Being able to apprehend the determinants that influence the way a person or a group develops one’s relationship with time constitutes a crucial aspect of a process of professionalization. Based on this assumption, this paper formulates six finalities characterizing a critical and reflective approach in order to conceive and question the relationships between professionalization and temporalities. It proposes in particular to question the way one learns to discriminate, evaluate, interpret, argue, judge and challenge the temporalities and the rhythms, lived (...) or observed, that determine the everyday life and lifelong learning. Doing so, this reflection suggests one to conceive professionalization as a capacity to (re)organize a rhythmic autonomy. (shrink)

Critical reflection helps professionals to learn directly from their practice experience, so that they can improve their own work in an ongoing and flexible way - something essential in today's complex and changing organisations. It allows change to be managed in a way which enables individuals to preserve a sense of what is fundamentally important to them as professionals. It is particularly important as it can also help make sense of some fundamental issues, and so also has implications (...) for how we live our lives. However, more systematic research on critical reflection is needed to help us understand what works best for professionals in different settings. This timely work explores how critical reflection is researched, evaluated and used as a research method itself, with the aim of improving how it is taught and practised in a rigorous and transferable way. Developing a more comprehensive and multi-disciplinary view of the current state of critical reflection and the research directions which need to be taken, the book is divided into four parts. It: - Provides an overview of different perspectives on critical reflection and stimulates dialogue between them - Establishes some common platforms from which to develop further research directions - Identifies the major issues in evaluating critical reflection teaching, and main methods for doing so - Contributes to social science methodological innovations by exploring how methods based on critical reflection can be used for researching professional practice - Contains contributions from academics who are internationally known and highly experienced in different aspects of critical reflection. Researching Critical Reflectionis an important reference for all students, practitioners, and researchers - including in the areas of education, management, health and social work - who engage with critical reflection to develop their practice. (shrink)

Vocational education is generally structured around self-evaluation and the analysis of the practice of people in training, in order to favour their autonomy to face unprecedented situations. In this sense, a central position is given to experience in training which is observed and analysed each time it is possible. This approach that the institution - and its teachers - have to fundamentally rethink dual education. But rethinking dual education taking into account the experience of the teachers in training as well (...) as the situations they face, results in a questioning on various temporalities which are sometimes competing, in education. The meso time of the institution not always being in phase with the micro and very personal time of learning, this dysphasia can become a source of schizo-chronie, a discontinuity of which the rhythmicity, will naturally be different from one person to another. This research thus gives us an opportunity to understand more fully the rhythms of adult learning in the situation of on-the-job training in order to take this into consideration in future teaching and andragogic system. It is addressed to teachers designing dual educational systems and teachers involved in such trainings. More generally to any teacher or designer, even if he/she does not act in a situation of dual training, as dual training is not just a simple juxtaposition of place and/or time, but also a process of explicitation and mediatisation of professional practice. (shrink)

The author reviews the literature in professional education that cites Ernest Becker’s work from the 1960s-70s. Some of Becker’s main ideas from his own writing on education are also reviewed. The purpose here is to establish a sketch, not a full-study, of the importance of Becker’s educational legacy and begin some critique of the biases of professional educators in regard to utilizing Becker’s work. This critical reflectivity is an appropriate model of Becker’s own integrative approach to knowledge and learning. (...) The aim is to ensure that future applications may be cautious to certain reductive tendencies and offer more diverse perspectives that are truer to Becker’s oeuvre and core ideas about human behavior and societies in general, and education specifically. The author concludes that the future of Education, formal and informal, would do well to take a long serious look at Becker’s work, especially as the world’s children, youths and adults are is becoming more and more vulnerable to frightening conditions, with cascading collapse of systems, including extinctions of all kinds already well underway in an era of global threats nearing extremes. Becker’s oeuvre is both realistic and idealistic, offering Education a way to radically improve to help make for a better world. (shrink)

In this article, the author argues that the question of educational time is absolutely essential in contemporary debates concerning the fate of the university. In order to examine the nature of educational time, this article first outlines Heidegger's distinction between temporality and Temporality. Second, the author makes a clarification between inauthentic and authentic learning as two forms of educational temporality. Here the article turns to the work of Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus on expert skill building versus standardised or generic (...) forms of learning. When inauthentic and authentic forms of temporality are brought to light through this distinction, new ways of understanding the convergence and divergence of learning modes open up for critical reflection. Third, the article suggests that while differentiations internal to learning are critical in the struggle to define the nature of education, education cannot be reduced to its temporalising forms. At this point, the work of one of Heidegger's late students, Giorgio Agamben, becomes important for grounding the educational experience in Temporality through study. At stake here is carving out a time in education for enpresencing versus self-projection through action. And finally, the article turns back to Hediegger in order to see the ethical limitations of too quickly collapsing education into learning—even if that learning is authentic. (shrink)

In this article, the author argues that the question of educational time is absolutely essential in contemporary debates concerning the fate of the university. In order to examine the nature of educational time, this article first outlines Heidegger's distinction between temporality and Temporality. Second, the author makes a clarification between inauthentic and authentic learning as two forms of educational temporality. Here the article turns to the work of Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus on expert skill building versus standardised or generic (...) forms of learning. When inauthentic and authentic forms of temporality are brought to light through this distinction, new ways of understanding the convergence and divergence of learning modes open up for critical reflection. Third, the article suggests that while differentiations internal to learning are critical in the struggle to define the nature of education, education cannot be reduced to its temporalising forms. At this point, the work of one of Heidegger's late students, Giorgio Agamben, becomes important for grounding the educational experience in Temporality through study. At stake here is carving out a time in education for enpresencing versus self-projection through action. And finally, the article turns back to Hediegger in order to see the ethical limitations of too quickly collapsing education into learning—even if that learning is authentic. (shrink)

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese scholars have tended to traditional Chinese learning split apart and rearrange it according to the systematics of modern Western academic disciplines. By examining the meaning of Western "philosophy" and "ethics," it is demonstrated that Western and Chinese learning should not be lumped together according to the same systematics. Moreover, classical Chinese learning has always had its own complex systematics and its own long tradition, and it has undergone constant development over time. Thus, (...) it is well beyond any criticism that may be leveled at it from the standpoint of Western systematics. Even so, modern Chinese intellectuals have become accustomed to understanding classical Chinese learning through a Western prism. (shrink)

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese scholars have tended to traditional Chinese learning split apart and rearrange it according to the systematics of modern Western academic disciplines. By examining the meaning of Western "philosophy" and "ethics," it is demonstrated that Western and Chinese learning should not be lumped together according to the same systematics. Moreover, classical Chinese learning has always had its own complex systematics and its own long tradition, and it has undergone constant development over time. Thus, (...) it is well beyond any criticism that may be leveled at it from the standpoint of Western systematics. Even so, modern Chinese intellectuals have become accustomed to understanding classical Chinese learning through a Western prism. (shrink)

This text maps out the professional, political and theoretical landscape of reflective practice, its nature and purposes and the claims being made for it. The book aims to bring together two central aspects of educational improvement: the power that teachers have to appraise, understand and transform their practice; and the bigger picture and the structures that serve to imprison and liberate practice.

The aim of this paper is to introduce a correction into the notion of self-directed adult learning by way of conjoining it with philosophically elaborated notions of autonomy, self-reflectiveness, and maturity. The basic premise of this intervention is that in andragogical theorizing, learners’ self-directedness ought not to be thought as obvious and thus beyond question. Since adult selves are not transparent but socially, culturally, and discoursively constructed, adult educators are encouraged to think of themselves as facilitators of (...) adult learners’ self-awareness and self-directedness in their learning processes. Adult learners need to be assisted in developing critical skills that can be used to eliminate distortions in their perception of social reality, in understanding their own personalities, their needs and decisions concerning continuing education. The problematization of the concept of human autonomy amid external influences, is first discussed in Immanuel Kant’s idea of maturity as an ability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. I then turn to Habermas’s philosophy of communicative action and three knowledge-constitutive interests where the human interest in emancipation comes to the fore. Its significance for critical adult learning is further emphasized in line with Stephen Brookfield’s and Jack Mezirow’s association of self-directed learning with empowerment, understood as freeing consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers. Drawing on Foucault’s work, I argue that attaining the state of autonomy requires practice in “the care for oneself” which amounts to the lifelong endeavor to create and govern oneself and to learn how not to be governed. The agenda for adult education for citizenship opted for in this paper attributes essential significance to learnable skills of critical reasoning, deliberation, and self-reflectiveness which all operate within three proposed dimensions of adult education: experiential learning, literacy, and vocationalism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce a correction into the notion of self-directed adult learning by way of conjoining it with philosophically elaborated notions of autonomy, self-reflectiveness, and maturity. The basic premise of this intervention is that in andragogical theorizing, learners’ self-directedness ought not to be thought as obvious and thus beyond question. Since adult selves are not transparent but socially, culturally, and discoursively constructed, adult educators are encouraged to think of themselves as facilitators of (...) adult learners’ self-awareness and self-directedness in their learning processes. Adult learners need to be assisted in developing critical skills that can be used to eliminate distortions in their perception of social reality, in understanding their own personalities, their needs and decisions concerning continuing education. The problematization of the concept of human autonomy amid external influences, is first discussed in Immanuel Kant’s idea of maturity as an ability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. I then turn to Habermas’s philosophy of communicative action and three knowledge-constitutive interests where the human interest in emancipation comes to the fore. Its significance for critical adult learning is further emphasized in line with Stephen Brookfield’s and Jack Mezirow’s association of self-directed learning with empowerment, understood as freeing consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers. Drawing on Foucault’s work, I argue that attaining the state of autonomy requires practice in “the care for oneself” which amounts to the lifelong endeavor to create and govern oneself and to learn how not to be governed. The agenda for adult education for citizenship opted for in this paper attributes essential significance to learnable skills of critical reasoning, deliberation, and self-reflectiveness which all operate within three proposed dimensions of adult education: experiential learning, literacy, and vocationalism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce a correction into the notion of self-directed adult learning by way of conjoining it with philosophically elaborated notions of autonomy, self-reflectiveness, and maturity. The basic premise of this intervention is that in andragogical theorizing, learners’ self-directedness ought not to be thought as obvious and thus beyond question. Since adult selves are not transparent but socially, culturally, and discoursively constructed, adult educators are encouraged to think of themselves as facilitators of (...) adult learners’ self-awareness and self-directedness in their learning processes. Adult learners need to be assisted in developing critical skills that can be used to eliminate distortions in their perception of social reality, in understanding their own personalities, their needs and decisions concerning continuing education. The problematization of the concept of human autonomy amid external influences, is first discussed in Immanuel Kant’s idea of maturity as an ability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. I then turn to Habermas’s philosophy of communicative action and three knowledge-constitutive interests where the human interest in emancipation comes to the fore. Its significance for critical adult learning is further emphasized in line with Stephen Brookfield’s and Jack Mezirow’s association of self-directed learning with empowerment, understood as freeing consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers. Drawing on Foucault’s work, I argue that attaining the state of autonomy requires practice in “the care for oneself” which amounts to the lifelong endeavor to create and govern oneself and to learn how not to be governed. The agenda for adult education for citizenship opted for in this paper attributes essential significance to learnable skills of critical reasoning, deliberation, and self-reflectiveness which all operate within three proposed dimensions of adult education: experiential learning, literacy, and vocationalism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce a correction into the notion of self-directed adult learning by way of conjoining it with philosophically elaborated notions of autonomy, self-reflectiveness, and maturity. The basic premise of this intervention is that in andragogical theorizing, learners’ self-directedness ought not to be thought as obvious and thus beyond question. Since adult selves are not transparent but socially, culturally, and discoursively constructed, adult educators are encouraged to think of themselves as facilitators of (...) adult learners’ self-awareness and self-directedness in their learning processes. Adult learners need to be assisted in developing critical skills that can be used to eliminate distortions in their perception of social reality, in understanding their own personalities, their needs and decisions concerning continuing education. The problematization of the concept of human autonomy amid external influences, is first discussed in Immanuel Kant’s idea of maturity as an ability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. I then turn to Habermas’s philosophy of communicative action and three knowledge-constitutive interests where the human interest in emancipation comes to the fore. Its significance for critical adult learning is further emphasized in line with Stephen Brookfield’s and Jack Mezirow’s association of self-directed learning with empowerment, understood as freeing consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers. Drawing on Foucault’s work, I argue that attaining the state of autonomy requires practice in “the care for oneself” which amounts to the lifelong endeavor to create and govern oneself and to learn how not to be governed. The agenda for adult education for citizenship opted for in this paper attributes essential significance to learnable skills of critical reasoning, deliberation, and self-reflectiveness which all operate within three proposed dimensions of adult education: experiential learning, literacy, and vocationalism. (shrink)

Critical Reflections on Teacher Education argues that educational philosophy can improve the quality of teacher education programs in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The book documents the ways in which the market model of education propagated by governments and outside agencies hastens the decline of philosophy of education and turns teachers into technicians in hierarchical school systems. A grounding in educational philosophy, however, enables future teachers to make informed and qualified judgements defining their professional lives. In (...) a clear and accessible style, Howard Woodhouse uses a combination of reasoned argument and narrative to show that educational philosophy, together with Indigenous knowledge systems, forms the basis of a climate change education capable of educating students about the central issue of our time. (shrink)

Almost a quarter-century after the Carnegie report, Scholarship Reconsidered, the scholarship of teaching remains a contested idea, celebrated by some and critiqued by others. This new book is particularly relevant now however as it explores the notion of the scholarship of teaching through the lens of authenticity, a complex, intriguing and particularly striking and distinctively helpful notion which has caught the attention of several authors in adult and higher education. However, those writing about authenticity do not always make explicit (...) what it is that they mean by this notion, nor are they clear about the philosophical foundations underpinning it. In developing the notion of the scholarship of teaching as an 'authentic practice', the author draws on several complementary philosophical ideas to explore the nature of this practice, why it is imperative for universities to engage in it, what meaningful engagement wold look like and the conditions under which it might qualify as 'authentic'. Core constructs employed include practice virtue communicative action 'being', 'power', critical reflection and transformationThe scholarship of teaching is described as a practice sustained through critical reflection and critical self-reflection. Being a scholar of teaching is viewed as an ongoing transformative learning process, a process of becoming authentic, the latter ultimately aimed at both helping students to become authentic and creating a better world in which to teach, learn and live. Although explored as a practice in its own right, the scholarship of teaching is seen to be strengthened by being situated within a wider integrated notion of academic practice. The book combines the author's previous research on authenticity with earlier work on the meaning of the scholarship of teaching, offering a provocative, fresh and timely perspective on the scholarship of teaching and professional learning in our times but also providing guidance on how to create a better world in which to learn, teach and live. (shrink)

We tend to imagine revolution as a vivid tableau of uprisings and armed conflicts. Much less notice is taken of the complex layers of meaning that shape our understanding of these events: why some are seen as just expressions of a popular will, while others are condemned as wild disruptions of political order. A critical understanding of politics must grapple with these subtle, often unnoticed normative issues. This essay tries to understand some of the processes that create political normativity, (...) investigating the way revolutionary movements use time to endow themselves with normative value. I sketch a genealogy of revolution across three centuries, noting changes in its meaning, observing the rise of discourse as an important mode of revolutionary activity, and tracing a shifting mosaic of temporalities that are politicized in important ways. Time is instrumentalized to justify political insurgency in this history. Time, in short, becomes a tool of revolution. (shrink)

This paper extracts the findings of the impact study on the Learning Facilitator programme’s study, a 6-month blended learning professional programme accredited by the Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt (Germany) and delivered by Jesuit Worldwide Learning to teachers in context of marginalisation. Focused on elucidating how the Learning Facilitator programme nurtures graduates' soft skills in teaching and fosters their servant-leadership, this paper underscores how the programme redefines the temporal horizons for its participants, enabling them to transcend established frames of reference and (...) cultivate inclusive and conducive learning environments both within and beyond the confines of traditional classrooms. This contribution seeks to bring the seldom heard voices at the centre of the discussion on “time for education”, echoing graduates’ critical exploration in reevaluating conventional frames of reference in pedagogical contexts. (shrink)

Rapid changes in academic work environments raise ethical dilemmas in supporting students, implementing policies, and developing professional practice. New teaching technologies require academics to consider community aspects of learning and teaching and impacts on student learning in networked environments. This paper critically reflects on recent experience at a small Australian regional university adapting teaching- notably through on-line environments- to respond to student learning need diversity. Applying Shapiro’s use of the ethics of care, critique, justice and the profession to examine ethical (...) dilemmas associated with increasingly networked and on-line learning, the authors propose that an ethics of community will assist finding practical solutions to ethical dilemmas in curriculum development and delivery. This approach shifts from the individual as moral agent to ethical practice as communal processes. Considering community practices and processes can frame and critique learning and teaching approaches, policies and administration to assist students and staff develop ethical scholarship and professionalism. (shrink)

Definition of the problem In light of the ubiquitous role of time in human life, the importance of time for medical practices and for the ethical reflections of these practices seems all too obvious. However, the growing number of ethical reflections on temporal implications of medical practices all too often lack a systematic understanding of time. Aim of the article This article therefore aims to provide a map of temporal distinctions which should be both of theoretical interest and of practical (...) and ethical relevance. Procedure Starting with the fundamental distinction between time and temporality, four temporal dimensions will be discussed: linear time as chronological order of events, intersubjective time of social interactions, the cyclical temporal structure of biological rhythms and social routines, and the biographical time of the past, present and future of a single life, its finiteness and irreversibility. The article elucidates these distinctions from the perspective of different philosophical approaches and outlines how temporal distinctions may help to better understand the ethical importance of time in the realm of medicine. (shrink)

Rhythm is generally taken to refer to a temporal pattern of events. Yet in recent years, across diverse fields in the arts, humanities, and social sciences, it has come to serve as the conceptual marker for a wide range of new approaches to understanding relations and relationality, following most explicitly from the late work of Henri Lefebvre. This article explores the temporal aspect of such relational thinking, in particular asking how time is implicated in relations, and how it can be (...) meaningful in those relations. The sense of time is surveyed from the perspectives of both cognition and metaphysics as well as with reference to music scholarship and social theory, and key threads are drawn, from the writings of Gaston Bachelard and Charles Sanders Peirce in particular, in order to suggest that time can be a sign, and that the signifying properties of rhythm have critical social consequences. (shrink)

Designed to immediately engage students and other readers in philosophical reflection, the new edition of Ethical Argument: Critical Thinking in Ethics bridges the gap between ethical theory and practice. This brief introduction combines a discussion of ethical theory with fundamental elements of critical thinking--including informal fallacies and the basics of logic--and uses case studies and practical applications to illustrate concepts. Author Hugh Mercer Curtler presents a carefully formulated critique of ethical relativism, encouraging students to reason along with (...) him and to question his argument at every point. This approach enables students to think systematically about ethical issues and to acquire basic skills in argumentation at the same time. They will learn how to bring principles to bear on ethical conflict, how to weigh pros and cons, how to recognize good ethical reasons, and how to distinguish sound argumentation from rationalization. The second edition of Ethical Argument: Critical Thinking in Ethics includes new exercises and examples, summary boxes, cartoons, and sample dialogues that demonstrate how to effectively debate ethical positions. It features more than forty case studies on ethical issues that are interesting and relevant to students. An ideal core text for courses in introductory ethics, this concise volume can be used along with additional primary sources, case studies, or newspaper articles and novels. It is also a helpful supplementary text for courses in applied ethics--including professional, business, and medical ethics--and in critical thinking. (shrink)

A work of music is repeatable in the following sense: it can be multiply performed or played in different places at the same time, and each such datable, locatable performance or playing is an occurrence of it: an item in which the work itself is somehow present, and which thereby makes the work manifest to an audience. As I see it, the central challenge in the ontology of musical works is to come up with an ontological proposal (i.e. an account (...) of what sort of thing a work of music is) which enables us to explain what such repeatability consists in, whilst doing maximal justice to the way in which we conceive of musical works in our reflective critical and appreciative practice. To this end, many have found it tempting to defend some version or other of the type-token theory : the thesis that a work is a type and its occurrences are its tokens. Much of the early debate prompted by the publication of Jerrold Levinson's seminal 'What a Musical Work Is' in 1980 has taken the type-token theory for granted, choosing to focus on how musical works, qua types, are individuated. (A key question here has been whether we should hold, with the sonicist , that works are identical just in case they sound exactly alike; or whether we should agree with Levinson's contextualist thesis that exact sound-alikes are distinct, if composed in distinct musico-historical contexts.) More recently, however, the type-token theory itself has been put under pressure, and alternatives have been suggested. So, e.g. Gregory Currie and David Davies have held versions of the thesis that musical works (and artworks generally) are acts of composition, whilst Guy Rohrbaugh has recommended that we think more innovatively about our metaphysical categories, and treat musical works (along with all repeatable artworks) as historical individuals . Historical individuals, like particular substances, come into and go out of existence, could have been somewhat different than they are, and can change through time; but such items, unlike particular substances, are nonetheless capable of having occurrences. In the last few years, ontologists of music have also stepped back to consider the very nature of their enterprise. In particular, a debate has ensued concerning the cogency of ontological proposals (such as those of Nelson Goodman, Nicholas Wolterstorff and Julian Dodd) that are substantially revisionary of our folk concept of a work of music. Amie Thomasson, David Davies and Andrew Kania occupy, to a greater or lesser degree, the descriptivist standpoint, according to which such revisionary ontologies are misconceived. The debate between revisionists and descriptivists in the ontology of music – if prosecuted against the backdrop of an awareness of developments in meta-ontology more generally – is a particularly fertile area in the philosophy of music at present. Author Recommends Wollheim, Richard. Art and its Objects . 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. This seminal study nicely introduces and motivates the type-token theory, and in the course of doing so, helpfully, although perhaps contentiously, distinguishes types from both sets and properties. Wollheim's treatment was to a large part responsible for stimulating the subsequent debate as to the ontological nature of musical works. Levinson, Jerrold. 'What a Musical Work Is.' Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980); reprinted in his Music, Art and Metaphysics , 63–88. This paper has, perhaps, been the most influential account of the nature of musical works, post-Wollheim. Presuming the type-token theory to be correct, Levinson elaborates it by claiming musical works to be, not sound structures (i.e. structured patterns of sound-types), but a species of types he calls indicated structures . According to Levinson, a work of music is not to be identified with its sound structure, S ; it is, in fact, a compound of S and a performance-means structure, PM , as indicated (typically, via a score) by its composer on a certain occasion : something that we can represent as S/PM -as-indicated-by- X -at- t . Such indicated structures, Levinson argues, fit the bill for being what works of music are, because they come into being with their indication (i.e. their composition), are individuated in terms of the musico-historical context in which they were composed, and have their specified performance-means (i.e. their instrumentation) essentially. Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Works and Worlds of Art . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Part I of this book sees Wolterstorff defend a Platonistic version of the type-token theory (although Wolterstorff calls them 'kinds' rather than 'types'). According to Wolterstorff, considerations about the existence conditions of types commit us to the thesis that works of music, qua types, are entities that cannot come into or go out of existence. Kivy, Peter. 'Platonism in Music: A Kind of Defence.' Grazer Philosophische Studien 19 (1983): 109–29. In this article, Kivy ingeniously (and wittily) defends a variety of Platonism about works of music against the animadversions of Levinson. Currie, Gregory. An Ontology of Art . New York: St, Martin's Press, 1989. Here Currie introduces and defends the thesis that works of music (and, indeed, all artworks) are compositional action-types. The book also contains some well-aimed criticisms of Levinson's account. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. In this book, Dodd defends the type-token theory, but argues that no version of it can escape the Platonisic consequence that musical works exist at all times (and hence, are discovered, rather than created, by their composers). Dodd also defends another controversial thesis, this time concerning musical works' individuation. According to Dodd, and pace Levinson and others, sonicism is correct: works that sound exactly alike are identical. Rohrbaugh, Guy. 'Artworks as Historical Individuals.' European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003): 177–205. In this essay, Rohrbaugh makes some pointed criticisms of the type-token theory of repeatable artworks in the course of arguing that such works should be viewed, not as types, but as historical individuals (see above). Rohrbaugh suggests that treating musical works as historical individuals best captures our intuitions about such works' temporal and modal characteristics, and, in the course of elaborating his position, he makes some meta-ontological claims that see him endorsing a non-revisionary, descriptivist approach to the ontology of art. As Rohrbaugh sees it, ontologies of art are 'beholden to our artistic practices' (179), and 'aesthetics should not be beholden to the metaphysics on offer, but rather should drive new work in metaphysics' (197). Ridley, Aaron. 'Against Musical Ontology,' Journal of Philosophy 100 (2003): 203–220. This paper sees Ridley outlining a sceptical attitude towards the project of formulating ontological proposals. In his view, a 'serious philosophical engagement with music is orthogonal to, and may well in fact be impeded by, the pursuit of ontological issues' (203). Thomasson, Amie. 'The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics.' JAAC 63 (2005:221–9). Thomasson defends descriptivism in the ontology of art by arguing that such a position is a consequence of the only defensible solution to a problem in the theory of reference: the so-called 'qua' problem concerning how the reference of a term can be fixed. Davies, David. Art as Performance . Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. Davies' position is characterised by two theses: one methodological, the other ontological. The methodological claim is that the ontology of art faces a pragmatic constraint : roughly speaking, the ontology of art is answerable to the epistemology of art. The ontological claim is that the rigorous enforcement of the pragmatic constraint commits us to the thesis that all artworks are compositional action-tokens. Online Materials http://www.blackwell-compass.com/subject/philosophy/article_view?article_id=phco_articles_bpL173 Dodd, Julian. 'Musical Works: Ontology and Meta-Ontology.' Philosophy Compass 3/6 (2008): 1113–34. doi: [DOI link] http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118557784/abstract Thomasson, Amie. 'Debates about the Ontology of Art: What are We Doing Here?' Philosophy Compass 1/3 (2006): 245–55. doi: [DOI link] http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122517227/abstract Davies, David. 'Works and Performances in the Performing Arts.' forthcoming in Philosophy Compass . doi: [DOI link] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/music/ Kania, Andrew. 'The Philosophy of Music.' Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Sample Mini-Syllabus Week 1: The Type/Token Theory Introduced Wollheim, Richard. Art and its Objects , §§4–8, 21–3, 35–7. Kivy, Peter. Introduction to a Philosophy of Music , chapter 11. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology , chapter 1. Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Works and Worlds of Art , chapter 2. Week 2: The Type/Token Theory and Platonism in Music Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Works and Worlds of Art , chapter 2. Levinson, Jerrold. 'What a Musical Work Is'. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology , chapters 2–5. Kivy, Peter. 'Platonism in Music: A Kind of Defence.' Grazer Philosophische Studien 19 (1983): 109–29. Kivy, Peter. 'Platonism in Music: Another Kind of Defence.' American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): 245–52. Predelli, Stefano. 'Against Musical Platonism.' British Journal of Aesthetics 35 (1995): 338–50. Caplan, Ben and Carl Matheson. 'Can a Musical Work be Created?' British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (2004): 113–34. Week 3: Musical Works as Indicated Structures Levinson, Jerrold. 'What a Musical Work Is'. Levinson, Jerrold. 'What a Musical Work Is, Again', in his Music, Art and Metaphysics . Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1990. 215–63. Dodd, Julian. 'Musical Works as Eternal Types.' British Journal of Aesthetics 40 (2000). Davies, Stephen. Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Account , chapter 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Howell, Robert. 'Types, Indicated and Initiated.' British Journal of Aesthetics 42 (2002): 105–27. Caplan, Ben and Carl Matheson. 'Fine Individuation.' British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (2007): 113–37. Week 4: Musical Work as Historical Individuals Rohrbaugh, Guy. 'Artworks as Historical Individuals'. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology , chapter 6. Caplan, Ben and Carl Matheson. 'Defending Musical Perdurantism.' British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (2006): 59–69. Caplan, Ben and Carl Matheson. 'Defending "Defending Musical Perdurantism".' British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 331–37. Week 5: Musical Works as Compositional Actions Currie, Gregory. An Ontology of Art . New York: St, Martin's Press, 1989. Davies, David. Art as Performance . Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology , chapter 7. Week 6: Meta-ontology of Music: What are we Doing When we do the Ontology of Music? Ridley, Aaron. 'Against Musical Ontology'. Thomasson, Amie. 'The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics'. Thomasson, Amie. Ordinary Objects , chapter 11. OUP, 2007. Davies, David. 'The Primacy of Practice in the Ontology of Art.' Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (2009): 159–72. Kania, Andrew. 'Piece for the End of Time: In Defence of Musical Ontology,' British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 65–79. Kania, Andrew. 'The Methodology of Musical Ontology: Descriptivism and its Implications.' British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 426–44. Cameron, Ross. 'There are No Things That are Musical Works.' British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 295–314. Dodd, Julian. 'Musical Works: Ontology and Meta-Ontology.' Philosophy Compass 3/6 (2008): 1113–1134. doi: [DOI link] Focus Questions 1. Are musical works literally created by their composers? 2. Critically examine Levinson's thesis that musical works are 'indicated structures'. 3. What, if anything, is wrong with the thesis that musical works are identical just in case they sound exactly alike? 4. Should we immediately be sceptical of ontological proposals for works of music that are substantially revisionary of the way in which we ordinarily think of them? (shrink)

Background: Informal coercion, that is, situations where caregivers use subtle coercive measures to impose their will on patients, is common in adult psychiatric inpatient care. It has been described as ‘a necessary evil’, confronting nurses with an ethical dilemma where they need to balance between a wish to do good, and the risk of violating patients’ dignity and autonomy. Aim: To describe nurses’ experiences of being involved in informal coercion in adult psychiatric inpatient care. Research design: The study (...) has a qualitative, inductive design. Participants and research context: Semi-structured interviews with 10 Swedish psychiatric nurses were analysed with qualitative content analysis. Ethical considerations: The study was performed in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. In line with the Swedish Ethical Review Act, it was also subject to ethical procedures at the university. Findings: Four domains comprise informal coercion as a process over time. These domains contain 11 categories focusing on different experiences involved in the process: Striving to connect, involving others, adjusting to the caring culture, dealing with laws, justifying coercion, waiting for the patient, persuading the patient, negotiating with the patient, using professional power, scrutinizing one’s actions and learning together. Discussion: Informal coercion is associated with moral stress as nurses might find themselves torn between a wish to do good for the patient, general practices and ‘house rules’ in the caring culture. In addition, nurses need to be aware of the asymmetry of the caring relationship, in order to avoid compliance becoming a consequence of patients subordinating to nurse power, rather than a result of mutual understanding. Reflections are thus necessary through the process to promote mutual learning and to avoid violations of patients’ dignity and autonomy. Conclusion: If there is a need for coercion, that is, if the coercion is found to be an ‘unpleasant good’, rather than ‘necessary evil’ considering the consequences for the patient, it should be subject to reflecting and learning together with the patient. (shrink)

Virtue ethics is now well established as a substantive, independent normative theory. It was not always so. The revival of virtue ethics was initially spurred by influential criticisms of other normative theories, especially those made by Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, John McDowell, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Bernard Williams. 1 Because of this heritage, virtue ethics is often associated with anti-theory movements in ethics and more recently, moral particularism. There are, however, quite a few different approaches to ethics that can reasonably claim (...) to be versions of virtue ethics. The predominant strand of virtue ethics is broadly Aristotelian, although some accounts bear little resemblance to Aristotle's. In its most general form, virtue ethics is compatible with a wide range of meta-ethical and normative commitments. This diversity makes it difficult to compare virtue ethics as such with other normative theories. It can also be a challenge to see just what the various versions of virtue ethics have in common with each other. Three major types of virtue ethics are represented in the books by Rosalind Hursthouse, Michael Slote, and Christine Swanton, recommended in the following section. Each of these book sets forward a considerably self-standing form of virtue ethics. The authors differ on central issues such as the relationship between virtue and flourishing and the link between virtuous agents and right or virtuous actions. Unlike Swanton and Slote, Hursthouse defends a version of ethical naturalism that has affinities with theories recently defended by Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre. 2 Slote's theory is agent-based, meaning that his account derives judgments about the moral status of actions from moral features of agents. Hursthouse and Swanton defend theories according to which the moral status of an action depends on its broader relationship to human flourishing (Hursthouse) or whether it hits the target of a virtue (Swanton). Although these three books presently form the core of contemporary virtue ethics, there are other approaches that might reasonably be described as versions of virtue ethics, such as those presented by Julia Driver, Linda Zagzebski, and Robert Adams. 3 There are also, of course, a large number of articles in which authors defend or criticize tenets that are central to most versions of virtue ethics. Some recent articles on especially important topics are listed in the following section. Current 'hot topics' in virtue ethics include whether its account of right action is adequate and whether virtue ethics is at odds with empirical psychology. Articles on these debates and others are listed in the following section. Author Recommends: Books These three books are foundational works in contemporary virtue ethics, and represent quite different approaches to virtue ethics. For each book, I have also listed an article by the same author in which he or she articulates some similar themes. Those pressed for time or space on a syllabus might start by examining those articles. 1. Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Hursthouse defends a eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics with Aristotelian affinities. *See also Hursthouse, Rosalind. 'Normative Virtue Ethics.' How Should One Live? Ed. Roger Crisp. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. 19–36. 2. Slote, Michael. Morals from Motives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Slote defends a version of virtue ethics based on evaluations of motives, drawing on historical figures like Martineau, Hutcheson, and Hume. Note that this book represents a fairly significant departure from his first book in virtue ethics, From Morality to Virtue (New York: Oxford, 1992). *See also Slote, Michael. 'Agent-Based Virtue Ethics.' Virtue Ethics . Ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 3. Swanton, Christine. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Swanton defends a pluralistic, non-eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics that draws on influences ranging from Aristotle to Nietzsche to contemporary psychoanalytic theory. *See also Swanton, Christine. 'A Virtue Ethical Account of Right Action.' Ethics 112 (2001): 32–52. Articles The following is a selection of articles that address some of the central and controversial topics within virtue ethics. 1. Annas, Julia. 'Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing.' Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78.2 (2004): 61–75. This article addresses the problem of action guidance and the role that an account of right action should play in virtue ethics. 2. Conly, Sarah. 'Flourishing and the Failure of the Ethics of Virtue.' Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. XIII, Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue . Eds. P. French et al. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. 83–96. This article articulates the central problems faced by versions of virtue ethics that rely on a conception of human flourishing. 3. Das, Ramon. 'Virtue Ethics and Right Action.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 324–39. This article raises objections about insularity and circularity to accounts of right action presented by Hursthouse, Slote, and Swanton. 4. Doris, John M. 'Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics.' Nous 32 (1998): 504–30. This article argues that situationist psychology undermines the concept of a character trait on which virtue ethicists rely. An expanded version of this criticism can be found in Doris, Lack of Character, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 5. Hursthouse, Rosalind. 'Virtue Theory and Abortion.' Philosophy and Public Affairs 20.3 (1991): 223–46. This article argues that virtue ethics is capable of providing action guidance in the difficult problem of abortion. 6. Johnson, Robert N. 'Virtue and Right.' Ethics 113 (2003): 810–34. This article raises several objections against the accounts of right action in virtue ethics, one of which is that they cannot make sense of the rightness of self-improving actions. The criticism is directly primarily at Hursthouse's theory, but Swanton and Slote are discussed as well. 7. Kamtekar, Rachana. 'Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character.' Ethics 114 (2004): 458–91. This article argues that situationist critiques of virtue ethics rely on a mistaken understanding of virtuous character. 8. Kawall, Jason. 'Virtue Theory and Ideal Observers.' Philosophical Studies 109 (2002): 197– 222. This article argues for an ideal observer-style account of right action in virtue ethics. 9. Nussbaum, Martha. 'Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach.' Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XIII, Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue . Ed. P. French et al. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. 32–53. This article presents a view of the virtues on which the virtues are excellences in spheres of activity. Although the spheres are common to all humans, the manifestation of excellence in a given sphere is subject to cultural variation. 10. Sreenivasan, Gopal. 'Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution.' Mind 111 (2002): 47–68. This article addresses the situationist critique of character traits by arguing that virtue ethics does not depend on the concept of a character trait as Doris and others understand it. 11. Stangl, Rebecca. 'A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics.' Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 665–78. This article addresses the relationship between virtue ethics and radical moral particularism, arguing that the latter may have undesirable consequences for virtue ethicists unless they accept the unity of the virtues. 12. Stohr, Karen. 'Contemporary Virtue Ethics.' Philosophy Compass 1.1 (January 2006): 22–7. This article provides an overview and analysis of contemporary virtue ethics. It includes discussion of main problems and challenges for the future. 13. Stohr, Karen. 'Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue.' Journal of Ethics 7 (2003): 339–63. This article raises problems for the commonly accepted distinction between virtue and continence, arguing that the mixed emotions normally associated with continence are sometimes characteristic of virtue instead. 14. van Zyl, Liezl. 'Agent-Based Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Action Guidance.' Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2009): 50–69. This article defends agent-based virtue ethics against objections that it cannot distinguish agent-appraisal from act-appraisal and that it cannot provide adequate action guidance. Anthologies 1. Crisp, Roger, ed. How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. This is one of the first virtue ethics anthologies published, and so reflects a correspondingly earlier picture of the field. The essays, however, are important and interesting in their own right, and cover a broad array of topics. 2. Crisp, Roger and Michael Slote, eds. Virtue Ethics . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. This anthology was published over a decade ago and does not capture recent developments in the field. It is, however, an admirably thorough collection of the most influential essays from the early days of virtue ethics, both promoting and criticizing it. 3. Darwall, Stephen, ed. Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003. This anthology is distinctive in that it includes material from Aristotle, Hutcheson, and Hume, along with some central contemporary sources. 4. Walker, Rebecca L. and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds. Working Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. This recent anthology focuses on applied virtue ethics and has an excellent selection of essays by influential thinkers on topics including the environment, business, medicine, war, and poverty. Online Sources 'Virtue Ethics', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/ Entry written by Rosalind Hursthouse and updated in 2007. 'Bibliography on Virtue Ethics', maintained by Jörg Schroth. http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/cvirtue.pdf Extensive list of work published in virtue ethics. Updated regularly, listed in both alphabetical and chronological order, and contains abstracts of papers. 'Janusblog', maintained by Guy Axtell. http://janusblog.squarespace.com/ Blog devoted to current work in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, although with an emphasis on the latter. It contains spirited discussion among the many contributors, as well as a library of papers. Sample Syllabus This syllabus is for a graduate seminar or intense upper-level undergraduate course. Books for purchase for this course might include the Crisp and Slote anthology, the Walker and Ivanhoe anthology, and Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics. Week 1: The Roots of Contemporary Virtue Ethics Anscombe, Elizabeth. 'Modern Moral Philosophy' (Crisp and Slote) Foot, Philippa. 'Virtues and Vices' (Crisp and Slote) MacIntyre, Alasdair. 'The Nature of the Virtues' (Crisp and Slote) Week 2: The Roots of Contemporary Virtue Ethics Stocker, Michael. 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories' (Crisp and Slote) Williams, Bernard. 'Morality, the Peculiar Institution' (Crisp and Slote) McDowell, John. 'Virtue and Reason' (Crisp and Slote) Week 3: Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics, Part I Hursthouse, Rosalind. 'Practical Wisdom: A Mundane Account.' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106.3 (2006): 283–307. Stangl, Rebecca. 'A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics' Week 4: Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics, Part II Stark, Susan. 'Virtue and Emotion.' Nous 33.5 (2001): 440–55. Stohr, Karen. 'Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue' Week 5: Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics, Part III Conly, Sarah. 'Flourishing and the Failure of an Ethics of Virtue' Nussbaum, Martha. 'Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach' MacIntyre, Alasdair. Dependent Rational Animals, chapter 10 Week 6: Agent-Based Virtue Ethics Slote, Michael 'Agent-Based Virtue Ethics' (Crisp and Slote) Slote, Michael, Morals from Motives, chapters 1 and 3 Week 7: Pluralistic Virtue Ethics Swanton, Christine. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View , chapters 3, 4, and 11. Week 8: The Situationist Critique of Virtue Ethics Doris, John. 'Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics' Kamtekar, Rachana. 'Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character' Sreenivasan, Gopal. 'Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution' Merritt, Maria. 'Aristotelian Virtue and the Interpersonal Aspect of Ethical Character.' Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2009): 23–49. Week 11: Right Action – Problems Johnson, Robert. 'Virtue and Right' Das, Ramon. 'Virtue Ethics and Right Action' Week 12: Right Action – Virtue Ethics Solutions Annas, Julia. 'Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing' van Zyl, Liezl. 'Agent-Based Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Action Guidance' Kawall, Jason. 'Virtue Theory and Ideal Observers' Week 13: Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles Pelligrino, Edmund. 'Professing Medicine, Virtue Based Ethics, and the Retrieval of Professionalism' (Walker and Ivanhoe) Swanton, Christine. 'Virtue Ethics, Role Ethics, and Business Ethics' (Walker and Ivanhoe) Sherman, Nancy. 'Virtue and a Warrier's Anger' (Walker and Ivanhoe) Week 14: Virtue Ethics and the Non-Human World Hursthouse, Rosalind. 'Environmental Virtue Ethics' (Walker and Ivanhoe) Walker, Rebecca. 'The Good Life for Non-Human Animals: What Virtue Requires of Humans' (Walker and Ivanhoe) Focus Questions 1. What is the relationship between virtue and flourishing? Are the virtues necessary for flourishing? Sufficient? 2. Can virtue ethics provide an adequate account of right action? 3. On what concept of a character trait does virtue ethics rely, and does situationist psychology undermine it? 4. Is the project of ethical naturalism a plausible one? To what extent does the success of Aristotelian virtue ethics depend on it? 5. How does virtue ethics affect the way that applied ethics is done? (shrink)

Much has been said about the formative process that occurs via the “hidden curriculum” of medical education during which many students experience a disconnect between the professional values espoused within the formal curriculum and the implicit values communicated through interactions with peers and mentors. Less attention, however, has been paid to the formation of the future medical self that takes place during students’ premedical years, a time in which many undergraduate students seek out immersive clinical experiences —such as medical scribing— (...) before applying to medical school. Despite the fact that medical scribes undoubtedly are affected by their clinical experiences, scribes are rarely offered opportunities to reflect on them. The authors contend that the developmental processes of medical scribes, especially those who intend on pursuing a career in the health professions, ought to be supported. This can be achieved, at least in part, through engaging in well-designed reflective sessions with other scribes. Encouraging students to reflect on their experiences can help them make sense of troubling events and give voice to the inconsistencies and value conflicts within medical practice that are so often ignored. The authors describe the development of their new Reflective Scribe program and offer suggestions for future directions. (shrink)

We are purposive agents; but we—adult humans in a broadly modern world—are more than that. We are reflective about our motivation. We form prior plans and policies that organize our activity over time. And we see ourselves as agents who persist over time and who begin, develop, and then complete temporally extended activities and projects. Any reasonably complete theory of human action will need in some way to advert to this trio of features—to our reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our (...) conception of our agency as temporally extended. These are, further, features that have great significance for the kinds of lives we can live. For these two reasons I will say that these are among the core features of human agency. A theory of human action needs to say what these core features consist in and how they are related to each other. And such a theory needs also to clarify the relation between these core features of our agency and the possibility that we are fully embedded in an event causal order. (shrink)

For Hannah Arendt, authority is the shape educational responsibility assumes. In our time, authority in Arendt’s sense is under pressure. The figure of Greta Thunberg shows the failure of adult generations, taken collectively, to take responsibility for the world and present and future generations of newcomers. However, in reflecting on Arendt’s use of authority, we argue that her account of authority also requires amendments. Arendt’s situating of educational authority in-between past and future adequately captures its temporal dimension. We make (...) explicit another, spatial, dimension: authority in-between world and earth. Arendt’s neglect of the material earth also has implications for the relational dimension of authority. Arendt’s authority depends on a dichotomy between the private and the public sphere. This is problematic. First, we agree with Arendt’s feminist critics that the personal can be made into the site of the political. Second, we point once more to Thunberg, the child, taking the public stage, thereby contesting the division between public and private. In response, we situate the relational dimension of authority in-between private and public. The three dimensions of educational authority taken together imply that it is situated in-between domains that cannot be reduced to each other or taken as absolutes: past and future, world and earth, and the private and public sphere. This brings us to our concept of ambiguous authority, which expresses the Arendtian nature of our reflections and the ways in which we seek to renew her original insights on educational authority. (shrink)

We are purposive agents; but we—adult humans in a broadly modern world—are more than that. We are reflective about our motivation. We form prior plans and policies that organize our activity over time. And we see ourselves as agents who persist over time and who begin, develop, and then complete temporally extended activities and projects. Any reasonably complete theory of human action will need in some way to advert to this trio of features—to our reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our (...) conception of our agency as temporally extended. These are, further, features that have great significance for the kinds of lives we can live. For these two reasons I will say that these are among the core features of human agency. A theory of human action needs to say what these core features consist in and how they are related to each other. And such a theory needs also to clarify the relation between these core features of our agency and the possibility that we are fully embedded in an event causal order. (shrink)

Phenomenology's relation to sensation has many facets. Sensation arises in different contexts in Edmund Husserl's work, and receives several reformulations. This causes us to inquire how the sensations that are unified within the temporal flow by time constituting consciousness, in On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, and that continue to exercise an affective pull even after having passed away, in Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis, can be related to the bodily sensations which constitute the lived body in Ideas (...) II. What is revealed in a critical study of these texts is the unthematized role that sensation plays in Husserl's writings. Yet sensation is not for that reason less significant, nor could his phenomenological descriptions of experience convincingly forgo this concept. ;What is the concept of sensation which can subtend these different formulations and provide a connecting thread within Husserl's phenomenology? My dissertation is a reply to this question. I argue that the sketches of sensation found in Husserl's works can provide the grounds for a rhythmic and dynamic theory of the lived body---a theory which not only inserts the body into the temporal flow of lived experience, and defines its spatiality as fluid, malleable and affectively charged, but which also opens the body to an intersubjective dimension. In this way, sensation becomes a differentiated and heterogeneous reality. Sensation has the structure of an evolution, the continuity of a rhythm, so that the body that is constituted of sensings secretes time at its joints. This theory frees sensation from Husserl's early hylomorphic schema in Ideas I, and reconnects it to the flow of life, and to bodily experiences of world and others. In the process I also examine alternative views which deal with the role of sensation in the contexts of the body, temporality and otherness. The works of M. Merleau-Ponty, but also of E. Levinas, L. Irigaray, H. Bergson and G. Deleuze are important in this regard. Reading these thinkers in connection to Husserl sheds an unexpected light on their philosophies, while allowing us to challenge Husserl and to propel phenomenology in new directions. (shrink)

It is common to say that we leave infancy when, with the passing of time, very different experiences are produced in us, causing us to mature and, in this way, lead us into adulthood; in other words, we could say that infancy ends when, as time passes, we accumulate and live our different experiences. In this sense, two observations come to mind and make us think about the relations between time, infancy, and experience. Victor Hugo and Picasso offered the following (...) concise phrases: “Infancy begins when time brings experience” ; and “…when I was twelve, I painted like an adult, and I spent my entire lifetime learning how to paint like a child” . This text proposes a reflection on these themes, observing them through the universes of education, philosophy, and psychology, and founded in the ideas of Walter Benjamin, Giorgio Agamben, Comenius, Augustine, and others. Beginning with a political-philosophical reflection on the concept of infancy, we move toward philosophy, and from there, toward an etymological discussion that circumscribes the theme of linguistics and ends with politics. We are invited to contemplate: what is this infancy we produce, and what practices of power do we create in our relations with the infantile? For this reflexive journey, we turn to the discussions of Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben regarding the concept of experience, which lead us to an idea of experience as a route, a crossing, a path to be followed, i.e something that is not given, that is uncertain. Based on this notion, we can link the ideas of infancy and of experience, and both of these to a perspective of opening and to the yet-to-come, the unfinished. In this reflection, we find in St. Augustine spaces for thinking about time as temporality. Amalgamating this reflection on infancy and time with the notion of experience put forth by Benjamin and Agamben , other views and possibilities are produced regarding the themes presented by education in the context of new educational practices with children. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:'Difficult Patient':A Reflective EssayDaniel McFarlandThe patient who sat across from me knew too much about all brain tumors. According to her, she would never know enough about the one sitting uncomfortably close to her brain's temporal lobe. In her quest for the 'right' answer to her meningioma problem, she became certain that its surgical removal would upend her life, leaving her in neurological taters.She was a small business owner (...) of a practice dedicated to medical massage. Indubitably, she had helped countless clients heal themselves of medical mishaps and avoid or recover from the tyranny of [End Page E13] a medical community that did not always provide respectable, hospitable care. She was certain a craniotomy would end her business, nullifying everything she had spent her life building. She became fluent in the legalese needed to transfer or sell her business in anticipation of surgery. To stave off losing her life's work from a surgical mishap, she sought opinions from a dozen neurosurgeons. They reassured her that a routine surgery like this would be effective with little chance of neurological collateral damage. She did not believe them. In her business she had treated numerous exhausted professionals. Many surgeons with whom she worked professionally frequently referred patients to her. She had seen the poor self-care that many surgeons and doctors brought on themselves in the form of unrelenting stress, drinking, bad eating habits, and even drugs. This made her nervous and untrusting about the care she could receive at the hands of an overworked or impaired surgeon. She scheduled appointments with every neurosurgeon she could find and interviewed them relentlessly, looking for the slightest sign of incompetence, unprofessionalism, antipathy, or lapse in compassion. Given her insistence and dogged nature, she usually found what she was looking for. She would bring her research to the appointments and interview the neurosurgeons on what other doctors had opined. If they were incredulous of research she brought or a technique on which she inquired, they were summarily dismissed.At first glance, which is likely all that she got from many of her visits, these encounters put a spotlight on a 'difficult' patient refusing care. The deeper look that my patient deserved revealed a personal narrative of the oldest child who survived a broken home riddled with drug use and prostitution. She learned to rely on only herself for protection. She took unapologetic control of her fate. Her own mother had at one time offered my patient work as a prostitute. Her father was no better in providing protection and a decent upbringing. He had left her as an eight-year-old with the neglectful mother and four younger siblings to fend for herself, which she did against the odds. She suffered physical, emotional, and spiritual abuse.As an adult, her strong sense of selfhood and boundaries allowed her to have a guarded relationship with both of her parents at a comfortable emotional distance. Her mission and passionate drive to help others heal saved her life. In healing others, she was healing herself. Importantly, her experience marked for her indelibly that while she could do this for herself, others were not reliable and could not heal her. She had only ever trusted and relied upon herself. She was the only one who had never let her down. She was terrified that this might be the first time. The potential surgery risked her cognition, physical capacities, and ability to care for herself. The risk was too great.We met numerous times, uncovering her past, reliving the stories of her tumultuous background, and examining how she established her place in the world away from the horrors of her insecure childhood. She took in my reaction to her stories and saw the horror on my face when I tried to imagine a world where one's parents were not only neglectful but the source of danger. Through my reaction, she may have begun to have some compassion for her own story and put the pieces together. One several occasions, she became enraged when I didn't meet her expectations, or I didn't entertain the diatribe of neurosurgical scholarly work.On one of those... (shrink)

This paper takes a critical look at the applicability of the Jungian view on individuation and imagination. While Jungian ideas can bring something fresh and necessary into educational practice, personal enthusiasm might blind us to a dissonance between educational goals and the therapeutic goal of analytical psychology. The case is made with particular attention to some work in the field of transformative learning in adult education.

The COVID-19 pandemic has foregrounded the significance of time to everyday life, as the routines, pace, and speed of social relations were widely reconfigured. This article uses rhythm as an object and tool of inquiry to make sense of spatio-temporal change. We analyse the Mass Observation (MO) directive we co-commissioned on ‘COVID-19 and Time’, where volunteer writers reflect on whether and how time was made, experienced, and imagined differently during the early stages of the pandemic in the UK. We draw (...) on Henri Lefebvre and Catherine Régulier's ‘rhythmanalysis’, taking up their theorisation of rhythm as linear and cyclical and their concepts of arrhythmia (discordant rhythms) and eurhythmia (harmonious rhythms). Our analysis highlights how MO writers articulate (a) the ruptures to their everyday rhythms across time and space, (b) their experience of ‘blurred’ or ‘merged’ time as everyday rhythms are dissolved and the pace of time is intensified or slowed, and (c) the remaking of rhythms through new practices or devices and attunements to nature. We show how rhythm enables a consideration of the spatio-temporal textures of everyday life, including their unevenness, variation, and difference. The article thus contributes to and expands recent scholarship on the social life of time, rhythm and rhythmanalysis, everyday life, and MO. (shrink)

The paper provides a critical review of Martin Hägglund's influential Radical Atheism. The paper focuses on what Hägglund calls ‘radical atheism’: the view that according to Derrida ‘the best is the worst’. First, the paper critically examines Hägglund's reconstruction of Derrida's argument for the structure of the trace or ‘the spacing of time’. This analysis clarifies one of the central premises in Hägglund's argument for radical atheism: the ‘contamination’ claim, according to which anything temporal is open as such to (...) the future and is thus alterable in some way. The paper then turns to highlight some of Hägglund's rhetorical slippages that seem to be supported by the contamination claim but actually move beyond what it licenses. Next, the paper focuses critically on the argument for radical atheism and shows how it relies on an unwarranted premise that lies hidden in the discussion of the structure of the trace. Finally, the second central argument that informs Hägglund's work is questioned, that is, the argument for the view that what we are always and already committed to is to live on, that is, survive, so that it is this desire for the mortal that lies behind all our desires. (shrink)

Lecture was the most prevalent teaching style in the colleges and universities we attended. Hired as a lecturer by a local university, the lead author choose to approach teaching based on two principles: first to teach the way she preferred to learn, which is in groups, and second to be both a teacher and a fellow learner.Ten adult practitioners were enrolled in the graduate course Iisted as “The Trainer/Manager as Coach.” This article includes their experiences along with those of (...) the instructor / facilitator.Critical thinking and critical self-reflection are ways to help participants explore assumptions about coaching and particularly about their roles as coaches in the workplace. Critical thinking is a means of examining assumptions by identifying patterns in ourselves and in others-patterns that influence our thinking and subsequent actions. Critical self-reflection is “challenging the vaIidity of presuppositions in prior learning” (Mezirow, 1990, p. 14). Our purpose together was to develop critical thinking skills and practice critical self-reflection as they related to coaching within our practices.Participants used time between class sessions for integration of learning and self-reflection on their own assumptive worlds. Students participated in electronic dialogue and in action research. The online dialogue provided opportunities to share experiences from our places of work. It further served as a collaborative means for building a knowledge base from onIine discussion of coaching literature.Action research is a means of studying one’s practice for the purpose of improvement. Students applied an action research model to a workplace problem that involved them in the role of coach.The results were transformational for all co-Iearners. Changes took pIace in our approaches to coaching. Changes in the focus of coaching, from focusing on the coach to focusing on the learner, are prevalent. (shrink)

We are purposive agents; but we—adult humans in a broadly modern world—are more than that. We are reflective about our motivation. We form prior plans and policies that organize our activity over time. And we see ourselves as agents who persist over time and who begin, develop, and then complete temporally extended activities and projects. Any reasonably complete theory of human action will need in some way to advert to this trio of features—to our reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our (...) conception of our agency as temporally extended. These are, further, features that have great significance for the kinds of lives we can live. For these two reasons I will say that these are among the core features of human agency. A theory of human action needs to say what these core features consist in and how they are related to each other. And such a theory needs also to clarify the relation between these core features of our agency and the possibility that we are fully embedded in an event causal order. (shrink)

Fifty years ago John Dewey asked: "What is freedom and why is it prized?" Charles Sherover raises that question again and answers it with the help of the theoretical traditions of phenomenology, existentialism, American pragmatism, and British idealism, which he relates to the traditions of civic-spirited republicanism from Greek antiquity to the American Founding. His ambitious presentation of a "systematically developed public philosophy" confronts a world experiencing an "accommodation with the universal appeal of freedom," yet one still lacking theoretical clarity (...) about the grounds of that appeal and the character of the institutions that respond to it. Sherover's is a timely and novel defense of liberalism that exposes weaknesses in contemporary liberal thought and practice, attempts to define a new way between the libertarian, Kantian contractarian, and communitarian alternatives that dominate discussion today, draws learnedly on a wide range of sources in the Western heritage of political and moral reflection in this effort, and grounds its critical and positive discussions in an original theory of freedom that employs a Heideggerian analysis of the finite temporal horizon of human existence, with its dual character of dependence on a determinate past and openness to an indeterminate future. (shrink)

The deep comprehension of a text is tantamount to the construction of an articulated mental model of that text. The number of correct recollections is an index of a learner's mental model of a text. We assume that another index of comprehension is the timing of the gestures produced during text recall; gestures are simultaneous with speech when the learner has built an articulated mental model of the text, whereas they anticipate the speech when the learner has built a less (...) articulated mental model. The results of four experiments confirm the predictions deriving from our assumptions for both children and adults. Provided that the recollections are correct, the timing of gestures can differ and can be considered a further measure of the quality of the mental model, beyond the number of correct recollections. (shrink)

Business students early on should be offered a course presenting and analyzing ethical dilemmas they will face as human beings both in the business world and in society. However, such a course should use literature, plays, and novels to illustrate ethical norms and values in the intertwined relationships of human activities. Better than business case studies, literature offers portraits of characters as leaders, employees, consultants, and other professionals, as ordinary human beings with conflicting desires, drives, and ambitions. Literary texts offer (...) excellent descriptions of the circumstances or the organizational settings in which people find themselves. I believe this is the best way to sensitize students without business experience when they are still open to such a formative learning process. At the same time, this pedagogical method linking ethics and literature may help to critically expose some of the weak or missing aspects of various management theories students encounter in their business curriculum and make them more observant and critical. (shrink)

Business students early on should be offered a course presenting and analyzing ethical dilemmas they will face as human beings both in the business world and in society. However, such a course should use literature, plays, and novels to illustrate ethical norms and values in the intertwined relationships of human activities. Better than business case studies, literature offers portraits of characters as leaders, employees, consultants, and other professionals, as ordinary human beings with conflicting desires, drives, and ambitions. Literary texts offer (...) excellent descriptions of the circumstances or the organizational settings in which people find themselves. I believe this is the best way to sensitize students without business experience when they are still open to such a formative learning process. At the same time, this pedagogical method linking ethics and literature may help to critically expose some of the weak or missing aspects of various management theories students encounter in their business curriculum and make them more observant and critical. (shrink)

Business students early on should be offered a course presenting and analyzing ethical dilemmas they will face as human beings both in the business world and in society. However, such a course should use literature, plays, and novels to illustrate ethical norms and values in the intertwined relationships of human activities. Better than business case studies, literature offers portraits of characters as leaders, employees, consultants, and other professionals, as ordinary human beings with conflicting desires, drives, and ambitions. Literary texts offer (...) excellent descriptions of the circumstances or the organizational settings in which people find themselves. I believe this is the best way to sensitize students without business experience when they are still open to such a formative learning process. At the same time, this pedagogical method linking ethics and literature may help to critically expose some of the weak or missing aspects of various management theories students encounter in their business curriculum and make them more observant and critical. (shrink)

The ability to learn the direction of causal relations is critical for understanding and acting in the world. We investigated how children learn causal directionality in situations in which the states of variables are temporally dependent (i.e., autocorrelated). In Experiment 1, children learned about causal direction by comparing the states of one variable before versus after an intervention on another variable. In Experiment 2, children reliably inferred causal directionality merely from observing how two variables change over time; they interpreted (...) Y changing without a change in X as evidence that Y does not influence X. Both of these strategies make sense if one believes the variables to be temporally dependent. We discuss the implications of these results for interpreting previous findings. More broadly, given that many real-world environments are characterized by temporal dependency, these results suggest strategies that children may use to learn the causal structure of their environments. (shrink)

The pace of change in the world is accelerating, yet educational institutions have not kept pace. Indeed, schools have historically been the most static of social institutions, uncritically passing down from generation to generation outmoded didactic, lecture-and-drill-based, models of instruction. Predictable results follow. Students, on the whole, do not learn how to work by, or think for, themselves. They do not learn how to gather, analyze, synthesize and assess information. They do not learn how to analyze the diverse logic of (...) the questions and problems they face and hence how to adjust their thinking to those problems. They do not learn how to enter sympathetically into the thinking of others, nor how to deal rationally with conflicting points of view. They do not learn to become critical readers, writers, speakers and listeners. They do not learn how to use their native languages clearly, precisely, or persuasively. They do not, therefore, become ‘literate’, in the proper sense of the word. Neither do they gain much in the way of genuine knowledge since, for the most part, they could not explain the basis for what they believe. They would be hard pressed to explain, for example, which of their beliefs were based on rational assent and which on simple conformity to what they have been told. They have little sense as to how they might critically analyze their own experience, or identify national or group bias in their own thinking. They are much more apt to learn on the basis of irrational than rational modes of thought. They lack the traits of mind of a genuinely educated person: intellectual humility, courage, integrity, perseverance, and faith in reason.Happily, there is a movement in education today striving to address these problems in a global way, with strategies and materials for the modification of instruction at all levels of education. At its foundation is an emerging new theory of knowledge, learning, and literacy, one which recognizes the centrality of independent critical thinking to all substantial learning, one which recognizes that higher-order, multilogical thinking is as important to childhood as to adult learning, and as important to foundational learning in monological as in multilogical disciplines. This educational reform movement is not proposing an educational miracle cure, for its leading proponents recognize that many social and historical forces must come together before the ideals of the critical thinking movement will become a full academic reality. Schools do not exist in a social vacuum. To the extent that the broader society is uncritical so, on the whole, will be society's schools. Nevertheless, the social conditions necessary for fundamental changes in schooling are increasingly apparent. The pressure for fundamental change is growing. Whether and to what extent these needed basic changes will be delayed or side-tracked, thus requiring new periodic resurgences of this movement, with new, more elaborate articulations of its ideals, goals, and methods — only time will tell. (shrink)

Engaging and accessible, this book is ideal for anyone looking to teach leadership and organization - from lecturers to human resource professionals and managers alike.'Donna Ladkin gives us an entirely novel and creative approach to thinking about, and importantly, doing and teaching ethics. The book is practice-based in the best sense of the word, using meditation and other attention techniques to enhance awareness, inquiry, and ultimately ethical insight at the personal and organizational levels. It is accessible to students at all (...) levels of learning, with exercises that will generate personal insights. At the same time, it is grounded in a wide range of sources, both philosophical and managerial, that enhance the credibility of its approach. This book will enhance the ethics and the lives of people who read it and practice its approaches.'- Sandra Waddock, Boston College Carroll School of Management, USWith the use of exercises, reflective prompts and case studies, Mastering the Ethical Dimension of Organizations offers a practice-based approach to developing the skills critical to responding ethically to organizational dilemmas. Engagingly and accessibly written by a leading communicator in the field, this book will be essential for postgraduate students of business, management or leadership.Starting from the premise that ethical issues within organizations rarely come 'packaged', this book encourages an understanding of ethics beyond organizational compliance systems or codes of conduct. It argues that our ability to respond ethically requires ethical perception, moral imagination and discernment akin to aesthetic judgment; capabilities it fosters through a clear, programmed approach. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Further Reflections on Conversations of Our TimeJudith Butler (bio)The exchange that Ernesto Laclau and I conducted through e-mail last year at this time begins a conversation that I expect will continue. And I suppose I would like to use this “supplementary” reflection to think about what makes such a conversation possible, and what possibilities might emerge from such a conversation.First of all, I think that I was drawn (...) to the work of Laclau and Mouffe when I began to read Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and realized that I had found a set of Marxist thinkers for whom discourse was not merely a representation of preexisting social and historical realities, but was also constitutive of the field of the social and of history. The second moment came when I realized that central to the notion of articulation, appropriated from Gramsci, was the notion of rearticulation. As a temporally dynamic and relatively unpredictable play of forces, hegemony had been cast by both Laclau and Mouffe as an alternative to forms of static structuralism that tend to construe contemporary social forms as timeless totalities. I read in Laclau and Mouffe the political transcription of Derrida’s “Structure, Sign, and Play”: a structure gains its status as a structure, its structurality, only through its repeated reinstatement. The dependency of that structure on its reinstatement means that the very possibility of structure depends on a reiteration that is in no sense determined fully in advance, that for structure, and social structure as a result, to become possible, there must first be a contingent repetition at its basis. Moreover, for some social formation to appear as structured is for it to have covered over in some way the contingency of its own installation.The theoretical rearticulation of structure as hegemony marked the work of Laclau and Mouffe as consequentially poststructuralist and offered perhaps the most important link between politics and poststructuralism in recent years (along with the work of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak). The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to structure social relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of hegemony in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation brought the question of temporality into the thinking of structure, and marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power.It is, of course, impossible in this context to reconstruct the particular way in which Derrida’s work and Foucault’s work converge in the reconceptualization of hegemony that Laclau and Mouffe have offered. One of the points, however, that became most salient for me is the reintroduction of temporality and, indeed, of futurity into the thinking of social formations. Among many critical social theorists, the tendency has been to underscore how the systemic character of capital tends to incorporate any instance of opposition in the service of capital’s own self-augmentation. I would clearly agree that the incorporative and domesticating possibilities of capital are immense. But I would also [End Page 13] argue that any theory that fails to think the possibilities of transformation from within that “systemic” formation is itself complicit with the idea of the “eternal” character of capital that capital so readily produces. Hegemony also marks a limit to the totalizing terms within which social formations are to be thought. For what hegemony attends to are the moments of breakage, of rearticulation, convergence, and resistance that are not immediately coopted by social formations in their past and present forms. That no social formation can endure without becoming reinstated, and that every reinstatement puts the “structure” in question at risk, suggests that the possibility of its own undoing is at once the condition of possibility of structure itself.Before I knew the work of Laclau and Mouffe very well, I came close to this kind of insight in my work on gender. 1 There I argued that gender is not an inner core or static essence, but a reiterated enactment of... (shrink)

This paper explores ways in which experiential learning theories, in particular transformative learning theory, can inform farmer participatory research and extension (PR&E). I identify and discuss three key elements of experiential learning theory – second-order experiences, reflection, and dialogue – that are particularly pertinent to PR&E practice. I then turn to one experiential learning theorist – Mezirow, and examine his theory of transformative learning to assess how it may inform the PR&E process. I outline the basic components and stages (...) of transformative learning and summarize the main criticisms of the theory. Following this, parallels are drawn between transformative learning and what actually takes place in PR&E, and examples are given of the ways in which scientists and rural people may undergo transformative learning through the PR&E process. Ways in which transformative learning can be encouraged within the PR&E context are discussed. I conclude that Mezirow’s work can provide PR&E practitioners and theorists with additional insights into how adults learn and especially how they – researchers, extensionists and rural people – can transform their ways of thinking to accommodate a shift from conventional research and extension to PR&E. (shrink)

Educating young people about how to interact with patients at the end of their lives is challenging. A qualitative study based on Husserl’s phenomenological approach was performed to describe the learning experience of secondary education students after watching, analysing, and reflecting on two videoclips featuring Cameron Duncan, a young man suffering from terminal cancer. Students from three vocational centres providing training in ancillary nursing, pharmacy, and dependent care in the Community of Madrid visited the Palliative Care Hospital. A total of (...) 110 students, with a median age of nineteen years, participated in the study. The students’ learning experience through the videoclips reveals the essential aspects required in palliative care, since the character suffers in every dimension of his being: physically as well as psychologically, socially, and spiritually. Therefore, this requires healthcare professionals to understand their experience, putting themselves in their place, to provide affectionate care and to display communication skills leading to a quality helping relationship. Four comprehensive educational categories were identified in the study. The students learned the importance of: 1) providing comprehensive and affectionate care to patients, 2) the need for communication skills in caring for patients, 3) being aware of the end of life and time left, 4) valuing life and fighting for what one wishes to attain. A visit to a PC hospital and the viewing of videoclips and reflection upon these, represents a useful strategy for secondary education healthcare students. The study indicates that videoclips are an innovative method for becoming aware of the various issues pertaining to palliative care. (shrink)