30 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Kevin Scharp [33]Kevin A. Scharp [1]
  1.  85
    Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
    Kevin Scharp proposes an original theory of the nature and logic of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. He argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept, and proposes a detailed theory of inconsistent concepts that can be applied to the case of truth. Truth also happens to be a useful concept, but its inconsistency inhibits its utility; as such, it should be replaced with consistent concepts that can (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   127 citations  
  2. Replacing truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.
    Of the dozens of purported solutions to the liar paradox published in the past fifty years, the vast majority are "traditional" in the sense that they reject one of the premises or inference rules that are used to derive the paradoxical conclusion. Over the years, however, several philosophers have developed an alternative to the traditional approaches; according to them, our very competence with the concept of truth leads us to accept that the reasoning used to derive the paradox is sound. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   164 citations  
  3. Philosophy as the Study of Defective Concepts.Kevin Scharp - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 396-416.
    Abstract: From familiar concepts like TALL and TABLE to exotic ones like GRAVITY and GENOCIDE, they guide our lives and are the basis for how we represent the world. However, there is good reason to think that many of our most cherished concepts, like TRUTH, FREEDOM, KNOWLEDGE, and RATIONALITY are defective in the sense that the rules for using them are inconsistent. This defect leads those who possess these concepts into paradoxes and absurdities. Indeed, I argue that many of the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  4. Replies to Bacon, Eklund, and Greenough on Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):422-475.
    ABSTRACTAndrew Bacon, Matti Eklund, and Patrick Greenough have individually proposed objections to the project in my book, Replacing Truth. Briefly, the book outlines a conceptual engineering project – our defective concept of truth is replaced for certain purposes with a team of concepts that can do some of the jobs we thought truth could do. Here, I respond to their objections and develop the views expressed in Replacing Truth in various ways.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  5.  80
    What is conceptual disruption?Samuela Marchiori & Kevin Scharp - unknown
    Recent work on philosophy of technology emphasises the ways in which technology can disrupt our concepts and conceptual schemes. We analyse and challenge existing accounts of conceptual disruption, criticising views according to which conceptual disruption can be understood in terms of uncertainty for conceptual application, as well as views assuming all instances of conceptual disruption occur at the same level. We proceed to provide our own account of conceptual disruption as an interruption in the normal functioning of concepts and conceptual (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Truth, the Liar, and Relativism.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):427-510.
    This essay proposes a theory of the nature and logic of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. The paradoxes associated with truth (for example, the liar) and the pattern of failures in our attempts to deal with them suggest that truth is an inconsistent concept. The first part of the essay describes a pair of replacement concepts, which the essay dubs ascending truth and descending truth, along with an axiomatic theory (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  7.  71
    Shrieking in the face of vengeance.Kevin Scharp - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):454-463.
    Paraconsistent dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true and that the inference rule ex falso quod libet is invalid. A long-standing problem for paraconsistent dialetheism is that it has difficulty making sense of situations where people use locutions like ‘just true’ and ‘just false’. Jc Beall recently advocated a general strategy, which he terms shrieking, for solving this problem and thereby strengthening the case for paraconsistent dialetheism. However, Beall’s strategy fails, and seeing why it fails brings into greater (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  8.  31
    Semantics for Reasons.Bryan R. Weaver & Kevin Scharp - 2019 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Edited by Kevin Scharp.
    Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion Reasons Contextualism. They use this view to argue for a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9. (1 other version)Alethic vengeance.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), The Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
    Thinking about truth can be more dangerous than it looks. Of course, our concept of truth is the source of one of the most frustrating and impenetrable paradoxes humans have ever contemplated, the liar paradox, but that is just the beginning of its treachery. In an effort to understand why one of the most beloved and revered members of our conceptual repertoire could cause us so much trouble, philosophers have for centuries proposed “solutions” to the liar paradox. However, it seems (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  10. Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability.Kevin Scharp - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):597-645.
    Although there has been a recent swell of interest in theories of truth that attempt solutions to the liar paradox and the other paradoxes affecting our concept of truth, many of these theories have been criticized for generating new paradoxes, called revenge paradoxes. The criticism is that the theories of truth in question are inadequate because they only work for languages lacking in the resources to generate revenge paradoxes. Theorists facing these objections offer a range of replies, and the matter (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  11.  62
    The End of Vagueness: Technological Epistemicism, Surveillance Capitalism, and Explainable Artificial Intelligence.Alison Duncan Kerr & Kevin Scharp - 2022 - Minds and Machines 32 (3):585-611.
    Artificial Intelligence (AI) pervades humanity in 2022, and it is notoriously difficult to understand how certain aspects of it work. There is a movement—_Explainable_ Artificial Intelligence (XAI)—to develop new methods for explaining the behaviours of AI systems. We aim to highlight one important philosophical significance of XAI—it has a role to play in the elimination of vagueness. To show this, consider that the use of AI in what has been labeled _surveillance capitalism_ has resulted in humans quickly gaining the capability (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12.  64
    Tolerance and the Multi‐range View of Vagueness.Kevin Scharp - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):467-474.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13. Scorekeeping in a Defective Language Game.Kevin A. Scharp - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):203-226.
    One common criticism of deflationism is that it does not have the resources to explain defective discourse (e.g., vagueness, referential indeterminacy, confusion, etc.). This problem is especially pressing for someone like Robert Brandom, who not only endorses deflationist accounts of truth, reference, and predication, but also refuses to use representational relations to explain content and propositional attitudes. To address this problem, I suggest that Brandom should explain defective discourse in terms of what it is to treat some portion of discourse (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  14.  86
    Communication and content: Circumstances and consequences of the Habermas-Brandom debate.Kevin Scharp - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):43 – 61.
    The recent exchange between Robert Brandom and Jürgen Habermas provides an opportunity to compare and contrast some aspects of their systems. Both present broadly inferential accounts of meaning, according to which the content of an expression is determined by its role in an inferential network. Several problems confront such theories of meaning - one of which threatens the possibility of communication because content is relative to an individual's set of beliefs. Brandom acknowledges this problem and provides a solution to it. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  15.  66
    (1 other version)On the indeterminacy of the meter.Kevin Scharp - 2017 - Synthese 196:1-31.
    In the International System of Units, ‘meter’ is defined in terms of seconds and the speed of light, and ‘second’ is defined in terms of properties of cesium 133 atoms. I show that one consequence of these definitions is that: if there is a minimal length, then the chances that ‘meter’ is completely determinate are only 1 in 21,413,747. Moreover, we have good reason to believe that there is a minimal length. Thus, it is highly probable that ‘meter’ is indeterminate. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16. New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering.Manuel Gustavo Isaac, Kevin Scharp & Steffen Koch (eds.) - forthcoming - Synthese Library.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  54
    Truth's saviour?Kevin Scharp - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):183-188.
    Hartry Field’s book, Saving Truth from Paradox, is without question among the best works on truth and the liar paradox in the analytic tradition—it should become the standard reference on the liar paradox for years to come. Field offers lucid, technically accurate, but accessible discussions of most of the approaches to the liar paradox that are currently being debated in the literature. He also defends his favored approach, which requires a change from classical to paracomplete logic. After a brief flirtation (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18.  40
    A defense of QUD reasons contextualism.Bryan R. Weaver & Kevin Scharp - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    In this article, we defend the semantic theory, Question Under Discussion (QUD) Contextualism about Reasons that we develop in our monograph Semantics for Reasons against a series of objections that focus on whether our semantics can deliver predictions for some common examples, how we defend the semantic theory, and how we assess it compared to its competitors.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Truth and expressive completeness.Kevin Scharp - 2009 - In Reading Brandom.
    Robert Brandom claims that the theory of meaning he presents in Making It Explicit is expressively complete—i.e., it successfully applies to the language in which the theory of meaning is formulated. He also endorses a broadly Kripkean approach to the liar paradox. I show that these two commitments are incompatible, and I survey several options for resolving the problem.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. Brandom on Communication.Kevin Scharp - 2012 - In Jason Hannon & Robert Rutland (eds.), Philosophical Profiles in the Theory of Communication. McGill-Queen's University Press.
    This chapter covers some of Robert Brandom’s contributions to our understanding of communication. Topics discussed include his theory of discursive practice, his inferential semantics, his scorekeeping pragmatics, his views on the “transmission” model of communication, and his semantic perspectivism. I compare his scorekeeping pragmatic theory to other kinds of pragmatic theories, and I argue that his semantic perspectivism can be understood as a global indexical relativism.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Wilfrid Sellars' Anti-Descriptivism.Kevin Scharp - 2012 - In Leila Haaparanta & Heikki J. Koskinen (eds.), Categories of Being: Essays on Metaphysics and Logic. Oxford, England: OUP USA.
    The work of Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, and others initiated a tradition in philosophy that has come to be known as anti-descriptivism. I argue that when properly interpreted, Wilfrid Sellars is a staunch anti-descriptivist. Not only does he accept most of the conclusions drawn by the more famous anti-descriptivists, he goes beyond their critiques to reject the fundamental tenant of descriptivism—that understanding a linguistic expression consists in mentally grasping its meaning and associating that meaning with the expression. I show that Sellars’ (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22.  63
    Analytic Pragmatism and Universal LX Vocabulary.Richard Samuels & Kevin Scharp - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1-25.
    In his recent John Locke Lectures – published as Between Saying and Doing – Brandom extends and refines his views on the nature of language and philosophy by developing a position that he calls Analytic Pragmatism. Although Brandom’s project bears on an extraordinarily rich array of different philosophical issues, we focus here on the contention that certain vocabularies have a privileged status within our linguistic practices, and that when adequately understood, the practices in which these vocabularies figure can help furnish (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Locke's theory of reflection.Kevin Scharp - 2008 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (1):25 – 63.
    Those concerned with Locke’s Essay have largely ignored his account of reflection. I present and defend an interpretation of Locke’s theory of reflection on which reflection is not a variety of introspection; rather, for Locke, we acquire ideas of our mental operations indirectly. Furthermore, reflection is involuntary and distinct from consciousness. The interpretation I present also explains reflection’s role in the acquisition of non-sensory ideas (e.g., ideas of pleasure, existence, succession, etc.). I situate this reading within the secondary literature on (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. Falsity.Kevin Scharp - 2010 - In Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Although there is a massive amount of work on truth, there is very little work on falsity. Most philosophers probably think this is appropriate; after all, once we have a solid understanding of truth, falsity should not prove to be much of a challenge. However, there are several interesting and difficult issues associated with understanding falsity. After considering two prominent definitions of falsity and presenting objections to each one, I propose a definition that avoids their problems.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  12
    G. Priest, Doubt truth to be a liar.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 13 (4):541.
  26. Reading Brandom.Kevin Scharp (ed.) - 2009
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Xeno Semantics for Ascending and Descending Truth.Kevin Scharp - manuscript
    As part of an approach to the liar paradox and the other paradoxes affecting truth, I have proposed replacing our concept of truth with two concepts: ascending truth and descending truth.1 I am not going to discuss why I think this is the best approach or how it solves the paradoxes; instead, I concentrate on the theory of ascending and descending truth. I formulate an axiomatic theory of ascending truth and descending truth (ADT) and provide a possible-worlds semantics for it (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. Norms and Necessity, by Amie Thomasson. [REVIEW]Matthew Chrisman & Kevin Scharp - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):267-276.
    Imagine you’re teaching someone how to play chess. You might start by saying ‘White must move first’, where the word ‘must’ is used to convey a rule. You would.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29.  17
    Doubt truth to be a liar. [REVIEW]Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 13 (4):541-543.
  30. On Richard’s When Truth Gives Out. [REVIEW]Kevin Scharp & Stewart Shapiro - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):455-463.
    On Richard’s When Truth Gives Out Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9796-0 Authors Kevin Scharp, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 350 University Hall, 230 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210, USA Stewart Shapiro, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 350 University Hall, 230 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark