. Philia and pedagogy ‘side by side’: the perils and promise of teacher–student friendships. Ethics and Education: Vol. 7, Creating spaces, pp. 211-223. doi: 10.1080/17449642.2013.766541.

Benedict XVI's first encyclical, Deus Caritas Est, treated the different characteristics of human love and their expression. The first section discusses eros and the second shows how agape provides the essential framework for Catholic charitable organisations. I will be arguing that by omitting any reflection on the role of philia, he missed a significant opportunity to retrieve an important part of the Tradition and expand our usual understanding of the elements of social ethics. Part I briefly gives the background of (...) Benedict's non-use of philia in his encyclical and indicates the basis for the view that philia has no place in Christian social ethics. The favoured approach is that of agape. Part II presents Thomas Aquinas' view of friendship and how it might counter the shortcomings identified by the authors in Part I. Part III applies his view of friendship to the key principles in Catholic social teaching of solidarity and preferential option for the poor. Part IV concludes with some general summary remarks. (shrink)

Benedict XVI's first encyclical, Deus Caritas Est, treated the different characteristics of human love and their expression. The first section discusses eros and the second shows how agape provides the essential framework for Catholic charitable organisations. I will be arguing that by omitting any reflection on the role of philia, he missed a significant opportunity to retrieve an important part of the Tradition and expand our usual understanding of the elements of social ethics. Part I briefly gives the background of (...) Benedict's non-use of philia in his encyclical and indicates the basis for the view that philia has no place in Christian social ethics. The favoured approach is that of agape. Part II presents Thomas Aquinas' view of friendship and how it might counter the shortcomings identified by the authors in Part I. Part III applies his view of friendship to the key principles in Catholic social teaching of solidarity and preferential option for the poor. Part IV concludes with some general summary remarks. (shrink)

This paper offers some critical thoughts concerning the concept of "civic" or "political" friendship within commercial societies. In response to Badhwar's suggestion (2008) that the "free market" provides the best opportunities for political friendship, I argue that civic philia cannot be reduced to a form of "market-friendship." This was already apparent to early advocates of the market who recognized the fragility of friendship under capitalism. Subsequent attempts to address this dilemma bring into focus the deficiency of market friendships and the (...) concept of friendship more broadly. In conclusion, I argue that Kant's attempt to circumscribe friendship for the sake of "civility" contains the seeds of friendship's renewal. (shrink)

El artículo analiza la noción griega de philía y describe dos enfoques diferentes, que se asocian respectivamente con Sócrates y Protágoras. Para el primero, la amistad, conectada con eros, es el lazo más importante entre los seres humanos, en tanto que para Protágoras ninguna relación, incluida la philía, puede estar por encima de justicia. La Medea de Eurípides sería una aplicación de la teoría de Protágoras a un caso célebre en la literatura mítica.

The present article studies the epictetean philosophical use of some passages of the Greek and Roman history. The concepts of love-friendship (philía) and personal con- venience (sumphéron) second the philosopher to explain why happiness (eudaimonía) has not been reached by the human being in all history. All historical war or strife (pólemos), such as the Trojan, the Medics and the Peloponnesian wars, is provoked by epistemological-moral mistakes derived from the ignorance of which is the correct place to put the (...) sumphéron; such correct place is only the personal “rational capacity” ( proháiresis). This causal explanation of the incorrect and vicious human actions, of which history is full and which destroy the existent philía between nations and provoke pólemos, constitutes an authentic epictetean philosophy of history. Nevertheless, those vicious actions have a justification in a superior Cosmological level because they are pre-determined and ordered by the God-Providence. This leads us to the possibility of observing that the stoic philosophy of history, particularly the epictetean, is analogous to some modern speculative systems of history like the ones developed by Vico or Hegel. (shrink)

Based on a philosophical interpretation of the Ancient concepts, philia and agape, the present contribution offers a comparative study of the ancient Greek ethics of friendship and the Christian theology of love. While the former tradition understands philia as a finite relationship between human selves within a sociopolitical context, agape is regarded by the latter tradition as the bond of love which God grants all humans who believe in Jesus Christ as the Messiah. Despite the fundamental differences between the two (...) conceptions of love, they converge at one point, namely in the caring concern for the stranger, who humans are called upon to receive in hospitality. (shrink)

This paper examines Hannah Arendt’s reception of the Aristotelian philía. First, we expose the notes of the philía in his Nicomachean Ethics and the political projection of friendship as synaísthesis. Secondly, we argue that in a relevant fragment of “Truth and Politics” and in Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Arendt finishes clarifying her notion of friendship as a political and worldly bond. There she does not allude to Aristotle, but to Kant and his reflections on the sense of (...) taste. (shrink)

Socrates in the Lysis discusses philia and the conditions under which two or more people can be said to engage in this relationship. Many commentators take Socrates to be attempting to discover how human beings enter into the relationship of friendship, a relationship characterized by reciprocal affection, altruistic concern and personal intimacy. Other readers of the Lysis see in the dialogue’s investigation of philia a discussion of desire and attraction at the most general level. On this view, philia is one (...) species of the general human desire for good. The present paper develops a third reading of philia. Philia is a type of partnership or fellowship where affection and intimacy are not central features of the relationship. The fellowship involves at least one party who possesses wisdom while other members of the fellowship seek to benefit from wisdom. Thus philia is a characteristically human response to the need for wisdom. The members of such a fellowship share a common desire for a good which gives purpose to their association, and because of their common desire to benefit from this good the members can be described as fellows or partners in the pursuit of this good. (shrink)

En el Lisis Sócrates se presenta ante Hipótales como experto en cuestiones eróticas (tà erotiká). Demostrará ante el joven amante “cómo hay que dirigirse al amado” para ganar su afecto. Así, se embarcará en una conversación con Lisis y Menéxeno acerca de la naturaleza del phílos la cual conducirá a una aporía que, prima facie, parece condenar el diálogo al fracaso; pero el estado aporético al que arriba la conversación con los niños permitirá estimular la reflexión filosófica de Lisis y (...) Menéxeno. El presente trabajo no busca establecer una definición de qué sea la amistad (philía) o el amigo (phílos), sino resaltar la práctica misma de preguntas y respuestas, la dialéctica (dialégesthai) como actividad amistosa entre philoi que persiguen el más alto bien. (shrink)

This article is the first one to offer an investigation, from a biological perspective, of “natural philia” or “kin-based” philia in Aristotle’s practical philosophy. After some preliminary considerations about its place in Aristotle’s ethical treatises, the discussion focuses on Aristotle’s biology. Here we learn that natural philia, couched in terms of a biological praxis rather than a trait of character, is widespread in the animal kingdom, although in different ways and to varying degrees. To account for such differences, Aristotle establishes (...) a Scala Philiae in two different biological texts—Historia Animalium and Generation of Animals—where natural bonds in animals are classified in view of their strength and duration. Each level of Aristotle’s Scala is examined. Finally, the argument returns to Aristotle’s ethical and political texts, drawing greater attention to the biological mechanisms that underlie natural philia in human beings. I conclude that natural philia provides one fundamental biological building-block of Aristotle’s ethics and politics. (shrink)

Resumen: Tanto en Platón como en Aristóteles el eros es cuestionado como forma de relación con el otro que conduzca a una vida virtuosa y que permita además pensar la vida en común. En la perspectiva de Platón, tal cuestionamiento se daría en favor de una búsqueda de la Belleza que proveería un determinado modelo de philia −el de la philosofía−. En el planteamiento de Aristóteles, el cuestionamiento del eros por particulares se daría en favor de un modelo de philia (...) −la philia virtuosa− prácticamente limitado a un plano ideal −por cuanto los hombres virtuosos son muy raros de encontrar−. En ambos casos, sin embargo, la forma en que se está pensando la philia proveería, en cierto sentido, un modelo ideal de comunidad.: Both in Plato and Aristotle, eros is questioned as a form of relationship with the other that brings us to a virtuous life and enable us to think about life in community. In Plato’s view, such a questioning would be in favor of a search for the Beauty that would offer a particular model of philia −that of philo-sofia−. In Aristotle’s view, the questioning of eros by individuals would be in favor of a model of philia −the virtuous philia− virtually restricted to an ideal level −because it is rare to find virtuous men−. In both cases, however, the way philia is being thought would, in a sense, provide an ideal model of community. (shrink)

L'interet qu'accorde la philosophie moderne et contemporaine au probleme d'autrui est souvent, et a juste titre, considere comme l'une de ses principales caracteristiques. Peut-on neanmoins croire que cette question de l'intersubjectivite ou de l'interpersonnalite, telle que la poserent Fichte ou Husserl, soit une pure invention ex nihilo de l'epoque contemporaine? Ou bien l'historien de la philosophie, s'il se veut philosophe, ne doit-il pas au contraire postuler l'existence d'une continuite de la reflexion philosophique, et discerner par la comment une question qui (...) se presente comme radicalement neuve manifeste en fait la resurgence d'une meditation et d'un probleme plus anciens? Que les systemes et les reponses changent mais que les questions et les problemes auxquels ils repondent demeurent, telle est la conviction premiere qui anime cet essai. Ainsi, loin que le probleme des rapports avec autrui ait ete absent de la philosophie antique, l'auteur montre dans ce livre comment cette interrogation fut longtemps presente chez les Grecs, sous l'aspect d'une reflexion sur la nature et les conditions de la philia. Cette analyse du theme de l'amitie, indissociable chez les Grecs de leur metaphysique et de leur morale, revele ainsi une pensee du rapport entre les consciences qui, faisant eclater les oppositions factices issues du dualisme classique entre raison et sentiment ou encore entre amour de soi et amour d'autrui, permet d'elaborer une representation plus unitive, plus dynamique aussi, du moi lui-meme. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Preliminary Note Eudaimonism and Rational Egoism NE VIII.1: Nicomachean Context and Platonic Background NE VIII.2: Aristotle's Preliminary Account NE VIII.3–4: Three Forms of Philia? NE IX.4–6: Ta Philika versus the Defining Features of Philia Digression on Dia: Efficient Causal, Final Causal, or Both? NE IX.7 (VIII.8 and 12): Benefactors, Poets, and Parents Ethnocentrism and Aristotle's Ethocentric Ideal NE IX.9: The Lysis Puzzle Revisited Contemplative (versus Engaged) Pleasures Conclusion: Eudaimonism Revisited Conclusions Notes Reference.

Il s’agit d’explorer la notion politique de « lien » (desmos) chez Platon et de déterminer son rapport avec la philia (amitié) des citoyens entre eux, condition sine qua non de la cité, et que l’on peut identifier à ce que nous appelons « le lien social ». Deux textes sont examinés dans cette perspective : Les Lois, VII, 793a-d et Le Politique, 305e et suiv. Bien que le terme soit pris dans chacun d’entre eux selon un point de vue (...) différent (objectif dans les Lois, où il désigne les coutumes qui lissent et solidifient l’édifice législatif ; subjectif dans le Politique, où il désigne l’opinion vraie présente dans les âmes, grâce à laquelle celles-ci harmonisent leurs conceptions et donc leurs actions), il s’avère que le desmos est à chaque fois constitué par les manières de faire communes, lesquelles reposent sur des opinions communes. Fruit de l’éducation, œuvre politique essentielle et première, il est ce sans quoi la philia (le lien social, donc) n’est pas possible, ni par conséquent la cité comprise comme unité d’une multiplicité. (shrink)

Não é fácil demarcar a diferença entre as concepções platônicas de Eros e Philia. Nos diálogos mais voltados para o assunto, como Lísis, Banquete e Fedro , identificamos uma sobreposição dos dois temas, tal que o exame de um acaba por remeter ao exame do outro. No Lísis , enquanto a Philia constitui-se como o foco da discussão de Sócrates com Menexeno, o diálogo traz como pano de fundo e com forte apelo dramático o amor de Hipótales por Lísis. No (...) Banquete , apesar de ser Eros o tema central do diálogo, tem-se a partir do discurso de Pausânias a diferenciação entre dois tipos de Eros , de modo que o mais belo deles em muito se assemelha ao que se entende por Philia . No Fedro , por sua vez, esta aparece como um Eros mitigado. Pretendo mostrar que, nos diálogos supracitados, Platão se vale da aproximação entre Eros e Philia para fundamentar sua própria concepção de Philos sophía , na qual Eros desempenha um papel decisivo. Mais precisamente, uma concepção de filosofia na qual o que é Belo ( Eros ) deve assimilar o que é Bom ( Philia ). Para tanto, lança mão das seguintes teses: 1. O desejo é causa tanto de Eros quanto de Philia e, enquanto tal, pressupõe uma relação entre amantes/amigos; 2. O desejo é marcado por uma falta (presente ou futura); 3. O que falta é na verdade algo que foi perdido; 4. O desejo é o movimento da alma para recuperar algo perdido, a saber, a contemplação do Belo. 5. A filosofia é o percurso, guiado por Eros, para o reencontro do Belo. (shrink)

This work reveals the ambivalence of the notion of philia and its inability to serve as a foundation for the civic order when it is not supported by dike. The range of different analytical approaches opens up the perspective from which philosophy addresses a pivotal question for social and political ties in ancient Greece.

The philosophy of loveFor centuries, popular writers and respected scholars have written about and analyzed the phenomenon of love without exhausting its potential for contemporary debate. By representing the three major traditions in the philosophy of love--Platonic eros, Christian agape, and Aristotelian philia--editor Alan Soble has not only examined the intellectual problem of what "love" is, but has designed a dialogue among the three traditions in genuine philosophical style. "Eros is acquisitive, egocentric or even selfish; agape is a giving love. (...) Eros is an unconstant, unfaithful love, while agape is unwavering and continues to give despite ingratitude. Eros is a love that responds to the merit or value of its object; while agape creates value in its object as a result of loving it... Finally, eros is an ascending love, the human's route to God; agape is a descending love, GodÆs route to humans... Philia is caught between eros and agape."--From the Introduction to Eros, Agape and Philia ISSUES EXPLORED: --What is the state of love today as seen through the eyes of Plato, Aristotle, and Paul? --How do relations between the sexes illustrate the difficulties of love? --What are the nature and effects of exclusivity, reciprocity, and constancy? --What are the conceptual and psychological ties between sex and love? --Does it make any sense to think of love in moral terms? (shrink)

This article roots Kant’s concept of disinterestedness, as he uses it in the Critique of Judgment, in Aristotle’s notion of philia by establishing a path from ethics to aesthetics and back. In this way, the third Critique turns out to be one of the main sources for a new ideal of humanity: the ideal suitable for late Enlightenment. This article argues that Kant reaches this fruitful use of disinterestedness by giving to Aristotle’s concept of philia an aesthetic turn.

O presente trabalho procurará apontar elementos no caráter de cada um dos heróis-guerreiros na Ilíada de Homero – Aquiles e Pátroclo – e analisar sucintamente como a hýbris do primeiro e a sofrosýne do último são utilizadas de modo significativo na epopeia, a fim de demonstrar a complementaridade entre os dois personagens e garantir o equilíbrio da narrativa naquilo que podemos denominar uma “antropologia homérica”. Ainda, buscará fazer alguns apontamentos sobre as características desta philía que transpassa elementos antagônicos e (...) mostrar o paradoxo em Aquiles – um herói em crise, o qual beira o anti-herói – e a emergência em Pátroclo – um herói necessário, sem o qual a continuidade narrativa da Ilíada não ocorreria. (shrink)

In the opening remark of Nicomachean Ethics VIII 1 Aristotle notices that the next step would be a discussion of philia, since it is a certain aretē or is associated with aretē (NE VIII 1 1155a 1–2). This article is an attempt to determine how the real object of philia and aretē are related from Aristotle’s point of view. The author performs a study into two sections. The first section is focused on the analysis of aretē and its various types, (...) in particular the human one. The second section is concentrated on the typology of philia, namely friendship and its particular kinds. The author shows that the relation between philia and aretē can be described in two ways: if both philia and aretē play the crucial role in leading a eudaimonic life, then philia is the aretological friendship and aretē—the human one, namely the whole consists of the aretē of character in the full sense and the practical wisdom on condition that the aretological friends equate eudaimonia with life focused on the political or practical activity, or even of the theoretical wisdom, providing that they identify it with the highest form of eudaimonic life, that is, the theoretical one. If, however, philia is to be a term said in many ways (pleonachōs legetai) and aretē is to be understood in a broad sense, that is, as “being good at something”, then philia can signify every kind of friendship, namely the aretological, the hedonistic and the utilitarian one, whereas aretē—qualification or skill that makes these friendships perform their functions well. The first possibility is that the relation between philia and aretē is limited to the aretological friendship at the expense of narrowing the meaning of aretē to the human one. The second possibility is that every kind of friendship is considered as the functional thing and, in consequence, defined by their proper function. From this point of view, all friendships are accompanied by appropriate aretai, namely by qualifications or skills that guarantee the perfect fulfillment of their proper function and, therefore, the achievement of the set goal by two persons in question. (shrink)

Traditionally, Lucian’s Navigium is regarded as a moralizing dialogue, which criticizes unrealistic aspirations. Lycinus incorporates this criticism by attacking his friends ironically. This essay elaborates that the dialogue also offers a more ethical interpretation that problematizes Lycinus’ moralizing attitude towards his friends. It argues that Timolaus, one of Lycinus’ interlocutors and friends, introduces a discourse about the reciprocal connection between the act of storytelling on the one hand, and friendship on the other. By doing so, aesthetics (stories) and ethics (friendship) (...) appear as complementary. To emphasize this perspective on the dialogue, the modern concept of narrative communities is connected with ancient concepts of friendship. Lycinus’ ironizing voice and behavior can then be seen as antagonistic rather than dominant. Timolaus, however, appears as subtle narrator, who by his own wish tries to make Lycinus aware of the importance of storytelling for friendship. (shrink)

This paper argues that the account of friendship (philia) present in Plato's dialogue the Lysis is rife with the disruptive and maddening force of eros. By its end it is no longer clear whether the familiar sorts of personal relationships that we typically count as friendships, and which Aristotle discusses with great sensitivity and appreciation in the Nicomachean Ethics, can be meaningfully sustained. To support this thesis, the paper analyzes each of the seven, relatively self-contained arguments Socrates offers. In addition, (...) it shows how the dramatic context in which these arguments are embedded foreshadows the dialogue's principal objective: to blur the distinction between philia and eros by allowing the latter to infect the former. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Resumo : Central na chamada doutrina ética de Epicuro, o tema da amizade é neste artigo analisado sob três aspectos: a) vinculado aos princípios tradicionais (denominados de regra de ouro ) com os quais várias culturas buscaram reger as relações amistosas; b) de como Epicuro, num sentido diferente do da Academia de Platáo, levou para o Jardim a prática da philía como um teste de reconstituiçáo da pólis ; c) de como o (...) conceito de utilidade (da opheleía ) se vincula ao de interesse e ao de reciprocidade. (shrink)

Several scholars argue that Aristotle's character friendship occurs only between completely virtuous moral agents. Oppositely, others seem to be more skeptical about such an interpretation. Especially John Cooper (1980) has given to us an original and creative understanding of the matter at hand. Particularly, he argues that not only the completely virtuous agents can engage in virtuous friendship; less morally developed agents can do so as well. The key advantage of Cooper’s account is that it allows agents of unequal moral (...) development to take part in character friendship. That is, if an agent A has advanced high in the levels of moral excellence, this does not mean that he necessarily has to find someone with the same level of moral excellence to befriend. I will argue that this agent can also be friends with a less morally developed agent. I will call this relationship: character friendship between unequally developed moral agents. In fact, I will not only follow Cooper’s argument, but I will also try to extend it. Specifically, I will argue that the most significant upshot of his argument is that Aristotle has found a way for the less morally developed agents to improve in moral excellence, throughout the help of their friends of higher moral status. I will suggest then, that this interpretation of character friendship, can not only give an answer to scholars that support the ‘completely virtuous agents’ presupposition; and especially those who reject character friendships between unequally developed agents (Cocking & Kennett, 1998). Cooper’s interpretation can be the stepping stone in understanding character friendship as a mechanism in Aristotle’s hands for his less morally developed agents to further advance in virtue. If we accept the ‘completely virtuous agents’ argument about character friendship then the circumstance just mentioned is impossible. In order for Cooper’s argument to work, however, we have to give a solution to what I will call the Reciprocity Problem. Unfortunately, he does not discuss this matter. I will suggest though, that Aristotle covers this potential gap of Cooper’s theory in his discussion based on superiority. In this manner we can have a less problematic version of the extended view of character friendship. I will thus deploy this paper in the subsequent order. I will first explore the ‘completely virtuous agents’ view of character friendship. I will argue there that despite the merits of such an interpretation, Aristotle seems to offer a more extended view of character friendship. My next task will be to demonstrate why Cooper’s position covers this extended view. Before I move one, I will give a solution to the Reciprocity Problem. After that, I will try to show that Cooper’s view can be extended, so as to explain the prospect of less morally developed agents to advance in the sphere of virtue, by participating in character friendship between unequally developed moral agents. Lastly, I will try to show how the extended view of character friendship can work as an anti-luck shield against the vulnerability of the human character. (shrink)