This article has two purposes. First, it aims to present a detailed analysis of the argument of “recognition” or even of the “fight for recognition”, which Hegel uses in his fragments from Jena treating of the system of philosophy, especially of the philosophy of spirit. It will be necessary to determine precedently by means of an exact interpretation the content of that expressions, in order to criticize and to compare, his original significance in Hegel with the theoretical application made by (...) Honneth. The special aim hereby is to correct and to explain the function of the “fight for recognition”, even in its sharpening significance as a “fight for life and death”, with relation to the genesis of the state of right. Second, the figure of “recognition” is related to Hegel’s Philosophy of right in the version of 1820. In this work, recognition participates in the theory of “institutions” which is analyzed by Honneth as well. Apart from the merits gained through the endeavour to introduce a classic philosophical theory into a conception of justice in society, we feel obliged to state an error in Honneth‘s interpretation in so far as he understands an institution as a simple social community of communication. For that reason, a conclusion based on a critical commentary can only include a negative recommendation, that means, not to follow those traces of interpretation but rather to defend and to consult the texts originally composed by Hegel. (shrink)

Proceedings of an international conference held at the Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbèuttel in 2009.

Theodor W. Adorno: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason . Hrsg. von Rolf Tiedemann. Übers. von Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge: Polity Press 2001 . xi/300 S. ISBN 0-80474-426-2. Lara Denis : Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant's Moral Theory. New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc. 2001. xvi/245 S. . 0-815-33967-4.

Neste texto, refero-me principalmente à forma madura da Ciência da Lógica, isto é, ao seu primeiro livro da edição revista do ano 1832. O objetivo de meu trabalho reside em demonstrar que a ilustração do problema do início da filosofia por Hegel é indiretamente uma chave para o entendimento da ideia fundamental de sua concepção da lógica como método científico da filosofia. Para atingir esse objetivo exponho, em primeiro lugar, as principais ideias do programa de Hegel por uma revisão da (...) lógica, da metafísica e da filosofia completa, em contraste à lógica tradicional. Depois ofereço uma interpretação da declaração da dificuldade em encontrar um início lógico na filosofia, que reside em que resolver o problema de unir o método ao conteúdo, a forma ao princípio. Essa interpretação deve mostrar no qual sentido o início vale sem pressuposto. Esse entendimento nega a possibilidade de começar a filosofia com algo hipotética e problematicamente verdadeiro como é o procedimento comum na matemática. Por meio da análise daquele problema ilustrado especialmente pelo exemplo da crítica hegeliana à compreensão da natureza da relação entre o ser puro e a sua alteração necessária em Jacobi, tento encontrar um acesso para o entendimento do método lógico de Hegel, na medida em que o momento da negatividade enquanto princípio do modo de determinar e, com isso, do conteúdo, resultam necessariamente da indeterminidade do ser como a mais pensável abstração. Esse resultado surge pela necessidade, por qual o ser puro provoca a sua própria mudança para o devir um desenvolvimento que Jacobi desmente por princípio para ficar parado na abstração unilateral e falsa. Assim, a indeterminidade enquanto algo contrário é mesmo o determinado ou o negativo, isto é, o negativo puro, inteiramente abstrato, em outras palavras: O ser como resultado da perfeita abstração é negatividade abstrata, o nada. Mas essa negatividade é o princípio e o método da determinação e do conhecer na lógica e na filosofia como ciência. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 110 Heft: 1 Seiten: 172-177.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 1 Seiten: 207-216.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 106 Heft: 2 Seiten: 326-335.

Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 19 Heft: 1 Seiten: 72-85.

Plato's dialogues frequently criticize traditional Greek myth, yet Plato also integrates myth with his writing. Daniel S. Werner confronts this paradox through an in-depth analysis of the Phaedrus, Plato's most mythical dialogue. Werner argues that the myths of the Phaedrus serve several complex functions: they bring nonphilosophers into the philosophical life; they offer a starting point for philosophical inquiry; they unify the dialogue as a literary and dramatic whole; they draw attention to the limits of language and the (...) limits of knowledge; and they allow Plato to co-opt cultural authority as a way of defining and legitimating the practice of philosophy. Platonic myth, as a species of traditional tale, is thus both distinct from philosophical dialectic and similar to it. Ultimately, the most powerful effect of Platonic myth is the way in which it leads readers to participate in Plato's dialogues and to engage in a process of self-examination. (shrink)

This is Werner S. Pluhar's translation of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment (Kritik der Urtheilskraft) for Hackett Publications (Indianapolis, Indiana). ISBN 9780872200258 (paperback).

The Information Artifact Ontology (IAO) was created to serve as a domain‐neutral resource for the representation of types of information content entities (ICEs) such as documents, data‐bases, and digital im‐ages. We identify a series of problems with the current version of the IAO and suggest solutions designed to advance our understanding of the relations between ICEs and associated cognitive representations in the minds of human subjects. This requires embedding IAO in a larger framework of ontologies, including most importantly the Mental (...) Func‐tioning Ontology (MFO). It also requires a careful treatment of the aboutness relations between ICEs and associated cognitive representa‐tions and their targets in reality, which implies in turn a new treatment of the relation of truthmaking. (shrink)

Affective congruency effects in the evaluation task can be explained by either spreading of activation or response competition. Eliminating effects of response compatibility by using other tasks (semantic categorisation, naming task) typically also eliminates affective congruency effects. However, there is no need for processing the affective information of the stimuli in these tasks either, which could be necessary for an affectively mediated spreading of activation (Spruyt et al., 2007, 2009, 2012). We introduced a new task to further test this hypothesis. (...) The valent/neutral-categorisation task does not confound affective congruency with response compatibility, but still requires a processing of the stimuli's valence. No affective congruency effect was obtained with this task in two experiments, disfavouring a conditional spreading activation account. On the other hand, a significant priming effect was found for associated word pairs in Experiment 1, providing evidence for the sensitivity of the task to detect spreading activation processes. (shrink)

This collection broadens the scientific discussion of modularity by bringing together experts from a variety of disciplines, including artificial life, ...

Health Level 7 (HL7) is an organization seeking to provide universal standards for the exchange of healthcare information. In a document entitled ‘HL7 Version 3 Standard: Data Types’, the HL7 organization advances descriptions of data types recom- mended for use as identifiers. We will argue that the descriptions supplied provide insufficient guidance as to what exactly the entities are which these data types uniquely identify. Are they real things, such as persons or pieces of equipment? Or are they representations of (...) such real things in information artifacts? We here outline the problems faced by HL7 in providing answers to such questions, problems which arise because of the lack of anything like a coherent ontology in the HL7 standard, and we make some recommendations for future improvements. (shrink)

Philosophers of science traditionally have ignored the details of scientific research, and the result has often been theories that lack relevance either to science or to philosophy in general. In this volume, leading philosophers of biology discuss the limitations of this tradition and the advantages of the "naturalistic turn"—the idea that the study of science is itself a scientific enterprise and should be conducted accordingly. This innovative book presents candid, informal debates among scholars who examine the benefits and problems of (...) studying science in the same way that scientists study the natural world. Callebaut achieves the effect of face-to-face engagement through separate interviews with participants. Contributors include William Bechtel, Robert Brandon, Richard M. Burian, Donald T. Campbell, Patricia Churchland, Jon Elster, Ronald N. Giere, David L. Hull, Philip Kitcher, Karin Knorr Cetina, Bruno Latour, Richard Levins, Richard C. Lewontin, Elisabeth Lloyd, Helen Longino, Thomas Nickles, Henry C. Plotkin, Robert J. Richards, Alexander Rosenberg, Michael Ruse, Dudley Shapere, Elliott Sober, Ryan Tweney, and William Wimsatt. "Why can't we have both theoretical ecology and natural histories, lovingly done?"—Philip Kitcher "Don't underestimate the arrogance of philosophers!"—Elisabeth Lloyd. (shrink)