Refugee crises are one of the grand challenges of the 21st century. Despite the theoretical importance attached to value created for beneficiaries in the partnership literature, research tends to focus on internal processes and value created for partners and partnerships, leading to widespread calls to further specify the value created by partnerships for beneficiaries. Applying an analytical framework from the value creation and social impact literatures, we report on a study of multiple social partnerships of a nongovernmental organization in the (...) refugee issue field. Our results demonstrate that frames of refugees held by partners and in partnerships’ implementation contexts shape the value creation activities undertaken for beneficiaries, and determine whether value is created and what types of value. The dual contribution of this article comprises a rare empirical study of value creation activities for beneficiaries (here, refugees) and theorization of how and when implementation context affects value creation by partnerships. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that paintings are transformations of the perceptual world, transformations that the world itself elicits but does not determine, thus undercutting the subjective-objective divide in art. First, I describe Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of institution, according to which sense develops only by changing, that is, by being taken up and coherently deformed. Next, I use this notion to argue that paintings develop the perceptual sense of the world by coherently deforming it. In other words, paintings are transformations (...) of the perceptual world that are called for by the world itself. To make my case, I analyze Susan Rothenberg’s painting Three Heads, a work that develops and furthers the perceptual sense of horses only by taking it up and changing it. Finally, I suggest that this view of painting motivates an interactive ontology according to which things are not self-contained but interactive, fundamentally opening onto things beyond themselves. (shrink)

According to Aristotelian essentialism, the nature of an organism is constituted of a particular goal-directed disposition to produce an organism typical of its kind. This paper argues—against the prevailing orthodoxy—that essentialism of this sort is indispensable to evolutionary biology. The most powerful anti-essentialist arguments purport to show that the natures of organisms play no explanatory role in modern synthesis biology. I argue that recent evolutionary developmental biology provides compelling evidence to the contrary. Developmental biology shows that one must appeal to (...) the capacities of organisms to explain what makes adaptive evolution adaptive. Moreover, the specific capacities in question are precisely those that, according to Aristotle, constitute the nature of an organism. Essentialism 1.1 Aristotelian biological kinds Evolutionary anti-essentialism 2.1 Taxonomic anti-essentialism 2.2 Explanatory anti-essentialism Adaptation 3.1 Stability 3.2 Mutability 3.3 Phenotypic plasticity and adaptive evolution The natures of organisms Conclusion. (shrink)

Modal constitution theory is one of the most influential solutions to the paradoxes of coincidence, and the problem of personal identity. It rests on three fundamental premises: common-sense objects exist; sometimes objects coincide in space; the coincidence of objects in space requires explanation. In this article, the author offers a critique of the modal theory of constitution. First, the definition of the constitution is examined and a new argument is offered that modal theory either does not provide asymmetry of the (...) constitution or leads to an infinite series of constitutive objects, unsatisfactorily extending ontology. Also, the author demonstrates that possible additions to the constitutive definition, which can make the definition sufficient for asymmetric relation, lead to additional theoretical difficulties, leading to the logical impossibility of constitution relation. Second, the author demonstrates that the theory of constitution offers an unsatisfactory theory of identity because it faces three problems: the overpopulation problem, the epistemic problem, and the personal problem. All of these considerations lead the author to conclude that modal constitution theory is not metaphysically satisfactory. (shrink)

There are two general approaches to characterising biological functions. One originates with Cummins. According to this approach, the function of a part of a system is just its causal contribution to some specified activity of the system. Call this the ‘C-function’ concept. The other approach ties the function of a trait to some aspect of its evolutionary significance. Call this the ‘E-function’ concept. According to the latter view, a trait's function is determined by the forces of natural selection. The C-function (...) and E-function concepts are clearly quite different, but there is an important relation between them which heretofore has gone unnoticed. The purpose of this paper is to outline that relation.This is not the first paper to discuss the relation of C-function and E-function. Previous attempts all follow either one of two strategies. The first proposes that the two concepts are ‘unified.’ The other proposes that they are radically distinct and apply to wholly different fields within biology. (shrink)

The underlying claim of this paper is that phenomenology is well-situated to re-orient the philosophy of music, a discipline too often concerned with logical wrangling over the ontology of musical works. By starting with the experience of music itself in its many forms, we can see how both work music and non-work music comes to have sense for us. Specifically, I contend that Merleau-Ponty’s notion that sense develops through what he calls “institution” accurately describes the sense of music, and I (...) attempt to bear this out through careful description of multiple modes of musical experience. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari frequently discuss Western classical music, referencing such diverse traditions as medieval polyphony and 20th century modernism. In their work, however, they have an intense focus, common among philosophers, on composition, with very little consideration given to performance. Nevertheless, I find that their work resonates with questions of performance in important ways. In this paper, I bring Deleuze and Guattari’s work to bear on the practices and processes of musical interpretation and performance, transposing into this musical (...) domain the concepts of the smooth and the striated that they explicate in A Thousand Plateaus. The basic claim is that there exist smooth and striated methods of interpreting and performing music and that these concepts allow us to articulate afresh important differences in performance practice. Ultimately, I claim that the smooth is perhaps the privileged term, but that a good performance necessarily includes both smooth and striated elements. (shrink)

We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications (...) of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biologythe `explananda of selection' debate and the `units of selection' debate. (shrink)

Over the past fifteen years there has been a considerable amount of debate concerning what theoretical population dynamic models tell us about the nature of natural selection and drift. On the causal interpretation, these models describe the causes of population change. On the statistical interpretation, the models of population dynamics models specify statistical parameters that explain, predict, and quantify changes in population structure, without identifying the causes of those changes. Selection and drift are part of a statistical description of population (...) change; they are not discrete, apportionable causes. Our objective here is to provide a definitive statement of the statistical position, so as to allay some confusions in the current literature. We outline four commitments that are central to statisticalism. They are: 1. Natural Selection is a higher order effect; 2. Trait fitness is primitive; 3. Modern Synthesis (MS)-models are substrate neutral; 4. MS-selection and drift are model-relative. (shrink)

There are two competing interpretations of the modern synthesis theory of evolution: the dynamical (also know as ‘traditional’) and the statistical. The dynamical interpretation maintains that explanations offered under the auspices of the modern synthesis theory articulate the causes of evolution. It interprets selection and drift as causes of population change. The statistical interpretation holds that modern synthesis explanations merely cite the statistical structure of populations. This paper offers a defense of statisticalism. It argues that a change in trait frequencies (...) in a population can be attributed only to selection or drift against the background of a particular statistical description of the population. The traditionalist supposition that selection and drift are description‐independent causes of population change leads the dynamical interpretation into a dilemma: it must face a contradiction or accept the loss of explanatory power. (shrink)

The concept of the environment appears to be indispensably involved in adaptive explanation. Quite what its role is, however, is a matter of some dispute. The environment is customarily viewed as the dual of the organism; a wholly external, discrete, autonomous cause of evolution. On this view, the external environment is the principal cause of the adaptedness of form, and the determinant of what it is to be an adaptation. I argue that this conception of the environment neither adequately explains (...) nor individuates evolutionary adaptations. Instead, adaptation, properly construed, is an evolutionary response to affordances. The environment, traditionally construed, underdetermines an organism’s affordances. Instead, I argue that the environment takes its place in evolutionary models not as a discrete causal entity, but as an abstraction. (shrink)

In evolutionary biology changes in population structure are explained by citing trait fitness distribution. I distinguish three interpretations of fitness explanations—the Two‐Factor Model, the Single‐Factor Model, and the Statistical Interpretation—and argue for the last of these. These interpretations differ in their degrees of causal commitment. The first two hold that trait fitness distribution causes population change. Trait fitness explanations, according to these interpretations, are causal explanations. The last maintains that trait fitness distribution correlates with population change but does not cause (...) it. My defense of the Statistical Interpretation relies on a distinctive feature of causation. Causes conform to the Sure Thing Principle. Trait fitness distributions, I argue, do not. *Received July 2009; revised October 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy/Institute for the History, Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto, Victoria College, 91 Charles Street West, Toronto, ON M5S 1K7, Canada; e‐mail: denis[email protected]. (shrink)

According to a prominent view of evolutionary theory, natural selection and the processes of development compete for explanatory relevance. Natural selection theory explains the evolution of biological form insofar as it is adaptive. Development is relevant to the explanation of form only insofar as it constrains the adaptation-promoting effects of selection. I argue that this view of evolutionary theory is erroneous. I outline an alternative, according to which natural selection explains adaptive evolution by appeal to the statistical structure of populations, (...) and development explains the causes of adaptive evolution at the level of individuals. Only together can a statistical theory of selection and a mechanical theory of development explain why populations of organisms comprise individuals that are adapted to their conditions of existence. (shrink)

Psychological individualism is motivated by two taxonomic principles: (i) that psychological states are individuated by their causal powers, and (ii) that causal powers supervene upon intrinsic physiological state. I distinguish two interpretations of individualism--the 'orthodox' and the 'alternative'--each of which is consistent with these motivating principles. I argue that the alternative interpretation is legitimately individualistic on the grounds that it accurately reflects the actual taxonomic practices of bona fide individualistic sciences. The classification of homeobox genes in developmental genetics provides an (...) illustration. When applied to the taxonomy of psychological kinds, alternative individualism has some surprising consequences. In particular, externalist taxonomies of thought are consistent with the alternative interpretation, and hence consistent with individualism. I conclude, on this basis, that the individualism/externalism dispute which has long preoccupied philosophy of psychology is an empty one. (shrink)

This article argues that the second part of the Parmenides (137-166) consists not only of the well-known logical structure that has been widely studied but also of a great variety of definitions of forms. My aim is to show how these definitions depend on a specific group of closely connected primary forms (i.e., same, different, part, whole). The definitions that Parmenides provides help Socrates overcome his failure in attempting to define forms in the first part of the dialogue.

Introduction -- Landscape and longing -- Art and human nature -- What is art? -- But they don't have our concept of art -- Art and natural selection -- The uses of fiction -- Art and human self-domestication -- Intention, forgery, dada : three aesthetic problems -- The contingency of aesthetic values -- Greatness in the arts.

The need to create art is found in every human society, manifest in many different ways across many different cultures. Is this universal need rooted in our evolutionary past? The Art Instinct reveals that it is, combining evolutionary psychology with aesthetics to shed new light on fascinating questions about the nature of art.

This paper comprises a case study illustrating ethical and practical challenges for a Ugandan hospital-based social worker early in the COVID-19 pandemic, followed by a commentary. The hospital was under-resourced, with staff and patients experiencing lack of information and panic. The social worker, Denis Adia, recounts his responses to new and ethically challenging situations, including persuading Muslim patients to stop fasting for the good of their health; deciding to keep a baby in hospital with parents although this was against (...) the rules; and supporting a stigmatised former patient in the face of intimidation by colleagues. He reflects on the importance of recognising each person’s unique needs and circumstances, seeing this as a vital role for social workers. The case is followed by a commentary from a UK academic (Sarah Banks), who notes the cognitive and emotional effort (‘ethics work’) undertaken by the social worker to: see the ethical aspects of particular situations; take account of patients’ specific needs; ensure they are treated with respect; promote their well-being; and perform as a good social worker. Banks draws attention to the key role of the virtue of courage in pandemic conditions, which involves working with new risks and facing fears with confidence. (shrink)

What is Life? This is the question asked by Denis Noble in this very personal and at times deeply lyrical book. Noble is a renowned physiologist and systems biologist, and he argues that the genome is not life itself: to understand what life is, we must view it at a variety of different levels, all interacting with each other in a complex web. It is that emergent web, full of feedback between levels, from the gene to the wider environment, (...) that is life. (shrink)

How is it possible to have present memory experiences of things that, being past, are no longer presently experienced? A possible answer to this long-standing philosophical question is what I call the “ideality of time view,” namely the view that temporal succession is unreal. In this paper I outline the basic idea behind Brentano’s version of the ideality of time view. Additionally, I contrast it with Hume’s version, suggesting that, despite significant differences, it can nonetheless be construed as broadly Humean.

Como é possível ter experiências de memória presente de coisas que, sendo passadas, não são mais experimentadas no presente? Uma resposta possível a esta pergunta filosófica de longa data é o que eu chamo de "visão da idealidade do tempo", ou seja, a visão de que a sucessão temporal é irreal. Neste artigo, esboço a ideia por trás da versão de Brentano da visão da idealidade do tempo. Além disso, eu a contrasto com a versão de Hume, sugerindo que, apesar (...) das diferenças significativas, ela pode, no entanto, ser interpretada como humeana em sentido amplo. (shrink)

Barely a decade after the discovery of the chromosomal basis of inheritance, and the articulation of the genetical theory of population change, the gene came to be widely regarded as the fundamental unit of biological organization. This is hardly surprising. The gene concept is a powerful one; it plays a unifying role in our understanding of evolution. Darwin told us that evolution by natural selection occurs in a population when organisms survive, die and reproduce differentially on account of their heritable (...) form. This is a very schematic theory. It requires an account of the process of inheritance and also an account of the generation of phenotype. The gene concept plays a prominent role in explaining, and uniting, these phenomena. Genes are the units of inheritance; they are passed from parents to offspring in reproduction. Moreover, they are seen as units of phenotypic control. Evolutionary biologists often speak of the genome as a program for the production of an organism. Genes also became the elements of which populations are composed. Our best theory of population dynamics—inherited from Fisher, Haldane, and Wright—is a theory of changes in the relative frequencies of gene types. Genes are not just the principal causes of evolutionary change, they are also the units over which evolutionary change is defined and measured. So, at least, the orthodox reading of the Modern Synthesis theory of evolution would have us believe... (shrink)

The Byzantine philosopher Michael Psellos describes in his ethics two kinds of virtue: practical and intellectual virtues. Practical virtues are defined as a middle term between two extremes as is known from the Aristotelian tradition. His innovation is to define also a middle regarding the intellectual virtues. He says that the highest object of knowledge is not graspable for the human intellect because it exceeds his powers. Whoever strives to understand the highest object of knowledge, the essence of god, is (...) determined to fail. Thus, the best objects that the human intellect can contemplate are situated below god, in the “middle”. The concept of the middle is thus present twice in Psellos’ ethics: once in the practical virtues and once in the intellectual virtues. (shrink)

The first results of my Phd-thesis regarding Michael Psellos’ practical philosophy, namely his approach on brotherly love and cosmopolitism. I will analyze passages from several texts and present first translations. Secondly I will put his arguments in context with the classical pagan, late antique and Christian ways of understanding virtue, cosmopolitism and brotherly love as well as work out his proper innovation. Michael Psellos is representative for the byzantine way of thought and its unique mixture that just begins to be (...) analyzed by modern scholars. (shrink)