The Beneficiary Pays Principle and Strict Liability: exploring the normative significance of causal relations

Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2169-2189 (2018)
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Abstract

I will discuss the relationship between two different accounts of remedial duty ascriptions. According to one account, the beneficiary account, individuals who benefit innocently from injustices ought to bear remedial responsibilities towards the victims of these injustices. According to another account, the causal account, individuals who caused injustices ought to bear remedial duties towards the victim. In this paper, I examine the relation between the principles central to these accounts: the Beneficiary Pays Principle and the well-established principle of Strict Liability in law. I argue that both principles display a strong yet unexplored similarity as they make certain kinds of causal connection sufficient for incurring liability. Because of this similarity, I suggest that insights into the Beneficiary Pays Principle can be gained from exploring its relation with Strict Liability. In particular, I examine two new positive arguments that could be adapted to support of the Beneficiary Pays Principle: the Minimising Injustice Argument and the Normative Connection Argument. However, I’ll show that only one of those arguments, namely the Normative Connection Argument, can truly support the Beneficiary Pays Principle. I conclude that, if you endorse the Normative Connection Argument for Strict Liability, you have at least a strong prima facie reason to endorse the parallel argument for the Beneficiary Pays Principle.

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Citations of this work

Strict moral liability.Justin A. Capes - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1):52-71.
Is It Wrong to Benefit from Injustice?Katerina Psaroudaki - forthcoming - Moral Philosophy and Politics.
Blame in the Aftermath of Excused Wrongdoing.Adam Piovarchy - 2020 - Public Affairs Quarterly 34 (2):142-168.

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References found in this work

Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Oxford University Press USA.
Famine, affluence, and morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.

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