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Results for 'the subjective interpretation of probability'
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- Is the subjective interpretation of quantum probabilities really inconsistent?Lefteris Farmakis - 2009 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 23 (2):163-173.Christopher Fuchs has recently offered a provocative version of quantum mechanical realism, which is based on the suggestion that quantum probabilities merit a subjective interpretation. His proposal, however, has been charged with inconsistency by Amit Hagar (2003), who argues that interpreting quantum probabilities subjectively is inconsistent with the realist claims Fuchs wants to maintain for the quantum system and the dimensionality of the Hilbert space that accompanies it. In this paper I first outline the fundamentals of Fuchs's approach (...)
- Is the subjective interpretation of quantum probabilities really inconsistent?Lefteris Farmakis - 2009 - Theoria 23 (2):163-173.Christopher Fuchs has recently offered a provocative version of quantum mechanical realism, which is based on the suggestion that quantum probabilities merit a subjective interpretation. His proposal, however, has been charged with inconsistency by Amit Hagar, who argues that interpreting quantum probabilities subjectively is inconsistent with the realist claims Fuchs wants to maintain for the quantum system and the dimensionality of the Hilbert space that accompanies it. In this paper I first outline the fundamentals of Fuchs’s approach and (...)No categories
- On the putative incompatibility of the logical and subjective interpretations of probability.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - unknown
- What is Logical about the Logical Interpretation of Probability?Torfehnezhad Parzhad - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1).My goal, in this paper, is to critically assess the categorization of “interpretations of probability” as it appears in the literature. In some sources only Carnap’s treatment of probability is understood to be the best example of “logical” probability. This is surprisingly narrow and I will here suggest otherwise. In fact, I believe that certain forms of Baysianism should also be included in the logical camp.Export citation
Bookmark - An interpretation of probability in the law of evidence based on pro-et-contra argumentation.Lennart Åqvist - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):391-410.The purpose of this paper is to improve on the logical and measure-theoretic foundations for the notion of probability in the law of evidence, which were given in my contributions Åqvist [ (1990) Logical analysis of epistemic modality: an explication of the Bolding–Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength. In: Klami HT (ed) Rätt och Sanning (Law and Truth. A symposium on legal proof-theory in Uppsala May 1989). Iustus Förlag, Uppsala, pp 43–54; (1992) Towards a logical theory of legal evidence: semantic (...)
- A problem for Popper : corroboration and the logical interpretation of probability.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - unknownHow are we to understand the use of probability in Popper’s corroboration function? Popper says logically, but this raises a problem that becomes apparent when his views on logical probability are compared with those of Keynes. Specifically, Popper does not make it clear how we could have access to, or even calculate, probability values in a logical sense. For first, he would likely want to deny the Keynesian distinction between primary and secondary propositions, and the underlying notion (...)
- Interpretations of Probability.Weimin Sun - 2003 - Dissertation, The University of ConnecticutIn this dissertation I aim to clarify the concept of probability. There are three kinds of interpretation of probability: the objective interpretation, the logical interpretation, and the subjective interpretation. The objective interpretation understands probability as a natural property that exists independently of our minds. I will clarify and defend one version of objective probability---the propensity interpretation of probability. I reject the logical interpretation of probability that treats (...)Export citation Bookmark
- Interpretations of probability.Armin Schulz - 2010 - In Jon Williamson & Federica Russo (eds.), Key Terms in Logic. pp. 81.Key Terms in Logic offers the ideal introduction to this core area in the study of philosophy, providing detailed summaries of the important concepts in the study of logic and the application of logic to the rest of philosophy. A brief introduction provides context and background, while the following chapters offer detailed definitions of key terms and concepts, introductions to the work of key thinkers and lists of key texts. Designed specifically to meet the needs of students and assuming no (...)No categories
- Interpretations of probability.Armin Schulz - 2010 - In Jon Williamson & Federica Russo (eds.), Key Terms in Logic. The key terms in philosophy. London, U.K.: Continuum.Key Terms in Logic offers the ideal introduction to this core area in the study of philosophy, providing detailed summaries of the important concepts in the study of logic and the application of logic to the rest of philosophy. A brief introduction provides context and background, while the following chapters offer detailed definitions of key terms and concepts, introductions to the work of key thinkers and lists of key texts. Designed specifically to meet the needs of students and assuming no (...)No categories
- Interpretations of probability.Armin Schulz - 2010 - In Jon Williamson & Federica Russo (eds.), Key Terms in Logic. The key terms in philosophy. London: Continuum. pp. 81.Key Terms in Logic offers the ideal introduction to this core area in the study of philosophy, providing detailed summaries of the important concepts in the study of logic and the application of logic to the rest of philosophy. A brief introduction provides context and background, while the following chapters offer detailed definitions of key terms and concepts, introductions to the work of key thinkers and lists of key texts. Designed specifically to meet the needs of students and assuming no (...)No categories
- The Smith-Walley Interpretation of Subjective Probability: An Appreciation.Carl G. Wagner - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):343-350.The right interpretation of subjective probability is implicit in the theories of upper and lower odds, and upper and lower previsions, developed, respectively, by Cedric Smith (1961) and Peter Walley (1991). On this interpretation you are free to assign contingent events the probability 1 (and thus to employ conditionalization as a method of probability revision) without becoming vulnerable to a weak Dutch book.
- Interpretations of probability.Jon Williamson & Federica Russo - 2010 - In Jon Williamson & Federica Russo (eds.), Key Terms in Logic. pp. 81.Key Terms in Logic offers the ideal introduction to this core area in the study of philosophy, providing detailed summaries of the important concepts in the study of logic and the application of logic to the rest of philosophy. A brief introduction provides context and background, while the following chapters offer detailed definitions of key terms and concepts, introductions to the work of key thinkers and lists of key texts. Designed specifically to meet the needs of students and assuming no (...)No categories
- On the Proximity of the Logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ Interpretations of Probability.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):335-349.In his Bayesian Nets and Causality, Jon Williamson presents an ‘Objective Bayesian’ interpretation of probability, which he endeavours to distance from the logical interpretation yet associate with the subjective interpretation. In doing so, he suggests that the logical interpretation suffers from severe epistemological problems that do not affect his alternative. In this paper, I present a challenge to his analysis. First, I closely examine the relationship between the logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ views, and show (...)
- The semiotic interpretation of legal subjects in China’s new criminal procedure law.Xu Lin & Li Liang - forthcoming - Semiotica.Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.Export citation Bookmark
- The propensity interpretation of probability.Karl R. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):25-42.
- The Propensity Interpretation of Probability: A Re-evaluation.Joseph Berkovitz - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (S3):629-711.Single-case and long-run propensity theories are among the main objective interpretations of probability. There have been various objections to these theories, e.g. that it is difficult to explain why propensities should satisfy the probability axioms and, worse, that propensities are at odds with these axioms, that the explication of propensities is circular and accordingly not informative, and that single-case propensities are metaphysical and accordingly non-scientific. We consider various propensity theories of probability and their prospects in light of (...)
- Infinitely Challenging: Pitowsky’s Subjective Interpretation and the Physics of Infinite Systems.Laura Ruetsche & John Earman - 2011 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 219--232.On Itamar Pitowsky’s subjective interpretation of quantum mechanics, “the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics [QM] is just a new kind of probability theory”, one whose probabilities correspond to odds rational agents would accept on the outcomes of gambles concerning quantum event structures. Our aim here is to ask whether Pitowsky’s approach can be extended from its original context, of quantum theories for systems with an finite number of degrees of freedom, to systems with an infinite number (...)
- The interference problem for the betting interpretation of degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):809-830.The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition (...)
- The concept of probability, crisis in statistics, and the unbearable lightness of Bayesing.Boris Čulina - 2023 - Science and Philosophy 11 (1):7-30.Education in statistics, the application of statistics in scientific research, and statistics itself as a scientific discipline are in crisis. Within science, the main cause of the crisis is the insufficiently clarified concept of probability. This article aims to separate the concept of probability which is scientifically based from other concepts that do not have this characteristic. The scientifically based concept of probability is Kolmogorov’s concept of probability models together with the conditions of their applicability. Bayesian (...)
- Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.The foundations of probability are viewed through the lens of the subjectivist interpretation. This article surveys conditional probability, arguments for probabilism, probability dynamics, and the evidential and subjective interpretations of probability.
- Amelius’ Interpretation of the Hypotheses of Plato’s Parmenides.Leonida Vanni - 2023 - Philosophie Antique 23:27-61.In book VI of his Parmenides commentary, Proclus surveys the previous Neoplatonic interpretations of the “hypotheses” of Plato’s Parmenides, starting with Amelius, a disciple of Plotinus. This paper analyses Amelius’ exegesis of the hypotheses. After presenting the extant evidence about his Parmenides commentary, I explore three puzzling aspects of his interpretation: 1) unlike most Neoplatonists, Amelius distinguished eight hypotheses instead of nine. I argue that he considered the last section (Prm. 165e2-166c2) to be devoid of any positive content and (...)
- A probability logical interpretation of fallacies.Niki Pfeifer - 2008 - In G. Kreuzbauer, N. Gratzl & E. Hiebl (eds.), Rhetorische Wissenschaft: Rede Und Argumentation in Theorie Und Praxis. Lit. pp. 225--244.This chapter presents a probability logical approach to fallacies. A special interpretation of (subjective) probability is used, which is based on coherence. Coherence provides not only a foundation of probability theory, but also a normative standard of reference for distinguishing fallacious from non-fallacious arguments. The violation of coherence is sufficient for an argument to be fallacious. The inherent uncertainty of everyday life argumentation is captured by attaching degrees of belief to the premises. Probability logic (...)
- The subjective theory of probability. [REVIEW]D. A. Gillies - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):138-157.
- Philosophy of Probability and Statistical Modelling.Mauricio Suárez - 2020 - Cambridge University Press.This Element has two main aims. The first one is an historically informed review of the philosophy of probability. It describes recent historiography, lays out the distinction between subjective and objective notions, and concludes by applying the historical lessons to the main interpretations of probability. The second aim focuses entirely on objective probability, and advances a number of novel theses regarding its role in scientific practice. A distinction is drawn between traditional attempts to interpret chance, and (...)No categories
- The nature of probability.Patrick Suppes - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):89 - 102.The thesis of this article is that the nature of probability is centered on its formal properties, not on any of its standard interpretations. Section 2 is a survey of Bayesian applications. Section 3 focuses on two examples from physics that seem as completely objective as other physical concepts. Section 4 compares the conflict between subjective Bayesians and objectivists about probability to the earlier strident conflict in physics about the nature of force. Section 5 outlines a pragmatic (...)
- The concept of probability. A critical survey of recent contributions.Charles E. Bures - 1938 - Philosophy of Science 5 (1):1-20.It is the purpose of this paper to review the present status of discussion concerning the concept of probability. The exposition will consist of six sections: A brief statement of the most important traditional views of the concept of probability: subjective and objective; A brief criticism of two traditionally important conceptions: a priori probability and the Principle of Indifference; A criticism of an outstanding example of the subjective theory of probability, the theory of F. (...)
- Subjective Probability and the Problem of Countable Additivity.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 17 (1).The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Bruno de Finetti's view that the axiom of countable additivity of the probability calculus cannot be justified in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability. After presenting the core of the subjective theory of probability and the main de Finetti's argument against the axiom of countable additivity (the so called de Finetti's infinite lottery) I argue against de Finetti's view. In particular, I claim that (...)Export citation Bookmark
- Philosophical Theories of Probability.Donald A. Gillies - 2000 - New York: Routledge.The Twentieth Century has seen a dramatic rise in the use of probability and statistics in almost all fields of research. This has stimulated many new philosophical ideas on probability. _Philosophical Theories of Probability_ is the first book to present a clear, comprehensive and systematic account of these various theories and to explain how they relate to one another. Gillies also offers a distinctive version of the propensity theory of probability, and the intersubjective interpretation, which develops (...)
- From Bayesianism to the Epistemic View of Mathematics: Review of R. Jeffrey, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. [REVIEW]Jon Williamson - 2006 - Philosophia Mathematica 14 (3):365-369.Subjective Probability: The Real Thing is the last book written by the late Richard Jeffrey, a key proponent of the Bayesian interpretation of probability.Bayesians hold that probability is a mental notion: saying that the probability of rain is 0.7 is just saying that you believe it will rain to degree 0.7. Degrees of belief are themselves cashed out in terms of bets—in this case you consider 7:3 to be fair odds for a bet on (...)
- Time and the propensity interpretation of probability.Niall Shanks - 1993 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 24 (2):293 - 302.The prime concern of this paper is with the nature of probability. It is argued that questions concerning the nature of probability are intimately linked to questions about the nature of time. The case study here concerns the single case propensity interpretation of probability. It is argued that while this interpretation of probability has a natural place in the quantum theory, the metaphysical picture of time to be found in relativity theory is incompatible with (...)
- The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness and the Propensity Interpretation of Probability.Isabelle Drouet & Francesca Merlin - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (S3):457-468.The paper provides a new critical perspective on the propensity interpretation of fitness, by investigating its relationship to the propensity interpretation of probability. Two main conclusions are drawn. First, the claim that fitness is a propensity cannot be understood properly: fitness is not a propensity in the sense prescribed by the propensity interpretation of probability. Second, this interpretation of probability is inessential for explanations proposed by the PIF in evolutionary biology. Consequently, interpreting the (...)
- Statistical mechanics and the propensity interpretation of probability.Peter Clark - 2001 - In Jean Bricmont & Others (eds.), Chance in Physics: Foundations and Perspectives. Springer. pp. 271--81.
- The Propensity Interpretation of the Calculus of Probability, and the Quantum Theory.Karl R. Popper - 1957 - In Stephan Körner (ed.), Observation and Interpretation. Butterworths. pp. 65--70.
- A subjective interpretation of conditional probability.Glenn Shafer - 1983 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (4):453 - 466.
- The Interpretation of Probability in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Malvina Ongaro - 2021 - Wittgenstein-Studien 12 (1):131-144.In this paper, I propose an assessment of the interpretation of the mathematical notion of probability that Wittgenstein presents in TLP (1963: 5.15 – 5.156). I start by presenting his definition of probability as a relation between propositions. I claim that this definition qualifies as a logical interpretation of probability, of the kind defended in the same years by J. M. Keynes. However, Wittgenstein’s interpretation seems prima facie to be safe from two standard objections (...)
- Entanglement, Information, and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.Gregg Jaeger - 2009 - Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.Entanglement was initially thought by some to be an oddity restricted to the realm of thought experiments. However, Bell’s inequality delimiting local - behavior and the experimental demonstration of its violation more than 25 years ago made it entirely clear that non-local properties of pure quantum states are more than an intellectual curiosity. Entanglement and non-locality are now understood to figure prominently in the microphysical world, a realm into which technology is rapidly hurtling. Information theory is also increasingly recognized by (...)
- Confirmation and the intersubjective interpretation of probability.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - unknown
- Quantum probability from subjective likelihood: Improving on Deutsch's proof of the probability rule.David Wallace - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):311-332.I present a proof of the quantum probability rule from decision-theoretic assumptions, in the context of the Everett interpretation. The basic ideas behind the proof are those presented in Deutsch's recent proof of the probability rule, but the proof is simpler and proceeds from weaker decision-theoretic assumptions. This makes it easier to discuss the conceptual ideas involved in the proof, and to show that they are defensible.
- The Interpretation of Probability: Still an Open Issue? 1.Maria Carla Galavotti - 2017 - Philosophies 2 (3):20.Probability as understood today, namely as a quantitative notion expressible by means of a function ranging in the interval between 0–1, took shape in the mid-17th century, and presents both a mathematical and a philosophical aspect. Of these two sides, the second is by far the most controversial, and fuels a heated debate, still ongoing. After a short historical sketch of the birth and developments of probability, its major interpretations are outlined, by referring to the work of their (...)No categories
- Statistical Inference and the Plethora of Probability Paradigms: A Principled Pluralism.Mark L. Taper, Gordon Brittan Jr & Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - manuscriptThe major competing statistical paradigms share a common remarkable but unremarked thread: in many of their inferential applications, different probability interpretations are combined. How this plays out in different theories of inference depends on the type of question asked. We distinguish four question types: confirmation, evidence, decision, and prediction. We show that Bayesian confirmation theory mixes what are intuitively “subjective” and “objective” interpretations of probability, whereas the likelihood-based account of evidence melds three conceptions of what constitutes an (...)
- Pragmatism and the Birth of Subjective Probability.Maria Carla Galavotti - 2019 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 11 (1).Pragmatism, taken not just as a philosophical movement but as a way of addressing problems, strongly influenced the debate on the foundations of probability during the first half of the twentieth century. Upholders of different interpretations of probability such as Hans Reichenbach, Ernest Nagel, Rudolf Carnap, Frank Ramsey, and Bruno de Finetti, acknowledged their debt towards pragmatist philosophers, including Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, Clarence Irving Lewis, William Dewey and Giovanni Vailati. In addition, scientist-philosophers like Ernst Mach, Ludwig (...)
- Subjectivity of pre-test probability value: controversies over the use of Bayes’ Theorem in medical diagnosis.Tomasz Rzepiński - 2023 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 44 (4):301-324.This article discusses the use of Bayes’ Theorem in medical diagnosis with a view to examining the epistemological problems of interpreting the concept of pre-test probability value. It is generally maintained that pre-test probability values are determined subjectively. Accordingly, this paper investigates three main philosophical interpretations of probability (the “classic” one, based on the principle of non-sufficient reason, the frequentist one, and the personalistic one). This study argues that using Bayes’ Theorem in medical diagnosis does not require (...)
- Neural unpredictability, the interpretation of quantum theory, and the mind-body problem.Matthew J. Donald - 2002 - Quant-Ph/0208033.It has been suggested, on the one hand, that quantum states are just states of knowledge; and, on the other, that quantum theory is merely a theory of correlations. These suggestions are confronted with problems about the nature of psycho-physical parallelism and about how we could define probabilities for our individual future observations given our individual present and previous observations. The complexity of the problems is underlined by arguments that unpredictability in ordinary everyday neural functioning, ultimately stemming from small-scale uncertainties (...)
- Conditional probability and the cognitive science of conditional reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):359–379.This paper addresses the apparent mismatch between the normative and descriptive literatures in the cognitive science of conditional reasoning. Descriptive psychological theories still regard material implication as the normative theory of the conditional. However, over the last 20 years in the philosophy of language and logic the idea that material implication can account for everyday indicative conditionals has been subject to severe criticism. The majority view is now apparently in favour of a subjective conditional probability interpretation. A (...)
- Ergodic theory, interpretations of probability and the foundations of statistical mechanics.Janneke van Lith - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 32 (4):581--94.The traditional use of ergodic theory in the foundations of equilibrium statistical mechanics is that it provides a link between thermodynamic observables and microcanonical probabilities. First of all, the ergodic theorem demonstrates the equality of microcanonical phase averages and infinite time averages (albeit for a special class of systems, and up to a measure zero set of exceptions). Secondly, one argues that actual measurements of thermodynamic quantities yield time averaged quantities, since measurements take a long time. The combination of these (...)
- Interpretations of probability in evolutionary theory.Roberta L. Millstein - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1317-1328.Evolutionary theory (ET) is teeming with probabilities. Probabilities exist at all levels: the level of mutation, the level of microevolution, and the level of macroevolution. This uncontroversial claim raises a number of contentious issues. For example, is the evolutionary process (as opposed to the theory) indeterministic, or is it deterministic? Philosophers of biology have taken different sides on this issue. Millstein (1997) has argued that we are not currently able answer this question, and that even scientific realists ought to remain (...)
- The emergence and interpretation of probability in Bohmian mechanics.Craig Callender - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):351-370.A persistent question about the deBroglie–Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics concerns the understanding of Born’s rule in the theory. Where do the quantum mechanical probabilities come from? How are they to be interpreted? These are the problems of emergence and interpretation. In more than 50 years no consensus regarding the answers has been achieved. Indeed, mirroring the foundational disputes in statistical mechanics, the answers to each question are surprisingly diverse. This paper is an opinionated survey of this literature. (...)
- Review: The Subjective Theory of Probability. [REVIEW]D. A. Gillies - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):138 - 157.
- On de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability.Joseph Berkovitz - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):25.De Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjective school of probability. He held that probabilities are subjective, coherent degrees of expectation, and he argued that none of the objective interpretations of probability make sense. While his theory has been influential in science and philosophy, it has encountered various objections. I argue that these objections overlook central aspects of de Finetti’s philosophy of probability and are largely unfounded. I propose a new interpretation (...)No categories
- Conditional Probability and the Cognitive Science of Conditional Reasoning.Nick Chater Mike Oaksford - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):359-379.This paper addresses the apparent mismatch between the normative and descriptive literatures in the cognitive science of conditional reasoning. Descriptive psychological theories still regard material implication as the normative theory of the conditional. However, over the last 20 years in the philosophy of language and logic the idea that material implication can account for everyday indicative conditionals has been subject to severe criticism. The majority view is now apparently in favour of a subjective conditional probability interpretation. A (...)
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