Si Casque d’or est avant tout une tragédie amoureuse, c’est aussi un chef-d’œuvre de mise en scène dosant dialogues et silences, économisant les mouvements de caméra, instaurant une esthétique qui lui est propre et qui fera date. Non dénuée de critique sociale , le film se distingue d’abord par le réquisitoire lancé en faveur du bonheur contre le tragique de la vie, mettant à ce titre en scène le jeu d’une certaine fatalité.Le présent ouvrage se propose, en explorant les recoins (...) de ce film mythique, d’en sonder philosophiquement la beauté et le sens. (shrink)

Le regain d'interet pour la philosophie kantienne est ne en Allemagne vers 1860 et provient essentiellement d'un declin de l'idealisme hegelien, d'une reaction au materialisme, et d'un climat politique qui favorise un abandon des questions morales et politiques pour retourner a des problemes theoriques. De sorte que ce qui caracterise tous les neokantiens est leur volonte de redonner a la philosophie son statut scientifique au titre de theorie de la connaissance. Mais comment construire cette theorie de la connaissance est une (...) question qui donne lieu a des oppositions entre des auteurs qui se reclament pourtant tous de Kant. Or c'est precisement la subtilite des differences entre les ecoles de Heidelberg, de Marbourg, ou encore entre les pensees de Cohen, de Natorp, de Lask ou de Rickert, que nous permet de saisir cet ouvrage en nous offrant un eclairage essentiel. (shrink)

Ce livre presente les films de Lynch en montrant que ce qui deja apparait dans Eraserhead trouve son prolongement et sa cle dans Inland Empire (en passant bien sur par les autres oeuvres et tout particulierement Lost Highway et Mulholland Drive). A savoir que, comme dans le premier chapitre de Matiere et memoire de Bergson, le monde est image, de sorte que la matiere se resout dans son image et que ce sont les images qui, par leur agencement, creent le (...) monde dans sa solidite et sa fixite. Avec cette difference toutefois: les films de Lynch fonctionnent sur un desenchainement des images qui, d'abord, donne une matiere a l'image, et, ensuite, a pour consequence que ces images entrent sans cesse dans de nouvelles series. Ces series produisent non seulement des mondes possibles qui annulent le privilege d'un monde reel (parce que celui-ci devient un monde possible au meme titre que les autres), mais elles entremelent aussi differentes temporalites ou la linearite passe-present-futur disparait. (shrink)

Cette etude, la premiere en France sur la philosophie de Natorp (1854-1924), met en evidence sa specificite et son evolution. Sa specificite: Natorp est le seul des neokantiens de l'ecole de Marbourg a batir, au sein de la theorie de la connaissance, une psychologie dont la version definitive, intitulee Psychologie generale, parait en 1912. Il s'agit d'en etablir la configuration, de montrer comment elle se situe relativement a la psychologie scientifique en plein essor et de mettre en evidence l'importance qu'elle (...) a eue dans la constitution de la phenomenologie. La psychologie critique de Natorp est d'abord une methodologie qui s'interroge sur les conditions d'une connaissance scientifique des processus cognitifs. Elle est ensuite une methode, la methode de reconstruction du subjectif a partir de ses objectivations, qui s'oppose a la reduction husserlienne pretendant s'appuyer sur une donation et retrouver une immediatete subjective pourtant definitivement perdue. Son evolution: Natorp se detourne en effet apres la premiere guerre mondiale de la philosophie marbourgeoise, parce que celle-ci construit sa theorie de la connaissance sur des presupposes ininterroges et reduit le donne a la pensee du donne. Il en vient a considerer, avec ses derniers textes et dans une perspective qui influencera Heidegger, que la question fondamentale est celle de l'etre. C'est pourquoi il construit une ontologie ou logique de l'etre qui tente de penser l'alterite dans son immanence au logos. (shrink)

Une mise en lumière de la spécificité du cinéma en trois parties : le cinéma et l'image, le cinéma et le langage, le cinéma et le montage. Deux textes de G. Deleuze et N. Burch complètent l'ensemble.

Une interrogation sur la musique suivie de textes D'E.-T. Hoffman et de L. Wittgenstein.

English summary: Michael Haneke social criticism in his cinematographic work leaves no one indifferent. His films shed cruel light on the pathologies violence, medias, genres of neoliberal society. Each of his films examines the gaze he brings upon his subjects, one that places him in the very world he critiques. French description: Pourquoi l'oeuvre cinematographique de Michael Haneke ne laisse-t-elle aucun de nous indifferent? Parce qu'il y pratique a l'envi, et de maniere frontale, la critique sociale. Ses films mettent cruellement (...) au jour ces figures du mal qui fondent les pathologies de la societe neoliberale - la violence, les medias, les genres, etc. Prend-il pour autant quelque facile position de surplomb? Pas du tout. Chacun de ses films interroge le regard meme qu'il porte sur son objet - la critique a beau etre radicale, en effet, son auteur fait bel et bien partie du monde qu'il met en question. (shrink)

Here we question the mechanisms underlying the emergence of the feeling of control that can be modulated even when the feeling of being the author of one’s own action is intact. With a haptic robot, participants made series of vertical pointing actions on a virtual surface, which was sometimes postponed by a small temporal delay (15 or 65 ms). Subjects then evaluated their subjective feeling of control. Results showed that after temporal distortions, the hand-trajectories were adapted effectively but that the (...) feeling of control decreased significantly. This was observed even in the case of subliminal distortions for which subjects did not consciously detect the presence of a distortion. Our findings suggest that both supraliminal and subliminal temporal distortions that occur within a healthy perceptual–motor system impact the conscious experience of the feeling of control of self-initiated motor actions. (shrink)

Il semble tout autant irrecevable de comprendre l’Esthétique à l’aune de la Logique que de mettre sur le même plan les écrits des différentes périodes de Kant : on nie par là même le sens positif de l’Esthétique, puisque, en expliquant ce passage en rapport à ce qui suit, on en gomme la spécificité. C’est alors l’irréductibilité de la passivité et la signification véritable de l’espace et du temps qui se trouvent anéanties. Or cette passivité est pourtant attestée par l’expression (...) selon laquelle espace et temps sont des grandeurs infinies données : elles ne sont pas construites et ne relèvent pas d’une synthèse. Aussi faut-il distinguer ces grandeurs des grandeurs extensives et de celles intensives qui apparaissent dans l’Analytique des principes. Il faudra, dans cet effort pour soutenir le sens positif de l’Esthétique, s’appuyer sur la note litigieuse du paragraphe 26, afin de distinguer l’espace et le temps comme intuitions pures, donc comme quanta proprement originaires, des concepts de l’espace et du temps qui sont construits à partir de l’application des catégories à la forme de l’intuition. Pour ne parler que de l’espace, cela signifie qu’il faut distinguer deux plans: l’espace de l’Esthétique forme le sous-bassement à partir duquel sont construits les concepts mathématiques d’espace – par exemple l’espace de la géométrie euclidienne. Une telle thèse a l’avantage, comme le soulignait Joseph Moreau, qui dissocie. (shrink)

Cette étude prend pour objet Le monde comme volonté et comme représentation et La naissance de la tragédie. Le but est de montrer que, si Nietzsche reprend la métaphysique de Schopenhauer, il forge une métaphysique de la musique différente de celle de son maître, en sorte que ce n'est pas dans le même sens que la musique est, pour tous deux, une reproduction de la volonté originaire. This review deals with The World as Will and as Representation and The Birth (...) of Tragedy. Its aim is to show that, if Nietzsche takes over Schopenhauer's metaphysic ideas, he however builds up a metaphysic of music that differs from his master's, so that they both claim that music is the expression of will, but with a different meaning. (shrink)

Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) est le fondateur de l'ecole de Heidelberg, l'autre grand courant neokantien qui apparait au meme moment que l'ecole de Marbourg, et dont Heinrich Rickert et Emil Lask furent des representants eminents. C'est Windelband qui pose les fondements de la philosophie des valeurs qui caracterise le neokantisme de Heidelberg. Ce volume presente un choix d'opuscules, qui relevent essentiellement de la philosophie de la connaissance, fondement de toute investigation philosophique pour les neokantiens. C'est en effet sur une analyse logique (...) des processus cognitifs que sont fondes non seulement l'assimilation de la verite a une valeur - sans pour autant que la verite se dissolve, car Windelband et les autres membres son ecole cherchent a fonder la transcendance de la valeur et donc a sauvegarder la verite comme telle -, mais aussi la theorie de la science qui distigue la methode nomothetique des sciences exactes de la methode idiographique propre a l'histoire. (shrink)

Erwin Panofsky explicitly states that the first half of the opening chapter of Studies in Iconology—his landmark American publication of 1939—contains ‘the revised content of a methodological article published by the writer in 1932’, which is now translated for the first time in this issue of Critical Inquiry.1 That article, published in the philosophical journal Logos, is among his most important works. First, it marks the apogee of his series of philosophically reflective essays on how to do art history,2 that (...) reach back, via a couple of major pieces on Alois Riegl, to the 1915 essay on Heinrich Wölfflin.3 Under the influence of his colleague at Hamburg Ernst Cassirer, the principal interpreter of Kant in the 1920s, Panofsky from 1915 on exhibits in his work ever more Kantian thinking and language.4 But Logos was not an art-historical review or one dedicated to aesthetics but a principal mainstream journal of the philosophy of culture. So ‘On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting Works of the Visual Arts’ has a good claim to be the culmination of Panofsky's philosophical thinking in his German period under the Weimar Republic. · 1. Erwin Panofsky, Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance , p. xv; hereafter abbreviated SI. See Panofsky, ‘Zum Problem der Beschreibung und Inhaltsdeutung von Werken der bildenden Kunst’, Logos 21 : 103–19; trans. Jaś Elsner and Katharina Lorenz under the title ‘On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting Works of the Visual Arts’, Critical Inquiry 38 : 467–82; hereafter abbreviated ‘P’.· 2. See the discussion in Carlo Ginzburg, ‘From Aby Warburg to E. H. Gombrich: A Problem of Method’, Myths, Emblems, Clues, trans. John and Anne C. Tedeschi , pp. 17–59, esp. pp. 36–41.· 3. See Panofsky, ‘Das Problem des Stils in der bildenden Kunst’, Deutschsprachige Aufsätze, ed. Karen Michels and Martin Warnke, 2 vols. , 2:1009–18; ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’,Deutschsprachige Aufsätze, 2:1019–34, trans. Kenneth J. Northcott and Joel Snyder under the title ‘The Concept of Artistic Volition’, Critical Inquiry 8 : 17–33; and ‘Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie: Ein Beitrag zu der Erörterung über die Möglichkeit kunstwissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe’, Deutschsprachige Aufsätze, 2: 1035–63, trans. Lorenz and Elsner under the title ‘On the Relationship of Art History and Art Theory: Towards the Possibility of a Fundamental System of Concepts for a Science of Art’, Critical Inquiry 35 : 43–71.· 4. On neo-Kantianism in pre-Nazi Germany, see Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger , pp. 25–37; Éric Dufour and T. Z. R. Créteil, ‘Le Statue du singulier: Kant et le néokantisme de l’École de Marbourg', Kantstudien 93 : 324–50; Edward Skidelsky, Ernst Cassirer: The Last Philosopher of Culture , pp. 22–51; and Peter E. Gordon, Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos , pp. 52–86. Specifically on the Cassirerian Kantianism of Panofsky, see Michael Podro, The Critical Historians of Art , pp. 181–82; Michael Ann Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History , pp. 91–92, 147–52; Silvia Ferretti, Cassirer, Panofsky, and Warburg: Symbol, Art, and History, trans. Richard Pierce , pp. 174–77, 182–84; David Summers, ‘Meaning in the Visual Arts as a Humanistic Discipline’, in Meaning in the Visual Arts: Views from the Outside, ed. Irving Lavin , pp. 9–24; Mark A. Cheetham, Kant, Art, and Art History: Moments of Discipline , pp. 68–77; Paul Crowther, The Transhistorical Image: Philosophizing Art and Its History , pp. 70–73; Allister Neher, ‘“The Concept of Kunstwollen”, Neo-Kantianism, and Erwin Panofsky's Early Art Theoretical Essays', Word and Image 20 : 41–51; Georges Didi-Huberman,Confronting Images: Questioning the Ends of a Certain History of Art, trans. John Goodman , pp. 4–6, 90–138; and Lorenz and Elsner, ‘Translators’ Introduction', Critical Inquiry35 : 33–42, esp. pp. 38, 40–42. (shrink)

As ecologically and socially oriented food initiatives proliferate, the significance of these initiatives with respect to conventional food systems remains unclear. This paper addresses the transformative potential of alternative food networks by drawing on insights from recent research on food and embodiment, diverse food economies, and more-than-human food geographies. I identify several synergies between these literatures, including an emphasis on the pedagogic capacities of AFNs; the role of the researcher; and the analytical and political value of using assemblage and actor-network (...) thinking to understand the far-reaching forces and power disparities confronting proponents of more ethical and sustainable food futures. (shrink)

In some recent works, Crupi and Iacona have outlined an analysis of ‘if’ based on Chrysippus’ idea that a conditional holds whenever the negation of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent. This paper presents a sound and complete system of conditional logic that accommodates their analysis. The soundness and completeness proofs that will be provided rely on a general method elaborated by Raidl, which applies to a wide range of systems of conditional logic.

Written in debate format, this book covers developing fields such as social cognition, as well as classic areas such as memory, learning, perception and categorization. The links between emotion and memory, learning, perception, categorization, social judgements, and behavior are addressed.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:690 BOOK REVIEWS Galileo, Bellarmine and the Bible. By RICHARD J. BLACKWELL. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1991. Pp. 272. $29.95 {cloth). Although this well-hound, manageable volume, complete with an artistic seventeenth-century dust jacket, has not received an official ecclesiastical "imprimatur," nevertheless, it is (according to this Dominican reviewer) both free from doctrinal error and filled with true and useful historical, philosophical, and theological information. Seemingly no (...) other case in the history of our western intellectual tradition has generated more controversy, more ill feeling, and more mutual misunderstanding across more lines of intellectual, political, and religious division than the "Galileo affair." Few people today are equipped historically, scientifically, philosophically, and theologically to discuss accurately the wide range of issues surrounding this unfortunate incident. A seasoned veteran of the strong historical, philosophical tradition of the Jesuit-run St. Louis University, and himself an active member of the Roman Catholic Church, Richard J. Blackwell, historian of philosophy and philosopher of science, has done a marvelous service to the academic community hy presenting us with this volume. In this well-researched, well-argued, and very readable manuscript, Blackwell helps to place Galileo's intellectual and ecclesiastical struggle within the broader historical, philosophical, religious, and theological context of rthe late 16th and early 17th centuries. Quoting the words of Olaf Pedersen, Blackwell considers the Galileo affair " not only as an episode in the history of science, but also as an important event in the history of theology" {p. 3). His principal purpose in writing this book is " to study the Galileo affair from this perspective " and, in particular, to understand "the role played by the Bible in the Galileo affair" (p. 3). Without attempting to praise, to blame, or to excuse, Blackwell sets out to understand precisely how it was that the historical, religious, and theological factors came to have such a profound effect on the scientific and philosophical questions of Galileo's time. He argues convincingly that the Roman insistence on upholding the traditional interpretation of certain key biblical passages can he understood adequately only within the historical and religious climate of postTridentine theology, Jesuit obedience, and strict adherence to the Thomistic synthesis of philosophy and theology. Toward this end, Blackwell brings together for the first time certain important texts, concepts, and historical arguments that help to alleviate some of the " murkiness " blurring our view of the Galileo affair, and help to make that incident more intelligible to our modern minds. BOOK REVIEWS 691 Blackwell argues that the Roman hierarchy was not so much concerned with the content of the new astronomy as it was determined to reassert itself as the authentic interpreter of Scripture and tradition. According to Blackwell, the new astronomy challenged not only the philosophy of Aristotle and the theology of Thomas Aquinas, but, perhaps more importantly, it challenged the ecclesiastical authority of the Roman hierarchy in its role as interpreter and teacher of the Apostolic faith. How could the new astronomy be anything but a hypothetical model, when it so clearly contradicted the words of Scripture as in· terpreted by the Church Fathers? How could mere mathematicians and astronomers insist on philosophical propositions that seemed to make the Bible false? No single individual was invested with the authority to interpret the Bible for the whole body of believers, as the Church had so painfully learned from the lessons of the Protestant Reformers. That authority lay solely with the "Church," that is, with the Roman hierarchy, the Pope in union with a council, as was clear from the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent. Moreover, strict obedience was the order of the day as many Jesuit thinkers so agonizingly came to realize. Blackwell divides his own text into seven chapters: (1) Trent and Beyond; (2) Bellarmine's Views Before the Galileo Affair; (3) Gali· leo's Detour into Biblical Exegesis; (4) Foscarini's Bombshell; (5) The Bible at Galileo's Trial (6) The Jesuit Dilemma: Truth or Obedience ; and (7) Reflections on Truth in Science and in Religion. In the first two chapters, he establishes a context for the Galileo affair by discussing :the theological interpretation and importance of the Council of Trent... (shrink)

An analysis of a valenced corpus of English words revealed that words that rhyme with slurs are rated more poorly than their synonyms. What at first might seem like a bizarre coincidence turns out to be a robust feature of slurs, one arising from their phonetic structure. We report novel data on phonaesthetic preferences, showing that a particular class of phonemes are both particularly disliked, and overrepresented in slurs. We argue that phonaesthetic associations have been an overlooked source of some (...) of the more peculiar, arational aspects of slurs. We conclude by drawing broader morals about the evolution of the lexicon. (shrink)

This paper investigates the implicative conditional, a connective intended to describe the logical behavior of an empirically defined class of natural language conditionals, also named implicative conditionals, which excludes concessive and some other conditionals. The implicative conditional strengthens the strict conditional with the possibility of the antecedent and of the contradictory of the consequent. $${p\Rightarrow q}$$ p ⇒ q is thus defined as $${\lnot } \Diamond {(p \wedge \lnot q) \wedge } \Diamond {p \wedge } \Diamond {\lnot q}$$ ¬ ◊ (...) ( p ∧ ¬ q ) ∧ ◊ p ∧ ◊ ¬ q. We explore the logical properties of this conditional in a reflexive normal Kripke semantics, provide an axiomatic system and prove it to be sound and complete for our semantics. The implicative conditional validates transitivity and contraposition, which we take to be integral parts of reasoning and communication. But it only validates restricted versions of strengthening the antecedent, right weakening, simplification, and rational monotonicity. Apparent counterexamples to some of these properties are explained as due to contextual factors. Finally, the implicative conditional avoids the paradoxes of material and strict implication, and validates some connexive principles such as Aristotle’s theses and weak Boethius’ thesis, as well as some highly entrenched principles of conditionals, such as conjunction of consequents, disjunction of antecedents, modus ponens, cautious monotonicity and cut. (shrink)

Unconscious logical inference seems to rely on the syntactic structures of mental representations (Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum 2018). Other transitions, such as transitions using iconic representations and associative transitions, are harder to assimilate to syntax-based theories. Here we tackle these difficulties head on in the interest of a fuller taxonomy of mental transitions. Along the way we discuss how icons can be compositional without having constituent structure, and expand and defend the “symmetry condition” on Associationism (the idea that associative links and (...) transitions are perfectly symmetric). In the end, we show how a BIT (“bare inferential transition”) theory can cohabitate with these other non-inferential mental transitions. (shrink)

Expanded reprint of the WIREs Science of Belief paper for Julien Musolino, Joseph Sommer, and Pernille Hemmer's The Science of Beliefs: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Cambridge University Press.

This chapter demonstrates how Sophie de Grouchy (1764–1822) anticipates the famous modern-day distinction between positive and negative liberty in her late eighteenth-century writings. It is argued that, on these grounds, De Grouchy deserves a rightful place in the history of the liberal tradition, a tradition that is typically depicted as the exclusive province of men. To support this claim, this chapter examines De Grouchy’s ideas in comparison with Rousseau’s and Adam Smith’s views on justice and property rights. This sets the (...) context in which De Grouchy introduces her distinction between positive and negative rights, a distinction that maps onto the modern-day divide between negative and positive liberty. It is shown how, in her writings, political issues of rights and justice intersect with moral issues to do with virtue and with the proper education of virtuous citizens who are also free. (shrink)

This book sets forth a novel theory of distributive justice premised on the fundamental moral equality of persons. It argues that, subject to certain limitations on personal sacrifice, no one should have less valuable resources and opportunities available to him than anyone else, simply invirtue of some chance occurrence the risk of which he did not choose to incur. Applying this principle to the distribution of wealth and income, the specification of property rights, and the allocation of scarce medical resources, (...) Professor Rakowski reaches challenging, often unconventional,conclusions. He further criticizes the economic analysis of law as a normative theory, and develops an alternative account of tort law.Among the topics discussed are the principles by which earnings, wealth, and gifts should be taxed; whether the compulsory removal of organs for transplantation can be justified; how doctors and public officials should make life-or-death decisions when all those endangered cannot be saved; and themorality of killing human beings and nonhuman animals. (shrink)

A recent solution to the Body-Minus problem, which is a problem of material constitution, claims that ordinary proper parts (such as left feet) exist, but the complements of these objects (such as left-foot complements) do not exist. In this paper, I examine a defense of this solution from the worry of arbitrariness and from its ineffectiveness against a revised version of the problem that focuses on the head, and I show that this defense fails.

Moral or ethical questions are vital because they affect our daily lives: what is the best choice we can make, the best action to take in a given situation, and ultimately, the best way to live our lives? Health ethics has contributed to moving ethics toward a more experience-based and user-oriented theoretical and methodological stance but remains in our practice an incomplete lever for human development and flourishing. This context led us to envision and develop the stance of a “living (...) ethics”, described in this inaugural collective and programmatic paper as an effort to consolidate creative collaboration between a wide array of stakeholders. We engaged in a participatory discussion and collective writing process known as instrumentalist concept analysis. This process included initial local consultations, an exploratory literature review, the constitution of a working group of 21 co-authors, and 8 workshops supporting a collaborative thinking and writing process. First, a living ethics designates a stance attentive to human experience and the role played by morality in human existence. Second, a living ethics represents an ongoing effort to interrogate and scrutinize our moral experiences to facilitate adaptation of people and contexts. It promotes the active and inclusive engagement of both individuals and communities in envisioning and enacting scenarios which correspond to their flourishing as authentic ethical agents. Living ethics encourages meaningful participation of stakeholders because moral questions touch deeply upon who we are and who we want to be. We explain various aspects of a living ethics stance, including its theoretical, methodological, and practical implications as well as some barriers to its enactment based on the reflections resulting from the collaborative thinking and writing process. (shrink)

The subject of this two-part article is the bearing of Søren Kierkegaard’s writings, and of their reception, upon the development of Religionswissenschaft or the comparative study of religion. This first part opens by taking account of Kierkegaard’s own awareness of, and relationship to, “non-Christian” religions, including his late reading of Schopenhauer; then considers Kierkegaard in juxtaposition with his contemporary F. Max Müller, the Sanskritist and foundational pioneer of comparative religion, and the two men’s contrasting relations to F.W.J. Schelling; and finally (...) examines the interest taken in Kierkegaard by William James, Max Weber, and Gerardus van der Leeuw as early twentieth-century contributors through three different disciplines to the study of comparative religion. (shrink)

This paper discusses an analogical argument for the compatibility of the evidential argument from evil and skeptical theism. The argument is based on an alleged parallel between the paradox of the preface and the case of apparently pointless evil. I argue that the analogical argument fails, and that the compatibility claim is undermined by the epistemic possibility of inaccessible reasons for permitting apparently pointless evils. The analogical argument fails, because there are two crucial differences between the case of apparently pointless (...) evil and the case of the preface. First, in the preface case, our non-cumulative evidence supports a claim of error, whereas the analogical argument is based on the idea that our non-cumulative evidence supports the success claim that there’s at least one instance of truly pointless evil. Second, our non-cumulative evidence of error in the case of the preface rests on a track record establishing author fallibility; in the case of apparently pointless evils, there is no relevant track record to support the claim that some apparently pointless evils are truly pointless. These differences, together with certain plausible assumptions about our fallibility and reliability with respect to propositions about evil, also indicate that inaccessible reasons for permitting apparently pointless evil are epistemically possible. Given the epistemic possibility of such reasons, we’re in no position to judge whether such reasons are present in every case no matter how large the set of such evils may be. (shrink)

Debates about modularity invariably involve a crucial premise about how visual illusions are experienced. This paper argues that these debates are wrongheaded, and that experience of illusions is orthogonal to the core issue of the modularity hypothesis: informational encapsulation.

This paper explores the connective ‘because’, based on the idea that ‘CbecauseA’ implies the acceptance/truth of the antecedentAas well as of the consequentC, and additionally that the antecedent makes a difference for the consequent. To capture this idea of difference-making a ‘relevantized’ version of the Ramsey Test for conditionals is employed that takes the antecedent to be relevant to the consequent in the following sense: a conditional is true/accepted in a state$$\sigma $$σjust in case (i) the consequent is true/accepted when$$\sigma (...) $$σis revised by the antecedentand(ii) the consequent fails to be true/accepted when$$\sigma $$σis revised by the antecedent’s negation. To extend this to a semantics for ‘because’, we add that (iii) the antecedent and (iv) the consequent are accepted/true in the state$$\sigma $$σ. We get metaphysical or doxastic interpretations of these clauses, depending on what we mean by a model and a state. We introduce several semantics known from suppositional conditionals, which we reinterpret for difference-making conditionals and ‘because’. We present a minimal logic for ‘because’ sentences and show how it can be extended in ways that parallel the hierarchy of extensions of the logic of suppositional conditionals. We establish correspondence results between axioms for ‘because’ and properties of states, and prove that the specified logics are sound with respect to the semantics. (shrink)

Living labs are interdisciplinary and participatory initiatives aimed at bringing research closer to practice by involving stakeholders in all stages of research. Living labs align with the principles of participatory research methods as well as recent insights about how participatory ways of generating knowledge help to change practices in concrete settings with respect to specific problems. The participatory, open, and discussion‐oriented nature of living labs could be ideally suited to accompany ethical reflection and changes ensuing from reflection. To our knowledge, (...) living labs have not been explicitly trialed and reported in ethics literature. In this discussion paper, we report and discuss four initial issues that marked the process of setting up a living lab in ethics: (1) determining the goals and expected outcomes of an ethics living lab; (2) establishing operational procedures; (3) selecting communities and defining pilot projects; and (4) adopting a lens to tackle emerging questions and challenges. We explain these four issues and present the paths taken based on the novel and specific orientation, that is, living ethics, at the basis of this project. In alignment with living ethics and É‐LABO, we approach challenges as learning opportunities to ask not only “how” questions but also “why” questions. We hope that this discussion paper informed by our experience helps to clarify the theoretical, methodological, and practical approaches necessary to successfully adopt and employ living labs in ethics. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Definitional Structure Probabilistic Structure Theory Structure Concepts Without Structure Rethinking Conceptual structure.

If individuals possess robust rights over their own persons and legitimately acquired possessions does any action on the part of another person that has any physical effect on the right-holder or her property to which the right-holder has not consented violate those rights? If so, it seems that almost every ordinary exercise of one’s rights—e.g., starting one’s car up in one’s own driveway, emitting some smoke while grilling in one’s own backyard—violate the rights of one’s neighbors. To avoid this conclusion (...) must the libertarian theorist shift to a less robust understanding of rights? This chapter argues against the need for such a general attenuation of rights. Any sensible delineation of rights must leave moral elbow room for the exercise of those rights. So, a sensible delineation of rights will not construe the minor physical intrusions under consideration as moral boundary-crossings. (shrink)

Ethics is often viewed as the elaboration of and compliance to norms, a.k.a. as the deductive model of ethics. This is well illustrated by the mainstream development of codes of ethics and ethics committees in the healthcare setting and beyond. Drawing upon a recent synthesis of pragmatist insights on the nature of ethics as well as contemporary scholarship on human flourishing, I explain how ethics is not primarily about the compliance of experience and agency to preset norms but about liberation (...) and empowerment within a process of existential meaning-making. This point is made in the context of two important tasks of ethics: (1) understanding moral problems and (2) providing guidance for solving such problems. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay calls attention to two blind spots in Power Without Knowledge. First, the book has little to say about the role that political institutions can play in promoting effective democratic governance. Drawing on the “mixed government” tradition, I argue that properly designed institutions can correct for the epistemic deficits that Friedman describes by creating what I call the “pressure to conflict.” Second and more importantly, the book has nothing to say about the role of responsible leadership in a (...) democratic technocracy. Drawing on Max Weber’s analysis of the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of conviction, I argue that responsible leadership can promote judicious technocracy in a dynamic that I call the “spiral of responsibility.” The responsible leader recognizes that to recuse oneself from the exercise of technocratic power is to empower the unscrupulous and irresponsible. According to Weber, any theory of politics that fails to embrace the ethics of responsibility will therefore occupy an uneasy middle ground between quietism and enthusiasm. This, I fear, is where Power Without Knowledge may leave us. (shrink)

Bioethics has made a compelling case for the role of experience and empirical research in ethics. This may explain why the movement for empirical ethics has such a firm grounding in bioethics. However, the theoretical framework according to which empirical research contributes to ethics—and the specific role it can or should play—remains manifold and unclear. In this paper, we build from pragmatic theory stressing the importance of experience and outcomes in establishing the meaning of ethics concepts. We then propose three (...) methodological steps according to which the meaning of ethics concepts can be refined based on experience and empirical research: function identification, function enrichment, and function testing. These steps are explained and situated within the broader commitment of pragmatic ethics to a perspective of moral growth and human flourishing. We hope that this proposal will give specific direction to the bridging of theoretical and empirical research in ethics and thus support stronger actualization of ethics concepts. (shrink)