: It is often argued that while Kant grounds practical freedom in the idea of transcendental or absolute freedom in the Dialectic of the First Critique, he would have explicitly dissociated these concepts in the Canon. For, in contradiction with the Dialectic, Kant claims in the Canon that through experience we know practical freedom to be one of the natural causes and that the transcendental freedom could be left aside as irrelevant. These claims are usually interpreted in the light of (...) the socalled “patchwork theory” as evidence of an inconsistency between the two sections of the First Critique and of a defense of a mere comparative, compatibilistic or even psychological concept of freedom by Kant in the Canon. In contradistinction to this widespread interpretation, I intend to provide an alternative interpretation of the Canon by showing that the concept of practical freedom contained in it is a genuinely incompatibilistic one and that this section can be reconciled with the Dialectic. Moreover, I intend to show that Henry Allison’s allegedly alternative interpretation is entirely misguided. (shrink)

QUALITY AND QUANTITY are fairly generally regarded as complementary terms, although the profound reason for their comple- mentarism is often far from being understood, this reason lying in the 'polar' correspondence referred to toward ...

An incidental extension of the central domain of argumentation theory with non-classical ways of constructing arguments seems to automatically raise a question that is otherwise rarely posed, namely whether or not it is useful to consider the sex of the arguer. This question is usually posed with regard to argumentation by women in particular. Do women rely more, or differently than men do on non-canonical modes of reasoning stemming from the realm of the emotional, physical and intuitive, instead (...) of the logical? One may simply refer this question to folk-linguistics. One may also take the question seriously, given the findings on women's linguistic behaviour, and for various other reasons that will be explained below.Section 1 sums up the most frequently quoted differences in language use between women and men. This is followed by a non-exhaustive, interdisciplinary review of studies on male/female differences in verbal and written argumentation.Section 2 discusses the role of language and texts in generating and maintaining ideas on gender. These gender messages not only influence the actual argumentation behaviour of women and men, but also the way such behaviour is valued.Section 3 subsequently shows that our ideas on rationality are gendered, and therefore also our ideas on the proper central domain of argumentation theory.Section 4 briefly reflects on why this kind of wrong question about the reasoning of women should sometimes be addressed seriously anyway. (shrink)

The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current form by (...) the no-supervenience theorem, except for Chalmers' theory, which I show requires humans to behave irrationally. (shrink)

Although the computational properties of the Region Connection Calculus RCC-8 are well studied, reasoning with RCC-8 entails several representational problems. This includes the problem of representing arbitrary spatial regions in a computational framework, leading to the problem of generating a realization of a consistent set of RCC-8 constraints. A further problem is that RCC-8 performs reasoning about topological space, which does not have a particular dimension. Most applications of spatial reasoning, however, deal with two- or three-dimensional space. (...) Therefore, a consistent set of RCC-8 constraints might not be realizable within the desired dimension. In this paper we address these problems and develop a canonical model of RCC-8 which allows a simple representation of regions with respect to a set of RCC-8 constraints, and, further, enables us to generate realizations in any dimension d = 1. For three-and higher-dimensional space this can also be done for internally connected regions. (shrink)

This paper looks at the Kantian background in the development of the views on formal logic and contradiction in German Idealism. Assuming the post-Kantian view, I examine what Kant advanced and what he left unsettled, provoking thus the subsequent debate. I start by showing (§1) that already the pre-critical Kant questions the effectiveness of formal logic in philosophical discourse andclaims that the laws of identity and non-contradiction fall short of explaining change, opposition, and contradiction, all these being parts of reality. (...) Turning then to the first Critique, I discuss (§2) the introduction of transcendental logic as the (meta)logic of truth, consider how the tension between formal and transcendental logic is displayed in Kant’s exposition of the antinomy of pure reason (§3), and arrive at the conclusion (§4) that Kant, despite his criticism, and unlike the other great German Idealists, allows formal logic to dominate his exposition of transcendental logic. (shrink)

This paper connects the following four topics: a class of generalized graphs whose relations do not have fixed arities called hypergraphs, a family of non-normal modal logics rejecting the aggregative axiom, an epistemic framework fighting logical omniscience, and the classical group knowledge modality of ‘someone knows’. Through neighborhood frames as their meeting point, we show that, among many completeness results obtained in this paper, the limit of a family of weakly aggregative logics is both exactly the modal logic of hypergraphs (...) and also the epistemic logic of local reasoning with veracity and positive introspection, and upon adding a single combinatorial axiom, it is also the logic of ‘someone knows’ for a fixed finite number of positively introspective agents. At the core of all these completeness results is a new canonical neighborhood model construction for monotone modal logics that is capable of dealing with all these diverse cases. We also provide an axiomatization for the logic of all non-n-colorable hypergraphs based on a filtration argument that also shows the decidability of the logics of hypergraphs we study. (shrink)

This paper generalises an argument for probabilism due to Lindley [9]. I extend the argument to a number of non-classical logical settings whose truth-values, seen here as ideal aims for belief, are in the set $\{0,1\}$, and where logical consequence $\models $ is given the “no-drop” characterization. First I will show that, in each of these settings, an agent’s credence can only avoid accuracy-domination if its canonical transform is a (possibly non-classical) probability function. In other words, if an agent (...) values accuracy as the fundamental epistemic virtue, it is a necessary requirement for rationality that her credence have some probabilistic structure. Then I show that for a certain class of reasonable measures of inaccuracy, having such a probabilistic structure is sufficient to avoid accuracy-domination in these non-classical settings. (shrink)

I argue that the scope of rational framing effects may be broader than Bermúdez assumes. Even in many “canonical experiments,” the explanation of the judgment reversals or shifts may refer to reasons, including moral ones. Referring to the Asian disease paradigm (ADP), I describe how non-consequentialist reasons related to fairness and the distinction between doing and allowing may help explain and justify the typical pattern of choices in the cases like ADP.

I first put the notion of non–expansive character education in context by locating its place within recent trends in values education and, in particular, by distinguishing it from more expansive accounts such as civic education and critical postmodernism. I argue that the essential characteristics of non–expansive character education are, on the one hand, moral cosmopolitanism and, on the other, methodological substantivism. In the second part of the essay, I defend this sort of character education against various common criticisms, with special (...) reference to two canonical works of the movement, by Lickona and Kilpatrick. Non–expansive character education stands out, in the end, as a reasonable middle–ground proposal with neither too little nor too much meat on its bones. (shrink)

I first put the notion of non–expansive character education in context by locating its place within recent trends in values education and, in particular, by distinguishing it from more expansive accounts such as civic education and critical postmodernism. I argue that the essential characteristics of non–expansive character education are, on the one hand, moral cosmopolitanism and, on the other, methodological substantivism. In the second part of the essay, I defend this sort of character education against various common criticisms, with special (...) reference to two canonical works of the movement, by Lickona and Kilpatrick. Non–expansive character education stands out, in the end, as a reasonable middle–ground proposal with neither too little nor too much meat on its bones. (shrink)

This paper considers how Kierkegaard self-reflexively portrays the tension between the boundary limit of discursive reason and mythic imagination in his classic analysis of Abrahamic faith. Following some reflections on the nature and philosophical implications of that tension, I examine its salient delineation in the Prelude of Fear and Trembling. Through four non-canonical renderings of the biblical Aqedah myth featured in the Prelude, Kierkegaard depicts the limits of ethical reasoning in the drama of Johannes de Silentio’s struggle to (...) figure-forth Abraham’s “movements” in ethically intelligible terms. I conclude that, as dramatized by Kierkegaard, the tension between mythemic figuration and discursively articulated critical reasoning sets in relief one of the formative aporiai of modern Western culture, namely the conflictive interplay of vision and discourse. (shrink)

This paper considers how Kierkegaard self-reflexively portrays the tension between the boundary limit of discursive reason and mythic imagination in his classic analysis of Abrahamic faith. Following some reflections on the nature and philosophical implications of that tension, I examine its salient delineation in the Prelude of Fear and Trembling. Through four non-canonical renderings of the biblical Aqedah myth featured in the Prelude, Kierkegaard depicts the limits of ethical reasoning in the drama of Johannes de Silentio’s struggle to (...) figure-forth Abraham’s “movements” in ethically intelligible terms. I conclude that, as dramatized by Kierkegaard, the tension between mythemic figuration and discursively articulated critical reasoning sets in relief one of the formative aporiai of modern Western culture, namely the conflictive interplay of vision and discourse. (shrink)

Mathematics and logic are indispensable in science, yet how they are deployed and why they are so effective, especially in the natural sciences, is poorly understood. In this paper, I focus on the how by analysing Jean Piaget’s application of mathematics to the empirical content of psychological experiment; however, I do not lose sight of the application’s wider implications on the why. In a case study, I set out how Piaget drew on the stock of mathematical structures to model psychological (...) content, namely, the operations of thought involved in reasoning. In particular, I show how operations of thought form structured wholes that initially resisted modelling by either lattices or groups but could be modelled adequately by modifications of these mathematical structures. Piaget coined the term ‘grouping’ for the modified structure, and I conclude that it represents a non-canonical application of mathematics to the empirical content of experimental psychology. I also touch on the role external factors played in Piaget’s development of the grouping. According to the genetic epistemology conceived by Piaget, the origin of intelligence lies in the biological organism and develops in stages over time, and, via the grouping, Piaget established a genetic relationship between two stages of reasoning. I show how this relationship explains why mathematics and logic fit the psychological content of reasoning whilst simultaneously making their successful deployment in the natural sciences more mysterious. Finally, I turn to the explanation Piaget envisaged for the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences and consider some consequences for naturalism and Pythagoreanism. (shrink)

Bivalent chromatin with active H3K4me3 and repressive H3K27me3 was initially identified in embryonic stem cells (ESCs) to poise expression of developmental genes upon lineage commitment. Since then, many more different bivalent modifications have been demonstrated in both ESCs and fully differentiated cells. Bivalency not only spatiotemporally controls gene transcription but also acts to fine‐tune the level of transcription during development. Although increasing number of studies demonstrated the functional significance of bivalent chromatin, the molecular connection of bivalent chromatin and transcriptional regulation (...) remains largely elusive. Recently, we showed Spindlin1/C11orf84 complex prefers to recognize the non‐canonical histone H3K4me3K9me3 bivalent mark, which is required for timely ribosomal RNA transcription. Here, we hypothesize the recognition of K4me3 and K9me3 at the same histone tail by Spindlin1/C11orf84 complex may serve as a general mechanism of conversion from a repressed to an active chromatin structure for transcriptional activation. (shrink)

This paper will contend that we, in the first quarter of the 21st century, need an enhanced Age of Reason based on global epistemology. One reason to legitimize such a call for more intellectual enlightenment is the lack of required information on non-European philosophy in today’s reading lists at European and North American universities. Hence, the present-day Academy contributes to the scarcity of knowledge about the world’s global history of ideas outside one’s ethnocentric sphere. The question is whether we genuinely (...) want to rethink parts of the “Colonial Canon” and its main narratives of the past. This article argues that we, if we truly desire, might create “a better Enlightenment.” Firstly, by raising the general knowledge level concerning the philosophies of the Global South. Thus, this text includes examples from the global enlightenments in China, Mughal India, Arabic-writing countries, and Indigenous North America—all preceding and influencing the European Enlightenment. Secondly, we can rebuild by rediscovering the Enlightenment ideals within the historiography of the “hidden enlightenment” of Europe’s and North America’s past. In Part I, of two parts of this paper, a comparative methodology will be outlined. In addition, examples will be given from the history of ideas in India and China to argue that we need to study how these regions influenced the European history of ideas in the 16th and 17th centuries. Finally, towards the end of this text, a re-reading of the contributions from Egypt and Greece aspires to give a more global and complex context for Western Europe’s so-called Age of Reason. (shrink)

Abstract. As a general theory of reasoning—and as a general theory of what holds true under every possible circumstance—logic is supposed to be ontologically neutral. It ought to have nothing to do with questions concerning what there is, or whether there is anything at all. It is for this reason that traditional Aristotelian logic, with its tacit existential presuppositions, was eventually deemed inadequate as a canon of pure logic. And it is for this reason that modern quantification theory, too, (...) with its residue of existentially loaded theorems and patterns of inference, has been claimed to suffer from a defect of logical purity. The law of non-contradiction rules out certain circumstances as impossible—circumstances in which a statement is both true and false, or perhaps circumstances where something both is and is not the case. Is this to be regarded as a further ontological bias? (shrink)

Syllogism is a type of everyday reasoning. For instance, given that ‘Avicenna wrote the famous book the Canon of Medicine’ and ‘The Canon of Medicine has influenced modern medicine,’ it can be conc...

Every artificial-intelligence research project needs a working definition of "intelligence", on which the deepest goals and assumptions of the research are based. In the project described in the following chapters, "intelligence" is defined as the capacity to adapt under insufficient knowledge and resources. Concretely, an intelligent system should be finite and open, and should work in real time. ;If these criteria are used in the design of a reasoning system, the result is NARS, a non-axiomatic reasoning system. ;NARS (...) uses a term-oriented formal language, characterized by the use of subject-predicate sentences. The language has an experience-grounded semantics, according to which the truth value of a judgment is determined by previous experience, and the meaning of a term is determined by its relations with other terms. Several different types of uncertainty, such as randomness, fuzziness, and ignorance, can be represented in the language in a single way. ;The inference rules of NARS are based on three inheritance relations between terms. With different combinations of premises, revision, deduction, induction, abduction, exemplification, comparison, and analogy can all be carried out in a uniform format, the major difference between these types of inference being that different functions are used to calculate the truth value of the conclusion from the truth values of the premises. ;Since it has insufficient space-time resources, the system needs to distribute them among its tasks very carefully, and to dynamically adjust the distribution as the situation changes. This leads to a "controlled concurrency" control mechanism, and a "bag-based" memory organization. ;A recent implementation of the NARS model, with examples, is discussed. The system has many interesting properties that are shared by human cognition, but are absent from conventional computational models of reasoning. ;This research sheds light on several notions in artificial intelligence and cognitive science, including symbol-grounding, induction, categorization, logic, and computation. These are discussed to show the implications of the new theory of intelligence. ;Finally, the major results of the research are summarized, a preliminary evaluation of the working definition of intelligence is given, and the limitations and future extensions of the research are discussed. (shrink)

In case-marking languages with nominative-accusative alignment the subject of a sentence is usually marked by nominative case. In some of these languages, however, the subject of a number of verbs is either consistently or alternately marked by another, non-nominative case. Such non-canonical case marking has often been approached in the linguistic literature as a phenomenon at the interface between syntax and semantics. Yet the predictions of this kind of approach seem more probabilistic than regular. This paper offers a new (...) perspective to analyse the phenomenon, which encompasses the role of information structure in case marking. Drawing on Silverstein’s theory of differential subject marking and Dalrymple & Nikolaeva’s approach to differential object marking, it is argued that non-canonically case-marked subjects can be better analysed as instances of either non-topical subjects or subjects lacking one or more semantic features typical of topicality. The approach outlined in the paper is tested on a number of constructions in Russian and Lithuanian. It is shown how, in both languages, the analysed instances of non-canonically case-marked subjects exhibit a complex interplay among grammatical, semantic and discourse-pragmatic factors. (shrink)

Taurek cases focus a choice between two views of permissible action, Can Save One and Must Save Many . It is argued that Taurek cases do illustrate the rationale for Can Save One , but existing views do not highlight the fact that this is because they are examples of claims grounded on non-comparative justice. To act to save the many solely because they form a group is to discriminate against the one for an irrelevant reason. That is a (...) class='Hi'>canonical form of non-comparative injustice. The error lies in taking a contingency of some presentations of some Taurek cases, namely, that they involve distribution, to introduce the claims of comparative as opposed to non-comparative justice. But cases of non-comparative justice can, contingently, also involve distribution. In order to settle which form of justice applies it is necessary to examine the nature of the distribution involved and the nature of “classes” to which individuals can be assigned. (shrink)

Kōūhala’s Līlāvaī, a romance in Prakrit verse from around 800 CE, has two types of constructions that present “syntactical difficulties” : the use of mhi in the meaning of maē, and the use of amhēhi and tumhēhi in the meanings of amhē and tumhē. This article reviews the phenomena and puts them into the context of expressions of agency in related Indic languages, arguing that Prakrit’s split ergativity is implicated in both cases. A further conclusion is that the particle hi (...) is all but absent from Kōūhala’s Prakrit. (shrink)

This article discusses the English construction variously known as Locative Inversion or Stylistic Inversion. It shows that the construction displays a unique ensemble of grammatical and usage properties that can be stated but not motivated through purely grammatical means. In search of an explanatory approach, an analysis is presented that draws on concepts of Artificial Intelligence, in particular plans viewed as complex mental attitudes. It is claimed that utterances of Locative Inversion are associated with a particular communicative plan on the (...) speaker's part that motivates the grammatical and usage properties of the construction where grammar alone cannot. The final section of the article presents corpus examples showing that Locative Inversion is indeed used in the contexts predicted by the plan associated with the construction. This result is both theoretically and methodologically significant, insofar as it constitutes a case where the grammatical properties of a syntactic construction are better explained through its typical conditions of use than through grammatical means proper. (shrink)

In the first part I argue that normic laws are the phenomenological laws of evolutionary systems. If this is true, then intuitive human reasoning should be fit in reasoning from normic laws. In the second part I show that system P is a tool for reasoning with normic laws which satisfies two important evolutionary standards: it is probabilistically reliable, and it has rules of low complexity. In the third part I finally report results of an experimental study (...) which demonstrate that intuitive human reasoning is in well accord with basic argument patterns of system P. (shrink)

The mind-body problem in philosophy is typically understood as a discourse concerning the relation of mental states to physical states, and the experience of sensation. On this level it seems to transcend issues of race and racism, but Another Mind-Body Problem demonstrates that racial distinctions have been an integral part of the discourse since the Modern period in philosophy. Reading figures such as Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant in their historical contexts, John Harfouch uncovers discussions of mind and body that engaged (...) closely with philosophical and scientific notions of race in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, in particular in understanding how the mind unites with the body at birth and is then passed on through sexual reproduction. Kant argued that a person’s exterior body and interior psyche are bound together, that non-White people lacked reason, and that this lack of reason was carried on through reproduction such that non-Whites were an example of a union of mind and body without full being. Charting the development of this phenomenon from sixteenth-century medical literature to modern-day race discourse, Harfouch argues for new understandings of Descartes’s mind-body problem, Fanon’s experience of being ‘not-yet human,’ and the place of racism in relation to one of philosophy’s most enduring and canonical problems. -/- “Harfouch has written an important book on the intersection of race and the Western construction of the mind-body problem … This book is a significant resource for theorists dealing with race and decolonization issues, but it is more significant for the critique of philosophy itself and the continued teaching of mind-body issues. Readers will need some knowledge of philosophy, but the volume is in general accessible. It should be required reading for scholars of philosophy. Harfouch establishes a logically strong argument and makes a unique contribution to the field.” — CHOICE. (shrink)

Platon zählt zu den einflussreichsten Philosophen aller Zeiten. Er beeinflusste maßgeblich Profil und Kanon der westlichen Philosophie. Die Kritik am sogenannten Platonismus wurde kontinuierlich von den Schwierigkeiten gespeist, die die Interpretation der philosophischen Schriften Platons bereitet. Gemeinhin wird er als rein rationaler Philosoph gesehen. Ein Philosoph war er in der Tat, ebenso jedoch ein Experte in der Annäherung an das Nicht-Rationale, unter anderem in Form von Mythen. So wurde er auch als "Mythenerfinder" und "Mythologe" bezeichnet. Platon war ein Visionär, der (...) es wagte, das Reich des Nicht-Rationalen auf systematische und disziplinierte Art zu erforschen. Insgesamt lässt sich Platons philosophisches Vorhaben als Streben nach einer umfassenden Sicht des organischen Ganzen klassifizieren. Der Ausdruck „Gestalt“ scheint die Ganzheit am ehesten zu beschreiben. Platon kann als prominentester und auch als letzter Repräsentant der antiken Philosophie angesehen werden, der die Entwicklung einer Gestalt-Philosophie anstrebte. Plato is one of the most influential philosophers of all time. He decisively shaped the profile and canon of western philosophy. Criticism of what has become known as Platonism has been continuously nourished by the difficulties of interpreting this philosopher's writings. Plato is commonly viewed as a purely rational philosopher. A philosopher he was indeed, but Plato was also an expert in approaching the non-rational, in the form of mythology among others. Plato has been called a "mythmaker" and a "mythologist". Plato was a visionary who dared to explore the realm of the non-rational in a systematic and disciplined way. In an overall comparison, Plato's philosophical enterprise strives for a comprehensive perspective on the organic whole. The expression "Gestalt" seems to come closest to describing the wholeness. Plato may be considered to be the most prominent representative of classical philosophy to develop a Gestalt philosophy and also the last to do so in antiquity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The major approaches to belief revision and non monotonic reasoning proposed in the literature differ along a number of dimensions, including whether they are “syntax- based” or “semantic-based”, “foundational” or “coherentist”, “consistence-restoring” or “inconsistency-tolerant”. Our contribution towards clarifying the connections between these various approaches is threefold: •We show that the two main approaches to belief revision, the foundations and coherence theories, are mathematically equivalent, thus answering a question left open in [Gar90, Doy92], The distinction between syntax-based approaches to (...) revision and approaches based on (semantic) preferential structures falls along similar lines, and their expressive equivalence is a consequence of this result. •We formally clarify the connection between belief revision and non monotonic reasoning, in a particularly simple way which also throws light on the connection between consistence- restoring and reasoning-from-inconsistency approaches [BDP95]. •As a direct application of the above, we show that Poole's (syntax-based) system of default reasoning and Shoham's preferential semantic for non monotonic reasoning are also expressively equivalent, in that they can represent the same set of non monotonic consequence relations. (shrink)

Leibniz is not commonly numbered amongst canonical writers on toleration. One obvious reason is that, unlike Locke, he wrote no treatise specifically devoted to that doctrine. Another is the enormous amount of energy which he famously devoted to ecclesiastical reunification. Promoting the reunification of Christian churches is an objective quite different from promoting the toleration of different religious faiths – so different, in fact, that they are sometimes even construed as mutually exclusive. Ecclesiastical reunification aims to find agreement at (...) least on the most important doctrines. Religious toleration involves accepting and respecting disagreement even on the most important doctrines. If one regards these two projects as alternative rather than complementary strategies for dealing with religious diversity, Leibniz might more readily be characterised as an ecumenist rather than a tolerationist. Such appears to be the conclusion, at any rate, implicit in the balance of critical literature on these topics: whereas a steady stream of studies has discussed Leibniz’s project of ecclesiastical reunification, only a meager trickle has been devoted to his views on toleration; and some of these studies go so far as to conclude that Leibniz had no doctrine of toleration at all. This paper will attempt to show, on the contrary, that a robust, many-layered, and unusually inclusive doctrine of toleration can be gleaned from Leibniz’s writings. This doctrine operated at least at three different levels: philosophical, theological, and pragmatic. As this implies, the doctrine of religious toleration, rather than being in collision with Leibniz’s core project of ecclesiastical reunification, was an essential element of that very project: it should be seen, in other words, not as a competing goal, but as a necessary first step toward ecclesiastical reunification. Yet at the same time it will also emerge that Leibniz’s doctrine of toleration was no mere function of this intra-Christian project of reunification: rather it was a still more fundamental principle which extended beyond the ecumenical project as well. It had the resources for accepting and respecting irreducible religious diversity and disagreement on points of importance not only between Christian communities, but also between Christians and non-Christians, including, in principle, even the atheists. These points will emerge from a discussion of statements on the philosophical, theological, and pragmatic justifications of religious toleration scattered throughout Leibniz’s sprawling corpus of writings. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The major approaches to belief revision and non monotonic reasoning proposed in the literature differ along a number of dimensions, including whether they are ?syntax- based? or ?semantic-based?, ?foundational? or ?coherentist?, ?consistence-restoring? or ?inconsistency-tolerant?. Our contribution towards clarifying the connections between these various approaches is threefold: ?We show that the two main approaches to belief revision, the foundations and coherence theories, are mathematically equivalent, thus answering a question left open in [Gar90, Doy92], The distinction between syntax-based approaches to (...) revision and approaches based on (semantic) preferential structures falls along similar lines, and their expressive equivalence is a consequence of this result. ?We formally clarify the connection between belief revision and non monotonic reasoning, in a particularly simple way which also throws light on the connection between consistence- restoring and reasoning-from-inconsistency approaches [BDP95]. ?As a direct application of the above, we show that Poole's (syntax-based) system of default reasoning and Shoham's preferential semantic for non monotonic reasoning are also expressively equivalent, in that they can represent the same set of non monotonic consequence relations. (shrink)

A variety of strategies have been used to oppose the influential Humean thesis that all of an agent’s reasons for action are provided by the agent’s current wants. Among these strategies is the attempt to show that it is a conceptual truth that reasons for action are non-relative. I introduce the notion of a basic reason- giving consideration and show that the non-relativity thesis can be understood as a corollary of the more fundamental thesis that basic reason-giving considerations are generalizable. (...) I then consider the relationship between the generalizability thesis and the Humean thesis that all of an agent’s reasons for action are provided by the agent’s current wants. I argue that, contrary to a common assumption, there is a subtle and clearly motivated version of the Humean thesis that does not deny, and so is not threatened by, the generalizability thesis. (shrink)

Some interesting cases of non-monotonic reasoning have already been identified in medieval theological texts. Jacob Archambault proved in 2015 that the argumentation presented by St Anselm of Canterbury in his Proslogion has non-monotonic “embeddings”. My own contribution from 2011 indicated that we can argue that a non-monotonic logic underlies some discussions provided by St Thomas Aquinas in his Summa theologiae, and showed that Boethius of Dacia used non-monotonic reasoning in his De aeternitate mundi. In this article, I would (...) like to briefly present these examples and verify whether we can speak about similar cases in medieval Biblical exegesis. My aim is to outline particular problems connected with the identification of non- monotonicity which are specific to theology, as well as assumptions that should be adopted to successfully discuss this issue. (shrink)

We have a reason to pursue good patterns of reasoning in the determination of the means to the satisfaction of our desires. To deny this, it seems, would be to turn our backs on rationality. Furthermore, we would agree that we all have the same reason to do so. Is this reason internal or external? If external reasons are incoherent, as Bernard Williams claims, what choice do we have but to assume that it is internal? ;If we assume that (...) it is internal, however, we run into difficulties. How does the internalist explain the fact that all individuals have the same reason to pursue good patterns of reasoning? She could argue as Williams does, and claim that every rational deliberator, by virtue of being a rational deliberator, has a desire to be rationally and factually correctly informed. If she is right, all rational deliberators have an internal reason to strive towards soundness and completeness. I show that this argument fails. There are other arguments available to the internalist. I argue, however, that they all result in the necessity of acknowledging a third class of reasons, non-contingent reasons. ;Non-contingent reasons are a bit like external reasons and a bit like internal reasons. On the one hand, they resemble external reasons, for they recommend actions independently of the particular desires that we happen to have. On the other hand, however, non-contingent reasons resemble internal reasons, for neither non-contingent reasons nor internal reasons recommend actions independently of the efficacy of those actions to satisfy our desires. Even so, non-contingent reasons are very different from internal reasons. Internal reason statements ten us what we ought to do in order to satisfy a particular desire; their truth therefore depends upon the content of an individual's desires. Non-contingent reasons ten us what we ought to do in order to be a reliable and efficient desire satisfier; their truth depends upon whether the recommended action is a means to the satisfaction of all of our desires. (shrink)

The essays that make up my dissertation share a methodological approach that aims to explore the philosophical implications of linguists' accounts of ordinary language use. In particular, all of them focus on epistemic natural language and the implications that linguists' accounts of such language has for epistemology. The first essay focuses on the debate about the norms that govern assertion and shows the ways in which research on natural language evidentiality has direct bearing. This essay uses existing cross-linguistic data about (...) assertions in Quechua and Cheyenne to argue that assertions and the norms that govern them are more complex than allowed for in extant views. What makes Quechua and Cheyenne important is that they allow speakers to assert sentences the content of which they do not believe, or even believe to be false, as long as the sentence contains the right evidential marker. This is a problem for the current theories as they all take belief in the proposition being expressed as a minimal requirement for a speaker to felicitously assert. Given the data, I argue that we should see evidential markers as modifying the norm that is in place governing felicity of the current content. I go on to present three implementations of a context-sensitive norm and argue that only the ones that are evidence-based or completely contextual can properly capture the entire set of linguistic data. In the second essay I argue that epistemic uses of 'should' can be modelling using the standard Kratzerian modal canon. In Kratzer's system, modals induce quantification over some partially ordered, restricted class of worlds. The relevant partially ordered, restricted class of worlds is generally fixed by two ingredients: a modal base and an ordering source. Modelling epistemic uses of 'should' requires us to rethink and expand what has traditionally been thought of as making up an epistemic modal base. Traditionally it has been thought that epistemic modal bases just include information about probabilities but this thought needs to be updated in order to bring epistemic 'should' into the fold. I argue that there are good theoretical reasons for having as uniform a semantics as possible then show that the context-sensitive semantic model that I develop meets all empirical demands. I end the essay by arguing that this updated way of thinking about epistemic modals bases has implications for epistemology. The final essay outlines the broad type of methodological approach mentioned above that guides the research throughout the dissertation. In it, I argue that the results of linguistics' theorizing about semantics, especially within the epistemic domain, ought to be seen as an accurate guide to reality. Looking to the way that language evolves over time and what it takes for information to become encoded into language is what drives this result. Buttressing the evolutionary explanation with results from the Condorcet Jury Theorem gives us more reason to believe that language is an accurate, albeit defeasible, guide to reality. If these results hold, they not only have broad implications for how we ought to be conducting our epistemological theorizing but our philosophical theorizing in general. (shrink)

Sometimes a belief that p promotes having true beliefs, whether or not p is true. This gives reasons to believe that p, but most epistemologists would deny that it gives epistemic reasons, or that these reasons can epistemically justify the belief that p. Call these reasons to believe “truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief.” This paper argues that three common views in epistemology, taken together, entail that reasons of this sort can epistemically justify beliefs. These three claims are: epistemic oughts (...) are normative, epistemic oughts have a source, and the source of epistemic oughts is an end that has true belief as a necessary component. These claims would be hard for many epistemologists to deny, but accepting them, and thus accepting that truth promoting non-evidential reasons can justify beliefs, has significant consequences for epistemology. The paper considers accounts of epistemic oughts that endorse these claims but might seem to avoid the consequence that truth promoting non-evidential reasons generate real epistemic oughts, and shows that none do. (shrink)

This paper draws a correlation between processes of research and drawing by analyzing the formation of emotional content and stylistic representation in art. The paper suggests that research process fundamentally involves a systematic development of understanding on a particular issue through a process of rational inquiry. The research outcome or an intellectual understanding is therefore nothing more than a thoroughly investigated form of a hypothesis/ premise/ theory/ idea that has undergone a careful process of scrutiny, comparison and evaluation. On similar (...) grounds, drawing process also involves a systematic development of form in which adjustments are made with the help of nonverbal reasoning till the final form is evolved. The development of form in drawing becomes a systematic rational process but operates at a subconscious plane; reason is substituted by aesthetic sensibility. It is suggested that aesthetic sensibility is a judgment that the human mind tailors through the use of non-verbal criteria of evaluating the beautiful and ugly. The paper develops a theoretical model in the light of above and then applies it to analyze various drawing conventions used by Sadequain in figurative treatment. (shrink)

Wnt glycoproteins are signaling molecules that control a wide range of developmental processes in organisms ranging from the simple metazoan Hydra to vertebrates. Wnt signaling also plays a key role in the development of the nematode C. elegans, and is involved in cell fate specification and determination of cell polarity and cell migration. Surprisingly, the first genetic studies of Wnt signaling in C. elegans revealed major differences with the established (canonical) Wnt signaling pathways of Drosophila and vertebrates. Thus, the (...) Wnt-dependent induction of endoderm in the early embryo and the specification of several asymmetric cell divisions during larval development are mediated by as yet novel Wnt signaling pathways that repress, rather than activate the TCF/LEF-1 transcription factor POP-1. Recently, however, it has been shown that, in addition to these divergent Wnt pathways, C. elegans also has a canonical Wnt pathway that converts POP-1 into an activator and controls the expression of several homeobox genes. Interestingly, these different Wnt pathways use distinct beta-catenins to control POP-1 function: the endoderm induction pathway requires the beta-catenin WRM-1 and parallel input from a mitogen-activated kinase (MAPK) pathway to downregulate POP-1, whereas the canonical Wnt pathway employs the beta-catenin BAR-1 to activate Wnt target gene expression. (shrink)

Hedgehog (Hh) signaling is a widely studied signaling pathway because of its critical roles during development and in cell homeostasis. Vertebrate canonical and non‐canonical Hh signaling are typically assumed to be distinct and occur in different cellular compartments. While research has primarily focused on the canonical form of Hh signaling and its dependency on primary cilia – microtubule‐based signaling hubs – an extensive list of crucial functions mediated by non‐canonical Hh signaling has emerged. Moreover, amounting evidence (...) indicates that canonical and non‐canonical modes of Hh signaling are interlinked, and that they can overlap spatially, and in many cases interact functionally. Here, we discuss some of the many cellular effects of non‐canonical signaling and discuss new evidence indicating inter‐relationships with canonical signaling. We discuss how Smoothened (Smo), a key component of the Hh pathway, might coordinate such diverse downstream effects. Collectively, pursuit of questions such as those proposed here will aid in elucidating the full extent of Smo function in development and advance its use as a target for cancer therapeutics. (shrink)

Are non-natural properties worth caring about? I consider two objections to metaethical non-naturalism. According to the intelligibility objection, it would be positively unintelligible to care about non-natural properties that float free from the causal fabric of the cosmos. According to the ethical idlers objection, there is no compelling motivation to posit non-natural normative properties because the natural properties suffice to provide us with reasons. In both cases, I argue, the objection stems from misunderstanding the role that non-natural properties play in (...) the non-naturalist's understanding of normativity. The role of non-natural properties is not to be responded to, but to "mark" which natural properties it is correct for us to respond to in certain ways. (shrink)

Rho GTPases are critically important and are centrally positioned regulators of the actomyosin cytoskeleton. By influencing the organization and architecture of the cytoskeleton, Rho proteins play prominent roles in many cellular processes including adhesion, migration, intra‐cellular transportation, and proliferation. The most important method of Rho GTPase regulation is via the GTPase cycle; however, post‐translational modifications (PTMs) also play critical roles in Rho protein regulation. Relative to other PTMs such as lipidation or phosphorylation that have been extensively characterized, protein oxidation is (...) a regulatory PTM that has been poorly studied. Protein oxidation primarily occurs from the reaction of reactive oxygen species (ROS), such as hydrogen peroxide (H2O2), with amino acid side chain thiols on cysteine (Cys) and methionine (Met) residues. The versatile redox modifications of cysteine residues exemplify their integral role in cell signalling processes. Here we review prominent members of the Rho GTPase family and discuss how lipidation, phosphorylation, and oxidation on conserved cysteine residues affects their regulation and function. (shrink)