ResumenEl artículo estudia el significado de ‘paz’ en El defensor de la paz, la principal obra de Marsilio de Padua y, probablemente, del pensamiento político de la Baja Edad Media. Marsilio considera la ley el fundamento de la civitas y la paz el objetivo de su institución; y sitúa en el poder temporal del sacerdocio –del Papa en particular–, la causa de la guerra civil que dividía la sociedad cristiana y azotaba, en especial, el Imperio y el norte de Italia. (...) Analizamos el vocabulario de la paz en los textos mismos del Defensor Pacis; reconstruimos su historia conceptual desde el latín clásico hasta su dimensión teológica; y examinamos cómo opera dentro de la teoría racional del poder que defiende Marsilio el concepto de paz civil, muy diferente del ideal de paz espiritual propio de la tradición medieval. El propósito es demostrar la coherencia de este concepto con un nuevo paradigma político que excluye al sacerdocio del poder secular.Palabras clave:Paz, civitas, poder, papadoThe paper explains the meaning of ‘peace’ in The Defender of Peace, the main Marsilius of Padua’s work and, probably, one of the most outstanding political theories in the Later MThis thinker considers law as the base of civitas and peace as the aim of its creation; and he thinks that the temporal power of priesthood, especially of the Pope, is the cause of the civil war that was dividing christian society and devastating, in particular, the Empire and Northern Italy Middle Ages. We analyze the vocabulary of peace in the own texts of Defensor Pacis and we reconstruct its conceptual history from classical latin to its theological approach; then, we examine how the concept of civil peace, very different from the spiritual ideal of peace in the medieval tradition, works inside the rational theory of power advocated by Marsilius. The purpose is to show the coherence of this concept with a new political paradigm, which rejectes any secular power for the Pope or priests.Key words:Peace, civitas, power, papacy. (shrink)

El artículo estudia el significado de la ley y el papel que juega en la filosofía política de Marsilio de Padua, un autor interesado, por encima de todo, en la institución del Estado, que considera a la ley el fundamento de la civitas. Su énfasis en la ley significa que la cuestión principal es qué es lo que hace que una ley lo sea; y más que el contenido de justicia, es el precepto coactivo del legislador, que tiene la autoridad (...) de establecer la ley y de sancionar su incumplimiento, ya que una ley es una orden cuya desobediencia lleva su castigo. Por tanto, esa definición de ley desemboca en la pregunta por el legislador: es el conjunto de los ciudadanos o su parte prevalente ”, es decir, la legítima representación de toda la comunidad, pero nunca otra parte de la comunidad, ni siquiera los sacerdotes o los doctores. La definición de ley, que implica la unidad de la comunidad y la exclusividad del legislador, es el fundamento filosófico para rechazar todo poder político del Papa y de los sacerdotes para legislar. (shrink)

Resenha do livro de Maglio, Gianfranco, Autonomia della città dell’uomo e religione in Marsilio da Padova. S. Pietro in Cariano: Il Segno dei Gabrielli editori, 2003, 226 páginas.

The paper explains the meaning of law and its political function in Marsilius of Padua’s philosophy. This thinker is interested, above all, in statehood and he points out that law is the ground of civitas (polis or political community). His emphasis on law means that the main question is what makes law, law. It isn’t the content of justice, but the coercive command of the legislator, who has the authority to give law and to punish its transgression, because a law (...) is a command whose disobedience leads to punishment. Therefore such definition of law runs into the question for the law-giver: it is “the whole corporation of citizens or its weightier part (valentior pars)”, that is to say, the rightful representation of the whole community, but never any other part of community, not even priests or doctors. The definition of law, which involves the unity of community and the sole legislator, is the philosophical ground to refute any political power for the Pope or priests to make laws. (shrink)

A principios del siglo XIV algunos autores, como Juan de París y Dante, se apoyaron en el aristotelismo para defender la separación del poder religioso y del poder secular. Marsilio de Padua, en cambio, combatió el supremo poder del Papa sobre la base de que no existe poder religioso, porque no hay más que un solo poder: el gobernante civil. El artículo muestra las principales diferencias entre la concepción dualista de los primeros y el monismo marsiliano.

Marsilius of Padua’s thinking represents an unprecedented attempt to base power on rational grounds. Two centuries earlier than Machiavelli, Marsilius had developed a political theory that was very different from traditional medieval thought and had offered for the first time an autonomous explanation of power, without referring to a higher order or law to justify its existence. These two Italian writers were passionate about politics and, touched by the political instability in their motherland, sought to maintain peace. They held that (...) the State does not have a moral purpose, only a political one, and that the prince’s or ruler’s task is to guarantee that it functions, making use of coercion or force as necessary. This article deals with the main commonalities and differences between the two philosophers. (shrink)

Los esfuerzos por demostrar la influencia de la filosofía nominalista en la teoría política de Marsího de Padua no han tenido éxito. Otras corrientes de pensamiento y escuelas filosóficas, como el aristotelismo heterodoxo, el corporativismo medieval e incluso la concepción orgánica de la sociedad tienen más influencia en el Defensor pacis, concebido y escrito varios años antes de ser compañero de Ockham en la Corte imperial de Luis de Baviera. El artículo examina los textos en los que se ha basado (...) la interpretación nominalista del pensamiento de Marsilio. La conclusión es que la teoría de la civitas que expone Marsilio no está basada en la concepción nominalista de la sociedad. En su lucha contra la plenitud o potestatis del Papado, Marsihio construye una civitas, en la que no cabe el poder eclesiástico diferente del secular. El resultado son dos modelos de sociedad distintos: dualista el de Ockham; mucho más monolítico el de Marsilio, que no reconoce a los ciudadanos individuales ni a las partes de la civitas capacidad para actuar autónomamente. (shrink)

The paper explains the meaning of law and its political function in Marsilius of Padua’s philosophy. This thinker is interested, above all, in statehood and he points out that law is the ground of civitas (polis or political community). His emphasis on law means that the main question is what makes law, law. It isn’t the content of justice, but the coercive command of the legislator, who has the authority to give law and to punish its transgression, because a law (...) is a command whose disobedience leads to punishment. Therefore such definition of law runs into the question for the law-giver: it is “the whole corporation of citizens or its weightier part (valentior pars)”, that is to say, the rightful representation of the whole community, but never any other part of community, not even priests or doctors. The definition of law, which involves the unity of community and the sole legislator, is the philosophical ground to refute any political power for the Pope or priests to make laws. (shrink)

El trabajo expone el significado de la obra de Marsilio de Padua, la primera teoría medieval no clerical del Estado. Marsilio se propone combatir la doctrina de la plenitudo potestatis papal, porque la considera causa de la guerra civil en Italia a principios del siglo XIV. Se basa para ello en la unidad de la soberanía, frente al dualismo que caracteriza a otros defensores del poder secular, como Juan de Paris, Ockham o Dante. Sostiene que no existe fundamento espiritual para (...) un poder diferente del poder del legislador humano y que el único poder supremo o plenitudo potestatis no corresponde al Papa sino al gobernante secular. De lo cual se sigue la completa absorción de la Iglesia por el Estado y la atribución al gobernante temporal de toda la organización eclesiástica. La filosofía marsiliana representa un esfuerzo sin precedentes por dar al poder un fundamento racional, pero está lejos de la idea moderna de soberanía, así como del liberalismo y de la voluntad general de Rousseau. No tuvo éxito en su tiempo, pero influyó en la reforma anglicana y en el erastianismo de Hobbes. (shrink)

In his paper, Vardoulakis traces a genealogy of the concept of the ‘ineffectual’ that dominates many discussions in continental political philosophy back to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in the early 1920s. Although I sympathize with Vardoulakis’s suspicions concerning the ‘ineffectual’, I think his genealogy misses the main aspects of Heidegger’s analysis of praxis. In particular, Vardoulakis’s reading relies on two fundamentally ill-conceived assumptions: (a) that Heidegger’s thought can be read as a continuous endorsement of a series of fundamental claims, in (...) particular, the rejection of instrumentality, the critique of modern technical thinking, and a praise of a certain form of ineffectual meditative thought as an alternative; and (b) that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in general and of the Nichomachean Ethics in particular has, as its main aim, to ground in Greek thinking such form of ineffectual meditative thought. In this comment, I will challenge both these assumptions. I will claim that Heidegger’s project in the 1920s is oriented to provide an answer to the question that shaped the debate between Marburg Neo-Kantians, on the one hand, and Husserl, on the other: namely, how is it possible to account for lived experience and its categorial articulation. For Neo-Kantians such as Natorp (e.g. [1912: 28]), all conceptual understanding is an understanding of objects. Subjectivity as the pure form of activity—the Kantian I think—could not be understood but merely postulated. Hence, it is in principle impossible to account for subjectivity without objectifying it. This was a serious and potentially devastating objection to phenomenology’s fundamental project. It is in this context that Heidegger turns his attention to Aristotle’s ethics, precisely as a way of accounting for the kind of relationship between my understanding of experience and experience itself. Aristotelian praxis (and phronesis as the kind of ‘knowledge’ associated with praxis) provides a model for such understanding. Therefore, Heidegger has no interest in ethics or in developing a theory of action in the 1920s in general or when reading Aristotle in particular. Vardoulakis’s understanding of Heidegger’s mistranslation—even if there is one—can only make sense in hindsight, when reading those texts in the light of the later Heidegger’s interest in avoiding technical calculation and promoting a meditative thinking. If we abandon Vardoulakis’s assumptions, Heidegger’s analysis of praxis and, in particular, his reading of Aristotle’s hou heneka can be understood under a different light. Understanding the meaningful structure of the world as existing for the sake (hou heneka, umwillen) of Dasein is not so much a reflection on the role of ends in action—technical or otherwise—but an analysis of the way in which any understanding of the world and of our actions within it is an understanding of who we are and of the structures that constitute the very being of our subjectivity. This may suggest that there is in the early Heidegger a way out of the dilemma between ineffectuality and instrumentalism, a path that, perhaps, provides an alternative for contemporary ethics and political thinking. (shrink)

Propõe o ensino das duas linguagens fundamentais - de Língua Materna e de Matemática - através da argumentação para que se articule o ensino de todas as disciplinas. Ao final, faz uma proposta global de avaliação para a escola, centrada em textos argumentativos, transformando a "cola" consentida em consulta necessária.

This paper intends above all to highlight three fundamental interconnected questions: (1) without reifying it in a theoretical-systematic philosophy, to highlight Derrida’s Deconstruction as a “philosophical idiom” – that of différance or of the ab-solute otherness – endowed, therefore, with specific “theoretical” assumptions (khôra, messianic and trace); (2) to highlight and to clarify the meaning of the “Derridian exception” concerning the issue of the animal and animality within the context of the sacrificial philosophical-cultural Westernness; (3) to highlight the relevance of (...) the issue of the animal and animality in order to re-think, in new terms, the question of the human itself – still essentially structured in the light of a metaphysical subjectivity –, underlining the invaluable contribution of Deconstruction to rethink the exceptionality of the human among the living beings and to bring the war for compassion to a successful end, thus contributing to the emergence of new Lights for the promise of the “coming” [“à-venir”] of another humanity and, consequently, of another civilization. (shrink)

according to Plotinus, it is possible for the soul of the philosopher to follow a way of ascension towards the superior realities. This way is composed of two parts. The first one goes from the sensible world to the Intellect and the second, from the Intellect to the one. In this paper, I investigate the trópos and mēkhanaí, as Plotinus writes in I, 6, necessary to this journey.

Political theory is a field that finds nourishment in others. From economics, history, sociology, psychology, and political science, theorists have drawn a rich repertoire of schemas to parse the social world and make sense of it. With each of these encounters, new subjects are brought into focus as others recede into the background, ushering a change not only in how questions are tackled but also in what questions are thought worth asking.

El artículo a partir de fuentes iconográficas, estudia la sustitución de los símbolos imperiales españoles por nuevos símbolos republicanos a principios del siglo XIX, destacando obras como las alegorías de la libertad y la patria para el caso colombiano. Estos emblemas tuvieron su origen en las representaciones de América del siglo XVI, pero con las autonomías y las posteriores independencias se convierten en los primeros símbolos de identidad de las nacientes repúblicas. The article, based on iconographic sources, studies the substitution (...) of imperial Spanish symbols by new republican symbols at the beginning of the 19th century, emphasizing some works as the allegories of Freedom and the Mother land in the case of Colombia. These emblems had their origin in the representations of America of the 16th century, however, initially, with their autonomies and later independences they turn into the first symbols of identity of the blossoming republics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Philosophies of America Reader: From the Popol Vuh to the Present ed. by Kim Díaz and Mathew A. FoustBernardo R. Vargas (bio)The Philosophies of America Reader: From the Popol Vuh to the Present. Edited by Kim Díaz and Mathew A. Foust. New York: Bloomsbury, 2021. Pp. 480. Paperback $46.75, isbn 978-1-4742-9626-7.Philosophy in the United States continues to be among the least diverse disciplines in the humanities, dominated (...) statistically by white males, with the next largest group being white female philosophers.1 This lack of diversity affects how we define philosophy and who counts as a philosopher. As the editors of The Philosophies of America Reader, Kim Díaz and Mathew A. Foust, put it, "Just as history has fashioned and popularized distorted accounts of the 'discovery' of America, it has done the same in its presentation of American Philosophy" (p. xv). This exemplary collection of essays from across the Americas allows the readers and instructors to reimagine what we construe as philosophy and who we imagine an American philosopher to be.The editors offer diverse essays covering an impressive timeframe, ranging from the Popol Vuh, whose oral tradition from Guatemala predates Spanish colonization and was recorded in the mid-1500s, to contemporary philosophers such as Gregory Pappas. The collection excels in offering texts that typical philosophy anthologies are unlikely to include, which the editors call "unusual suspects" that have been historically marginalized, while also maintaining more familiar or "classical" figures (pp. xv–xvi). These "unusual suspects" include women, Latinx, American Indigenous, Black, and Caribbean thinkers.The Philosophies of America Reader offers various resources to enhance the student and instructor's experience. The book is structured into four themes: (1) Selfhood and Identity, (2) Knowing and Learning, (3) Aesthetics and Spirituality, and (5) Violence and Peace. The editors design these themes to fit the traditionally understood areas of philosophy of metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. Even if the instructor's course description does not specifically target American Philosophy, these thematic categories are valuable for th ose who wish to incorporate a more diverse reading list. For example, these essays could easily apply to courses such as Critical Philosophy of Race, Introduction to Philosophy, or Introduction to Ethics. Each thematic section also features a "For Further Reading" segment, which includes selected secondary sources to broaden research or substitute texts. In addition, the editors provide a detailed [End Page 1] syllabus example, including a Course Description and Outline of the Course for a bi-weekly class, which is neatly divided into a 16-week reading schedule. They also include instructive sections such as a Note to the Teacher to aid in thinking through how to interact with the unfamiliar texts and a Note to the Student to guide their disposition and readings.Moreover, the text presents introductory essays for each thematic section. These essays provide an overview of the content and delve into the author's positionality, such as their geography, context, motivations for writing, race, ethnicity, and native tongue. The introductions are philosophically robust yet accessible to new philosophy students and are not filled with unnecessary philosophical jargon.Due to its large scope of thinkers, this text offers a vibrant opportunity to dialogue with philosophers who share or differ in their perspectives across the major thematic categories. The editors emphasize that although this is not a history of thought, the texts present lineages of progression, elaboration, and disagreement intended to guide instructors in connecting the texts with their students (p. xx). Furthermore, this allows the reader and the instructor to avoid isolating their discourse to a particular time, geography, gender, or race and ethnicity. In addition to the biographical and contextual information given in the introductions, a small yet helpful detail is a timeline of the selections that further contextualizes the readings.I wish to underscore two key clusters of essays amidst the vast array of 50 readings related to Asian-American and Mexican-American discourse for the instructor's consideration, particularly those teaching in the United States. These two large population groups deserve consideration as enrollment rates for Asian Americans and Hispanics (of whom Mexicans are the largest population... (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, to conceive transcendence, Levinas retrieves the Platonic concept of “separation” and deploys it in three ways: metaphysically, semantically, and affectively. Levinas finds in the interaction between being and the Good beyond being of Republic VI 509b a certain “formal structure of transcendence”—one in which a term is conditioned by another while remaining absolutely separated from it. This formal structure is subsequently deployed metaphysically, in the relation between creator and creature; semantically, in the relation between (...) meaning and sense; and affectively, in the relation between the desiring self and its desired aim. (shrink)

Turing’s much debated test has turned 70 and is still fairly controversial. His 1950 paper is seen as a complex and multilayered text, and key questions about it remain largely unanswered. Why did Turing select learning from experience as the best approach to achieve machine intelligence? Why did he spend several years working with chess playing as a task to illustrate and test for machine intelligence only to trade it out for conversational question-answering in 1950? Why did Turing refer to (...) gender imitation in a test for machine intelligence? In this article, I shall address these questions by unveiling social, historical and epistemological roots of the so-called Turing test. I will draw attention to a historical fact that has been only scarcely observed in the secondary literature thus far, namely that Turing’s 1950 test emerged out of a controversy over the cognitive capabilities of digital computers, most notably out of debates with physicist and computer pioneer Douglas Hartree, chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyi, and neurosurgeon Geoffrey Jefferson. Seen in its historical context, Turing’s 1950 paper can be understood as essentially a reply to a series of challenges posed to him by these thinkers arguing against his view that machines can think. Turing did propose gender learning and imitation as one of his various imitation tests for machine intelligence, and I argue here that this was done in response to Jefferson's suggestion that gendered behavior is causally related to the physiology of sex hormones. (shrink)

La religión parece presentarse en franco declive en nuestras sociedades modernas. No en vano, numerosos sociólogos vaticinaron el fin de la religión en favor de la ciencia y el saber técnico. No obstante, tales profecías no solo no parecen cumplirse, sino que la actualidad presenta un resurgir de la espiritualidad y la religión en lugares que no se esperaba y como respuesta al hastío de tanto materialismo. Así lo atestiguan sociólogos de contrastada experiencia y que parecen indicar que la tan (...) aplaudida tesis de la secularización posee más de ideología que de realidad social. Atendemos pues en este artículo a tal situación con el fin de comprender mejor qué es lo que está ocurriendo en las modernas sociedades que parecen tenerlo todo y, en cambio, carecen de aspectos importantes como el sentido que guía una existencia. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill based initially his conception of suicide on Hume's theory and on Bentham's moral arithmetic; nevertheless, he had a transforming experience in his youth, moment in which he longed for ending his life that he overcame reading the English romanticism. This article describes Mill's vision on the suicide, which he purposely silenced, through the conception of romanticism, of Hume and also of Adam Smith. Certainly, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith was bold enough to criticize Hume's famous (...) defense of the suicide; however, in spite of the fact that the influence of The Wealth of the Nations in Mill has been widely studied, the possible influence of Smith’s moral theory in the overcoming of his mental crisis has been overlooked. (shrink)

I propose an idealist ontology that makes sense of reality in a more parsimonious and empirically rigorous manner than mainstream physicalism, bottom-up panpsychism, and cosmopsychism. The proposed ontology also offers more explanatory power than these three alternatives, in that it does not fall prey to the hard problem of consciousness, the combination problem, or the decombination problem, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: there is only cosmic consciousness. We, as well as all other living organisms, are but dissociated alters (...) of cosmic consciousness, surrounded by its thoughts. The inanimate world we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of these thoughts. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances of other dissociated alters. (shrink)

This article aims to contribute to the current debate on how imitation in early Greek epic can be identified and assessed. Two divine scenes in Iliad Book 7 and Odyssey Book 13 are compared in the light of their traditional background and contextual significance. It is suggested that there are grounds to interpret this as a case of imitation on the Odyssey poet’s part which, however, was not necessarily meant to elicit recognition of the subtext. A methodological point is made (...) by showing that it is possible to argue for a specific intertextual relation by considering the traditional techniques involved. (shrink)

Departing from Anderson’s (2016) suggestion that there are three communities in Peirce’s thought corresponding to his three normative sciences of logic, ethics, and esthetics, I argue that these communities partake in a relationship of dependence similar to that found among the normative sciences. In this way, just as logic relies on ethics which relies on esthetics, so too would a logical community of inquirers rely on an ethical community of love, which would rely on an esthetic community of artists. A (...) community could conduct inquiry together only if it pursued the same goal; and it could pursue the same goal only if it first imaginatively construed it. Any logical or ethical community requires a shared imaginative repertoire of ideal ends. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Plotinus does not limit the sphere of free human agency simply to intellectual contemplation, but rather extends it all the way to human praxis. Plotinus’s goal in the first six chapters of Ennead 6.8 is, accordingly, to demarcate the space of freedom within human practical actions. He ultimately concludes that our external actions are free whenever they actualize, in unhindered fashion, the moral principles derived from intellectual contemplation. This raises the question of how the (...) freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. After considering two previously offered models—a model of double activity, and an Aristotelian model of practical syllogism—I offer a third alternative, namely a model of moral attunement, according to which our rational desires assume a kind of ‘care of the soul’ through active supervision. Practical life is thus imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good. (shrink)

Recensión: CORBI, Marià. Para uma espiritualidade leiga . São Paulo: Paulus, 2010. 294 p. [ Hacia una espiritualidad laica, sin creencias, sin religiones, sin dioses . Barcelona: Herder, 2007, 350 p.].

Resumo Plotino é um pensador estranho para o filósofo contemporâneo: nas suas Enéadas, ele discute experiência mística e prática filosófica como se fosse uma mesma coisa. De fato, no pensamento plotiniano, o ápice da vida filosófica é a contemplação mística: não pensamento irracional, mas uma forma supra-racional de consciência que é alcançada pela prática ascética e pelo procedimento dialético. Este artigo tenta entender o que é a experiência mística em Plotino. Na verdade, uma leitura atenta dos textos das Enéadas que (...) tratam do assunto mostram que não existe apenas um, mas dois tipos de contemplação mística supra-racional: a experiência da alma humana unida ao Intelecto divino e a experiência da alma humana unida ao Um, o princípio supremo da realidade de acordo com a filosofia plotiniana. Ambos são tipos de intuição intelectual interior, mas, se a experiência mística do Intelecto é a contemplação da totalidade do mundo inteligível, a contemplação do Um é a intuição da identidade pura, além de toda a diferença. Palavras-chave: Plotino; Neoplatonismo; Mística.Plotinus is a strange scholar to the contemporary philosopher: in his Enneads, he discusses mystical experience and philosophical practice as if they were the same thing. Indeed, according to his thoughts, the summit of philosophical life is mystical contemplation: not irrational thinking, but a supra-rational form of consciousness achieved through ascetic practice and dialectical procedure. This paper attempts to understand the mystical experience in Plotinus. In fact, a close reading of the texts of the Enneads on the subject demonstrates that there are not only one, but two kinds of supra-rational mystical contemplation: the experience of the human soul united to the divine Intellect and the experience of the human soul united to the One, the supreme principle of reality according to Plotinus's philosophy. Both are kinds of interior intellectual intuition, but if the mystical experience of the Intellect is the contemplation of the whole of the intelligible world, the contemplation of the One is the intuition of pure identity, beyond all difference. Key words: Plotinus; Neo-Platonism; Mysticism. (shrink)

The Turing test has been studied and run as a controlled experiment and found to be underspecified and poorly designed. On the other hand, it has been defended and still attracts interest as a test for true artificial intelligence (AI). Scientists and philosophers regret the test’s current status, acknowledging that the situation is at odds with the intellectual standards of Turing’s works. This article refers to this as the Turing Test Dilemma, following the observation that the test has been under (...) discussion for over seventy years and still is widely seen as either too bad or too good to be a valuable experiment for AI. An argument that solves the dilemma is presented, which relies on reconstructing the Turing test as a thought experiment in the modern scientific tradition. It is argued that Turing’s exposition of the imitation game satisfies Mach’s characterization of the basic method of thought experiments and that Turing’s uses of his test satisfy Popper’s conception of the critical and heuristic uses of thought experiments and Kuhn’s association of thought experiments to conceptual change. It is emphasized how Turing methodically varied the imitation game design to address specific challenges posed to him by other thinkers and how his test illustrates a property of the phenomenon of intelligence and suggests a hypothesis on machine learning. This reconstruction of the Turing test provides a rapprochement to the conflicting views on its value in the literature. (shrink)

Several alternatives vie today for recognition as the most plausible ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these ontologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by bearing phenomenal properties within their physical boundaries. The ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenality in the first place. Unlike the other alternatives, however, idealism is often considered implausible today, particularly by analytic philosophers. A reason for this (...) is the strong intuition that an objective world transcending phenomenality is a self-evident fact. Other arguments—such as the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function, the evidence for the existence of the universe before the origin of conscious life, etc.—are also often cited. In this essay, I will argue that these objections against the plausibility of idealism are false. As such, this essay seeks to show that idealism is an entirely plausible ontology. (shrink)

The Idea of the World offers a grounded alternative to the frenzy of unrestrained abstractions and unexamined assumptions in philosophy and science today. This book examines what can be learned about the nature of reality based on conceptual parsimony, straightforward logic and empirical evidence from fields as diverse as physics and neuroscience. It compiles an overarching case for idealism - the notion that reality is essentially mental - from ten original articles the author has previously published in leading academic journals. (...) The case begins with an exposition of the logical fallacies and internal contradictions of the reigning physicalist ontology and its popular alternatives, such as bottom-up panpsychism. It then advances a compelling formulation of idealism that elegantly makes sense of - and reconciles - classical and quantum worlds. The main objections to idealism are systematically refuted and empirical evidence is reviewed that corroborates the formulation presented here. The book closes with an analysis of the hidden psychological motivations behind mainstream physicalism and the implications of idealism for the way we relate to the world. (shrink)