The different sorts of virtuous people who display various virtues to a remarkable degree have brought the issue of individualisation of moral character to the forefront. It signals a more personal dimension of character development which is notoriously ignored in the current discourse on character education. The case is made that since in practice, the individualisation of moral character must, by necessity, advance side by side with the cultivation of virtues, a full account of character education needs to give consideration (...) to both concerns. After analysing the specific ways which temperament, social roles, and occupations respectively contribute to the individualisation of moral character, some practical implications are drawn to shed new light on the common practice of the inculcation of virtues. Firstly, since the varieties of moral personality is the norm, it is appropriate to encourage the educated to become virtuous people of different sorts. Secondly, given the influence that temperament may exert on virtue, having good knowledge of each child’s temperament, identifying the specific difficulties possibly confronting him/her accordingly, and then providing more opportunities to strengthen the cultivation of the related virtues are crucial. Thirdly, since children with different temperaments are inclined to identify with different sorts of moral exemplars, it is valuable to present them a great variety of moral models, from which they can choose the kind of virtuous people they would want to emulate. Lastly, since assuming different occupations and social roles is liable to result in various moral characters, character formation cannot be confined to the family or school. Among others, workplaces and communities are also important variables. (shrink)

Educational undertakings are subject to disjunctures at three separate stages: in the creation of curricular programmes, in the implementation of these curricula in practice and in their effects on students. These disjunctures are the result of complex ‘leaps’ between ends and means, and between ideal and real. This article proposes a response in the form of ‘seamless enactment’, applied here to citizenship education. Seamless enactment involves, first, the harmonisation of the principles underlying the different stages in the passage of the (...) curriculum, avoiding problematic tensions between, for example, democratic aims and undemocratic teaching practices. Second, it requires the involvement of teachers and students in the design and development of the educational initiative, as well as in its implementation. Taken to its fullest extent, seamless enactment involves a unification of the separate stages, leading to the collapsing of the curricular transposition framework onto a single point. Finally, some possible justifications for and potential objections to the notion are considered. (shrink)

Educational undertakings are subject to disjunctures at three separate stages: in the creation of curricular programmes, in the implementation of these curricula in practice and in their effects on students. These disjunctures are the result of complex ‘leaps’ between ends and means, and between ideal and real. This article proposes a response in the form of ‘seamless enactment’, applied here to citizenship education. Seamless enactment involves, first, the harmonisation of the principles underlying the different stages in the passage of the (...) curriculum, avoiding problematic tensions between, for example, democratic aims and undemocratic teaching practices. Second, it requires the involvement of teachers and students in the design and development of the educational initiative, as well as in its implementation. Taken to its fullest extent, seamless enactment involves a unification of the separate stages, leading to the collapsing of the curricular transposition framework onto a single point. Finally, some possible justifications for and potential objections to the notion are considered. (shrink)

A recent trend in moral education, social and emotional learning, incorporates the mantra of emotional intelligence as a key element in an extensive program of character building. In making his famous claim that the good life would have to include appropriate emotions, Aristotle obviously considered the schooling of emotions to be an indispensable part of moral education. However, in this essay Kristján Kristjánsson casts doubt on the assumption that Aristotelians should approve of the clarion call for EI, as understood by (...) Daniel Goleman and the proponents of social and emotional learning, in the classroom. Various marked differences between EI and Aristotelian emotional virtue are highlighted and explored. Kristjánsson argues that the claims of EI lack moral ballast and that when this fact is added to an existing heap of educational problems attached to the implementation of EI programs, educators had better rethink their reliance on EI as a model of emotion cultivation, and perhaps revert to the teachings of Aristotle himself. (shrink)

This paper begins by rehearsing some commonly heard conservative and radical objections to the idea of citizenship education. I then explore another potentially radical objection, implicit in the tenets of ‘character education’ and ‘socio-emotional learning’ but rarely stated explicitly. According to this objection, citizenship education, with its overarching ideal of democratic justice, politicises values education beyond good reason by assuming that political literacy and specific (democratic) social skills, rather than transcultural moral and emotional ‘basics’, are the primary values to be (...) transmitted. I show how this objection is based on three major disagreements about (a) the good and the right, (b) pluralism and (c) the connection between morality and politics. (shrink)

This paper begins by rehearsing some commonly heard conservative and radical objections to the idea of citizenship education. I then explore another potentially radical objection, implicit in the tenets of ‘character education’ and ‘socio-emotional learning’ but rarely stated explicitly. According to this objection, citizenship education, with its overarching ideal of democratic justice, politicises values education beyond good reason by assuming that political literacy and specific (democratic) social skills, rather than transcultural moral and emotional ‘basics’, are the primary values to be (...) transmitted. I show how this objection is based on three major disagreements about (a) the good and the right, (b) pluralism and (c) the connection between morality and politics. (shrink)