Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

In (Hertwig et al. , 2003) Hertwig et al. draw a distinction between decisions from experience and decisions from description. In a decision from experience an agent does not have a summary description of the possible outcomes or their likelihoods. A career choice, deciding whether to back up a computer hard drive, cross a busy street, etc., are typical examples of decisions from experience. In such decisions agents can rely only of their encounters with the corresponding prospects. By contrast, an (...) agent furnished with information sources such as drug-package inserts or mutual-fund brochures—all of which describe risky prospects—will often make decisions from description. In (Hertwig et al. , 2003) it is shown (empirically) that decisions from experience and decisions from description can lead to dramatically different choice behavior. Most of these results (summarized and analyzed in (Hertwig, 2009)) are concerned with the role of risk in decision making. This article presents some preliminary results concerning the role of uncertainty in decision-making. We focus on Ellsberg’s two-color problem and consider a chance setup based on double sampling. We report empirical results which indicate that decisions from description where subjects select between a clear urn, the chance setup based on double sampling and Ellsberg’s vague urn, are such that subjects perceive the chance setup at least as an intermediate option between clear and vague choices (and there is evidence indicating that the double sampling chance setup is seen as operationally indistinguishable from the vague urn). We then suggest how the iterated chance setup can be used in order to study decisions from experience in the case of uncertainty. (shrink)

This paper looks at Alexander Guerrero’s epistemic case for ‘lottocracy’, or government by randomly selected citizen assemblies. It argues that Guerrero fails to show that citizen expertise is more likely to be elicited and brought to bear on democratic politics if we replace elections with random selection. However, randomly selected citizen assemblies can be valuable deliberative and participative additions to elected and appointed institutions even when citizens are not bearers of special knowledge or virtue individually or collectively.

Examinations form part of the assessment processes that constitute the basis for benchmarking individual educational progress, and must consequently fulfill credibility, reliability, and transparency standards in order to promote learning outcomes and ensure academic integrity. A randomly selected question examination is considered to be an effective solution to mitigate sharing of questions between students by addressing replicated inter-examination questions that compromise examination integrity and sequential intra- examination questions that compromise examination comprehensivity. In this study, a Monte Carlo approach was used (...) to design six examination schemes for the purpose of generating and evaluating 600 RSQEs in order to investigate the effects of RSQE design on replicated inter-examination and sequential and intra-examination questions. Results revealed that the number of randomly selected questions from the pool and the number of sub-pools inversely affected the replication and sequencing of the examination questions. Thus, by designing the RSQE in many sub-pools, in equivalence to the number of examination questions and selecting only one question from each sub-pool, and updating the sub-pools after each examination, the passing of information can be prevented, ensuring the integrity of the examinations. (shrink)

This paper looks at Alexander Guerrero’s epistemic case for ‘lottocracy’, or government by randomly selected citizen assemblies. It argues that Guerrero fails to show that citizen expertise is more likely to be elicited and brought to bear on democratic politics if we replace elections with random selection. However, randomly selected citizen assemblies can be valuable deliberative and participative additions to elected and appointed institutions even when citizens are not bearers of special knowledge or virtue individually or collectively.

This paper argues in favor of the epistemic properties of inclusiveness in the context of democratic deliberative assemblies and derives the implications of this argument in terms of the epistemically superior mode of selection of representatives. The paper makes the general case that, all other things being equal and under some reasonable assumptions, more is smarter. When applied to deliberative assemblies of representatives, where there is an upper limit to the number of people that can be included in the (...) group, the argument translates into a defense of a specific selection mode of participants: random selection. (shrink)

This essay lays out the common reasoning underlying a diversity of arguments for decision making using lotteries. This reasoning appeals to the sanitizing effects of ignorance. Lotteries ensure that bad reasons are unable to affect a decision. (They also ensure that good reasons have no effect as well, which is why care must be applied in deciding to use them.) All arguments for or against the use of a lottery to make a particular decision will thus appeal to the same (...) property that lotteries possess. This fact is compatible with continued vigorous disagreement about whether particular decisions should be made by lot. Such disagreements, however, will focus on the nature of the circumstances surrounding the decision. People can thus agree that a given set of circumstances calls for the use of a lottery even as they disagree over whether those circumstances hold. (shrink)

In this reply to Jesse Steinberg’s ‘God and the possibility of random creation’, I suggest a procedure whereby a being such as God could randomly select a number from an infinite set.

The two traditional justifications for bicameralism are that a second legislative chamber serves a legislative-review function (enhancing the quality of legislation) and a balancing function (checking concentrated power and protecting minorities). I furnish here a third justification for bicameralism, with one elected chamber and the second selected by lot, as an institutional compromise between contradictory imperatives facing representative democracy: elections are a mechanism of people’s political agency and of accountability, but run counter to political equality and impartiality, and are insufficient (...) for satisfactory responsiveness; sortition is a mechanism for equality and impartiality, and of enhancing responsiveness, but not of people’s political agency or of holding representatives accountable. Whereas the two traditional justifications initially grew out of anti-egalitarian premises (about the need for elite wisdom and to protect the elite few against the many), the justification advanced here is grounded in egalitarian premises about the need to protect state institutions from capture by the powerful few and to treat all subjects as political equals. Reflecting the “political” turn in political theory, I embed this general argument within the institutional context of Canadian parliamentary federalism, arguing that Canada’s Senate ought to be reconstituted as a randomly selected citizen assembly. (shrink)

Would randomly selecting legislators be more democratic than electing them? Lottocrats argue (reasonably) that contemporary regimes are not very democratic and (more questionably) that replacing elections with sortition would mitigate elite capture and improve political decisions. I argue that a lottocracy would, in fact, be likely to perform worse on these metrics than a system of representation that appoints at least some legislators using election – a psephocracy (from psēphizein, to vote). Even today's actually existing psephocracies, which are far from (...) ideally democratic, are better suited than a lottocracy would be to meet the demands of democratic citizenship (politics must be legible to ordinary people, who must have low-cost opportunities to participate) and the demands of democratic leadership (powerful representatives should be specialized and constrained by competitions for popular support). Democrats therefore have weighty instrumental reasons to reject lottocracy and work to democratize psephocracy, instead. (shrink)

A theorem on the partitioning of a randomly selected large population into stationary and non-stationary components by using a property of the stationary population identity is stated and proved. The methods of partitioning demonstrated are original and these are helpful in real-world situations where age-wise data is available. Applications of this theorem for practical purposes are summarized at the end.

In a recent Target Article Naomi Scheinerman (2023a) has offered an important and compelling call to institutionalize popular participation for heritable genome engineering through the inclusion of...

One of the greatest challenges facing current generations is the environmental and climate crisis. Democracies, so far, have not distinguished themselves by their capacity to bring about appropriate political responses to these challenges. This is partly explicable in terms of a lack of state capacity in a globalized context. Yet we also argue that election-centered democracies suffer from several flaws that make them inapt to deal with this challenge properly: youth is not appropriately represented; parliaments suffer from a lack of (...) diversity; elected representatives’ time-horizon is too narrow; anti-regulation lobbies have too much influence. Considering this, we argue for rejuvenating our democratic systems by introducing a randomly selected legislative chamber, which would be permanently integrated to our political systems and would play a deliberative and scrutinizing role. We have identified four eco-political arguments in favor of such reform. The generational rebalancing argument, which we examine first, has some plausibility but is not the strongest. The other three arguments – its eco-epistemic promises; its wider time horizon; and the independence of its members from short-term corporate interests – however, appear to us to be much more convincing. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the claim that lotteries are more democratic than elections. The paper starts by looking at the two main forms of equality that give lotteries their democratic appeal: an individually equal chance to be selected for office, and the proportionate representation of groups in the legislature. It shows that they cannot be jointly realized and argues that their egalitarian appeal is more apparent than real. Finally, the paper considers the democratic reasons to value (...) randomly selected assemblies, even if claims about their distinctively egalitarian properties are exaggerated. (shrink)

Elections are generally considered the only way to create a democratic legislature where direct democracy is not an option. However, in recent years that assumption has been challenged by individuals who claim that lotteries are a democratic way of selecting people for office, elections are aristocratic or oligarchic, not democratic, and that elections as we know them are inadequate if true democracy is prioritized. In opposition to this wave, my paper argues that the assertions made to support the democratic merits (...) of lotteries are unpersuasive. Current evidence that sortition is either more egalitarian or produces epistemically better results than elections is poor. Instead, these assertions illuminate the importance of elections in enabling the constituents of a democracy to reconcile the personal and political dimensions of their lives and, therefore, better reflect citizens’ claims to privacy and equality. The paper begins by recapping the main arguments for treating sortition as a democratic way to select a legislature, outlines their deficiencies, and then turns to what these perceived failings actually suggest about the democratic value of elections. (shrink)

Since the solution to many public health problems depends on research, it is critical for the progress and well-being for the patients that we can trust the scientific literature. Misconduct and poor laboratory practice in science threatens the scientific progress, leads to loss of productivity and increased healthcare costs, and endangers lives of patients. Data duplication may represent one of challenges related to these problems. In order to estimate the frequency of data duplication in life science literature, a systematic screen (...) through 120 original scientific articles published in three different cancer related journals [journal impact factor 20] was completed. The study revealed a surprisingly high proportion of articles containing data duplication. For the IF 20 journals, 25 % of the articles were found to contain data duplications. The IF 5–10 journal showed a comparable proportion. The proportion of articles containing duplicated data was comparable between the three journals and no significant correlation to journal IF was found. The editorial offices representing the journals included in this study and the individual authors of the detected articles were contacted to clarify the individual cases. The editorial offices did not reply and only 1 out of 29 cases were apparently clarified by the authors, although no supporting data was supplied. This study questions the reliability of life science literature, it illustrates that data duplications are widespread and independent of journal impact factor and call for a reform of the current peer review and retraction process of scientific publishing. (shrink)

The latter half of the twentieth century has been marked by debates in evolutionary biology over the relative significance of natural selection and random drift: the so-called “neutralist/selectionist” debates. Yet John Beatty has argued that it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the concept of random drift from the concept of natural selection, a claim that has been accepted by many philosophers of biology. If this claim is correct, then the neutralist/selectionist debates seem at best (...) futile, and at worst, meaningless. I reexamine the issues that Beatty raises, and argue that random drift and natural selection, conceived as processes, can be distinguished from one another. (shrink)

Mutations are often described as being “random with respect to fitness.” Here we show that the experiments used to establish randomness with respect to fitness are only capable of showing that mutations are random with respect to current external selection. Current debates about whether or not mutations are directed may be at least partially resolved by making use of this distinction. Additionally, this distinction has important mathematical, experimental, and inferential implications.

One controversy about the existence of so called evolutionary forces such as natural selection and random genetic drift concerns the sense in which such “forces” can be said to interact. In this paper I explain how natural selection and random drift can interact. In particular, I show how population-level probabilities can be derived from individual-level probabilities, and explain the sense in which natural selection and drift are embodied in these population-level probabilities. I argue that whatever (...) causal character the individual-level probabilities have is then shared by the population-level probabilities, and that natural selection and random drift then have that same causal character. Moreover, natural selection and drift can then be viewed as two aspects of probability distributions over frequencies in populations of organisms. My characterization of population-level probabilities is largely neutral about what interpretation of probability is required, allowing my approach to support various positions on biological probabilities, including those which give biological probabilities one or another sort of causal character. ‡This paper has benefited from feedback on and discussions of this and earlier work. I want to thank André Ariew, Matt Barker, Lindley Darden, Patrick Forber, Nancy Hall, Mohan Matthen, Samir Okasha, Jeremy Pober, Robert Richardson, Alex Rosenberg, Eric Seidel, Denis Walsh, and Bill Wimsatt. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, HB 414A, 900 13th Street South, Birmingham, AL 35294-1260; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Review of John Tyler Bonner: Randomness in Evolution. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2013, 152 pp, £19.95 hbk, ISBN 978-0-691-15701-6.

Evolutionary gradualism, the randomness of mutations, and the hypothesis that natural selection exerts a pervasive and substantial influence on evolutionary outcomes are pair-wise logically independent. Can the claims about selection and mutation be used to formulate an argument for gradualism? In his Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, R.A. Fisher made an important start at this project in his famous “geometric argument” by showing that a random mutation that has a smaller effect on two or more phenotypes (...) will have a higher average fitness than a random mutation that has a larger phenotypic effect. Motoo Kimura’s demonstration that a gene’s probability of fixation depends on both the selection coefficient and the effective population size shows that Fisher’s argument for gradualism was mistaken. Here we analyze Fisher’s argument and explain how Kimura’s theory leads to a conclusion that Fisher did not anticipate. We identify a fallacy that reasoning about fitness differences and their evolutionary consequences should avoid. We then distinguish forward-directed from backward-directed versions of gradualism. The backward-directed thesis about a single mutation may be correct, but the forward-directed thesis is not. After that we consider a sequence of random mutations that all affect the same cluster of phenotypes and Allen Orr’s idea that there is an optimal sequence of mutation sizes, moving from larger to smaller as the population approaches a fixed optimum. This provides a likelihood justification for a forward-directed version of gradualism when there is a fixed optimum, but it also provides an argument against forward-directed gradualism if the optimum shifts substantially as the population evolves. Finally, we consider whether genome-wide association studies (GWASs) can furnish empirical evidence that bears on the truth of gradualism. The version of gradualism that GWASs directly bear on concerns the phenotypic effect size of a gene after it arises by mutation and has reached an appreciable frequency, not the phenotypic size of the mutation event itself. (shrink)

This article discusses some ethical principles for distributing pandemic influenza vaccine and other indivisible goods. I argue that a number of principles for distributing pandemic influenza vaccine recently adopted by several national governments are morally unacceptable because they put too much emphasis on utilitarian considerations, such as the ability of the individual to contribute to society. Instead, it would be better to distribute vaccine by setting up a lottery. The argument for this view is based on a purely consequentialist account (...) of morality; i.e. an action is right if and only if its outcome is optimal. However, unlike utilitarians I do not believe that alternatives should be ranked strictly according to the amount of happiness or preference satisfaction they bring about. Even a mere chance to get some vaccine matters morally, even if it is never realized. (shrink)

We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly (...) discuss the implications of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biologythe `explananda of selection' debate and the `units of selection' debate. (shrink)

Population-level theories of evolution—the stock and trade of population genetics—are statistical theories par excellence. But what accounts for the statistical character of population-level phenomena? One view is that the population-level statistics are a product of, are generated by, probabilities that attach to the individuals in the population. On this conception, population-level phenomena are explained by individual-level probabilities and their population-level combinations. Another view, which arguably goes back to Fisher but has been defended recently, is that the population-level statistics are sui (...) generis, that they somehow emerge from the underlying deterministic behavior of the individuals composing the population. Walsh et al. label this the statistical interpretation. We are not willing to give them that term, since everyone will admit that the population-level theories of evolution are statistical, so we will call this the emergentist statistical interpretation. Our goals are to show that: This interpretation is based on gross factual errors concerning the practice of evolutionary biology, concerning both what is done and what can be done; its adoption would entail giving up on most of the explanatory and predictive projects of evolutionary biology; and finally a rival interpretation, which we will label the propensity statistical interpretation succeeds exactly where the emergentist interpretation fails. (shrink)

A randomly selected microcosm of the people can usefully play an official role in the lawmaking process. However, there are serious issues to be confronted if such a random sample were to take on the role of a full-scale, full-time second chamber. Some skeptical considerations are detailed. There are also advantages to short convenings of such a sample to take on some of the roles of a second chamber. This article provides a response to the skeptical considerations. Precedents from (...) ancient Athens show how such short-term convenings of a deliberating microcosm can be positioned before, during, or after other elements of the lawmaking process. The article draws on experience from Deliberative Polling to show how this is both practical and productive for the lawmaking process. (shrink)

‘Statisticalists’ argue that the individual interactions of organisms taken together constitute natural selection. On this view, natural selection is an aggregated effect of interactions rather than some added cause acting on populations. The statisticalists’ view entails that natural selection and drift are indistinguishable aggregated effects of interactions, so that it becomes impossible to make a difference between them. The present paper attempts to make sense of the difference between selection and drift, given the main insights of (...) statisticalism; basically, it will disentangle the various kinds of indistinguishability between selection and drift that happen within biology, by examining the epistemological and metaphysical nature of the distinction between selection and drift. It will be based on a ‘difference-making account’ of selection. The first section will explicate the inscrutability of selection and drift, its various types in the statisticalist writings, and its implications. The second section specifies concepts of natural selection and drift in the difference making account of selection I am using, and shows that one can derive from this the statistical signatures of selection and drift. On this basis I focus on one sort of indistinguishability issue about selection and drift, which I call epistemic opacity, and explain why it mostly affects small populations. The last section explains why epistemic opacity does not raise an genuine epistemic problem for evolutionary biology. (shrink)

A widely accepted tenet of evolutionary biology is that spontaneous mutations occur randomly with regard to their fitness effect. However, since the mutation rate varies along a genome and this variation can be subject to selection, organisms might evolve lower mutation rates at loci where mutations are most deleterious or increased rates where mutations are most needed. In fact, mechanisms of targeted hypermutation are known in organisms ranging from bacteria to humans. Here we review the main forces driving the (...) evolution of local mutation rates and identify the main limiting factors. Both targeted hyper‐ and hypomutation can evolve, although the former is restricted to loci under very frequent positive selection and the latter is severely limited by genetic drift. Nevertheless, we show how an association of repair with transcription or chromatin‐associated proteins could overcome the drift limit and lead to non‐random hypomutation along the genome in most organisms.Editor's suggested further reading in BioEssays Stress‐induced mutation via DNA breaks in Escherichia coli: A molecular mechanism with implications for evolution and medicine Abstract. (shrink)

In several of John Dewey's works on education, including Democracy and Education and The School and Society, he models the ideal school after the ideal community, conceiving the former as a microcosm of the latter. More recently, James Fishkin in Democracy and Deliberation and The Voice of the People renders a deliberative poll design with an eye to making its randomly selected deliberators representative of much larger groups, and in this way microcosms of the population-at-large. Thus, the smaller group deliberates (...) as if it were the much larger population assembled together to deliberate in mass-scale citizen assemblies. Although random selection is not widely accepted as a legitimate method for selecting political representatives, it has many desirable features, the most important of which is its ability to constitute bodies that resemble, and in this sense, represent larger populations. This last notion that smaller deliberative bodies can perform as if they are the larger populations represented-which I call the 'microcosm concept'-is not distinctly American, though many commentators trace it back to the musings of John Adams and some of the Anti-Federalists. In this paper, I argue that insights derived from Dewey's model of an educational microcosm can be appropriated and employed as resources to defend Fishkin's model of a deliberative microcosm against contemporary critics, such as Robert Goodin and Cass Sunstein. Besides defending Fishkin's deliberative poll design against its critics, I also argue that a Dewey-Fishkin partnership can help to improve actual deliberative institutions. I show how the Dewey-Fishkin microcosm concept operates in an actual deliberative event: the Ontario Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform, whereby a group of randomly-selected citizens were assembled and charged to deliver recommendations on whether to change the existing electoral system in the Canadian province of Ontario. (shrink)

OBJECTIVE: This article describes a method for investigating attitudes towards prioritisation in medicine. SETTING: University of Kuopio, Finland. DESIGN: The method consisted of a set of 24 paired scenarios, which were imaginary patient cases, each containing three different ethical indicators randomly selected from a list of indicators (for example, child, rich patient, severe disease etc.). The scenarios were grouped into 12 random pairs and the procedure was repeated four times, resulting in 12 scenario pairs arranged randomly in five different (...) sets. SURVEY: This method was tested with four groups of subjects (n = 8, n = 47, n = 104 and n = 36). RESULTS: Children and patients with a severe disease were prioritised in all groups. The aged, patients with a mild disease and patients with a self-acquired disease were negatively prioritised in all groups. Poor or rich patients were prioritised in some groups but negatively prioritised in others. CONCLUSIONS: The validity and reliability of this method are good and it is suitable for investigating attitudes towards medical prioritisation. (shrink)

Sortition, i.e. random appointment for public duty, has been employed by societies throughout the years as a firewall designated to prevent illegitimate interference between parties in a legal case and agents of the legal system. In judicial systems of modern western countries, random procedures are mainly employed to select the jury, the court and/or the judge in charge of judging a legal case. Therefore, these random procedures play an important role in the course of a case, and (...) should comply with some principles, such as transparency and complete auditability. Nevertheless, these principles are neglected by random procedures in some judicial systems, which are performed in secrecy and are not auditable by the involved parties. The assignment of cases in the Brazilian Supreme Court is an example of such a procedure, for it is performed using procedures unknown to the parties involved in the judicial cases. This article presents a review of how sortition has been historically employed by societies and discusses how Mathematical Statistics may be applied to random procedures of the judicial system, as it has been applied for almost a century on clinical trials, for example. A statistical model for assessing randomness in case assignment is proposed and applied to the Brazilian Supreme Court. As final remarks, guidelines for the development of good randomization procedures are outlined. (shrink)

Natural selection is the populational process whereby, for instance, the relative number of a variant better suited to a given environment’s attributes increases over generations. In other words, a population’s makeup is altered, over generations, to suit the requirements of a particular environment. Niche construction is the process whereby an environment’s attributes can be stably modified by organisms, over generations, to suit requirements of those organisms. Should the latter process, when it occurs, be considered as significant for the complementary (...) fit between organism and environment as the former? According to mainstream evolutionary theory, random genetic mutation is the only source of novel, unlearned, trans-generationally persistent behavior. A growing number of biologists and philosophers of science, however, maintain that organisms are capable of generating such behavior, in response to, for instance, trans-generationally persistent environmental change, by way of phenotype-mediated, developmentally plastic mechanisms that do not require mutation. Should mechanisms of this sort be more generally recognized as the source of the selectable variation that selection operates on? Niche construction theory answers “yes” to both these questions, and the result is a debate over the comprehensiveness of mainstream evolutionary theory. (shrink)

The way research is, and should be, funded by the public sphere is the subject of renewed interest for sociology, economics, management sciences, and more recently, for the philosophy of science. In this contribution, I propose a qualitative, epistemological criticism of the funding by lottery model, which is advocated by a growing number of scholars as an alternative to peer-review. This lottery scheme draws on the lack of efficiency and of robustness of the peer-review based evaluation to argue that the (...) majority of public resources for basic science should be allocated randomly. I first differentiate between two distinct arguments used to defend this alternative funding scheme based on considerations about the logic of scientific research. To assess their epistemological limits, I then present and develop a conceptual frame, grounded on the notion of “system of practice”, which can be used to understand what precisely it means, for a research project, to be interesting or significant. I use this epistemological analysis to show that the lottery model is not theoretically optimal, since it underestimates the integration of all scientific projects in densely interconnected systems of conceptual, experimental, or technical practices which confer their proper interest to them. I also apply these arguments in order to criticize the classical peer-review process. I finally suggest, as a discussion, that some recently proposed models that bring to the fore a principle of decentralization of the evaluation and selection process may constitute a better alternative, if the practical conditions of their implementation are adequately settled. (shrink)

Materialists argue that there is no place for God in the universe. Chance and contingency are all that structure our world. However, the materialists’ dismissal of subjectivity manifests a flawed metaphysics that invalidates their arguments against God. In this essay I explore the following: (1) How does personal metaphysics affect one's ability to do science? (2) Are the materialist arguments about contingency used to dismiss the importance of our place in the universe valid? (3) What are the implications of subjectivity (...) on belief and science? To answer the first question, I examine the later years of Sir Alfred Russel Wallace, one of the cofounders of evolution through natural selection with Darwin. His belief in nineteenth–century spiritualism profoundly affected his standing in the scientific community. I describe the effect of spiritualism on Wallace's science. To answer the second question, I use my own work in mathematical modeling of evolutionary processes to show that randomness, and contingency at one level, can actually be nearly deterministic at another. I demonstrate how arguments about chance and contingency do not imply anything relevant about whether there is a designer behind the universe. To answer the third question I begin by exploring a paradox of consciousness and show how the existence of subjective truths may provide a paradigm for sustaining a rational belief in God. These questions form the framework of a structured belief in a creator while yet embracing what science has to offer about the development of life on our planet. (shrink)

The Bell/CHSH inequalities of quantum physics are identical with the inequalities derived in mathematical psychology for the problem of selective influences in cases involving two binary experimental factors and two binary random variables recorded in response to them. The following points are made regarding cognitive science applications: (1) compliance of data with these inequalities is informative only if the data satisfy the requirement known as marginal selectivity; (2) both violations of marginal selectivity and violations of the Bell/CHSH inequalities are (...) interpretable as indicating that at least one of the two responses is influenced by both experimental factors. (shrink)

Recently, several philosophers have challenged the view that evolutionary theory is usefully understood by way of an analogy with Newtonian mechanics. Instead, they argue that evolutionary theory is merely a statistical theory. According to this alternate approach, natural selection and random genetic drift are not even causes, much less forces. I argue that, properly understood, the Newtonian analogy is unproblematic and illuminating. I defend the view that selection and drift are causes in part by attending to a (...) pair of important distinctions—that between process and product and that between natural selection and fitness. (shrink)

The selection strategies of individuals and 2-person cooperative groups were investigated in 5 concept-attainment problems. 2 types of stimulus displays were used: (a) form displays, consisting of geometric forms varying in 6 attributes with 2 levels of each, (b) sequence displays, consisting of 6 plus and/or minus signs in a row. The arrangement of cards in the stimulus displays was ordered or random. The principal results were: (a) 2-person groups used the focusing strategy more, required fewer card choices (...) to solution, and required more time than individuals; (b) form displays resulted in more use of the focusing strategy than sequence displays, with no difference in number of card choices; (c) no difference between ordered and random arrays in use of the focusing strategy or number of card choices. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

An infinite binary sequence X is Kolmogorov–Loveland random if there is no computable non-monotonic betting strategy that succeeds on X in the sense of having an unbounded gain in the limit while betting successively on bits of X. A sequence X is KL-stochastic if there is no computable non-monotonic selection rule that selects from X an infinite, biased sequence.One of the major open problems in the field of effective randomness is whether Martin-Löf randomness is the same as KL-randomness. (...) Our first main result states that KL-random sequences are close to Martin-Löf random sequences in so far as every KL-random sequence has arbitrarily dense subsequences that are Martin-Löf random. A key lemma in the proof of this result is that for every effective split of a KL-random sequence at least one of the halves is Martin-Löf random. However, this splitting property does not characterize KL-randomness; we construct a sequence that is not even computably random such that every effective split yields two subsequences that are 2-random. Furthermore, we show for any KL-random sequence A that is computable in the halting problem that, first, for any effective split of A both halves are Martin-Löf random and, second, for any computable, nondecreasing, and unbounded function g and almost all n, the prefix of A of length n has prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity at least n−g. Again, the latter property does not characterize KL-randomness, even when restricted to left-r.e. sequences; we construct a left-r.e. sequence that has this property but is not KL-stochastic and, in fact, is not even Mises–Wald–Church stochastic.Turning our attention to KL-stochasticity, we construct a non-empty class of KL-stochastic sequences that are not weakly 1-random; by the usual basis theorems we obtain such sequences that in addition are left-r.e., are low, or are of hyperimmune-free degree.Our second main result asserts that every KL-stochastic sequence has effective dimension 1, or equivalently, a sequence cannot be KL-stochastic if it has infinitely many prefixes that can be compressed by a factor of α<1. This improves on a result by Muchnik, who has shown that were they to exist, such compressible prefixes could not be found effectively. (shrink)

We review briefly the attempts to define random sequences. These attempts suggest two theorems: one concerning the number of subsequence selection procedures that transform a random sequence into a random sequence; the other concerning the relationship between definitions of randomness based on subsequence selection and those based on statistical tests.

Direct-democratic processes have won popular support but fall far short of the standards of deliberative democracy. Initiative and referendum processes furnish citizens with insufficient information about policy problems, inadequate choices among policy solutions, flawed criteria for choosing among such solutions, and few opportunities for reflection on those choices prior to decision making. We suggest a way to make direct democracy more deliberative by grafting randomly selected citizen assemblies onto existing institutions and practices. After reviewing the problems that beset modern direct-democratic (...) elections and the long history of randomly selected citizen assemblies, we propose five different varieties of randomly constituted citizen bodies—Priority Conferences, Design Panels, Citizens’ Assemblies, Citizens’ Initiative Reviews, and Policy Juries. After selecting members through stratified random sampling of citizens, each of these assemblies would operate at a different stage of the legislative process, from initial problem identification through approval of a finished ballot measure. Highly structured procedures guided by professional moderators and featuring expert testimony on policy and legal matters would help to ensure deliberative quality, and careful institutional designs would make each body politically powerful. In the end, these citizen bodies would be likely to address the deliberative deficit of direct democracy and better achieve the public’s desired policy objectives. (shrink)