Shared agency is of central importance in our lives in many ways. We enjoy engaging in certain joint activities with others. We also engage in joint activities to achieve complex goals. Current approaches propose that we understand shared agency in terms of the more basic phenomenon of shared intention. However, they have presented two antagonistic views about the nature of this phenomenon. Some have argued that shared intention should be understood as being primarily a structure of attitudes of individual participants (...) and their interrelations (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela and Miller). Others have claimed that shared intention should be regarded as being primarily a normative transaction which gives rise to interpersonal obligations (Gilbert). In contrast to these approaches, I propose a compromise view. I argue that shared intention involves a complex socio-psychological structure which ensures, in the absence of special circumstances, the existence of relevant moral obligations. My argument involves two main steps. First, I show that shared intention includes important relations of mutual reliance between the participants. Then, I argue that the existence of these relations of mutual reliance in shared intention helps us explain why, failing special circumstances, shared intention generates those obligations. This provides, in my view, a solution to the vexed question of the relation between shared intention and interpersonal obligations. (shrink)

In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose (...) can explain why it is not a mere accident that both (I) and (II) are true of shared intention, while psychological and normative views cannot. The basic idea is that shared intention involves a structure of attitudes of individuals –including, most importantly, attitudes of reliance – which normally plays the relevant motivating roles and creates the relevant obligations. (shrink)

Philosophers have in general offered only a partial view of the normative grounds of reliance. Some maintain that either one of evidence or of pragmatic considerations has a normative bearing on reliance, but are silent about whether the other kind of consideration has such a bearing on it as well. Others assert that both kinds of considerations have a normative bearing on reliance, but sidestep the question of what their relative normative bearing is. My aim in this article is to (...) offer a more systematic and comprehensive view of reasons for reliance. (shrink)

In this article I attempt to provide a conceptual framework for thinking about reliance in a systematic way. I argue that reliance is a cognitive attitude that has a tighter connection to the guidance of our thought and action than ordinary belief does. My main thesis is that reliance has a ‘constitutive aim’: namely, it aims at guiding our thought and action in a way that is sensible from the standpoint of practical or theoretical ends. This helps explain why reliance (...) is, in contrast to belief, typically formed and revised in response to pragmatic considerations. (shrink)

Shared intention normally leads to joint action. It does this, it is commonly said, only because it is a characteristically stable phenomenon, a phenomenon that tends to persist from the time it is formed until the time it is fulfilled. However, the issue of what the stability of shared intention comes down to remains largely undertheorized. My aim in this paper is to remedy this shortcoming. I argue that shared intention is a source of moral and epistemic reasons, that responsiveness (...) to such reasons on the part of each individual reinforces her own relevant attitudes, and that this enhances the stability of the shared intention as a whole. We thus discover an important self-reinforcing and stability-enhancing mechanism at the heart of shared intention and action. It follows from this proposal that the psychological commitment that an individual exhibits in joint action is normally a function not only of her own participatory intention, as often maintained, but also of her endorsement of the reasons created by her group’s shared intention to so act. (shrink)

Doxasticism is the thesis that intention is or involves belief in the forthcoming action (Velleman, Harman). Supporters claim that it is only by accepting that thesis that we can explain a wide array of important phenomena, including the special knowledge we have of intentional action, the roles intention plays in facilitating coordination, and the norms of rationality for intention. Others argue that the thesis is subject to counterexample (Davidson, Bratman). Yet some others contend that the thesis can be reformulated in (...) a way that avoids such counterexamples and preserves its explanatory significance (Pears, Setiya). Their suggestion is that we view intention as involving partial –rather than full—belief. I argue that while the move from full to partial doxasticism helps to accommodate such counterexamples, it does so in a way that undermines the ability of the resulting view to explain the coordinating roles of and rationality norms for intention. (shrink)

Philosophers of action of different persuasions have suggested that there is a tight connection between the phenomenon of intending and the phenomena of “being settled on” and of “settling” a course of action. For many, this connection supports an important constraint on intention: one may only intend what one takes one’s so intending as settling. Traditionally, this has been understood as a doxastic constraint on intention: what one takes one’s intention as settling is what one believes one’s so intending as (...) settling. This paper proposes an alternative conception of such a constraint. The idea is to conceive of it in terms of the attitude of reliance, rather than of belief. The aim of the paper is three-fold: to clarify the connection between intending to act and the phenomena of being settled on and of settling a course of action, to provide support for the reliance conception of the cited constraint, and to show that this conception drives a wedge in the familiar dispute, between doxastic and conative accounts of intention, as to whether intending to act necessarily involves the belief that one will so act. (shrink)

Intention plays a central role in coordinating action. It does so, it is commonly thought, by allowing one to plan further actions for the future on the basis of the belief that it will be executed. Doxasticists about intention (Harman, Velleman) conclude from this that accounting for this role of intention requires accepting the thesis that intention involves belief. Conativists (Bratman, Brunero, Mele) reject that conclusion. I argue that Doxasticists are right in calling attention to the existence of a cognitive (...) aspect to intention-based coordination, but that such an aspect is better understood in terms of the attitude of reliance than of belief. I also argue that an appeal to reliance affords Conativists with useful resources for explaining that aspect of intention-based coordination in a way that is compatible with their rejection of the aforementioned thesis. (shrink)

This is a survey article on reductive views of shared intention.

The claim I want to explore in this paper is simple. In social ontology, Margaret Gilbert, Abe Roth, Michael Bratman, Antonie Meijers, Facundo Alonso and others talk about rights or entitlements against other participants in joint action. I employ several intuition pumps to argue that we have reason to assume that such entitlements or rights can be ascribed even to non-sentient robots that we collaborate with. Importantly, such entitlements are primarily identified in terms of our normative discourse. Justified (...) criticism, for example, presupposes that another person acted wrongly, i.e., was not entitled to this action. Praise is supposed to encourage another person and acknowledge that one did more than one was obligated to. I show that such normative talk serves the same function when cooperating with robots. This, I argue, suggests that they have the same kind of entitlements and duties at least in the context of a joint action. (shrink)

Eco-Marxism presents a debate between two theoretical schools: metabolic rift theory, developed by John Foster and others, and world-ecology, proposed by Jason W. Moore. The debate refers ultimately to ontology, more precisely to the relation between society and nature. Critical realism plays a central role as the philosophical underlabouring for metabolic rift theory and has implications regarding the Anthropocene/Capitalocene debate as well. Reviewing the debate through CR categories provides clarity about the specifically social character of the causes of ecological disruptions. (...) Using CR, metabolic rift theorists could explain the interdisciplinary character of their analyses. By distinguishing between real transfactual mechanisms and their actual interaction in open systems, I intend to show that neither metabolic rift theory, nor its interdisciplinary approach to the Anthropocene, involve Cartesian Dualism, as Moore claims. World-Ecology provides an alternative historical account of capitalism's environmental history, but it does not critically replace metabolic rift theory. (shrink)

Resumen: En este trabajo voy a intentar una crítica inmanente del “monismo moral” de Axel Honneth desde el punto de vista de la lectura categorial del capital reconstruida por Moishe Postone. Críticos de Honneth como Nancy Fraser han señalado que los mercados modernos no podrían reconstruirse exhaustivamente en términos morales. Recuperando la crítica inmanente de la sociedad capitalista de Postone, sostendré que puede reconstruirse el cómo los mercados capitalistas presuponen principios normativos, cuya realización no distorsionada obturan sistemáticamente. La lógica del (...) capital, por lo tanto, permite construir un cuestionamiento de la neutralización sistemática de las pretensiones morales en el capitalismo y su dinámica social.: In this essay I will attempt an immanent criticism of Axel Honneth´s “moral monism” from the standpoint of Moishe Postone´s categorial reading of capital. Honneth´s critics such us Nancy Fraser have pointed out that modern markets cannot be fully reconstructed in moral terms. On the basis of Postone´s immanent critique of capitalism, I will claim that it is possible to reconstruct how capitalist markets presuppose moral principles, but systematically distort their realization. Postones theory may ground a critique of the neutralization of moral consideration in the capitalist form of society. This categorial reading may, thus, alloud for a questioning of the systemic neutralization of moral concerns under capitalism. (shrink)

Este artículo estudia afinidades no exploradas entre la teoría del capitalismo de El Anti-Edipo y algunas discusiones sobre la reproducción social en el marxismo feminista. Por un lado, el capitalismo, con su movimiento de decodificación de flujos, tiende a disolver a la familia bajo movimientos desterritorializados. Por el otro, supone una reterritorialización edípica en cuanto separa el parentesco de las relaciones de producción, fundando una escisión históricamente novedosa. La distinción entre axiomática y reterritorializaciones capitalistas, en este contexto, aparece como una (...) forma conceptual adecuada para analizar la relación entre familia y capitalismo en términos feministas-marxistas. (shrink)

The article presents a comparative analysis of the theories of capitalism of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus and Moishe Postone’s Time, Labor, and Social Domination. What Postone calls abstract domination is similar to the capitalist axiomatic of the French philosophers. These works introduce theories concerning the historical specificity of capitalism, which, at the same time, make possible an immanent critique of this particular social form. The authors of these works agree on highlighting the historically specific aspects of capitalism that (...) make the latter different from other social forms. Likewise, they maintain a partially affirmative relation to this social form, in which contradictory historical emancipatory possibilities are developed. Therefore, the article draws a parallel between Postone’s idea of abstract social domination and Deleuze and Guattari’s capitalist axiomatic. It also aims at showing that the three authors introduce a critique of capitalism, which is based on their own historical and social developments, and which work in an immanent way and not with abstract normative standards. (shrink)

This paper examines undergraduate business students' perception of corporate social responsibility in cases in which they have not attended any specific course either dealing with CSR or providing training in ethics. A survey was conducted of 535 Spanish business students as future managers. The results show that the stakeholders' perspective deserves a huge attention for those students considering what the keys of business success are. Significant differences in perception were nevertheless identified when a multifactorial analysis was undertaken. Female students are (...) more concerned about CSR issues. The maximization of value for shareholders is less valued by second- and third-year students than by first-year ones. The findings point to a number of important orientations for the future development of university curriculum. (shrink)

The Future of Representative Democracy poses important questions about representation, representative democracy and their future. Inspired by the last major investigation of the subject by Hanna Pitkin over four decades ago, this ambitious volume fills a major gap in the literature by examining the future of representative forms of democracy in terms of present-day trends and past theories of representative democracy. Aware of the pressing need for clarifying key concepts and institutional trends, the volume aims to break down barriers among (...) disciplines and to establish an interdisciplinary dialogue among scholars. The contributors emphasise that representative democracy and its future is a subject of pressing scholarly concern and public importance. Paying close attention to the unfinished, two-centuries-old relationship between democracy and representation, this book offers a fresh perspective on current problems and dilemmas of representative democracy and the possible future development of new forms of democratic representation. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to introduce, interpret, and defend the originality of the «first half» of the rational foundation of ethics of Francisco Miró Quesada Cantuarias (Lima 1918-2019). To do so, we will focus on his three first ethical works —«El Intelectual, el Occidente y la Política» (1965), «Sobre el Derecho Justo» (1976) y «Ser Humano Naturaleza, Historia» (1987)—, leaving his later works aside for a complementary work. We will show how Miró Quesada tries to refine Immanuel Kant’s (...) moral philosophy, overcoming its possible main flaw —here called disguised materialism— and rethinking the supreme moral principle, which he calls non-arbitrariness. We will also evaluate both his thesis that the principle of non-arbitrariness is the necessary condition of ethics and his invitation to renounce looking for its sufficient condition. On the way, we will highlight the originality of Miró Quesada’s proposal. Finally, we will advance the central thesis of his later ethical works and posit brief questions that his moral theory needs to answer. (shrink)

En este artículo analizamos la contribución de la teología protestante a la idea de autonomía moral a partir de un análisis de la obra de Juan Calvino. Mostramos cómo se afirma en ella la incapacidad del sujeto para conocer y querer el bien, manifiesto en la ley natural. Esta incapacidad es compensada con los mandatos bíblicos, para los que Calvino justificará una positivación jurídica en los Estados cristianos. Concluimos, por todo ello, que Calvino está lejos de la idea kantiana de (...) autonomía que consideramos distintiva de la Modernidad. (shrink)

Durante siglos lo que era un hecho que daba consistencia a la vida humana –cuidar– ha parecido ser sistemáticamente descatalogado y descargado de todo rango y categoría ética. La profusa presencia del cuidado en las fuentes griegas de la antigüedad desde la palabra epiméleia nos ha obligado a profundizar en los sentidos que la cura latina posee en la obra de Santo Tomás dada la preeminencia de esta para la teología moral posterior vinculada a la d– en el catálogo de (...) las virtudes junto con la misericordia, la beneficencia y la limosna que hacen operativa la caridad. El cuidar en su realización del amor irá más allá de socorrer las necesidades cuya forma verbal subvenio oscureció la cura y su sentido de atención, preocupación y ocupación activa por el prójimo.For centuries, what gave consistency to human life –to take care of- has seemed to be systematically discontinued and discharged of all rank and its ethical category. The abundant presence of care in the Greek sources of antiquity since the word epimeleia, has forced us to go deeper into the different meanings that the Latin word cura has in St Thomas’ work, given its prominence in a subsequent moral theology linked to charity. This requires a careful review of care as a virtue - to give it the majority of age- in the catalog of virtues together with mercy, beneficence and alms that make charity operational. Caring, in their realization of love, will go beyond needs help whose verbal form subvenio obscured its meaning of attention, concern and active occupation for the neighbor. (shrink)

El nacionalismo es un fenómeno a la vez poliédrico y de contornos difusos. Hay, sin embargo, un conjunto de parecidos familiares que autorizan una aproximación desde el ángulo normativo. Estas páginas se centran en la vertiente oscura, arguyendo que las consecuencias de las políticas de corte nacionalista tienen que ver con un cierto número de factores que inciden en la acción colectiva que guardan relación con el tema de la identidad. Después de justificar el enfoque, se trata: 1. de ciertas (...) particularidades de la retórica nacionalista 2. del bajo coste relativo de la movilización desde el marco nacionalista y de la preponderancia de la variante étnica 3. del papel de las emociones negativas Unas consideraciones sobre las eventuales vías de salida cierran el artículo. (shrink)

Neste artigo, demonstrei a relação entre a Memória, a História Oral e o Patrimônio Imaterial Afro-brasileiro. Apontei para os aspectos teóricos e para a práxis de uma História Oral capaz de oferecer algumas bases para a salvaguarda do Patrimônio Imaterial. Para tanto, propus um diálogo dinâmico com diferentes conceitos de Memória, sobretudo conforme compreendida por Joël Candau e Maurice Halbwachs. Apresentei diferentes conceitos em diálogo com autores especialistas em Patrimônio Imaterial, como: Maria Amélia Jundurian Corá, Chiara Bortolotto e Ulpiano Toledo (...) Bezerra de Menses. Além disso, identifiquei procedimentos construídos por José Carlos Sebe Bom Meihy, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro e Fabíola Holanda no âmbito do Núcleo de Estudos em História Oral – NEHO/USP. Palavras-chave: Memória, História Oral, Patrimônio Imaterial, Teoria. (shrink)

Rerum Novarum is a unique case of an encyclical, for we know in great detail how it was drafted and written. If we connect this knowledge to the fact that Matteo Liberatore - the main thinker who collaborated to its writing - wrote a treatise on the Principles of Political Economy, we can analyse how economic thought and moral theology are intertwined in the work of Liberatore. Similarly, the study of the economic thought of Liberatore can help us understand two (...) important questions of Rerum Novarum, namely, private property and the question of a just wage. (shrink)

Neste artigo, o trabalho seminal de Luciano Floridi “A Lógica de Estar Informado” é examinado em detalhes, em especial quais aspectos tornam tal lógica relevante para que a mesma não colapse em sistemas lógicos epistêmicos ou doxásticos conhecidos. Ao final, é apresentado um cenário para demonstrar que a refletividade da relação de acessibilidade não é necessária, e desse modo os axiomas de introspecção positiva e negativa podem ser descartados, e.g. quando se afirma que um agente pode deter uma informação sem (...) estar informado que ele detém uma informação. (shrink)

En este trabajo analizamos cómo se articula la justificación estadística de las conclusiones obtenidas en los ensayos clínicos aleatorizados con sus condiciones de aceptabilidad ética y política. Pretendemos mostrar cómo varía tal justificación dependiendo de nuestra concepción de la probabilidad y, correlativamente, qué argumentos éticos se pueden ofrecer sobre cada una de ellas. Veremos cómo los enfoques frecuentista y bayesiano resultan defendibles en el ámbito de los ensayos clínicos y defenderemos que, para su aceptación pública, se les debe exigir garantías (...) de imparcialidad cuyo mejor ejemplo es la propia técnica de aleatorización. /// This paper analyses how to combine the statistical justification of the results obtained in a randomised clinical trial and the ethical and social arguments that support its implementation. It aims at showing how this justification varies according to the view on probability we adopt and the different ethical cases that can be made to sustain it. Both the frequentist and the Bayesian approaches to the design of clinical trials will be seen as equally defensible on these grounds. To be socially acceptable both approaches must meet an impartiality requirement, which is best served by the technique of randomisation. (shrink)