In his Introduction, Hochberg writes: "Since this book is an attempt to resolve some problems about thought, truth, and reference within the tradition of Logical Atomism, readers of Bergmann and Sellars will find, not surprisingly, familiar themes." He continues a bit later: "What is attempted is the resolution of some issues that preoccupied Russell, Wittgenstein, Moore and their successors, as well as an explication of some links between Logical Atomism and Moore's early assault on idealism. The book is thus a (...) partial study of the ontology and the history of Logical Atomism." Hochberg accomplishes what he attempts. Note that he did not promise an introduction to the ontology and history of Logical Atomism. The book is intended for people who have read early Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, are familiar with some Fregean themes, who have read some secondary literature on Logical Atomism such as Urmson's or Pear's books, and who have read some of G. Bergmann's developments of Logical Atomism. Because the metaphysical analyses of several contemporary philosophers such as Quine, W. Sellars, D. Davidson, and D. Kaplan are criticized, familiarity with such writers, especially Quine, would be very helpful. Nevertheless, although the themes are familiar ones such as: realism vs. phenomenalism; realism vs. nominalism; theories of definite descriptions; coping with Bradley's regress; analyses of objects; analyses of thoughts; and although no sophisticated logic is needed to handle his formalizations, Hochberg demands almost too much concentration from even his intended readers. It is easy to get lost in the numerous alternative analyses and theories Hochberg considers. He seems unable to resist temptations to explore alternative analyses suggested to him by the one he is considering. Consequently, it is difficult to determine what are the analyses actually held by philosophers discussed, what are Hochberg's own analyses and theories, and what are serious alternatives. Because so many subtle and complicated alternatives are juggled it is difficult to uncover the main premisses of Hochberg's arguments for his resolutions. The combined insights and discipline of a seminar or reading group would be helpful in the effort to recognize the main themes and to stay with the work. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to present a systematic account of F. H. Bradley's philosophy in so far as it is relevant to an understanding of his conception of the nature and criterion of truth. I argue that, for Bradley, the nature of truth is the identity of thought with reality given in immediate experience. There is no absolute separation between thought and its object. Bradley therefore rejects both the correspondence theory and epistemological realism. Thought is (...) not just a mirror which reflects an independently existing reality. ;Concerning the criterion of truth, I argue that his criterion for our ordinary and scientific beliefs is practice, and the criterion for philosophical positions is a kind of coherence based on the doctrine of relative truth. For Bradley, some positions are truer than others, and the best philosophy is a comprehensive system which contains the truth of all different positions. ;Bradley does not accept the coherence theory of justification as it is understood today, since it is based on the standard account of negation and the doctrine of absolute truth. Bradley has a different approach to negation and inconsistency, according to which there are no absolutely inconsistent beliefs. Further, he insists that truth is not absolute but "relative," a matter of degree. All philosophical positions contain some truth, and none is completely false. The truth in philosophy is a position which accounts for the whole of reality and includes all apparently inconsistent positions within it. ;I explain Bradley's place in the history of philosophy and show his connections with the British empiricist tradition. I believe one of Bradley's central concerns is to explain the nature and criterion of truth in philosophy within the constraints of empiricism. I also contrast Bradley's positions on important issues with those of philosophers in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, such as Russell, Moore, Ayer, Tarski, Quine, Churchland, Lehrer and Campbell. I argue that most recent commentators on Bradley overlook the importance of understanding his philosophy as a system constructed according to the doctrine of relative truth. (shrink)

The concept of experience has been central to European philosophy since Descartes. He was the first to use experience to distinguish between two kinds of substance, mental and material, on the basis of the fact that one kind of substance is extended but does not think, while the other kind thinks, doubts, wills, imagines and feels, but is not extended. Other philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke and Hume, made the concept of experience the basis of their analysis of knowledge. These (...) ideas have become part of common sense, and provide the background for a range of philosophical problems from Descartes’ time to the present. While the concept of experience is important for philosophy, philosophers do not all have the same understanding of the nature of experience. (shrink)

In the last few years there has been a revival of interest in F.H. Bradley and particularly the account of judgment contained in The Principles of Logic. Many of those who discuss Bradley’s theory of judgment mistakenly assume that it can best be seen as a linguistic account. They insist that what Bradley says can be understood as an account of the meaning and reference of words or sentences. In this paper I will argue that Bradley’s (...) theory of judgment is essentially a psychological theory. Judgment is the union of part of the content of an image or other mental particular with our immediate experience. There is no evidence for the linguisitc interpretation and its defenders cannot make sense of Bradley’s discussion of a number of technical points, particularly his criticism of the view that judgment is the synthesis of ideas, and his comments on the idea of “this.” I will also argue that Bradley’s account of judgment cannot be separated from his later metaphysics and is essentially Hegelian in character. To explain Bradley’s theory I will begin where he does, with an examination of the nature of ideas. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The notion of stakeholder salience based on attributes (e.g., power, legitimacy, urgency) is applied in the family business setting. We argue that where principal institutions intersect (i.e., family and business); managerial perceptions of stakeholder salience will be different and more complex than where institutions are based on a single dominant logic. We propose that (1) whereas utilitarian power is more likely in the general business case, normative power is more typical in family business stakeholder salience; (2) whereas in a general (...) business context legitimacy is socially constructed; for family stakeholders, legitimacy is based on heredity; and (3) whereas temporality and criticality are somewhat independent in general-business urgency, they are linked in the family business case because of family ties and family-centered non-economic goals. We apply this theoretical framework to position and integrate the contributions to this special section ofBusiness Ethics Quarterlyon “Stakeholder Theory, Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Family Enterprise.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The notion of stakeholder salience based on attributes (e.g., power, legitimacy, urgency) is applied in the family business setting. We argue that where principal institutions intersect (i.e., family and business); managerial perceptions of stakeholder salience will be different and more complex than where institutions are based on a single dominant logic. We propose that (1) whereas utilitarian power is more likely in the general business case, normative power is more typical in family business stakeholder salience; (2) whereas in a general (...) business context legitimacy is socially constructed; for family stakeholders, legitimacy is based on heredity; and (3) whereas temporality and criticality are somewhat independent in general-business urgency, they are linked in the family business case because of family ties and family-centered non-economic goals. We apply this theoretical framework to position and integrate the contributions to this special section ofBusiness Ethics Quarterlyon “Stakeholder Theory, Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Family Enterprise.”. (shrink)

A Great Plains land ethic is shaped by an intimate knowledge of and appreciation for the evolution, ecology, and aesthetics of the plains landscape. The landscape evokes a sense of wonder and mystery suggested by the word “sacrament.” The biblical concept of “covenant” points to God as a community‐forming power, a creative process that has evolved into the earth community to which we humans belong. In contrast to an anthropocentric ethic which emphasizes human dominion over nature, a Theo‐centric land ethic (...) seeks a balance, reflected in Genesis 1–3, between humans who are membersofthe earth community and moral agents accountable to Godforthe earth. A land ethic identifies concrete practices ofmetanoiaand healing: agricultural practices to address the loss and degradation of soil; conservation and protection of water sources; utilization of wind and solar energy; and prescribed burning to restore processes vital to the prairie ecosystem. The concept of subsidiarity suggests that practices ofmetanoiaand healing are a combination of wise public policy balanced by personal, family, church, business, and community responsibility. (shrink)

The average male–female performance difference in the three sports of track athletics, swimming and time trial cycling are examined between the years 1948 and 1976. During this period females have gradually come to participate in a much larger number of events, particularly those of longer duration. In each of these three sports, women's performances in relation to men's have more or less continuously improved and it appears that if the changes between 1948 and 1976 are maintained, average female performance will (...) equal that of males for all events currently competed in by both sexes in these sports at some time during the next century. Estimates as to when, precisely, this will occur vary somewhat according to the basis on which the calculations are made. The other main change evident during these years is that in all three sports women's performances relative to men's for events of long duration have become as good or better than their relative performance at events of short duration. (shrink)

A Great Plains land ethic is shaped by an intimate knowledge of and appreciation for the evolution, ecology, and aesthetics of the plains landscape. The landscape evokes a sense of wonder and mystery suggested by the word "sacrament." The biblical concept of "covenant" points to God as a community-forming power, a creative process that has evolved into the earth community to which we humans belong. In contrast to an anthropocentric ethic which emphasizes human dominion over nature, a Theo-centric land ethic (...) seeks a balance, reflected in Genesis 1–3, between humans who are members of the earth community and moral agents accountable to God for the earth. A land ethic identifies concrete practices of metanoia and healing: agricultural practices to address the loss and degradation of soil; conservation and protection of water sources; utilization of wind and solar energy; and prescribed burning to restore processes vital to the prairie ecosystem. The concept of subsidiarity suggests that practices of metanoia and healing are a combination of wise public policy balanced by personal, family, church, business, and community responsibility. (shrink)

Those who deny the usefulness of the concept of “motive” for psychology commonly bring two arguments in support of theirview. The first is that the whole notion of “motive” is “animistic” and “folklorish”, since a motive cannot be directly observed. The second is that “motives” cannot be accurately observed, and therefore are beyond the scope of scientific study, because they are “the secret of the agent”, and the agenthimself has no indubitable knowledge of his “motives”. In a recent article, Professor (...) MacIver defends the view that the imputation of “motives” is necessary to a complete explanation of behaviour. To the first of the above criticisms, he replies that such a view neglects a part of reality and that since “motives” exist they should be studied by psychology. This reply does nothing to demonstrate the necessity of imputing motives in order to obtain a complete explanation of behaviour. To the second criticism he replies “motives” are not the secret of the agent, and we can only assert that the agent has mistaken his “motive” if we can gain indepen-dent knowledge of it. We can do this, Professor MacIver asserts, by observing typical behaviour in typical circum-stances, and making inferences from the coherence of total situations. Professor MacIver's replies to the second of the above criticisms are valid only if “motive” is defined as equivalent to “need”, so that we can say “under such-and-such conditions, such-and-such behaviour occurs”. A statement of this type says nothing about the agent's awareness of his goal. When the term “consciousness” is carefully defined along the lines suggested by Boring, the methods of imputation described by Professor MacIver can be seen to lead us only to the agent's “drives”, or “needs”, defined without reference to the agent's awareness of his goal. Professor MacIver uses “motives” to mean “awareness of the goal”, but gives us no clue as to how they may be imputed, and adduces no proof that their imputation is necessary. A possible criterion of the presence of a “motive” is the degree of direction observable in the organism's varied reac-tions in response to frustration, though the more precise definition of such a criterion must await further experiment. In view of the ambiguity of the term “motive” and its penumbra of false suggestion, it is desirable that the term be dropped from psychology. (shrink)

laudationem ferculum est insecutum plane non pro expectatione magnum: novitas tamen omnium convertit oculos. rotundum enim repositoriurr duodecim habebat signa in orbe disposita, super quae proprium convenien. temque materiae structor imposuerat cibum: super arietem cicer arietinum, super taurum bubulae frustum, super geminos testiculos ac rienes, supei cancrum coronam, super leonem ficum Africanam, super virginem steriliculam super libram stateram in cuius altera parte scriblita erat, in altera placenta super scorpionem † pisciculum marinum, super sagittarium oclopetam, supei capricornum locustam marinam,† super pisces (...) duos mullos. in medio autem caespes cum herbis excisus favum sustinebat. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Elementary Students’ Construction of Geometric Transformation Reasoning in a Dynamic Animation Environment” by Alan Maloney. Upshot: Parnorkou and Maloney describe how a dynamic animation environment, Graphs ’n Glyphs, supported fourth-grade students’ understandings of translations and rotations. Two elements were critical in their teaching experiment: the design of the software and tasks. This commentary focuses on the decisions that they made and possible implications they had for students’ reasoning.

It is now generally agreed that the Satyricon was written in the age of Nero by the Emperor's Arbiter elegantiae. The view that it should be dated to the age of the Antonines has been reasserted since the war, and the work of scholars who have refuted it has produced several new arguments of value; notably in the matter of the economic and social background in the Satyricon. H. C. Schnur has recently restated the economic arguments for the Neronian date, (...) with some new points, and with convincing force. (shrink)