The polluter pays principle (PPP) has the form of a reparative principle. It holds that since some countries have historically contributed more to global warming than others, these countries have the follow-up responsibility now to do more to address climate change. Yet in the climate justice debate, PPP is often rejected for two reasons. First, so the objection goes, it wrongly burdens present-day individuals because the actions of their predecessors. This is the unfairness objection. The second (...) objection is that early polluters were not aware of the harm that they were doing, and so ought not to be held culpable. This is the objection from excusable ignorance. In this commentary, I defend PPP against these two objections. The aim of this short reflection is not to provide a full justification of PPP, or to respond to all objections that have been made against it. My more limited but, I hope, important goal is to show that PPP is neither immediately unfair (in making innocent parties pay) nor immediately unreasonable (in making excusably ignorant parties pay) as is commonly noted, and is therefore worthy of further consideration as a principle of climate justice. (shrink)

Climate justice demands polluters to take responsibility for both present and future harm caused by past GHG emissions and for future harm caused by future GHG emissions. One problem with this is double climate taxation: people living in historical polluting countries must both shoulder the burden of an effective and inclusive climate transition and repay the climate debt incurred by their predecessors. Although double climate taxation might be defensible on normative grounds, it risks making climate justice politically infeasible. I therefore (...) maintain that global climate justice should focus on future, rather than past, climate harms. The forward-looking polluter pays principle (FL-PPP) can ensure both a cost-effective climate transition and a fair distribution of the climate burden, provided it is applied as follows: i) each country must introduce a carbon price calibrated to the global social cost of carbon; ii) each country must transfer part of carbon revenues collected at the country level to an international fund; iii) global carbon revenues must be redistributed on the basis of the country-level social cost of carbon. The FL-PPP burden can be made more progressive, moreover, if the formula for allocating global carbon revenues is adjusted through two coefficients, one consumption-based and one priority-sensitive. (shrink)

Action must be taken to combat climate change. Yet, how the costs of climate action should be allocated among states remains a question. One popular answer—the polluter-pays principle (PPP)—stipulates that those responsible for causing the problem should pay to address it. While intuitively plausible, the PPP has been subjected to withering criticism in recent years. It is timely, following the Paris Agreement, to develop a new version: one that does not focus on historical production-based emissions but rather (...) allocates climate burdens in proportion to each state’s annual consumption-based emissions. This change in carbon accounting results in a fairer and more environmentally effective principle for distributing climate duties. (shrink)

In their ‘Ethical and Technical Challenges in Compensating for Harm Due to Solar Radiation Management Geoengineering’ (2014), Toby Svoboda and Peter Irvine (S&I) argue that there are significant technical and ethical challenges that stand in the way of crafting a just solar radiation management (SRM) compensation system. My aim in this article is to contribute to the project of addressing these problems. I do so by focusing on one of S&I’s important ethical challenges, their claim that the polluter (...) class='Hi'>pays principle (PPP) is too problematic to be useful in determining responsibility for SRM compensation. Their argument for the latter claim consists in a series of allegations, mostly in the form of questions, that are thought to indicate serious difficulties standing in the way of using the PPP to craft a just compensation system. I argue that S&I fail to substantiate these allegations: the PPP is not as problematic as S&I suggest, and moreover, is a viable candidate for determining responsibility for SRM compensation. S&I raise five allegations against the PPP. I discuss each in turn. (shrink)

Climate change involves changes in the climate system caused by polluting human activities and the social and natural effects of these changes. The historical and anthropogenic grounds of climate change play an important role in climate justice claims. Many climate justice scholars believe that principles of climate justice should account for the historical and anthropogenic sources of climate change. Two main backward-looking principles have been proposed: the polluter pays principle (PPP) and the beneficiary pays principle (...) (BPP). The BPP emerged in the literature on climate justice in response to certain objections raised against the PPP. In this paper, I focus on two of these objections: the causation objection and the excusable ignorance objection. Defenders of the BPP have traditionally assumed that this principle is not vulnerable to those objections, which renders the BPP superior to the PPP. In this paper, I challenge this underlying assumption. My argument here is simple: moving from the PPP to the BPP in response to any of these objections might be unjustified because the BPP is affected by at least some of the considerations giving rise to these objections. (shrink)

This paper provides theoretical support for two historical principles for the allocation of remedial responsibility for paying the costs of pollution caused by humans. These remedial principles are based upon particular forms of backward-looking connection with the pollution in question. The suggestion is that we can have reasons to pay the costs of pollution when we are members of communities which were responsible for the original polluting acts in question and/or which have benefited from the polluting acts. In seeking to (...) provide support for backward-looking remedial duties, the paper aims to bolster understandings of the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) which place the primary burden of meeting the costs of pollution upon those communities which caused the pollution in the first place. Thus, in supporting the “beneficiary pays” principle in general, and the “polluter pays” principle in some cases, I challenge interpretations of CBDR which maintain that backward-looking principles are unfair, since they impose duties upon present day generations who were not themselves responsible for the polluting acts in question. (shrink)

Human consumption of pharmaceuticals often leads to environmental release of residues via urine and faeces, creating environmental and public health risks. Policy responses must consider the normative question how responsibilities for managing such risks, and costs and burdens associated with that management, should be distributed between actors. Recently, the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) has been advanced as rationale for such distribution. While recognizing some advantages of PPP, we highlight important ethical and practical limitations with applying it in (...) this context: PPP gives ambiguous and arbitrary guidance due to difficulties in identifying the salient polluter. Moreover, when PPP does identify responsible actors, these may be unable to avoid or mitigate their contribution to the pollution, only able to avoid/mitigate it at excessive cost to themselves or others, or excusably ignorant of contributing. These limitations motivate a hybrid framework where PPP, which emphasizes holding those causing large-scale problems accountable, is balanced by the Ability to Pay Principle (APP), which emphasizes efficiently managing such problems. In this framework, improving wastewater treatment and distributing associated financial costs across water consumers or taxpayers stand out as promising responses to pharmaceutical pollution from human use. However, sound policy depends on empirical considerations requiring further study. (shrink)

This article provides a theoretical policy-making model of chemical sunset that gradually substitutes green alternatives for persistent toxic substances within a finite timeframe. The technological inflexibility of these substances is a tough obstacle to a chemical sunset, because a chemical sunset seeks to ultimately stop, within a short period of time, the risky businesses of these substances that are highly entrenched into our society. In wrestling with this obstacle, the intelligent precautionary “polluter pays” principle integrates three policy (...) tools: a “precautionary `polluter pays' principle,” “intelligent trial and error,” and democratic “regulatory negotiation.” It is designed to promote technological pluralism and strong democracy, as well as to create either trust or mutual adjustment among relevant groups. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the All Affected Principle generates a puzzle when applied to carbon tax referendums. According to recent versions of the All Affected Principle, people should have a say in a democratic decision in positive proportion to how much the decision affects them. Plausibly, one way of being affected by a carbon tax referendum is to bear the economic burden of paying the tax. On this metric of affectedness, then, people who pollute a lot (...) are ceteris paribus more affected than people who don’t, because the former stands to pay more in carbon taxes than the latter. Consequently, people who pollute a lot receive large voting power, while people who pollute a little receive little voting power. This is a puzzling distribution of voting power for several reasons. First, it is instrumentally counterproductive if the goal is to rectify damages to the climate. Second, it introduces prudential incentives for everyone to pollute more to gain voting power. Third, the relative difference in voting power between people who pollute a lot and people who don’t is puzzling from a desert-based point of view, since the former often make a serious effort to avoid polluting, while the latter don’t. (shrink)

According to the Polluter Pays Principle, excessive emitters of greenhouse gases have special obligations to remedy the problem of climate change, because they are the ones who have caused it. But what kind of problem is climate change? In this paper I argue that as a moral problem, climate change has a more complex causal structure than many proponents of the Polluter Pays Principle seem to recognize: it is a problem resulting from the interaction (...) of anthropogenic climate effects with the underlying vulnerability and exposure of human communities and other things of value. This means that we should acknowledge more pathways by which human agency contributes to the climate problem and, accordingly, a different landscape of contribution-based remedial responsibilities. (shrink)

Much of the climate ethics discussion centers on considerations of compensatory justice and historical accountability. However, little attention is given to supporting and defending the Beneficiary Pays Principle as a guide for policymaking. This principle states that those who have benefitted from an instance of harm have an obligation to compensate those who have been harmed. Thus, this principle implies that those benefitted by industrialization and carbon emission owe compensation to those who have been harmed by (...) climate change. Beneficiary Pays is commonly juxtaposed with Polluter Pays Principle and the Ability to Pay Principle in the relevant literature. Beneficiary Pays withstands objections that raise suspicion for the latter two. (shrink)

The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) states that polluters should bear the burdens as- sociated with their pollution. This principle has been highly contested because of the pu- tative impossibility of considering individuals morally responsible for an important amount of their emissions. For the PPP faces the so-called excusable ignorance objec- tion, which states that polluters were for a long time non-negligently ignorant about the negative consequences of greenhouse gas emissions and, thus, cannot be considered morally responsible (...) for their negative consequences. This paper focuses on the concept of moral responsibility as it appears in the excusable ignorance objection. I claim that this objection stems from a narrow notion of moral responsibility and that a more fundamen- tal notion of moral responsibility would pave the way to overcome it. I show that it should be out of the question whether historical polluters should bear some burdens asso- ciated with climate change because of their historical emissions. The relevant question is which kind of burdens they can legitimately be asked to bear. I argue that this notion of moral responsibility allows us to assign burdens of symbolic reparation, which are at the core of ‘Loss and Damage’ policies. (shrink)

[Blog Post] This blog post (1) introduces a fundamental debate in climate ethics (polluter pays v beneficiary pays v ability to pay principles) while (2) arguing for a new principle (polluter pays, then receives, or PPTR/"Peter", principle).

The United States Environmental Protection Agency has begun to encourage innovative market-based approaches to address nonpoint source water pollution. These water quality trading programs have the potential to achieve environmental standards at a lower overall cost. Two fundamental questions must be answered before these benefits can be realized: How will trades between point and nonpoint sources be monitored and enforced? and, How will nonpoint sources be included within a trading market? ;Point-nonpoint source trading can be accommodated through either a technology-based (...) or performance-based approach. The technology-based approach accommodates trading through the use of a proxy for unobservable, individual nonpoint source emission reductions. While trading ratios can effectively deal with the uncertainty associated with using a proxy for actual abatement, they are inefficient and ineffective for dealing with problems of hidden action. The alternative use of performance-based trading approaches requires the use of team contracts that provide individual incentives linked to the performance of the entire group. Such contracts must be designed to overcome both adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Performance-based approaches promise efficiency gains in terms of reducing the problems of asymmetric information, and by introducing flexibility into the choice of nonpoint source abatement technologies and practices. ;Nonpoint sources are exempted from direct regulation under the polluter-pays-principle. As a result, their participation in trading markets is voluntary, thus preventing a baseline cap on pre-trade emissions. To determine whether this arrangement should be changed, we must ask if there something that morally prohibits the direct regulation of nonpoint sources of pollution. While a morally relevant distinction can be made between point and nonpoint sources of emission based on differences in the ability to observe individual emission levels, this relevance is limited to the case of performance-based policy instruments. The moral legitimacy of applying the polluter-pays-principle to nonpoint sources of pollution must be made on a case by case basis, as it is dependent upon existing social, economic, and other practical factors. However, it can be stated that there is no general moral barrier to prohibit the application of the polluter-pays-principle to nonpoint sources of pollution. (shrink)

Climate change confronts us with our most pressing challenges today. The global consensus is clear that human activity is mostly to blame for its harmful effects, but there is disagreement about what should be done. While no shortage of proposals from ecological footprints and the polluter pays principle to adaptation technology and economic reforms, each offers a solution – but is climate change a problem we can solve? In this provocative new book, these popular proposals for ending (...) or overcoming the threat of climate change are shown to offer no easy escape and each rest on an important mistake. Thom Brooks argues that a future environmental catastrophe is an event we can only delay or endure, but not avoid. This raises new ethical questions about how we should think about climate change. How should we reconceive sustainability without a status quo? Why is action more urgent and necessary than previously thought? What can we do to motivate and inspire hope? Many have misunderstood the kind of problem that climate change presents – as well as the daunting challenges we must face and overcome. Climate Change Ethics for an Endangered World is a critical guide on how we can better understand the fragile world around us before it is too late. This innovative book will be of great interest to students and scholars of climate change, climate justice, environmental policy and environmental ethics. "This book offers a rare combination of tough-mindedness, analytic rigor, and passion as it tackles the greatest challenge of our time―climate change. For Brooks, it’s past time to acknowledge that climate change cannot be solved though the careful selection of good polices. Climate change is an unavoidable tragedy that we must endure but may be able to survive. Offering a program that emphasizes flexibility and adaptation, Brooks brings original insights to a debate that too long has been bogged down in wishful thinking and empty scholasticism." Professor Eric Posner, Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago's Law School. (shrink)

Assisted migration (AM) is a translocation of the representatives of species to areas outside their natural habitats as a response to climate change. This article seeks to identify how customary norms and general principles of international environmental law could guide the development of regulation of AM maximizing the benefits of using AM and minimizing AM-related risks. Among the customary norms and principles of international environmental law discussed in the article and relevant to the regulation of AM are the permanent sovereignty (...) over natural resources, the principle of cooperation, the no-harm rule, the precautionary principle, the principles of prevention, due diligence, and obligation to conduct environmental impact assessment (EIA), the principles of integration and intergenerational equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, and the polluter pays principle, the principles of non-regression, progression, resilience, in dubio pro natura, the principle of ecological proportionality, and the principle of access to information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters (principle of good governance, environmental democracy). (shrink)

While mitigation and adaptation will help to protect us from climate change, there are harms that are beyond our ability to adapt. Some of these harms, which may have been instigated from historical emissions, plausibly give rise to duties of compensation. This chapter discusses several principles that have been discussed about how to divide climate duties—the polluter pays principle, the beneficiary pays principle, the ability to pay principle, and a new one, the polluter (...) pays, then receives principle. The chapter introduces several challenges to these principles from the literature, before discussing which policies and institutions might be relevant to compensation, whether internationally (e.g. the Green Climate Fund) or intergenerationally (e.g. Broome and Foley’s World Climate Bank). It also describes some recent successful climate cases which require both the Dutch government and a private firm to act in accordance with climate targets to avoid potential rights-violations. Finally, it discusses one of the most important international concepts with respect to compensation: the Loss & Damage pillar of climate policy. (shrink)

The paper examines two backward-looking principles about how the costs of mitigating and adapting to climate change should be distributed. According to the polluter pays principle, such costs should be borne by those who caused climate change. According to the beneficiary pays principle, they should be borne by those who have benefited from the activities causing climate change, regardless of whether they took part in such activities or not. The paper unpacks both principles, considers their (...) main problems and contends that, when properly combined, they can address such problems. (shrink)

There is a major divide between the work of normative theorists and concrete climate action (or inaction) politics and policies. In this volume, authors tackle the strained relationships between principles of justice and climate politics by responding to real-world climate politics and policies, offering proposals and analyses that take concerns of feasibility seriously, and identifying immediate justice and feasibility concerns with recent proposals for climate action. Contributors look at questions of feasibility as they relate to specific international institutions like the (...) IPCC and UNFCCC, and widely discussed principles of climate justice, including backward-looking principles like polluter pays and forward-looking principles like ability to pay. Others explore the feasibility hurdles and justice concerns that challenge popular mitigation proposals. (shrink)

Discussions of where the costs of climate change adaptation and mitigation should fall often focus on the 'polluter pays principle' or the 'ability to pay principle'. Simon Caney has recently defended a 'hybrid view', which includes versions of both of these principles. This article argues that Caney's view succeeds in overcoming several shortfalls of both principles, but is nevertheless subject to three important objections: first, it does not distinguish between those emissions which are hard to avoid (...) and those which are easy to avoid; second, its only partial reference to all-things-considered justice means it cannot provide a full account even of climate justice; and third, it assigns to the poor very limited duties to meet climate change costs, even where they have created those costs, which may incentivise them to increase emissions. An alternative pluralistic account which avoids these objections is presented. (shrink)

In this chapter we first discuss the main principles of justice and note the standard objections to them, which we believe necessitate a hybrid approach. The hybrid account we defend is primarily based on the distributive principle of sufficientarianism, which we interpret as the idea that each country should have the means to provide a minimally decent quality of life for each of its citizens. We argue that sufficientarian considerations give good reason to think that what we call the (...) ‘ability to pay objection’ should be taken much more seriously in this debate. Following this, our account emphasises what we believe are the two most important moral desiderata in any attempt to distribute responsibility for dealing with climate change: the ability to mitigate the problem and the making of culpable contributions to the problem. After noting that our proposal includes enough detail to be a useful start for policy makers, we defend our account against some potential objections. (shrink)

This paper examines the responsibilities of states to assist and to receive stateless people who are forced to leave their state territory due to rising seas and other unavoidable climate change impacts and the rights of ‘climate refugees’ to choose their host state. The paper employs a praxeological method of non-ideal theorising, which entails identifying and negotiating the unavoidable tensions and trade-offs associated with different framings of state responsibility in order to find a path forward that maximises the protection of (...) climate refugees within the constraints imposed by political feasibility. It argues that the responsibility of states to support climate refugees through financial and technical assistance should be treated separately from their responsibility to receive them. The former is a differentiated responsibility grounded in the ability to pay principle, or relative capability, while the latter is a common responsibility grounded in the fact that all states have causally contributed to their plight, albeit in varying degrees which cannot be, and need not be, precisely determined. A common state ‘responsibility to receive’ is linked with a right on the part of climate refugees to choose their host to suit their circumstances, which would provide a form of partial compensation for the injustice and trauma of their loss and damage. This right is expected to become more viable, and the political willingness of states to receive them more likely, the more that climate refugees are assured of adequate support for resettlement according to states’ differentiated responsibilities to assist. (shrink)

The first impacts of climate change have become evident and are expected to increase dramatically over the next decades. Thus, it becomes more and more pressing to decide who has to compensate those people who suffer from negative impacts of climate change but have neither contributed to the problem nor possess the resources to cope with the consequences. Since the frequently invoked Polluter Pays Principle cannot account for all climate-related harm, I will take a closer look at (...) the much more controversial Beneficiary Pays Principle. It is argued that, appropriately qualified, the Beneficiary Pays Principle can help to identify additional duty-bearers. Based on these results, I briefly comment on three different policy options to generate funds for compensation. (shrink)

Climate ethics has been concerned with polluter pays, beneficiary pays and ability to pay principles, all of which consider climate change as a single negative externality. This paper considers it as a constellation of externalities, positive and negative, with different associated demands of justice. This is important because explicitly considering positive externalities has not to our knowledge been done in the climate ethics literature. Specifically, it is argued that those who enjoy passive gains from climate change owe (...) gains not to the net losers, but to the emitters, just as the emitters owe compensation to the net losers for the negative externality. This is defended by appeal to theoretical virtues and to the social benefits of generating positive externalities, even when those positive externalities are coupled with far greater negative externalities. We call this the Polluter Pays, Then Receives ('PPTR', or 'Peter') Principle. This principle is then applied at two levels in the context of Canada. [Open access]. (shrink)

I will discuss the relationship between two different accounts of remedial duty ascriptions. According to one account, the beneficiary account, individuals who benefit innocently from injustices ought to bear remedial responsibilities towards the victims of these injustices. According to another account, the causal account, individuals who caused injustices ought to bear remedial duties towards the victim. In this paper, I examine the relation between the principles central to these accounts: the Beneficiary Pays Principle and the well-established principle (...) of Strict Liability in law. I argue that both principles display a strong yet unexplored similarity as they make certain kinds of causal connection sufficient for incurring liability. Because of this similarity, I suggest that insights into the Beneficiary Pays Principle can be gained from exploring its relation with Strict Liability. In particular, I examine two new positive arguments that could be adapted to support of the Beneficiary Pays Principle: the Minimising Injustice Argument and the Normative Connection Argument. However, I’ll show that only one of those arguments, namely the Normative Connection Argument, can truly support the Beneficiary Pays Principle. I conclude that, if you endorse the Normative Connection Argument for Strict Liability, you have at least a strong prima facie reason to endorse the parallel argument for the Beneficiary Pays Principle. (shrink)

The application of the polluter-pays principle in environmental policy depends on answers to the philosophical questions about what is good or detrimental with respect to nature. Science and the economy constitute a functional circle of “observing” nature’s unity as well as its utility. Based on a concept of nature as a system of causally related objects or - complementary to this - as a bunch of “resources,” however, the human interest and responsibility in nature do not seem (...) to be properly observed. Subjecting nature to human subjectivity may have been an adaptation in the wrong direction, since, if humanity is taken as the measure, there is no measure for humanity. A practical philosophy of nature should start from the assumption that science’s missing unity and the economy’s missing goodness are equivalent shortcomings in a complenlentary way. On the one hand, philosophy should engage in the problem-oriented reintegration of the sciences by establishing nuclei of interdisciplinary cooperation. We are relatingourselves to nature in a responsible way only when approaching nature as our own nature. On the other hand, while our technological faculties have reached a very high level of reliability and differentiation, we are definitely much less successful in recognizing goodness in economic “goods.” This calls for demand education with respect to how human needs are to be brought to bear as demands on nature, ahuman relation to nature as well as natural relations between human beings, again depending on answers to philosophical questions. In the history of ideas, nature has declined from “the nature of things and beings” to “the things and beings of nature,” or from being to beings. We will, however, never be able to judge what is good or bad with respect to nature if we do not from the outset start - pragmatically-with a normative concept of nature. (shrink)

This paper discusses two distinct questions of distributive justice raised by climate change. Stated very roughly, one question concerns how much protection is owed to the potential victims of climate change (the Just Target Question), and the second concerns how the burdens (and benefits) involved in preventing dangerous climate change should be distributed (the Just Burden Question). In Section II, I focus on the first of these questions, the Just Target Question. The rest of the paper examines the second question, (...) the Just Burden Question. To answer this question, I argue, it is necessary to address two important methodological questions (one concerning the choice between what I term Integrationism and Isolationism and the other concerning the choice between what I term Holism and Atomism). Sections III-V, thus, set out and explore these two methodological issues. Having done so, the paper then turns from methodological issues to substantive analysis, and in Section VI it examines three principles of distributive justice that, it has been suggested, should determine how the burden of addressing dangerous climatic changes should be distributed (the Polluter Pays Principle, the Ability to Pay Principle and the Beneficiary Pays Principle). (shrink)

Meanwhile California has emerged from its own record-breaking heat wave. For the United States as a whole, the first six months of 2006 were the hottest in more than a century. Europe is experiencing an unusually hot summer, too. July set new records in England and the Netherlands, where weather data go back more than 300 years.

Climate change poses grave threats to many people, including the most vulnerable. This prompts the question of who should bear the burden of combating ?dangerous? climate change. Many appeal to the Polluter Pays Principle. I argue that it should play an important role in any adequate analysis of the responsibility to combat climate change, but suggest that it suffers from three limitations and that it needs to be revised. I then consider the Ability to Pay Principle (...) and consider four objections to this principle. I suggest that, when suitably modified, it can supplement the Polluter Pays Principle. (shrink)

Carbon pricing is one of the most politically important approaches for the mitigation of climate change in the world today. Most political actors who are not committed to climate change denial favor carbon pricing, either as emissions trading or carbon taxation. In this article, I argue that carbon pricing should be considered unfair in most of its forms. I present a line of criticism called the Unfair Burdens Argument. It states that the most politically relevant ways to price carbon needlessly (...) burden the less affluent more than the more affluent. This is unfair because, among other things, the more affluent have on average done more to create the problem of climate change in the first place. Principles for the fair distribution of burdens under climate change mitigation like the Polluter Pays Principle, which were thought to support carbon pricing, turn out to speak against it, when interpreted properly. Although the Unfair Burdens Argument on its own cannot show that carbon pricing is impermissible, it offers important clues for what a morally permissible form of climate change mitigation would look like. (shrink)

This paper examines the nexus between climate change and trade governance from a normative perspective. Only little research attention has been paid to assessing the interactions between empirical and normative approaches to climate change in the context of potential trade measures. To this end, the paper focuses on currently discussed border carbon adjustment measures. The paper assesses these trade measures from a normative perspective: it explores whether they are compatible or in conflict with development ethics on the one hand and (...) with climate ethics on the other. The paper finds that border adjustment measures are both a potential threat to development, as well as to a workable climate agreement. It argues that they are therefore both in conflict with development as well as climate ethics concerns. From a development ethics perspective, border adjustment measures are objectionable for two reasons. First, they hurt developing countries and above all the ones that are vulnerable in terms of relying only on few export goods. Second, border adjustment measures restrict market access for developing countries and thereby undermine the potential of trade to foster development. From a climate ethics perspective, border adjustment measures are objectionable for three reasons. First, border adjustment measures amount to unilaterally changing whatever global burden-sharing deal has been agreed to—thereby undermining procedural justice. Second, border adjustment measures disregard the consumption-dimension: it might be questioned whether it is fair to focus exclusively on making producers pay for emissions rather than also holding those responsible that import and consume the goods that incorporate these emissions. Third, even if border adjustment measures and countries with low emissions are exempted from border adjustment measures, they still burden countries that bear no historic responsibility for current high levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, thereby undermining distributive justice by being in conflict with the polluter pays principle. (shrink)

It is paradoxical that lead shot and fishing sinkers are still used widely, given society's understanding of lead contamination and avian lead toxicosis. The statutory action taken by governments varies from total bans on both lead products to no regulation of either shot or sinkers. Many government agencies and field sport organisations are reluctant to use the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle and regulate use of available non-toxic substitutes. The attitudes of individuals towards their (...) roles in environmental lead contamination and remediation reflect marked self-deception about the need for changes and the benefits to be derived from substitution. Fatal lead poisoning of highly symbolic, revered species such as British mute swans and American bald eagles promoted development of national regulations to ban lead shot and fishing weights. Despite the parallels between these countries' reforms, there has been little parity between the banning of lead shot and fishing sinkers. (shrink)

It is evident that the problem of global climate change is closely bound up with questions of distributional justice, both intra- and intergenerational. Questions of justice are raised by two kinds of burdens: reductions in the emission of greenhouse gases, and the financial and knowledge transfers necessary to enable the poorest countries to compensate the harms suffered by the ongoing process. Both burdens involve considerable costs and opportunity costs. On the backdrop of a prioritarian version of utilitarianism, it is argued (...) that the answer should be a split strategy. While reduction of emissions should be based on the polluter-pays principle, obligations of compensation should be based on the criteria of overall economic strength. (shrink)

It is commonly believed that the history of behavior that has contributed to the threat of climate change bears in a significant way on the obligations of current people. In particular, a number of philosophers have defended the Beneficiary Pays Principle, according to which those who have benefited from unjust emitting activity have a special obligation to bear costs of mitigation and adaptation. I claim that versions of the BPP that have been defended by others share a common (...) problematic feature. Specifically, they seem to limit the benefits that ground obligations under the principle to those that derive from unjust acts, and thereby implicitly deny that other ways in which individuals might benefit from injustice can ground similar duties. I argue that there is no plausible theoretical basis for this distinction. I conclude that we should take seriously a different type of principle that can be plausibly called a Beneficiary Pays Principle, according to which those who benefit from injustice, all things considered, are obligated to give up the unjust benefits that they enjoy. (shrink)

This article explores the ethical architecture of the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle, which holds that agents can come to possess remedial obligations of corrective justice to others through the involuntary receipt of benefits stemming from injustice. Advocates of the principle face challenges of both persuasion and limitation in seeking to convince those unmoved of its normative force, and to explain in which cases of benefiting from injustice it does and does not give rise to rectificatory obligations. The article (...) considers ways in which advocates of the principle might seek to win over those sceptical of its merits by employing a modified principle which sidesteps the issue of enforceability, before considering the question of whether the argument can be expanded from cases of benefiting from wrongdoing specifically to other sorts of situation where one agent involuntarily benefits from another's loss. (shrink)

Both biofuels and BECCS serve the purpose of reducing the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere, biofuels by reducing the quantity of CO2 newly added and BECCS by removing the CO2 already emitted. Both rely on the large-scale growth of biomass and hence compete with food production for arable land. Consequently, the implementation of both at large scales potentially endangers food security. Given this conflict and the need for climate action, this paper discusses whether there are differences between the ethical (...) implications of mitigation by biofuels and geoengineering with BECCS. We apply a principlist approach, specifying and weighting four key principles of climate ethics: the polluter-pays principle, the ability-to-pay principle, the equal-per-capita principle, and the procedural involvement principle. Because the ethical and practical implications of BECCS and biofuels have many parallels, applying these four principles identifies relevant moral differences to decide between these two technologies. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal I argued that the distribution of the burdens involved in combating climate change should be determined by a combination of a particular version of the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) and a particular version of the Ability to Pay Principle. Carl Knight has presented three objections to my analysis. In what follows, I argue that he largely misinterprets my arguments.

Many moral and political theorists have recently argued that the fact that an agent has innocently benefited from wrongdoing or injustice can ground special moral duties to help out the victims or simply give up the benefits. This idea is often referred to as the ‘Beneficiary Pays Principle’. This article critically assesses three recent attempts at providing a rationale for the BPP and argues that there are profound problems with each of them. It argues that even if we (...) accept plausible versions of the different normative ideas these accounts appeal to, we have no reason to accept the BPP. (shrink)

The choice of greenhouse gas emissions accounting method is important because it affects the way climate burdens are allocated between states. This paper investigates the significance of state jurisdiction for this choice. It assesses three arguments from jurisdiction against consumption-based emissions accounting: the fairness argument from retrospective responsibility; the fairness argument from prospective responsibility; and the effectiveness argument. It argues that former two arguments fail since attributing emissions to importing states neither unfairly blames these states nor asks too much of (...) them. However, the effectiveness argument provides a strong potential reason against consumption-based emissions accounting. To the extent jurisdictional control is needed to reduce some emissions, and production-based accounting incentivizes states to reduce these emissions, there is a reason of environmental effectiveness for sticking with production-based accounting. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Volume 22, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 148-150.

It is widely accepted by the scientific community and beyond that human beings are primarily responsible for climate change and that climate change has brought with it a number of real problems. These problems include, but are not limited to, greater threats to coastal communities, greater risk of famine, and greater risk that tropical diseases may spread to new territory. In keeping with J. S. Mill's 'Harm Principle', green political theorists often respond that if we are contributing a harm (...) to others in contributing to climate change and its negative effects, we then have a negative duty to assist those we have harmed and to reduce our carbon emissions. In this paper, I will take seriously negative duties stemming from a contribution to climate change and demonstrate that our negative duties do not demand that we necessarily end our contribution to climate change if we were able to compensate those who may be affected by climate change. Thus, the conclusion of many green political theorists - that we must reduce our carbon emissions - does not necessarily follow from the view that humans are primarily responsible for climate change and its attended ill effects. (shrink)

The article examines four principles of cost allocation (cost of mitigation, of adaptation, and of compensation) for environmental policies that aim to address climate change: “the polluter pays”, “who benefits pays”, “who is able to pay, pays”, and “the equal per capita”. It shows that they are all problematic. A better case can be built by the joint work of only the two principles of “the polluter pays” and “who benefits pays”.

Nation-states are seen as reasonable candidates to whom to assign remedial responsibilities for climate change harms. A natural question arises: Based on what justification should these responsibilities be assigned to states? Three prominent principles have been proposed: the “Polluter pays,” the “Beneficiary pays,” and the “Ability to pay.” However, each principle faces important objections when considered in isolation. Building on David Miller's multi-principle theory of remedial responsibility, I propose and justify an account of remedial responsibility (...) for the case of climate change. I complement the account with a guiding algorithm that arranges these (and more) principles in a systematic way to make remedial responsibilities for climate change harms applicable. This guiding algorithm resolves the objections that arise when the principles are applied in isolation. (shrink)

Should people who perform equal work receive equal pay? Most would say ‘yes’, at least insofar as this question is understood to be asking whether employers should be permitted to discriminate against employees on the basis of race or sex. But suppose the employees belong to all of the same traditionally protected groups. Is (what I call) nondiscriminatory unequal pay for equal work wrong? Drawing an analogy with price discrimination, I argue that it is not intrinsically wrong, but it can (...) be deceptive, in which case it is wrong. (shrink)

Some moral theorists argue that being an innocent beneficiary of significant harms inflicted by others may be sufficient to ground special duties to address the hardships suffered by the victims, at least when it is impossible to extract compensation from those who perpetrated the harm. This idea has been applied to climate change in the form of the beneficiary-pays principle. Other philosophers, however, are quite sceptical about beneficiary pays. Our aim in this article is to examine their (...) critiques. We conclude that, while they have made important points, the principle remains worthy of further development and exploration. Our purpose in engaging with these critiques is constructive — we aim to formulate beneficiary pays in ways that would give it a plausible role in allocating the cost of addressing human-induced climate change, while acknowledging that some understandings of the principle would make it unsuitable for this purpose. (shrink)