This chapter defends a version of the indexical contextualist form of moderate relativism: the attempt to endorse appearances of faultless disagreement within the framework in which a sentence at a context at the index of the context determines its appropriate truth-value. Many object that any such an indexical proposal would fail to account for intuitions of (genuine) disagreement as revealed in ordinary disputes in the domain. The defence from this objection exploits presuppositions of commonality to the effect that (...) the addressee is relevantly like the speaker of the context. (shrink)

This paper presents problems for Stalnaker’s common ground theory of presupposition. Stalnaker (Linguist and Philos 25:701–721, 2002) proposes a 2-stage process of utterance interpretation: presupposed content is added to the common ground prior to acceptance/rejection of the utterance as a whole. But this revision makes presupposition difficult to distinguish from assertion. A more fundamental problem is that the common ground theory rests on a faulty theory of assertion—that the essence of assertion is to present the content of an utterance as (...) new information. Many examples are presented of utterances which are felicitous but not informative in this way. (shrink)

In this paper, I review a number of arguments in favor of treating many of the central cases of presupposition as the result of conversational inference, rather than as lexically specified properties of particular expressions. I then argue that, despite the standard assumption to the contrary, the view of presupposition as constraints on the common ground is not consistent with the provision of a conversational account of particular presuppositional constraints. The argument revolves crucially around the workings of accommodation. I then (...) offer an alternative view of the phenomenon of presupposition, which is compatible with a variety of sources for presuppositions. On the view offered here, presupposition is seen as a property of utterances. I argue that the presuppositions of an utterance are those propositions which an interpreter must take the speaker to accept in order to take the speaker to be fully cooperative, in the Gricean sense. (shrink)

Habermas asserts that the ‘presupposition’ of the common objective world is thrust upon us by the pragmatics of language use. However, this is a dubious claim. A pre-linguistic relation to the world as common and objective is required for language acquisition. What’s more, Husserl’s analyses indicate that aspects of our experience of the common world are grounded in experiences of spatio-temporal horizonality and of the co-presence of others within that world-horizon. This is not to negate the importance of communicatively achieved (...) intersubjectivity, nor to diminish the rational significance of our linguistically articulated ‘world concepts’. But it is to suggest that the ‘presupposition’ of the common objective world has phenomenological, not linguistic-pragmatic, roots. (shrink)

There is a crisis in philosophical rationality today—in which modern logic is implicated—that can be traced to the abandonment of a common background of principles. The situation has no parallel within the pre-modern tradition, which not only admits of such principles, but also refers them back to a set of assumptions grounded in a clearly religious frame of mind. Modern conceptions of rationality claim complete independence from religious sources, as from tradition more generally, and typically end up disposing of first (...) principles altogether. The result is a fragmentation of reason, which can be seen to be dramatically exemplified in the realm of modern logic, populated by countless different systems and incompatible conceptions of what it is to be a logic. Many of the conceptual choices that became implicit in the philosophical discussions eventually leading to the rejection of the religious picture, and ultimately to the aforementioned crisis, were themselves originally linked to religious premises, so that all along, a kind of religious subconscious has subsisted throughout those disputations; however, the lack of any proper recognition of this background obstructs the possibility of making a reasonable assessment of the nature and causes of the crisis. Alasdair MacIntyre, whose thought inspires the argument developed here, reached similar conclusions regarding practical rationality and the effects of abandoning the teleological framework of Aristotelian philosophy. MacIntyre’s arguments can be adapted, as he suggests, to deal with reason more generally, and his insistence upon the tradition-laden character of rational enquiry can help point toward the grounding of human reason in religion. (shrink)

Within his metahistorical thesis, White makes three assumptions about the nature of historical writing. First, he argues that "histories proper" and "philosophies of history" differ in emphasis and not in content because both share a common narrative strategy. However, White fails to acknowledge the vast differences in scope, principles of interpretation, and meaning between the two disciplines. Second, White assumes that the activity of ordering the historical text is a poetic act. This approach ignores the fact that events and the (...) relationships of those events exist prior to and independent of the historical account. Moreover, his tropological structures are too inflexible to provide a useful understanding of historical discourse. Finally, he never questions the validity of viewing an historical work as a purely linguistic structure. In fact, whereas "histories proper" seem to have much in common to compare and to evaluate, "philosophies of history" almost never agree. (shrink)

Discusses the empirical presuppositions of the metaphysical explanations in economics. Common arguments among philosophers of economics; Helen Boss’ arguments on productive-nonproductive distinction in economics; Domains of different economic theories; Methodological individualism in economics.

Há uma profunda divisão entre duas concepções fundamentais na epistemologia ao longo dos últimos trinta a quarenta anos. Alguns rotulam essa divisão como sendo aquela entre internalistas e externalistas, e essa caracterização pode, mesmo, ser exata, conforme alguma explicação dessa distinção. Eu abordarei a divisão por um ângulo diferente, dado que uma abordagem melhor é conceber a divisão como surgindo de uma compreensão do Problema de Sellars. O meu interesse é em posturas que recusam uma pressuposição crucial na formulação do (...) Problema de Sellars. Recusar essa pressuposição, como veremos, é uma das respostas mais comuns ao problema. Argumentarei, no entanto, que tal recusa é simplesmente insustentável, tanto na teoria da justificação quanto na teoria do conhecimento. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Plantinga. Problema de Sellars. Internalismo. Externalismo. Knowledge. Justification. ABSTRACT There is a great divide between two approaches to epistemology over the past thirty to forty years. Some label the divide that between internalists and externalists, and that characterization may be accurate on some account of the distinction. I will pursue the divide from a different direction, since a better approach is to think of the divide as arising from an understanding of Sellars’ Problem. My interest is in positions that deny a crucial presupposition in the formulation of Sellars’ Problem. Denying this presupposition, as we will see, is one of the most common responses to the problem. I will argue, however, that this denial is simply untenable, both in the theory of justification and in the theory of knowledge. KEY WORDS – Plantinga. Sellars’ Problem. Internalism. Externalism. Knowledge. Justification. (shrink)

A theory of common ground is proposed and defended. This is Chapter 2 of my 2014 DPhil (PhD) thesis.

The paper confronts the disagreement argument for relativism about matters of taste, defending a specific form of contextualism. It is first considered whether the disagreement data might manifest an inviariantist attitude speakers pre-reflectively have. Semantic and ontological enlightenment should then make the impressions of disagreement vanish, or at least leave them as lingering ineffectual Müller-Lyer-like illusions; but it is granted to relativists that this does not fully happen. López de Sa’s appeal to presuppositions of commonality and Sundell’s appeal (...) to metalinguistic disagreement are discussed, and it is argued that, although they help to clarify the issues, they do not fully explain why such impressions remain under enlightenment. To do it, the paper develops a suggestion that other writers have made, that the lingering impression of disagreement is a consequence of a practical conflict, appealing to dispositions to practical coordination that come together with presuppositions of commonality in axiological matters. (shrink)

In this paper it is shown how a partial semantics for presuppositions can be given which is empirically more satisfactory than its predecessors, and how this semantics can be integrated with a technically sound, compositional grammar in the Montagovian fashion. Additionally, it is argued that the classical objection to partial accounts of presupposition projection, namely that they lack “flexibility,” is based on a misconception. Partial logics can give rise to flexible predictions without postulating any ad hoc ambiguities. Finally, it (...) is shown how the partial foundation can be combined with a dynamic system of common-ground maintenance to account for accommodation. (shrink)

This paper brings a developmental perspective to the discussion of a longstanding issue surrounding the proper characterization of presuppositions. On an influential view (Stalnaker in Synthese 22(1–2):272–289, 1970; Stalnaker, in Milton, Unger (eds) Semantics and philosophy, New York University Press, New York, 1974; Karttunen in Theor Linguist 1:181–194, 1974), formal presuppositions reflect admittance conditions: an utterance of a sentence which presupposes _p_ is admitted by a conversational context _c_ only if _p_ is common ground in _c_. The theory (...) distinguishes two modes of satisfying this formal requirement: (i) presuppositions may have common ground status prior to utterance, or (ii) they may achieve common ground status post hoc, via accommodation, an adjustment of the common ground by cooperative listeners so as to meet the requirements of an uttered sentence. While intuitive and general, the theory has been criticized (among other things) on methodological grounds (see e.g. Gazdar in Pragmatics: implicature, presupposition and logical form, Academic Press, New York, 1979): the availability of accommodation makes it difficult to empirically examine the notion of presupposition as admittance conditions because a central tenet—pragmatic infelicity results whenever _c_ does not entail _p_—may be masked due to the pragmatic sophistication of language users. In this paper, we argue that child language presents an opportunity to avoid this intrinsic difficulty. In a series of behavioral experiments, we show that young children generate a default expectation that the presuppositions of an asserted sentence have common ground status prior to utterance. Furthermore and more tellingly, we also find that even when accommodation is the preferred option for adults, children fail to accommodate presuppositions in an adult-like manner. This pattern of behavior, we argue, is expected under the admittance theory: in a population where the interference from accommodation is reduced, the impact of failing to satisfy the formal admittance conditions becomes directly observable. (shrink)

Presuppositions and Appropriateness of Assertions In this paper I aim to compare and evaluate two theoretic approaches to pragmatic presuppositions: the Common Ground account and Propositional Context account. According to the Common Ground account proposed by Stalnaker, it is appropriate to assert a sentence p that requires a presupposition q only if q is mutually believed as accepted as true and taken for granted by the interlocutors. Otherwise, Gauker claims that the ground of propositions taken for granted coincides (...) with what he calls the objective propositional context, that is the set of objectively relevant propositional elements that speakers ought to share in order to evaluate the appropriateness of utterances so as to reach the goal of a conversation.The main purpose of my paper is to show that, according to the Propositional Context account, a theory of presupposition has to take into account a normative-objective notion of context. Secondly, I aim to develop a criticism of Gauker's point of view claiming that the Propositional Context account does not account for the number of ways in which a proposition can be taken for granted by the speakers depending on the context. Finally, I propose to integrate Gauker's account with a further condition for appropriateness of assertion which states that: in order to appropriately assert a sentence p that requires a presupposition q, speakers ought to recognize how they should justify q in a specific communicative context. (shrink)

The paper addresses a mainstream contemporary view of the notion of common sense in Thomas Reid’s philosophy, as proposed by Nicholas Wolterstorff who claims that Reid was not clear about the concept of common sense, or about the principles of common sense. In contrast, this paper presents Reid’s conception as a clear and traditional Aristotelian notion of common sense and its principles as presuppositions of particular sense judgments, usually taken for granted. The alleged confusion about principles is resolved by (...) a distinction between principles of common sense and first principles as such. (shrink)

In this paper it is shown how a partial semantics for presuppositions can be given which is empirically more satisfactory than its predecessors, and how this semantics can be integrated with a technically sound, compositional grammar in the Montagovian fashion. Additionally, it is argued that the classical objection to partial accounts of presupposition projection, namely that they lack “flexibility,” is based on a misconception. Partial logics can give rise to flexible predictions without postulating any ad hoc ambiguities. Finally, it (...) is shown how the partial foundation can be combined with a dynamic system of common-ground maintenance to account for accommodation. (shrink)

The institutionalization of systems of informed consent in market economies has exaggerated rather than minimized the meritocractic effect of such economies. In developing economies, it may help reduce both inherent economic gaps and effects of inherited wealth. In both cases, the highest paid people are those whose performances evidence the highest hierarchical complexity, and lowest paid people have the lowest stages of performance. Society is stratified according to stage of performance. Postformal thought is more likely to develop in graduate level (...) education. Higher education has the effect of further stratifying individuals by stage of performance, rather than equalizing opportunity. (shrink)

Using ideas from evolution and postformal stages of hierarchical complexity, a hypothetical scenario, premised on genetic engineering advances, portrays the development of a new humanoid species, Superions. How would Superions impact and treat current humans? If the Superion scenario came to pass, it would be the ultimate genocidal terrorism of eliminating an entire species, Homo Sapiens. We speculate about defenses Homo Sapiens might mount. The tasks to relate two species (systems) constitutes a postformal, Metasystematic task. Developing a system of discourse (...) to prevent destruction requires postformal Paradigmatic-stage tasks. Implications are twofold: species survival and sufficient evolution to survive. (shrink)

Science requires postformal capabilities to compare competing explanations and conceptualize how to coordinate or integrate them. With conflicts thus reconciled, science advances. The Model of Hierarchical Complexity facilitates the coordination of current arguments about intelligence. A cross-species measurement theory of comparative cognition is proposed. It has potential to overcome the lack of a general measurement theory for the science of comparative cognition, and the lack of domain-general mechanisms for evolutionary psychologists. The hierarchical complexity of concepts and debates as well as (...) the new theory are scored, and demonstrate the postformal hierarchical complexity of the proposed theory. (shrink)

Grammatical theories of Scalar Implicatures make use of an exhaustivity operator exh, which asserts the conjunction of the prejacent with the negation of excludable alternatives. We present a new Grammatical theory of Scalar Implicatures according to which exh is replaced with pex, an operator that contributes its prejacent as asserted content, but the negation of scalar alternatives at a non-at-issue level of meaning. We show that by treating this non-at-issue level as a presupposition, this theory resolves a number of empirical (...) challenges faced by the old formulation of exh (as well as by standard neo-Gricean theories). The empirical challenges include projection of scalar implicatures from certain embedded environments (‘some under some’ sentences, some under negative factives), their restricted distribution under negation, and the existence of common ground-mismatching and oddness-inducing implicatures. We argue that these puzzles have a uniform solution given a pex-based Grammatical theory of implicatures and some independently motivated principles concerning presupposition projection, cancellation and accommodation. (shrink)

The Model of Hierarchical Complexity is introduced in terms of its main concepts, background, and applications. As a general, quantitative behavioral developmental theory, the Model enables examination of universal patterns of evolution and development. Behavioral tasks are definable and their organization of information in increasingly greater hierarchical, or vertical, complexity is measurable. Fifteen orders of hierarchical complexity account for task performances across domains, ranging from those of machines to creative geniuses. The four most complex orders are demonstrated by postformal stages (...) of thought, which measure beyond formal operations, the highest stage found by Piaget for adults. (shrink)

The paper proposes an epistemic taxonomy of assertives based on a concept of epistemic presuppositions. Epistemic presuppositions are a special kind of pragmatic presuppositions, which describe the structure of hearer’s and speaker’s meta-reasoning. The epistemic taxonomy of assertives is based on the operator of strong common belief (sCB). It is argued that the properties of a strong common belief operator (positive and negative introspection, non-factivity) are relevant for the analysis of pragmatics presuppositions. Also strong common belief (...) operator is used for the explication of gricean epistemic construction: “the Speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks…”. The assertives’ taxonomy for an utterance φ consists of the following basic types: “1. Non-Literal Utterances” (sCBS,H¬φ) and “2. Literal Utterances” (¬sCBS,H¬φ). Non-Literal Utterances is divided into two groups: “1.1. Conventional Literal Utterances“ (there is a convention such that means ψ in a context c.) and “1.2. Non- Conventional Literal Utterances“ (there no such convention). There are two types of Literal Utterances “2.1. Semantically Trivial Utterances (sCBS,Hφ)” and “2.2. Semantically Non-Trivial Utterances (¬sCBS,Hφ)”. Semantically Trivial Utterances is divided into two parts: “2.1.1. Conventional Semantically Trivial Utterances” (there is a convention such that means ψ in a context c) and “2.1.2. Non-conventional Semantically Trivial Utterances” (there no such convention). Semantically Non-Trivial Utterances is divided into two parts: “2.2.1. Insincere Utterances” BS¬φ and “2.2.2. Sincere Utterances ¬BS¬φ. There are two types of Sincere Utterances “2.2.2.1. Credible Utterances” (BSφ) and “2.2.2.2. Non-credible Utterances”). (shrink)

We show 13 stages of the development of tool-use and tool making during different eras in the evolution of Homo sapiens. We used the NeoPiagetian Model of Hierarchical Complexity rather than Piaget's. We distinguished the use of existing methods imitated or learned from others, from doing such a task on one's own.

The missing ingredients in efforts to develop neural networks and artificial intelligence (AI) that can emulate human intelligence have been the evolutionary processes of performing tasks at increased orders of hierarchical complexity. Stacked neural networks based on the Model of Hierarchical Complexity could emulate evolution's actual learning processes and behavioral reinforcement. Theoretically, this should result in stability and reduce certain programming demands. The eventual success of such methods begs questions of humans' survival in the face of androids of superior intelligence (...) and physical composition. These raise future moral questions worthy of speculation. (shrink)

A sequential, hierarchical stage model of empathy can account for a comprehensive range of empathic behaviors. We provide an illustrative table, “Stages of Empathy,” to demonstrate how increasingly complex empathic behaviors emerge at each stage, beginning with the infant's “automatic empathy” and ending with the advanced adult's “coconstruction of empathetic reality.”.

This paper offers a critical analysis of Stalnaker''s work on presupposition (Stalnaker1973, 1974, 1979, 1999, 2002). The paper examines two definitions of speaker presupposition offered by Stalnaker – the familiar common ground view, and the earlier,less familiar, dispositional account – and how Stalnaker relates this notion to the linguistic phenomenon of presupposition. Special attention is paid to Stalnaker's view of accommodation. I argue that given Stalnaker's views, accommodation is not rightly seen as driven by the presuppositional requirements of utterances, but (...) only by the interests of speakers in eliminating perceived differences among presuppositions. I also consider the revisions which are needed either to the definition of speaker presupposition or to the definition of sentence presupposition in light of the possibility of informative presupposition. In the concluding section, I discuss the ways in which some recent accounts of context and speaker presupposition depart from their Stalnakerian foundations. (shrink)

The formal theory of the Model of Hierarchical Complexity is presented. Complexity theories generally exclude the concept of hierarchical complexity; Developmental Psychology has included it for over 20 years. It also applies to social systems and non-human systems. Formal axioms for the Model are outlined. The model assigns an order of hierarchical complexity to every task, using natural numbers, establishing a quantal notion of stage and stages of performance. This formalizes properties of stage theories in psychology. The formal theory of (...) the model enables extending the concept of hierarchical complexity to any field where tasks and their performances exist. (shrink)

We distinguish traditional cognition theories from hierarchically complex stacked neural networks that meet many of Newell's criteria. The latter are flexible and can learn anything that a person can learn, by using their mistakes and successes the same way humans do. Shortcomings are due largely to limitations of current technology.

Evolution means different things at different stages of development. Higher stage explanations for it are downward assimilated at lower stages. Different scientific explanations for evolution also reflect different stages of development. Hierarchical complexity of tasks in evolution is a behavioral analytic explanation. It is selection processes of various kinds in tandem with changes in selection tasks' orders of hierarchical complexity. There is neither teleology nor evolutionary favoring of the highest stages of performance. Selection tasks at higher orders of complexity increasingly (...) decenter at all scales of behaviors from thought to history's social periods. These processes account for sociopolitical conflicts over evolution. (shrink)

Recent semantic research has made increasing use of a principle, Maximize Presupposition, which requires that under certain circumstances the strongest possible presupposition be marked. This principle is generally taken to be irreducible to standard Gricean reasoning because the forms that are in competition have the same assertive content. We suggest, however, that Maximize Presupposition might be reducible to the theory of scalar implicatures. (i)First, we consider a special case: the speaker utters a sentence with a presupposition p which is not (...) initially taken for granted by the addressee, but the latter takes the speaker to be an authority on the matter. Signaling the presupposition provides new information to the addressee; but it also follows from the logic of presupposition qua common belief that the presupposition is thereby satisfied (Stalnaker, Ling Philos 25(5–6):701–721, 2002). (ii) Second, we generalize this solution to other cases. We assume that even when p is common belief, there is a very small chance that the addressee might forget it (‘Fallibility’); in such cases, marking a presupposition will turn out to generate new information by re-establishing part of the original context. We also adopt from Raj Singh (Nat Lang Semantics 19(2):149–168, 2011) the hypothesis that presupposition maximization is computed relative to local contexts—and we assume that these too are subject to Fallibility; this accounts for cases in which the information that justifies the presupposition is linguistically provided. (iii) Finally, we suggest that our assumptions have benefits in the domain of implicatures: they make it possible to reinterpret Magri’s ‘blind’ (i.e. context-insensitive) implicatures as context-sensitive implicatures which just happen to be misleading. (shrink)

Selectionism addresses the process of transition or change. In its evolution, Homo Sapiens has demonstrated such transitions to more hierarchically complex stages of performance at the individual, organizational, cultural, and biological levels. Traditionally, changes in biological, cultural, organizational, and individual behavior have been studied separately, with very little overlap. The current theory integrates selectionism across these realms, while noting that in each, selectionism operates through somewhat different mechanisms. Selectionism is comprised of complex processes in which tasks of greater hierarchical complexity (...) may be selected. Increased stages of performance underlie evolution's dynamics of increased complexity. (shrink)

How is cultural progress possible? Historically, no other animal has progressed as humans have. Conventional wisdom suggests that by having language, people accumulate knowledge, which produces progress. Such Formal stage 10 wisdom begs fundamental questions. Thus, we assert the cultural necessity of levels of support, or scaffolding, for people to develop higher stages of hierarchical complexity. The resulting, wider accessibility to higher-stage action and knowledge, which requires higher stages of development to understand, enables social and scientific progress. With memes and (...) downward assimilation, larger proportions of society gain access to advanced thinking with support, in turn enabling cultural progress. (shrink)

For economists, sustainability and environmental valuation are connected in two ways. At the micro level, proper environmental valuation is required if projects are to be approved and rejected consistently with sustainability requirements. This is cost benefit analysis. At the macro level, many take the view that sustainability requires that national income measurement be modified so as to account for environmental damage. Such natural resource accounting is possible only if environmental damage is valued for incorporation into the economic accounts. The paper (...) reviews the techniques that economists have developed for environmental valuation. In regard to cost benefit analysis and sustainability, it is noted that the technique on which most interest focuses, the Contingent Valuation Method, involves the extension of the domain of consumer demand analysis to include the natural environment. Contributions questioning the appropriateness of this are reviewed, and it is argued that they merit more attention from economists than they have received to date. In regard to natural resource accounting, it is argued that while there is little prospect of it achieving what its proponents claim for it, the modelling that it necessarily implies has the potential to both clarify valuation issues and play an important role in informing the policy process. (shrink)

(2008). Genetic Engineering and the Speciation of Superions from Humans. World Futures: Vol. 64, Postformal Thought and Hierarchical Complexity, pp. 436-443.

Many domains, notably the one involving predicates of personal taste, present the phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement. Contextualism is a characteristically moderate implementation of the relativistic attempt to endorse such appearances. According to an often-voiced objection, although it straightforwardly accounts for the faultlessness, contextualism fails to respect “facts about disagreement.” With many other recent contributors to the debate, I contend that the notion of disagreement—“genuine,” “real,” “substantive,” “robust” disagreement—is indeed very flexible, and in particular can be constituted by contrasting attitudes. (...) As such, contextualism is clearly straightforwardly compatible with facts about the existence of disagreement. There is, however, a genuine prima facie worry for contextualism involving facts about the expression of disagreement in ordinary conversations. Elaborating on a suggestion by Lewis :113–138, 1989), I argue that the presupposition of commonality approach in López de Sa shows that there are versions of contextualism that are in good standing vis-à-vis such facts about the expression of disagreement. (shrink)

The four stages of postformal thought are Systematic, Metasystematic, Paradigmatic, and Cross-Paradigmatic. Each successive stage is more hierarchically complex than the one that precedes it. Each stage uses the elements formed at the previous stage to construct more hierarchically complex elements (e.g., metasystems, paradigms). An actual instrument constructed using the Model of Hierarchical Complexity illustrates the progression in hierarchical complexity. Another example illustrates the nonlinear nature of hierarchical complexity. The distinct tasks of the four stages are described. Postformal thought benefits (...) interpersonal, societal, and academic endeavors by virtue of the kinds of tasks performed at each stage. (shrink)