There is an ethics of blaming the person who deserves blame. The Christian scriptures imply the following no-vengeance condition: a person should not vengefully overtly blame a wrongdoer even if she gives the wrongdoer the exact negative treatment that he deserves. I explicate and defend this novel condition and argue that it demands a revolution in our blaming practices. First, I explain the no-vengeance condition. Second, I argue that the no-vengeance condition is often violated. The most common (...) species of blame involves anger; anger conceptually includes a desire for vengeance; and there are many pleasures in payback. Third, I clarify that it is possible to blame non-vengefully in anger and highlight three good uses for anger in non-vengeful blame. Fourth, I offer two reasons that justify the divine command prohibiting vengeance, and I note that the Christian God is merely sufficient to make non-vengeance morally obligatory. Fifth, I defend the no-vengeance condition against four biblical objections. (shrink)

The afterlife has been imagined in a diversity of ways, one of which is as a vehicle for vengeance. Upon outlining, via the figures of Tertullian and Sayyid Qutb, a vengeful formulation of afterlife belief, this essay examines Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of such a belief. The belief is framed as an expression of impotence insofar as believers imagine in the beyond what they cannot achieve in the present, namely, taking vengeance upon their enemies. Nietzsche’s critique leads to the (...) essay’s central question. Is a vengeance-based formulation of afterlife belief an expression of impotence? To respond, this essay will analyze the practices and rhetoric of the Islamic fundamentalist group Boko Haram, while also briefly mentioning Al Qaeda and ISIS. As a result of the analysis, a simplistic and unqualified form of the impotence critique is to be rejected. Nonetheless, the critique remains relevant. Boko Haram’s lack of emphasis on afterlife belief in general and its omission of a vengeance-based formulation in particular highlights the possibility that a radical religious group’s approach to the afterlife is related to the group’s relative strength or weakness. Such a possibility carries practical ramifications when assessing the scope of that group’s aims and its willingness to act. (shrink)

This essay argues that the motifs of divine vengeance present in the Histories reflect a conscious, considered theory of divine action. This theory is defined by Herodotus’ empirical methodology and his lack of poetic revelation or other claimed insight into the nature and motivations of divinity. For Herodotus, divinity possesses a basically regulatory role in the cosmos, ensuring that history follows certain consistent patterns. One such pattern is vengeance, by which a large-scale balance of reciprocity is maintained in (...) human events through human and divine acts of repayment. This theory underlies Herodotus’ historical project, reinforcing his general skepticism about human knowledge and power and making possible his universalizing approach to historical narrative. (shrink)

Thinking about truth can be more dangerous than it looks. Of course, our concept of truth is the source of one of the most frustrating and impenetrable paradoxes humans have ever contemplated, the liar paradox, but that is just the beginning of its treachery. In an effort to understand why one of the most beloved and revered members of our conceptual repertoire could cause us so much trouble, philosophers have for centuries proposed “solutions” to the liar paradox. However, it seems (...) that our concept of truth takes offense to our efforts to understand it because it appears to retaliate against those who propose “solutions” to the liar. It takes its revenge on us by creating new paradoxes from our own attempts to find resolution. That is, most proposed solutions to the liar paradox give rise to new, more insidious paradoxes—often called revenge paradoxes. For our attempts at understanding, truth rewards us with inconsistent theories, untenable logics, and a deep feeling of bewilderment. It is as if our concept of truth lashes out at us because it wants to remain a mystery. After a few run-ins with truth, many philosophers have the good sense to keep their distance. Far from being the serene, profound concept most people take it to be, those of us who think much about the liar paradox know truth to be a vengeful bully—a conceptual misanthrope. (shrink)

Batman is allied with modern natural law in the way he relies upon reason to bring about his vision of ‘true justice’, operating as a force external to law. This vision of justice is a protective one, with Batman existing as a guardian—a force for resistance against the corruption of the state and the failures of the legal system. But alongside his rational means, Batman also employs violence as he moves beyond the boundaries of the civilised state into the dark (...) and violent world outside law’s protection. He thus sacrifices his own safety to ensure the safety of others—he is a Dark Knight, a sentinel, fighting the nasty and brutish underworld of criminality in his effort to bring rational order to the world and protect the people of Gotham from criminal harm. This fight for justice is fuelled by a deeply private trauma: the murder of Bruce Wayne’s parents: a private desire for vengeance that Batman transcends. In navigating Batman’s jurisprudential dimensions, we are ultimately reminded that private desires and motivations are enfolded within the public structures of justice. (shrink)

Justice is typically treated in philosophy and political science as a matter of theory and reasoning. I argue instead for a conception of justice based first of all on emotions, in particular, the emotions of compassion, caring, and vengeance.

본고의 목표는 구혼자들의 악행의 본질이, 영웅의 재산과 아내에 대한 그들의 탐욕에 있는 것이 아니라, 인간가치에 대한 전면적인 파괴라는 것을 보이는 것이다. 이해를 돕기 위해, 구혼자들과 많은 유사성을 보이는 폴뤼페모스와의 비교연구가 이루어질 것이다. 한편, 인간가치를 파괴하고, 신들처럼 살고자 하는 구혼자들의 욕구를 이해함으로써, 민담이나 기타 구송 귀향시에 등장하는 남편의 승리와는 근본적으로 다른, 오뒷세우스의 복수의 의미를 좀 더 깊은 차원에서 이해하고자 한다. 구혼자들은 이타카의 실질적인 지배자들로서, 신과 인간을 능멸하며, 인간의 행위를 지배하는 모든 규범들을 무시한다. 그들은 신들과 인간의 경계를 무시한 채, 마치 신들처럼 행세한다. (...) 따라서, 오뒷세우스와 구혼자들의 전투는 인간조건과 인간의 삶을 두고 대립하는 자들의 대결로 파악할 수 있으며, 이는 양립할 수 없는 두 가치의 충돌이다. (shrink)

El propósito de “Venganza imaginaria y espera escatológica” es demostrar como la temporalidad heredada de la religión cristiana se divide en dos regímenes distintos. Uno nos permite profundizar y ralentizar, según un largo proceso de incorporación. El otro, vinculado a una teleología fantasmática, es un tiempo acelerado por el ansioso esfuerzo de acabar con todo. En el conflicto que opone estas dos temporalidades, Nietzsche procura definir tres tipos de relaciones entre la espera y la expectativa.

America is driven by vengeance in Terry Aladjem's provocative account – a reactive, public anger that is a threat to democratic justice itself. From the return of the death penalty to the wars on terror and in Iraq, Americans demand retribution and moral certainty; they assert the 'rights of victims' and make pronouncements against 'evil'. Yet for Aladjem this dangerously authoritarian turn has its origins in the tradition of liberal justice itself – in theories of punishment that justify inflicting (...) pain and in the punitive practices that result. Exploring vengeance as the defining problem of our time, Aladjem returns to the theories of Locke, Hegel and Mill. He engages the ancient Greeks, Nietzsche, Paine and Foucault to challenge liberal assumptions about punishment. He interrogates American law, capital punishment and images of justice in the media. He envisions a democratic justice that is better able to contain its vengeance. (shrink)

Se abordan dos formas de justicia en principio antagónicas: la retributiva, propia del mundo de los héroes y de la venganza antigua, y la punitiva, de tradición tanto antigua como moderna, que consiste en la racionalización de la violencia mediante el tribunal. Se muestra la preeminencia de la punitiva, el antagonismo a medias con la retributiva, que viene a ser la apropiación de la violencia por la necesidad, y su marginación del ámbito de la justicia. The article addresses two antagonistic (...) forms of justice: retributive justice, form which belongs to the world of heroes and ancient vengeance; and punitive justice, which can be found in both ancient and modern traditions and consists on the rationalization of violence by means of the court. The article shows the preeminence of the punitive justice, its half antagonism with the retributive form -which comes to be violence's appropriation made by necessity -, and its margination from justice's ambit. (shrink)

This paper analyzes two main pro-vengeance Confucian arguments in light of Desmond Tutu's thinking. In the absence of just authority, Confucianism argues that carrying out blood vengeance is fulfillment of filial piety and fulfillment of moral duty for deterring crime and reforming the wrongdoer's character. Confucianism does not propose a systematic theory of blood vengeance after laws have been installed to prohibit act of revenge. As Confucian ethics focuses on virtue cultivation and advocates moral learning over punishment, (...) it may find the Tutuist approach of addressing wrongdoing compatible and complementary. In line with Tutuism, we argue that revenge is not justified because engaging in vengeance fuels negative and obsessive emotions, which undermine virtue and may lead to undesirable results, such as escalation of violence and harming of the innocent. Moreover, we defend that more conditions need to be met than the ones enunciated by the pro-vengeance standpoint to justify an act of revenge. (shrink)

Quentin Tarantino’s filmography, especially since the turn of the century, seems to be an argument for the moral justification of revenge. Bill and his D.iV.A.S. hit-squad (from Kill Bill); Adolf Hitler and Hans Landa (from Inglourious Basterds); “Monsieur” Calvin Candie and his loyal house slave Stephen (from Django Unchained); Stuntman Mike and the Manson family killers (from Death Proof and Once Upon a Time in Hollywood); and Daisy Domergue and General Sanford Smithers (from The Hateful Eight) – they all had (...) it coming, and audiences celebrate when they get what they deserve. Revenge, Tarantino reminds us, is a dish best served cold. But is it really the kind of thing that can be morally justified? To see whether it is, this chapter explores arguments both historic and contemporary. After delineating revenge from legal justice and simple retribution and exploring how Tarantino’s films argue for moral justification of revenge, we will consider common everyday arguments on the topic, as well as the relevant arguments of Plato, Baruch Spinoza, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Friedrich Nietzsche, Trudy Govier, Suzanne Uniacke, Andrew Oldenquist, Simone de Beauvoir, Joshua Gert, Gilead Bar-elli, David Heyd, Robert Nozick, and others. In the end, we will see that revenge can be justified – but only in very specific conditions. (shrink)

Sandia National Laboratories, located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, was originally a part of Los Alamos Laboratory. In 1949, AT&T agreed to manage Sandia, which they did for the next 44 years. During those Cold War years, Sandia was the prime weapons engineering laboratory for Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore. As such, it bore prime responsibility for designing and adapting nuclear weapons for the military services' delivery systems, and ensuring the safety and reliability of the stockpile. The Labs' history has been (...) unevenly documented, hindered by the secret nature of its work and the desire of management to maintain a low public profile. There have been three history programs at Sandia: a restricted history published internally in 1963; another history program in the early 1980s that resulted in a history of the Labs' first decade; and the current history program dating from the mid-1990s, which has published a general history and several monographs. This article discusses the challenges and problems inherent in documenting the history of a national weapons laboratory during the last 50 years. (shrink)

This Article situates contemporary shifts in citizenship law within a story of the relationship of globalization and illegal migration. The central argument is that citizenship as a formal legal status is enjoying a resurgence of authority at present. This mirrors the paradoxical nature of globalization itself: along the vector of citizenship, both inclusions and exclusions are increasing at present. As states are increasingly unable to assert exclusive power in a range of policy domains, immigration and citizenship law are transformed into (...) a last bastion of sovereignty. Many shifts in citizenship law are explained through an understanding of how migration law and citizenship law work in tandem to form the border of the national community. Recent changes in citizenship law respond to two trends: a crackdown on extra-legal migration and a desire to reassert authority over diasporic populations. While the focus of the Article is on citizenship as a formal legal status, the importance of amnesty programs for extra-legal migrants demonstrates that ultimately the bifurcation of formal and substantive citizenship is untenable. (shrink)

If Joan of Arc were to be reincarnated as an American atheist, she'd be Voltairine de Cleyre. De Cleyre is an almost forgotten figure, but she committed her life to a vision of human liberation, a vision which encompassed even the man who tried to kill her. She was an incandescent writer and an original thinker, though she also lived much of her life in despair to the point of suicide.

In this volume Peter A. French sets out to resurrect the role and meaning of vengeance. For French, vengeance is a fundamental aspect of morality that has “fallen into disrepute without being seriously examined”. Although at times this book appears less than serious, it is indeed an earnest analysis worth reading not only for ethicists but for philosophical and political audiences alike. His central argument is that very often “wrong doing requires a hostile response”. Thus, rightly understood, (...) class='Hi'>vengeance is an essential principle of morality that ought not to be entirely done away with. Revenge, French argues, “is the technology of moral empowerment, a technology for the sustaining of morality. I do not claim that it is the only one or indeed that it is the best one, although in some situations it well may be the only available one”. (shrink)

The present essay looks to add to the body of literature that seeks to clarify the nature of vengeance and evaluate it morally. However, unlike previous philosophical investigations of vengeance, my essay examines it not from the standpoint of impersonal justice but from the perspective of the one who seeks it, to determine whether it is good for the would-be avenger. The values I measure it by are fulfillment and self-knowledge. The paper has two major parts. In the (...) first, I argue that vengefulness is motivated by two ends: allaying a sense of vulnerability and preserving a positive self-conception. The emotional benefits of a vengeful disposition, I claim, come at the expense of self-knowledge. They are therefore unstable and prone to give way when vengefulness is translated into action. In the second part, I try to substantiate this claim by examining two criticisms of vengeance: that its pursuit can diminish the avenger by consuming him and that it is self-defeating. Framing vengefulness within broader psychoanalytic accounts of the repetition compulsion and projection, I endorse versions of both criticisms that tie vengeance’s failure to provide fulfillment to some of the ways in which it occludes self-knowledge. (shrink)

The topic of this article is the principle of non-vengeance, or a denial of the spirit of revenge [der Geist der Rache – Ger.], and how it is conceptualized in Friedrich Nietzsche and Lev Shestov. Both thinkers make this principle central to their philosophical discussions. However, they have different motives and ways of realizing the principle in their theories. Nietzsche’s approach is manifested in his idea of the eternal recurrence, while for Shestov, the principle is rooted in his interpretation (...) of the biblical myth of “repealing the past evil.” Nietzsche defines vengeance as the will to repeal a past misdeed. Only our own will, turning toward the past and reevaluating itself, can free us from the spirit of revenge. Shestov goes beyond Nietzsche, transforming a moral problem into a theodicy problem. Truth is in the power of an Almighty Creator, who is capable of repealing something that has existed before. The absolute freedom of an all-powerful God who by his own volition can at once repeal a past evil shall solve the problem of vengeance. This article attempts to show the evolution of the two philosophers’ views on the problem of vengeance and non-vengeance, putting those views in the context of the key events in the thinkers’ lives. (shrink)

Paraconsistent dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true and that the inference rule ex falso quod libet is invalid. A long-standing problem for paraconsistent dialetheism is that it has difficulty making sense of situations where people use locutions like ‘just true’ and ‘just false’. Jc Beall recently advocated a general strategy, which he terms shrieking, for solving this problem and thereby strengthening the case for paraconsistent dialetheism. However, Beall’s strategy fails, and seeing why it fails brings into greater (...) focus just how daunting the just-true problem is for the dialetheist. (shrink)

In On the Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche exposes christianity as the product of the slave morality and its resentment. Nietzsche’s exposure provoked different reactions. In Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen from 1913 Max Scheler shows, in contrast to Nietzsche, that the quintessence of christian ethics does not arise from resentment. More interesting than Scheler’s rebuttal of Nietzsche is the reaction from the French-American thinker René Girard . Girard does not only criticize Nietzsche’s analysis, but goes as well into the (...) both paradoxal and crucial point that resentment is, on the one hand, intertwined with christian culture and, on the other, is at odds with christian inspiration. I would like to present Girard’s rebuttal of Nietzsche in two steps. First, I outline the background of Girard’s view on the relation between myth and christianity, taking his interpretation of the function of the scapegoat mechanism in premodern mythical religions as a starting-point. According to Girard, christianity functions as the exposure of premodern mythical religions, rejecting as it does the foundational role of the scapegoat mechanism as a means of canalising violence, inherent to mimetic desire. It is not christianity’s intent to canalize violence by means of limited violence , but precisely to expose violence. By making obvious that christianity did not succeed in doing this – by giving a philosophical analysis of the role of christianity in Western culture Girard shows that christianity has succeeded only in wounding violence, not in eliminating it and, as a consequence, has cleared the way for resentment – he is able to demonstrate that resentment is the child of christianity, not its father. Subsequently I outline Girard’s view on the role of mimetic desire in modern culture. Instead of canalizing mimetic desire by means of the scapegoat mechanism, modern Western culture unchains mimetic desire by means of the free market principle of competition. External mediation, which is typical of premodern mythical-religious cultures, is now being replaced by internal mediation, which is guided by economic principles. As such, resentment is going to determine modern culture from within. Hence, christianity will, as an integral part of modern culture, be likely to fall a prey to this resentment. Finally, I conclude by going into the challenge christianity, squeezed as it were between religious claims on the one hand and modern presuppositions on the other, has to cope with: how can it overcome resentment, of which it undoubtedly bears the fruits and which it simultaneously radically rejects? (shrink)