Partimos de una revisión crítica de la interpretación canónica del tema platónico del cuidado de la muerte propia como condición típica del filósofo: el Fedón no propone algo así como una “preparación a la muerte”, sino más bien una resistencia intensamente reflexiva del alma frente al proceso natural de la muerte. Entendemos que la fenomenología heterológica de Lévinas permite formalizar este vitalismo hiperbólico de raíz platónica a través de la categoría del “ser contra la muerte”, en sistemática polémica con el (...) famoso “ser para la muerte” de Heidegger. Lévinas permite una comprensión filosófica del natural “miedo a la muerte” de todo ser vivo: el permanente “aplazamiento” de la última hora da tiempo y posibilidad a un Deseo del Otro, impensable en cambio en las coordenadas del solipsismo existenciario heideggeriano. (shrink)

This article shows and describes the most important discussions around the philosophy of Derrida. His philosophy could be characterized as broad and complex as far as concerned to the diversity of the issues he treated, the rigorous of his approximation to them and his particular stile. For all this the philosophical contexts that surround his ideas and the polemics derived from them are analyzed. The validity of framing the thinking of Derrida in what is today called “postmodernism” or “post structuralism” (...) is discussed, along with the equivocal readings, posterior corrected, of Derrida from Habermas. Is also discussed the disastrous interpretation of Derrida of the English analytic philosophy, represented by Searle; also are treated his deep confrontation with Foucault around the impact of cartesianism in modernity; his clash with Lacan on the new trends of psychoanalysis, rejected by Lacan and supported by Derrida; his elliptic relations with the distinct Marxist motives and the critic of Derrida to Heidegger about the metaphysic debris of the latter, especially around the modernity’s metaphysic dogma of the ontologic separation of the animal and the spiritual in the subject. Finally his contributions are evaluated, as a “rarity”, and because of that, “monstrous”. Monstrous because Derrida turns all that is classic in “aporethic”, disestablishing the tranquil world of philosophy and its essential distinctions, being “deconstruction” the main responsible of it. (shrink)

En este trabajo se arriesga una presentación muy general, atenta o sensible a la interna diversidad del pensamiento de Derrida. Característico de su escritura y de su amplísimo magisterio más o menos regular es una congruente pero complejísima diversidad temática. A lo que hay que añadir su peculiarísimo «tono». Nada se entenderá del idioma filosófico de Derrida si no se sabe acusar en su escritura, aquí y allá, todo un juego de ironías, parodias, elipsis, un juego que no le quita, (...) claro está, la mayor seriedad filosófica a su pensamiento. Por lo demás, no está mal recordar que el nacimiento de la filosofía está vinculado a ese bello tropo fecundo de la apariencia de esterilidad teórica que es la ironía socrática. La circunstancia de la reciente desaparición del filósofo francés, de origen judío argelino, como a él le gustaba subrayar, es además un motivo suplementario para intentar aquí dar lugar a ese debate sobre el valor y el significado de la aportación de la obra de Jacques Derrida al espacio filosófico contemporáneo que ha estado condicionado por toda una serie de equívocos interpretativos, y en fin, por una especie de alergia al tipo de escritura filosófica que ha ejercido Derrida durante casi medio siglo. (shrink)

El lenguaje "excesivo" de Lévinas apunta a un "exceso" reflexivo en la cultura actual. Porque "exceso" es querer pensar la Trascendencia, la presencia del Otro y del otro, la radicalidad de la responsabilidad moral y la fundamentación última de la libertad. "Exceso" de lenguaje, "exceso" de pensamiento que, quizá, la cultura de hoy necesita para recuperar la búsqueda de la verdad.

El ensayo propone una aproximación formal al problema de determinar el efecto que ha producido o ha debido producir en la estructura de la Filosofía esa figura histórica de mal político absoluto moderno que se llama Auschwitz, La premisa es que la Filosofía, ante ese desafío inédito de la racionalidad clásica, queda internamente condicionada por una tensión o una oposición irreductible: entre pasión de silencio y promesa de memoria, entre la fidelidad a los testimonios de un mal irreparable y la (...) obligación de memoria, de bendición de las cenizas. De ahí, la necesidad de una rigurosa desconstrucción de la axiomática idealista del racionalismo occidental dominante, y la consideración de nuevas posibilidades de elaborar filosóficamente el silencio, y el mal, en el ámbito del pensamiento judío, en diálogo conla teología judía y cristiana de la Shoa: desde Rosenzweig y Scholem, a Adorno, Lévinas y Derrida. (shrink)

Dentro de la obra madura de Spinoza, la _Ética_ y el _Tratado Teológico-Político _ se han analizado ampliamente. Sin embargo, el _Tratado Político_ ha sido menormente estudiado por ser una obra inconclusa y con problemas estructurales. Nosotros afirmamos que la teoría política más acabada de Spinoza se encuentra en el TP. En esta obra se sacan todas las consecuencias de guiarse por una noción estrictamente inmanente de la política. En ese sentido, el TP sigue de manera más coherente el programa (...) trazado por la doctrina fundamental de Spinoza expuesta en la _Ética_, y no el TTP. Esto nos lleva a la consideración de la política como tendencia en dos direcciones opuestas: ampliación de poder y concentración de poder. (shrink)

At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multi-national data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from (...) social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution—individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar was found for morality as cooperation, symbolized moral identity, self-control, open-mindedness, collective narcissism, while the inverse relationship was evident for the endorsement of conspiracy theories. However, we also found a non-negligible variability in the explained variance and predictive contributions with respect to macro-level factors such as the pandemic stage or cultural region. Overall, the results underscore the importance of morality-related and contextual factors in understanding adherence to public health recommendations during the pandemic. (shrink)

Is there a theoretically interesting notion that is a natural extension of the concept of rigidity to general terms? Such a notion ought to satisfy two Kripkean conditions. First, it must apply to typical general terms for natural kinds, stuffs, and phenomena, and fail to apply to most other general terms. Second, true 'identification sentences' (such as 'Cats are animals') containing general terms that the notion applies to must be necessary. I explore a natural extension of the notion of rigidity (...) to general terms, the notion of an essentialist predicate. I argue that, under natural assumptions, this notion satisfies the two Kripkean conditions. (shrink)

I reply to comments and criticism of my book Roads to Reference by Scott Soames (on the referents of ordinary substance terms and the conventions governing reference fixing for demonstratives, proper names, and color adjectives), Panu Raatikainen (on the exact scope of my critique of descriptivism and on the relation between referential indeterminacy and ‘‘partial reference’’), and Michael Devitt (on the role of referential intentions and anti-descriptivism in the metasemantics of demonstratives).

In Arnauld’s view, a fruitful clarification of the nature of knowledge is possible if only one pays close attention to “ce qui se passe en nous,” in such a fashion “de n’y rien mêler dont nous ne soyons certains.” In support of his position, he cites not only Descartes’ testimony but also that of St. Augustine. Consequently, he treats—first of all—of the things that any one can know about his own soul upon consulting with himself with a little attention, and (...) by so doing Arnauld shows once again his faithfulness to the spirit of Cartesianism. Yet he does more, for he is among the first thinkers fully to appreciate the value of a truly descriptive method in philosophy. (shrink)

Researchers working in the field of ecosystem services (ES) have long acknowledged the importance of recognising multiple values in ecosystems and biodiversity. Yet the operationalisation of value pluralism in ES assessments remains largely elusive. The aim of this research is to present a taxonomy of values and valuation methods to widen the evaluative space for ES. First, we present our preanalytic positions in regards to the values and valuation of ES. Second, we review different value definitions that we deem relevant (...) for the discussion of ES valuation. Third, we propose a taxonomy of ES values based on different conceptions of human-nature relationships. Finally, we present a taxonomy of different methods that can be used to recognise plural values in ES. This taxonomy for a plural valuation can help ES scientists and practitioners with their aim of representing people's multiple and context-specific ways of valuing nature. The taxonomy can also serve to pay broader attention to ES values that are overlooked or misrepresented in assessments that restrict their focus to monetary valuations. (shrink)

I offer a new objectivist theory of the contents of color language and color experience, intended especially as an account of what normal intersubjective variation in color perception and classification shows about those contents. First I explain an abstract account of the contents of color and other gradable adjectives; on the account, these contents are certain objective properties constituted in part by contextually intended standards of application, which are in turn values in the dimensions of variation associated with the adjectives. (...) Then I propose an explanation of normal variations in linguistic color classification; these are postulated to be effects of differences in intended standards for the color adjectives appearing in the classifying predicates. Next, I consider a potential objection to this explanation, based on the suggestion that contextual content should be more accessible than the explanation predicts. In reply, I point out that contextual content is occasionally opaque to unsophisticated reflection. Finally, I present a companion account of the contents of color experiences on which these represent an object as lying on certain salient intervals in the chromatic dimensions, and I show how the account accommodates intersubjective variation in color perception. (shrink)

El término “ambivalencia” cumple con varias de las funciones teóricas más relevantes tanto para el psicoanálisis como para su tesis fundacional: la del inconsciente. Este artículo se plantea la necesidad de elaborar una revisión somera que sea capaz de enlazar los condicionantes socio-históricos de la disciplina freudiana con los antecedentes teóricos más relevantes de su objeto de estudio. En este nexo surge la historia de la filosofía y sus contribuciones a la constitución de su concepto de inconsciente, comportándose como si (...) se tratara de un “alter ego”, incómodo pero imprescindible, de cuya acechanza Freud nunca se llega a emancipar. (shrink)

This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress (...) the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden. (shrink)

In both philosophy and the sciences of the mind there is a shared commitment to the idea that there is a center— the seat of consciousness, the source of deliberation and reflection, and the core of personal identity —in the mind. My dissertation challenges this deeply entrenched view. I review the empirical literature on working memory, psychology’s best candidate for the workspace of the mind, and argue that it is not a natural kind and cannot inform these central cognitive processes. (...) This deflationary view directly imperils many naturalistic theories of consciousness that rely on working memory, which are reviewed in this project. This dissertation thus serves as the necessary first negative step required to begin the process of articulating socially-embedded accounts of many central cognitive processes that dominate the contemporary philosophical literature, including consciousness and reasoning. (shrink)