This paper discusses an analogical argument for the compatibility of the evidential argument from evil and skeptical theism. The argument is based on an alleged parallel between the paradox of the preface and the case of apparently pointless evil. I argue that the analogical argument fails, and that the compatibility claim is undermined by the epistemic possibility of inaccessible reasons for permitting apparently pointless evils. The analogical argument fails, because there are two crucial differences between the case of apparently pointless (...) evil and the case of the preface. First, in the preface case, our non-cumulative evidence supports a claim of error, whereas the analogical argument is based on the idea that our non-cumulative evidence supports the success claim that there’s at least one instance of truly pointless evil. Second, our non-cumulative evidence of error in the case of the preface rests on a track record establishing author fallibility; in the case of apparently pointless evils, there is no relevant track record to support the claim that some apparently pointless evils are truly pointless. These differences, together with certain plausible assumptions about our fallibility and reliability with respect to propositions about evil, also indicate that inaccessible reasons for permitting apparently pointless evil are epistemically possible. Given the epistemic possibility of such reasons, we’re in no position to judge whether such reasons are present in every case no matter how large the set of such evils may be. (shrink)

This paper discusses the nature of competitiveness and argues that being competitive does not essentially involve a strong desire to win or to outperform others. The appeal of the ‘desire-to-win’ analysis of competitiveness can be explained away provided we distinguish between virtuous and vicious competitiveness. It is conceivable that a virtuously competitive athlete lack a strong desire to win or to outperform others. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that virtuous competitiveness and vicious competitiveness are distinct character traits. If being virtuously (...) competitive does not require a strong desire to win, then being competitive simpliciter does not require this. Other recent accounts, e.g. Kretchmar 2012 and Russell 2014, may appear to support the desire-to-win analysis, but careful reflection reveals that this is not the case. (shrink)

In some cases where we are faced with a decision of whether to prioritize identified lives over statistical lives, we have no basis for assigning specific probabilities to possible outcomes. Is there any reason to prioritize either statistical or identified lives in such cases? The ‘uncertainty argument’ purports to show that, provided we embrace ex ante contractualism, we should prioritize saving identified lives in such cases. The argument faces two serious problems. First, it relies on the principle of indifference, and (...) as such it leads to inconsistent assignments of epistemic probability to possible outcomes. Moreover, even if the uncertainty argument can be reformulated in order to avoid reliance on the principle of indifference, the uncertainty in such cases still undermines any judgment of which course of action – saving a statistical, or rather an identified life – involves the greater burden. The indeterminacy involved in the statistical group might be thought to undermine the argument that application of the principle of indifference leads to inconsistency in this case, but the thought that it does rests on a misunderstanding of the relationship between indeterminacy and reference. (shrink)

It appears that there is an inconsistency in combining epistemic contextualism with a plausible closure principle for knowledge and the view that knowledge is factive. I discuss the proposal that in order to avoid inconsistency the contextualist should reject closure and retain factivity. The proposal offers an alternative to closure and an argument that warrant fails to transmit through inference in the relevant cases. I criticize both accounts. The proposed alternative to closure is not well motivated and leaves unresolved the (...) question of why standard closure should not hold. The argument that warrant does not transmit is based on an inaccurate model of warrant transmission. An important lesson that emerges is that known propositions themselves can serve as warrant for further propositions, which may be known provided they are competently deduced from the former. Indeed it is arguably the factivity of knowledge that accounts for the fact that known propositions themselves serve as warrant. Thus, the strategy of rejecting closure while retaining factivity is a bad one not merely because the proposed alternatives to standard closure are inadequate and transmission failure in relevant cases would not imply closure failure, but because factivity ensures that warrant transmission worries in the relevant cases are unfounded. (shrink)

We argue that extreme endurance sport can be valuable for some nonhuman animals. To make the case, we focus specifically on dogsled racing. We argue that, given certain views about the nature of self-affirmation, perceptual agency, and affordances, sled dogs are capable of realizing significant value through extreme endurance running. Because our focus is on the axiological question of the nature of the value of the sport for its participants, we do not claim that extreme dogsledding is ethical; indeed, we (...) acknowledge the morally objectionable aspects of the practice in its current form. Still, we offer our argument as a critical step in providing an adequate moral justification for a reformed model of dogsled racing. If it is permissible, that is likely because it offers some significant benefits to sled dogs. Given some assumptions about sled dogs’ capacity to be guided by both internal and external affordances, those benefits include self-affirmation. (shrink)

We aren’t particularly sympathetic to modal realism (MR). Still, it isn’t clear to us that David Lewis argues for it in the wrong way. “The hypothesis is serviceable,” he says, “and that is a reason to think that it is true” (1986, p. 3). Let’s grant him the first claim: MR is serviceable, which is to say that it allows us “to reduce the diversity of notions we must accept as primitive, and thereby to improve the unity and economy of (...) the theory that is our professional concern – total theory, the whole of what we take to be true” (1986, p. 4). Our interest here is in the second claim, the thesis to the effect that a hypothesis’s being serviceable can provide reason to believe it. A number of philosophers maintain that this latter is false; others insist that it’s of no help to Lewis. So on one basis or the other, they conclude that Lewis’ argument for MR doesn’t get off the ground.1 We disagree. Our aim here is to show that there isn’t a cogent objection to Lewis’ use of serviceability that doesn’t rely a premise that he is justified in rejecting. (shrink)

We show that Lewis’s modal realism, and his serviceability-based argument for it, cohere with his epistemological contextualism. Modal realism explains why serviceability-based reasoning in metaphysics might be reliable, while Lewis’s contextualism explains why Lewis can properly ignore the possibility that serviceability isn’t reliable, at least when doing metaphysics. This is because Lewis’s contextualism includes a commitment to a kind of pragmatic encroachment, so that whether a subject knows can depend on how much is at stake with respect to whether the (...) belief is true or false. Accordingly, we suggest that Lewis can count as knowing that serviceability is a reliable guide to truth in metaphysics, since the stakes are generally low there, and so can be justified in believing that modal realism is true based on its serviceability. (shrink)

Snedegar offers a contrastivist solution to the puzzle about negative reason existentials, which he argues is preferable to Schroeder's own pragmatic solution. The proposed solution however raises a difficulty for contrastivism, as it suggests an alternative according to which the relevant contrast classes are determined not by the semantics of reason ascriptions but rather by pragmatic effects of contrastive stress. Nevertheless, I suggest there is a contrastivist-friendly solution to the puzzle. In what follows, I explain the problem for Snedegar's account, (...) and I offer an alternative solution to the problem of negative reason existentials. I argue that the solution is well-motivated by a feature of Snedegar's own account, and that it is also compatible with Schroeder's pragmatic account. (shrink)

One defense of the “steadfast” position in cases of peer disagreement appeals to the idea that it's rational for you to remain deeply agnostic about relevant propositions concerning your peer's judgment, that is, to assign no credence value at all to such propositions. Thus, according to this view, since you need not assign any value to the proposition that your peer's judgment is likely to be correct, you need not conciliate, since you can remain deeply agnostic on the question of (...) how the likelihood of your peer's judgment bears on the likelihood of your own. This paper argues that the case for deep agnosticism as a response to peer disagreement fails. Deep agnosticism implies that it is sometimes permissible to withhold judgment about whether there is a non-zero chance of a proposition's being true. However, in cases of disagreement where deep agnosticism is supposed to support the steadfast position, such withholding isn't rational. This is because of constraints placed on rational credence by objective probability or chance, which ensure that rational credence adequately reflects strength of evidence. (shrink)

The current ban on certain performance enhancing substances in sport such as erythropoietin faces a line-drawing problem: what is the moral difference between taking an EPO injection to incre...

Federica Malfatti criticizes recent arguments against the possibility of understanding transmission. While she offers no positive argument for the claim that understanding can be transmitted, she does defend a liberal conception of transmission that allows for the possibility of understanding transmission. In this article, I have three aims. First, I will show that there is a stronger version of one of the arguments against understanding transmission that Malfatti considers, which avoids her objection. This argument also fails, however, and the reason (...) it fails suggests that if understanding cannot be transmitted this is not due to the nature of epistemic trust. Second, I will offer a positive argument for understanding transmission on Malfatti's behalf, and defend the view of understanding on which it depends. Finally, I will raise a further challenge to the proponent of understanding transmission. The upshot is that although Malfatti is right that we have no clear reason to exclude the possibility of understanding transmission – and, if I am right, we have positive reason to accept it – nevertheless a puzzle remains about such transmission. (shrink)