary on Aristotle’s _Prior Analytics_ (CAG II 1), Alexander employs the same approach to the _Phaedrus_ that he uses (...) with Aristotle’s treatises: he puts an informal argument expressed in ordinary language into the more formal shape of a syllogism. This does not mean that Alexander gives his approval to Plato’s theory. In fact, in his commentary on Aristotle’s _Topics_ (CAG II 2), Alexander introduces a polemical discussion of the same Platonic argument. Commenting on Aristotle’s denial that the soul is a self-moving substance (_Top_. IV 1.120b21-29), Alexander spells out the implicit reference to the _Phaedrus_ and criticizes Plato’s argument for not taking into account the difference between an accidental property of the soul and the essential characteristics by which it is defined. Plato’s theory of self-motion is partly accepted by Alexander and partly criticized. This paves the way for how the theory will be applied in the Aristotelian tradition, not to the soul, as in Plato, but to the ensouled body, either of the living being or of the heavens. (shrink)

Il brano del "Fedro" (269el-270c5) in cui è menzionato Ippocrate e il suo metodo è uno dei più controversi dell'opera platonica. Alcuni studiosi si sono serviti degli scolî antichi al dialogo, tramandati sotto il nome del neoplatonico Ermia (V sec. d. C.), per sostenere che il metodo in questione non implica un'indagine preliminare dell'universo. È tuttavia utile (oltreché finora intentato) ripercorrere quanto l'esegeta neoplatonico dice a proposito dell'intero brano in questione per constatare come egli, al contrario, ne fornisca un'interpretazione cosmologica, (...) sulla base della significazione tecnica di ἡ ὅλη ψυχή come "anima dell'universo". In ogni caso l'esegesi di Ermia risulta essere non una semplice parafrasi grammaticale del testo platonico, ma anche una sua riformulazione filosofica nei termini della dottrina neoplatonica, la quale è estremamente complessa anche nel caso dell'anima umana. (shrink)

The studies of É. Évrard, recently published by M.-A. Gavray, are high quality works which allow to immerse oneself in the context of the Platonic-Aristotelian school of Alexandria in Egypt throughout the sixth century AD. They mostly focus on the figure and work of Joannes Philoponus, with specific attention to the compositional technique of his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics and of On the Eternity of the World against Aristotle. Despite being strongly critical of the Stagirite on some points, also due (...) to his Christian faith, Philoponus deeply assimilated Aristotelian methods, lexicon and concepts. He therefore uses this legacy in his commentary on the first chapter of the biblical text of the book of Genesis on the creation of the universe, of living species and of the human being. This work by Philoponus provides a first example of Christian Aristotelianism before the well-known one of the medieval Scholasticism. (shrink)

Asclépius est un commentateur aristotélicien du VI e siècle après J.-C., qui – élève d’Ammonius – étudie à l’école néoplatonicienne d’Alexandrie en Égypte. Il réalise l’exégèse de divers passages de la Métaphysique dans lesquels Aristote attribue à Platon la doctrine de l’existence de substances mathématiques séparées (avec une position intermédiaire entre les substances intelligibles et les sensibles) et, en même temps, la critique fortement. Asclépius a une attitude de conciliation entre les perspectives platonicienne et aristotélicienne. D’une part, il défend la (...) doctrine de l’existence de substances mathématiques séparées du monde sensible et supérieures à lui, et ce faisant il s’aligne sur la défense de la doctrine platonicienne déjà opérée par les néoplatoniciens Syrianus et Proclus. Cependant, d’autre part, il adopte aussi la position aristotélicienne et celle d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise, si bien qu’il existe aussi des entités mathématiques qui ne sont pas des substances, mais des caractéristiques mathématiques formelles immanentes au sensible. Enfin, les entités mathématiques sont aussi de simples concepts mentaux obtenus par abstraction du sensible. En parlant d’entités mathématiques non substantielles, Asclépius s’aligne sur Aristote et son commentateur peripatéticien Alexandre. Asclépius, grâce à une vision hiérarchisée de la réalité, peut admettre trois types d’entités mathématiques, de sorte que chaque type inférieur est une copie atténuée de celui qui lui est supérieur. (shrink)

This volume investigates the reasons why Plotinus, a philosopher inspired by Plato, made critical use of Epicurean philosophy. Eminent scholars show that some fundamental Epicurean conceptions pertaining to ethics, physics, epistemology and theology are drawn upon in the Enneads to discuss crucial notions such as pleasure and happiness, providence and fate, matter and the role of sense perception, intuition and intellectual evidence in relation to the process of knowledge acquisition. By focusing on the meaning of these terms in Epicureanism, Plotinus (...) deploys sophisticated methods of comparative analysis and argumentative procedures that ultimately lead him to approach certain aspects of Epicurus' philosophy as a benchmark for his own theories and to accept, reject or discredit the positions of authors of his own day. At the same time, these discussions reveal what aspects of Epicurean philosophy were still perceived to be of vital relevance in the third century AD. (shrink)

The following work features elements to ponder and an in-depth explanation taken on the Anca Vasiliu’s study about the possibilities and ways of thinking of God by a rational entity, such as the human being. This is an ever relevant topic that, however, takes place in relation to Platonic authors and texts, especially in Late Antiquity. The common thread is that the human being is a God’s creature who resembles him and who is image of. Nevertheless, this also applies within (...) the Christian Trinity according to which, not without problems, the Son is the image of the Father. Lastly, also the relationship of the Spirit with the Father and the Son, always within the Trinity, can be considered as a relationship of similarity, but again not without critical issues between the similarity of attributes, on the one hand, and the identity of nature, on the other. (shrink)

In his commentary on Plato’sCratylus, Proclus interprets the dialogue not as a mere work on logic or linguistics, but as having a full psychological and theological import.Late ancient Platonists had already proposed a similar reading for another Platonic dialogue,i.e.theParmenides. In that case too they rejected the logical interpretation, and aimed to find in the text the description of the hierarchy of reality, particularly of the highest beings. As a result, theParmenideswas seen as the accomplished expression of Plato’s theology.Proclus too draws (...) a comparison between theCratylusand theParmenidesin order to stress their theological significance. He also contrasts Plato’s dialectic with Aristotle’s dialectic. Proclus’ interpretation of dialectic is best understood if it is compared to the doctrines of his master Syrianus and of one of his co-disciples,i.e.Hermeias, at the Platonic school of Athens in the 5th centuryad.Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, in this milieu Platonists were not always committed to the task of reconciling the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. As it happens, they could strongly disagree with and even attack Aristotle, and side with Plato. In particular, they greatly valued Plato’s dialectic, which they viewed as the correct form of reasoning and at the same time as a theory of the utmost theological significance. On the other hand, Aristotle’s dialectic was considered as “bare” logic,i.e.as a mere set of logical rules and arguments with no specific contents.On the basis of a problematicCratylus’passage Proclus defends a theory of truth according to which not only propositions, but also names can be true or false. This allows him to view names as substitutes of propositions. This is particularly the case in the application of the four dialectical methods of definition, division, demonstration and analysis. Proclus’ approach arguably provides a basis—to pagan as well as Christian tradition—for the study of divine names as a part of theology, for the name of a god is held to reveal its attributes. (shrink)

Les preuves de l’immortalité de l’âme, qui sont un des thèmes cen­traux de l’enseignement de Platon, ont fait l’objet d’une réflexion d’ordre logique et formel sur la manière dont elles sont (ou devraient être) exprimées. En particulier l’argument en faveur de l’immortalité de l’âme contenu dans le Phèdre (245c5-246a2), fondé sur la notion d’âme automotrice et principe de mouve­ment, a été assidûment analysé, pour ce qui est de sa formulation, par plusieurs représentants de la tradition platonicienne (Alcinoos, Hermias d’Alexandrie), ainsi (...) qu’à l’intérieur de la tradition péripatéticienne (Alexandre d’Aphrodise). Par conséquent, il représente, à l’avis de l’auteur, un point privilégié d’observation de la façon dont les platoniciens s’approprient la logique aristotélicienne et récri­vent, à partir de l’époque impériale, certains arguments platoniciens. En outre, il apparaît qu’Alexandre d’Aphrodise, bien qu’étant de tradition péripatéticienne, a grandement contribué à la reformulation des arguments de Platon selon les canons de la logique aristotélicienne par les platoniciens contemporains et posté­rieurs. Il semble aussi qu’Hermias, dans ses scholies sur le Phèdre, réagit juste­ment à certaines affirmations d’Alexandre. Dans cet article, on montre quels sont les points de contact ainsi que les différences dans la réécriture analytico-syllogistique de l’argument du Phèdre en faveur de l’immortalité de l’âme par Alcinoos et Hermias, sans négliger l’apport d’Alexandre. (shrink)

As crenças fazem parte de um sistema conceitual que se forma na infância e é refinado e estabelecido ao longo da vida. O presente estudo investiga associações entre crenças básicas e bem-estar pessoal em 1.588 adolescentes brasileiros, meninos e meninas com idade entre 12-16 anos (M= 14,13; DP=1,26)..

Des grands courants philosophiques de l’époque hellénistique que Plotin reprend et discute, l’épicurisme est, pour ainsi dire, le parent pauvre. Aussi pendant longtemps, la littérature secondaire avait-elle pratiquement négligé l’étude de sa réception dans les Ennéades. En s’emparant de cette question, cet ouvrage collectif fait bien davantage que pallier une lacune scolastique. Il s’inscrit dans une perspective ouverte récemment visant à mettre en lumière les points sur lesquels l’épistémolo...

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Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. Views range from reductionist, favoring only neuroscience explanations, to mechanist, favoring the integration of multiple levels, to pluralist, favoring the preservation of even the most general, high-level explanations, such as those provided by embodied or dynamical approaches. In this paper, we challenge this framing. We suggest that these are not different levels of explanation at all but, rather, different styles of explanation that capture (...) different, cross-cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. Which pattern is explanatory depends on both the cognitive phenomenon under investigation and the research interests occasioning the explanation. This reframing changes how we should answer the basic questions of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to one another. On this view, we should expect different approaches to offer independent explanations in terms of their different focal patterns and the value of those explanations to partly derive from the broad patterns they feature. (shrink)

Science is the study of our world, as it is in its messy reality. Nonetheless, science requires idealization to function—if we are to attempt to understand the world, we have to find ways to reduce its complexity. Idealization and the Aims of Science shows just how crucial idealization is to science and why it matters. Beginning with the acknowledgment of our status as limited human agents trying to make sense of an exceedingly complex world, Angela Potochnik moves on to (...) explain how science aims to depict and make use of causal patterns—a project that makes essential use of idealization. She offers case studies from a number of branches of science to demonstrate the ubiquity of idealization, shows how causal patterns are used to develop scientific explanations, and describes how the necessarily imperfect connection between science and truth leads to researchers’ values influencing their findings. The resulting book is a tour de force, a synthesis of the study of idealization that also offers countless new insights and avenues for future exploration. (shrink)

There is increasing attention to the centrality of idealization in science. One common view is that models and other idealized representations are important to science, but that they fall short in one or more ways. On this view, there must be an intermediary step between idealized representation and the traditional aims of science, including truth, explanation, and prediction. Here I develop an alternative interpretation of the relationship between idealized representation and the aims of science. In my view, continuing, widespread idealization (...) calls into question the idea that science aims for truth. I argue that understanding must replace truth as the ultimate epistemic aim of science. Additionally, science has a wide variety aims, epistemic and non-epistemic, and these aims motivate different kinds of scientific products. Finally, I show how these diverse aims---all rather distant from truth---result in the expanded influence of social values on science. (shrink)

Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments. Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as they attempt to ground (...) an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is a fact) that they express who she is as a moral agent. As such, they seem to be open to some of the same objections Wolf originally raised to such accounts, and in particular to the objection that they cannot license the sorts of robust moral assessments involved in our current practices of moral responsibility. My aim in this paper is to try to respond to this challenge, by clarifying the kind of robust moral assessments I take to be licensed by (at least some) non-volitional accounts of responsibility and by explaining why these assessments do not in general require the agent to have voluntary control over everything for which she is held responsible. I also argue that the limited applicability of the distinction between “bad agents” and “blameworthy agents” on these accounts is in fact a mark in their favor. (shrink)

The concept of hierarchical organization is commonplace in science. Subatomic particles compose atoms, which compose molecules; cells compose tissues, which compose organs, which compose organisms; etc. Hierarchical organization is particularly prominent in ecology, a field of research explicitly arranged around levels of ecological organization. The concept of levels of organization is also central to a variety of debates in philosophy of science. Yet many difficulties plague the concept of discrete hierarchical levels. In this paper, we show how these difficulties undermine (...) various implications ascribed to hierarchical organization, and we suggest the concept of scale as a promising alternative to levels. Investigating causal processes at different scales offers a way to retain a notion of quasi-levels that avoids the difficulties inherent in the classic concept of hierarchical levels of organization. Throughout, our focus is on ecology, but the results generalize to other invocations of hierarchy in science and philosophy of science. (shrink)

This article argues that resolutions are reason-giving: when an agent resolves to φ, she incurs an additional normative reason to φ. Resolution-making is therefore a normative power: an ability we have to alter our normative circumstances through sheer acts of will. I argue that the reasons we incur from forming resolutions are importantly similar to the reasons we incur from making promises. My account explains why it can be rational for an agent to act on a past resolution even if (...) temptation causes a shift in her preferences and even her judgment about what to do, and offers a response to a common objection to the normativity of resolutions known as the bootstrapping problem, on which if resolutions were reason-giving, they would problematically allow us to bootstrap any action into rationality simply by resolving to perform it. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently argued that we should interpret the debate over moral responsibility as a debate over the conditions under which it would be “fair” to blame a person for her attitudes or conduct. What is distinctive about these accounts is that they begin with the stance of the moral judge, rather than that of the agent who is judged, and make attributions of responsibility dependent upon whether it would be fair or appropriate for a moral judge (...) to react to the agent in various (negative) ways. This is problematic, I argue, because our intuitions about whether and when it would be fair to react negatively to another are sensitive to a host of considerations that appear to have little or nothing to do with an agent’s responsibility or culpability for her attitudes or behavior. If this is correct, then theories which make attributions of responsibility dependent upon the appropriateness of our reactions as moral judges will turn out to be fundamentally misguided. (shrink)

Using data collected at two phases, this study examines why and how ethical leadership behavior influences employees’ evaluations of organization-focused justice, i.e., procedural justice and distributive justice. By proposing ethical leaders as moral agents of the organization, we build up the linkage between ethical leadership behavior and the above two types of organization-focused justice. We further suggest trust in organization as a key mediating mechanism in the linkage. Our findings indicate that ethical leadership behavior engenders employees’ trust in their employing (...) organization, which in turn promotes their justice perceptions toward the organization. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed, and some directions for future research are suggested. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIt has recently become fashionable among those who write on questions of moral responsibility to distinguish two different concepts, or senses, of moral responsibility via the labels ‘responsibility as attributability’ and ‘responsibility as accountability’. Gary Watson was perhaps the first to introduce this distinction in his influential 1996 article ‘Two Faces of Responsibility’ , but it has since been taken up by many other philosophers. My aim in this study is to raise some questions and doubts about this distinction and (...) to argue that it has led to confusion rather than clarification in debates over moral responsibility. In place of the attributability/accountability distinction, I propose that there is a single concept of moral responsibility underlying our actual moral practices. This core notion of moral responsibility, which I call ‘responsibility as answerability’, is well positioned to explain thos.. (shrink)

Plato's thinking on courage, manliness and heroism is both profound and central to his work, but these areas of his thought remain under-explored. This book examines his developing critique of both the notions and embodiments of manliness prevalent in his culture, and his attempt to redefine them in accordance with his own ethical, psychological and metaphysical principles. It further seeks to locate the discussion within the framework of his general approach to ethics, an approach which focuses on concepts of flourishing (...) and virtue, rather than on consequences or duty. The question of why courage is necessary in the flourishing life in its turn leads to Plato's bid to unify the noble and the beneficial and the tensions this unification creates between human and divine ideals. The issue of manliness also raises problems of gender: does Plato conceive of the ethical subject as human or male? (shrink)

Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. -/- Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in principle difficulties with currently (...) popular tracking and functional role theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of tracking relations and functional roles. -/- This book develops an alternative theory, the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), on which the source of intentionality is none other than phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, felt, or qualitative aspect of mental life. While PIT avoids the problems that plague tracking and functional role theories, it faces its own challenges in accounting for the rich and complex contents of thoughts and the contents of nonconscious states. In responding to these challenges, this book proposes a novel version of PIT, on which all intentionality is phenomenal intentionality, though we in some sense represent many non-phenomenal contents by ascribing them to ourselves. This book further argues that phenomenal consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental life, resulting in a view that is radically internalistic in spirit: Our phenomenally represented contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some sense represent are expressly targeted by us. (shrink)

Levels of organization and their use in science have received increased philosophical attention of late, including challenges to the well-foundedness or widespread usefulness of levels concepts. One kind of response to these challenges has been to advocate a more precise and specific levels concept that is coherent and useful. Another kind of response has been to argue that the levels concept should be taken as a heuristic, to embrace its ambiguity and the possibility of exceptions as acceptable consequences of its (...) usefulness. In this chapter, I suggest that each of these strategies faces its own attendant downsides, and that pursuit of both strategies (by different thinkers) compounds the difficulties. That both kinds of approaches are advocated is, I think, illustrative of the problems plaguing the concept of levels of organization. I end by suggesting that the invocation of levels may mislead scientific and philosophical investigations more than it informs them, so our use of the levels concept should be updated accordingly. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss two questions. What does Kant understand by mechanical explanation in the Critique of judgment? And why does he think that mechanical explanation is the only type of the explanation of nature available to us? According to the interpretation proposed, mechanical explanations in the Critique of judgment refer to a particular species of empirical causal laws. Mechanical laws aim to explain nature by reference to the causal interaction between the forces of the parts of matter and (...) the way in which they form into complex material wholes. Just like any other empirical causal law, however, mechanical laws can never be known with full certainty. The conception according to which we can explain all of nature by means of mechanical laws, it turns out, is based on what Kant calls ‘regulative’ or ‘reflective’ considerations about nature. Nothing in Kant’s Critique of judgment suggests that these considerations can ever be justified by reference to how the natural world really is. I suggest that what, upon first consideration, appears to be a thoroughly mechanistic conception of nature in Kant is much more limited than one might have expected. (shrink)

The 1940s and 1950s were marked by intense debates over the origin of drug resistance in microbes. Bacteriologists had traditionally invoked the notions of ‘training’ and ‘adaptation’ to account for the ability of microbes to acquire new traits. As the field of bacterial genetics emerged, however, its participants rejected ‘Lamarckian’ views of microbial heredity, and offered statistical evidence that drug resistance resulted from the selection of random resistant mutants. Antibiotic resistance became a key issue among those disputing physiological vs. genetic (...) explanations of variation in bacteria. Postwar developments connected with the Lysenko affair gave this debate a new political valence.Proponents of the neo-Darwinian synthesis weighed in with support for the genetic theory. However, certain features of drug resistance seemed inexplicable by mutation and selection, particularly the phenomenon of ‘multiple resistance’—the emergence of resistance in a single strain against several unrelated antibiotics. In the late 1950s, Tsutomu Watanabe and his collaborators solved this puzzle by determining that resistance could be conferred by cytoplasmic resistance factors rather than chromosomal mutation. These R factors could carry resistance to many antibiotics and seemed able to promote their own dissemination in bacterial populations. In the end, the vindication of the genetic view of drug resistance was accompanied by a recasting of the ‘gene’ to include extrachromosomal hereditary units carried on viruses and plasmids. (shrink)

Scientific explanations must bear the proper relationship to the world: they must depict what, out in the world, is responsible for the explanandum. But explanations must also bear the proper relationship to their audience: they must be able to create human understanding. With few exceptions, philosophical accounts of explanation either ignore entirely the relationship between explanations and their audience or else demote this consideration to an ancillary role. In contrast, I argue that considering an explanation’s communicative role is crucial to (...) any satisfactory account of explanation. (shrink)

In recent years bilingualism has been linked to both advantages in executive control and positive impacts on aging. Such positive cognitive effects of bilingualism have been attributed to the increased need for language control during bilingual processing and increased cognitive reserve, respectively. However, a mechanistic explanation of how bilingual experience contributes to cognitive reserve is still lacking. The current paper proposes a new focus on bilingual memory as an avenue to explore the relationship between executive control and cognitive reserve. We (...) argue that this focus will enhance our understanding of the functional and structural neural mechanisms underlying bilingualism-induced cognitive effects. With this perspective we discuss and integrate recent cognitive and neuroimaging work on bilingual advantage, and suggest an account that links cognitive control, cognitive reserve, and brain reserve in bilingual aging and memory. (shrink)

This paper summarises the author 's doctoral research on the development of interpersonal/interorganisational trust in relationships between expatriate and Russian staff working in east‐west enterprises in Russia. There is strong evidence from a variety of researchers to suggest that in order for western businesses investing in Russia to succeed, the dif.cult process of building trust needs to be understood and managed since in the Russian business climate western standards and norms of ethical business have not yet been established. According to (...) research.ndings, western investors doing business in Russia and the long‐term, personal trust that characterises family and friend relationships more congenial and more productive than formal, arm's‐length contacts and contracts. In such a context, it becomes important to identify what creates and destroys trust in the post‐Soviet business environment. This paper describes the causal factors leading to trust or lack of trust in relationships within western‐invested strategic alliances in Russia. The key relationship under consideration is the one between expatriate western staff and managers seconded to the venture on the one hand, and their local Russian staff, counterparts and superiors on the other. (shrink)

It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.

This paper examines the US Atomic Energy Commission’s radioisotope distribution program, established in 1946, which employed the uranium piles built for the wartime bomb project to produce specific radioisotopes for use in scientific investigation and medical therapy. As soon as the program was announced, requests from researchers began pouring into the Commission’s office. During the first year of the program alone over 1000 radioisotope shipments were sent out. The numerous requests that came from scientists outside the United States, however, sparked (...) a political debate about whether the Commission should or even could export radioisotopes. This controversy manifested the tension between the aims of the Marshall Plan and growing US national security concerns after World War II. Proponents of international circulation of radioisotopes emphasized the political and scientific value of collaborating with European scientists, especially biomedical researchers. In the end, radioisotopes were shipped from the Commission’s Oak Ridge facility to many laboratories in England and continental Europe, where they were used in biochemical research on animals, plants, and microbes. However, the issue of radioisotope export continued to draw political fire in the United States, even after the establishment of national atomic energy facilities elsewhere. (shrink)

The future of health research will be characterised by three continuing trends: rising demand for health data; increasing impracticability of obtaining specific consent for secondary research; and decreasing capacity to effectively anonymise data. In this context, governments, clinicians and the research community must demonstrate that they can be responsible stewards of health data. IRBs and RECs sit at heart of this process because in many jurisdictions they have the capacity to grant consent waivers when research is judged to be of (...) particular value. However, several different terms are used to refer to this value, indicating a lack of conceptual clarity regarding the appropriate test for access to health data for research without consent. In this paper we do three things. First we describe the current confusion and instability in terminology relating to public interest in the context of consent waivers. Second we argue for harmonisation of terminology on the grounds of clarity, transparency and consistency. Third we argue that the term ‘public interest’ best reflects the normative work required to justify consent waivers because it is the broadest of the competing terms. ‘Public interest’ contains within its scope positive and negative implications of a study, as well as welfare, justice and rights considerations. In making this argument, we explain the normative basis for consent waivers, and provide a starting place for further discussion about the precise conditions in which a given study can be said to advance the public interest. Ipsos MORI study found that: … the public would be broadly happy with administrative data linking for research projects provided Those projects have social value, broadly defined. Data are de-identified. Data are kept secure. Businesses are not able to access the data for profit. (shrink)