What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate question or as an ultimate question. The question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to contribute to a fruitful (...) articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human morality. We develop an approach to morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions. In this environment, the best strategy is to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation equally. Those who offer less than others will be left out of cooperation; conversely, those who offer more will be exploited by their partners. In line with this mutualistic approach, the study of a range of economic games involving property rights, collective actions, mutual help and punishment shows that participants' distributions aim at sharing the costs and benefits of interactions in an impartial way. In particular, the distribution of resources is influenced by effort and talent, and the perception of each participant's rights on the resources to be distributed. (shrink)

While examples of bacteria benefiting eukaryotes are increasingly documented, studies examining effects of eukaryote hosts on microbial fitness are rare. Beneficial bacteria are often called “mutualistic” even if mutual reciprocity of benefits has not been demonstrated and despite the plausibility of other explanations for these microbes' beneficial effects on host fitness. Furthermore, beneficial bacteria often occur in diverse communities, making mutualism both empirically and conceptually difficult to demonstrate. We suggest reserving the terms “mutualism” and “parasitism” for pairwise interactions (...) where the relationship is largely independent of other species and can be verified by measuring the fitness effect experienced by both partners. In hosts with diverse microbial communities, we propose re‐formulating some of the essential questions of symbiosis research – e.g. concerning specificity, transmission mode, and common evolutionary fates – as questions of community ecology and ecosystem function, allowing important biological interactions to be investigated without making assumptions about reciprocity. Understanding the fitness of host‐associated bacteria is a crucial component of investigations into the role of microbes in eukaryote evolution. (shrink)

Though viruses have generally been characterized by their pathogenic and more generally harmful effects, many examples of mutualistic viruses exist. Here I explain how the idea of mutualistic viruses has been defended in recent virology, and I explore four important conceptual and practical consequences of this idea. I ask to what extent this research modifies the way scientists might search for new viruses, our notion of how the host immune system interacts with microbes, the development of new therapeutic approaches, and, (...) finally, the role played by the criterion of autonomy in our understanding of living things. Overall, I suggest that the recognition of mutualistic viruses plays a major role in a wider ongoing revision of our conception of viruses. (shrink)

We discuss the cities of the future, and how they might co-habit with the biosphere in a more mutually beneficial way. Mutualistic cities would blend with their local ecology, co-existing with the immediately available resources of water, life, energy and materials, and enhancing the biosphere so that many species can thrive, including people. Such cities can make a significant contribution to stabilizing the Earth System by sustaining and nurturing life in tune with the evolving local ecology through cyclic economies and (...) values prioritizing mutually supportive communities over economic growth. The term “mutualism” comes from biology, referring to inter-species relationships that are beneficial. Mutualistic cities would benefit human and non-human inhabitants by recycling materials, clean air, and water, and providing habitats for many species. (shrink)

Although mutually advantageous cooperative strategies might be an apt account of some societies, other moral systems might be needed among certain groups and contexts. In particular, in a duty-based moral system, people do not behave morally with an expectation for proportional reward, but rather, as a fulfillment of debt owed to others. In such systems, mutualistic motivations are not necessarily a key component of morality.

Baumard et al. attribute morality to a naturally selected propensity to share costs and benefits of cooperation fairly. But how does mundane mutualism relate to transcendent notions of morality critical to creating cultures and civilizations? Humans often make their greatest exertions for an idea they form of their group. Primary social identity is bounded by sacred values, which drive individuals to promote their group through non-rational commitment to actions independently of likely risks and rewards.

An individual obtains an unfair benefit and faces the dilemma of either hiding it (to avoid being excluded from future interactions) or disclosing it (to avoid being discovered as a deceiver). In line with the target article, we expect that this dilemma will be solved by a fixed individual strategy rather than a case-by-case rational calculation.

Baumard et al. mischaracterize our model of individual and social choice behavior. We model individuals who maximize preferences given their beliefs, and subject to their informational and material constraints (Fehr & Gintis 2007). Individuals thus must make trade-offs among self-regarding, other-regarding, and character virtue goals. Two genetic predispositions are particularly crucial. The first is strong reciprocity. The second is the capacity to internalize norms through the socialization process. Our model includes the authors' model as a subset.

The target article convincingly argues that mutualistic cooperation is supported by partner choice. However, we will suggest that mutualistic cooperation is not the basis of fairness; instead, fairness is based on impartiality. In support of this view, we show that adults are willing to destroy others' resources to avoid inequality, a result predicted by impartiality but not by mutualistic cooperation.

The species comprising the fungal endophyte genus “Epichloë ”are symbionts of cool season grasses. About half the species in this genus are strictly vertically transmitted, and evolutionary theory suggests that these species must be mutualists. Nevertheless, Faeth and Sullivan (e.g., 2003) have argued that such vertically transmitted endophytes are ’usually parasitic,’ and Müller and Krauss (2005) have argued that such vertically transmitted endophytes fall along a mutualism-parasitism continuum. These papers (and others) have caused confusion in the field. We used (...) a systematic review to show that close to half of the published papers in this field incorrectly categorize the interaction. Here, we develop the argument that advantages and disadvantages are not the same things as mutualism and parasitism and that experimental evidence must be interpreted in the context of theory. We argue that, “contra ”Faeth and Sullivan, it is highly unlikely that such strictly vertically transmitted endophytes can be parasites, and that, “contra ”Müller and Krauss, it is inappropriate to apply the continuum concept to strictly vertically transmitted endophytes. We develop a mathematical model to support and illustrate our arguments. We use the model to clarify that parasitism “requires ”some degree of horizontal transmission, and that while it is appropriate to use the continuum concept when referring to the genus as a whole, or to species that possess horizontal transmission, we argue that it is inappropriate to use the concept when referring to species that are strictly vertically transmitted. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article, I will identify two key normative principles at the core of Robert L. Simon’s mutualist theory of sport, namely, the respect-for-the-opponent principle and the idea that sport is a practice aimed at pursuing excellence. The former is a Kantian principle grounded in human beings’ rationality, and the latter is an Aristotelian principle related to the development of excellences as a means to human flourishing. After having presented and analyzed both principles, I will critically evaluate Simon’s attempt to (...) combine them within his mutualist approach. To conclude, I will highlight the challenges that mutualism should face to complete such a combination more successfully.Abbreviation: Categorical imperative. (shrink)

The article considers several working anarchies in the networked environment, and whether they offer a model for improving on the persistent imperfections of markets and states. I explore whether these efforts of peer mutualism in fact offer a sufficient range of capabilities to present a meaningful degree of freedom to those who rely on the capabilities it affords, and whether these practices in fact remain sufficiently nonhierarchical to offer a meaningful space of noncoercive interactions. The real utopias I observe (...) here are perfect on neither dimension. Internally, hierarchy and power reappear, to some extent and in some projects, although they are quite different than the hierarchy of government or corporate organization. Externally, there are some spectacular successes, some failures to thrive, and many ambiguous successes. In all, present experience supports neither triumphalism nor defeatism in the utopian project. Peer models do work, and they do provide a degree of freedom in the capabilities they provide. But there is no inexorable path to greater freedom through voluntary open collaboration. There is a good deal of uncertainty and muddling through. The last part of the article suggests a theory of freedom that supports the significance of even these obviously imperfect peer systems with incomplete coverage of necessary human capabilities, and explains why expanding the domain of mutualism improves freedom and well-being under conditions of persistent market imperfection and an inevitably fallible state. Peer mutualism doesn’t have to be perfect; it merely needs to offer a new dimension or sufficient diversity in how it instantiates capabilities and transmits power to offer us, who inhabit the systems that these peer systems perturb, a degree of freedom. (shrink)

This article develops a novel theory of sport that I call ‘Confucian mutualism’. Confucian mutualism is underpinned by the Confucian Golden Rule and the Confucian conception of human dignity. It resembles the mutualist theory of sport developed by Robert L. Simon in maintaining that sport participants ethically ought to prioritize promoting sporting excellence both in themselves and in their co-participants. However, while Simon’s mutualism maintains that sporting excellence consists in proficiency at sport constitutive skills, Confucian mutualism (...) maintains that sporting excellence consists in success at achieving the Confucian virtues through sport participation. I provide a preliminary case for why Confucian mutualism’s virtue-centric conception of sporting excellence makes it better able than Simon’s mutualism to explain why sporting excellence is stance-independently ethically significant for all sport participants. I do so by trying to show that we have prima facie justification for believing that Confucian mutualism is not vulnerable to certain kinds of criticisms that have been leveled at Simon’s mutualism. (shrink)

While a number of jurisdictions internationally prohibit insuring companies to be able to use genetic information in their risk classification, a voluntary code of practice permits insurers the limited use of predictive genetic test results in the UK. Jonathan Pugh1 offers a pluralist justice-based argument in support of the UK practice. Pugh’s position is developed to avoid what he sees as flaws with the current debate on insurers’ access to genetic information, including an alleged reliance on idealised assumptions about the (...) predictive power of genetic test results, revisionary implications for the provision of insurance suggested in the debate and failings of commentators to engage adequately with a conception of justice that undergirds the status quo approach in the UK. Pugh suggests that a quasi-libertarian approach to justice is implicit within the terms of the present Code and should be phrased as a principle of equity. Further, he argues that basic egalitarian and non-comparative concerns should be captured in broad principles: equal access and need. This leaves him with three principles that should be balanced in order to guide protection insurance policy. When the argument is applied to review …. (shrink)

I undertake three tasks in this exploratory essay. First, I examine some of the lessons of recent history concerning the relation between socialism, markets, and liberal democracy. Second, I lay out the basic theoretical building-blocks of an alternative to both socialism and laissez-faire that I call “mutualism.” Finally, I draw some conclusions for public policy and practice, in the form of what I call a “progressive market strategy.” A brief conclusion ponders the question, What's left of socialism?

Mutualism provides a compelling account of the fairness intuitions on display in economic games. However, it is not yet clear how well the approach holds up as an explanation of all human morality. The theory needs to be tested outside the methodological neighborhood it was born in; such testing has the potential to greatly improve our understanding of morality in general.

Studies of economic decision-making have revealed the existence of consistent contributors, who always make contributions to the collective good. It is difficult to understand such behavior in terms of mutualistic motives. Furthermore, consistent contributors can elicit apparently altruistic behavior from others. Therefore, although mutualistic motives are likely an important contributor to moral action, there is more to morality than mutualism.

We explain here how the natural selection theory of people's mutualistic sense of fairness and the biofunctional theory of human understanding are made for each other. We welcome the stage that the target article has already set for this convergence, and invite the authors to consider moving the two independently developed approaches a step closer to the natural selection level of biofunctional understanding.

In the theory and history of ecology, Frederic Clements’s theory of plant communities is usually presented as the historical prototype and a paradigmatic example of synecological organicism, characterised by the assumption that ecological communities are functionally integrated units of mutually dependent species. In this paper, I will object to this standard interpretation of Clements’s theory. Undoubtedly, Clements compares plant communities with organisms and calls them “complex organisms” and “superorganisms”. Further, he can indeed be regarded as a proponent of ecological organicism—provided (...) that one defines ecological organicism as the interpretation of synecological units according to the model of the individual organism. However, Clements’s theory does not include the assumption that mutual dependence is a principle of the organisation of plant communities. Rather, he interprets plant communities as top-down control-hierarchical entities, in which subordinate species depend on dominant species—but not the other way around. Therefore, his theory represents what may be called ‘control-hierarchical organicism’ as against ‘mutualistic organicism’. The erroneous attribution to Clements of ‘mutualistic organicism’ might be due to an unawareness of the existence of different concepts of the organism. This unawareness results in the projection on Clements’s theory of a seemingly self-evident mutualistic concept of organism that Clements himself did not use as a basis for his theory of plant communities. (shrink)

Mutualistic theory explains convincingly the prevalence of fairness norms in small societies of foragers and in large contemporary democratic societies. However, it cannot explain the U-shaped curve of egalitarianism in human history. A theory based on bargaining power is able to provide a more general account and to explain mutualism as a special case. According to this approach, social norms may be more variable and malleable than Baumard et al. suggest.

Contemporary philosophers and psychologists seek the roots of ethically sound forms of behavior, including altruism and a sense of fairness, in the basic structure of cooperative action. I argue that recent work on cooperation in both philosophy and psychology has been hampered by what I call “the mutualistic paradigm.” The mutualistic paradigm treats one kind of cooperative situation—what I call a “mutualistic situation”—as paradigmatic of cooperation in general. In mutualistic situations, such as the primeval stag hunt described by Brian Skyrms, (...) every partner in a cooperative action has to do his part in order for the action as a whole to succeed. But many familiar cooperative situations—for example, serving on an academic committee—do not have this structure. Contemporary philosophers and psychologists are right that thinking about cooperation can shed light on how and why ethically sound behavior happens in human beings. But the deep connections between ethics and cooperation only come into view once we have a richer conception of our capacities for cooperation than the mutualistic paradigm provides. (shrink)

This paper reviews and extends ideas of eukaryotization by endosymbiosis. These ideas are put within an historical context of processes that may have led up to eukaryotization and those that seem to have resulted from this process. Our starting point for considering the emergence and development of life as an organized system of chemical reactions should in the first place be in accordance with thermodynamic principles and hence should, as far as possible, be derived from these principles. One trend to (...) be observed is the ever-increasing complexity resulting in several layers of compartmentalization of the reaction system, either spatial (of which the eukaryotic cell is an example), or functional (as in the gradually deepening distinction between metabolic, enzymatic and information-storing functions within the cell). One of the causes of this complexification of living systems will have been the changes in environmental conditions, particularly the geochemical impoverishment of the biosphere during geological history, partly brought about by living systems themselves, and partly by the trend towards increasing efficiency and specificity of the reactions that occur. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay argues that within competitive sport zero-sum logic and the theory of mutualism are compatible and complementary. Drawing on Robert Simon’s theory of mutualism and Scott Kretchmar’s argument for zero-sum logic, this article shows how athletes can strive for a clear-cut victory and shared benefits such as athletic excellence fully and wholeheartedly at the same time. This paper will also consider how acknowledgment of this dynamic could advance understandings for ethical theories for sport. It will then conclude (...) by describing a subjective approach that will make the affinity of zero-sum logic and mutualism more accessible for sports people. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est une analyse épistémologique des modèles du mutualisme. À partir de l’analyse Lotka-Volterra, nous chercherons les caractéristiques et les insuffisances épistémologiques de cette famille de modèles. Le travail mathématique de Vito Volterra était une réponse à une situation écologique, la rupture de l’équilibre d’espèces en compétition, considérées comme des espèces « associées ». À partir des équations décrivant les variations de ces populations en compétition, un simple changement de signe suffit pour obtenir les équations décrivant (...) les variations d’effectifs des populations mutualistes. En termes de modélisation, le mutualisme resta longtemps ignoré face au développement des modèles de compétition. Les modèles Lotka-Volterra appliqués au mutualisme aboutissent à un point d’équilibre lorsque les croissances relatives des deux populations sont les mêmes. Des modèles cherchent à distinguer les formes obligatoires et facultatives de mutualisme ; l’existence d’un point d’équilibre et le caractère dominant du mutualisme biologique (obligatoire ou facultatif) sont requis pour la validité de ces modèles. C est ce qui fait leur limite. Depuis la fin des années 1990, divers chercheurs ont mis au point des modèles plus réalistes en termes biologiques, c est-à-dire admettant un passage possible du parasitisme au mutualisme, dans un continuum et selon les densités des deux partenaires. D’un point de vue épistémologique, ces modèles demeurent relatifs au niveau populationnel, donc à l’étude des populations biologiques, ils demandent à être complétés par une analyse du même phénomène biologique au niveau individuel. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est une analyse épistémologique des modèles du mutualisme. À partir de l’analyse Lotka-Volterra, nous chercherons les caractéristiques et les insuffisances épistémologiques de cette famille de modèles. Le travail mathématique de Vito Volterra était une réponse à une situation écologique, la rupture de l’équilibre d’espèces en compétition, considérées comme des espèces « associées ». À partir des équations décrivant les variations de ces populations en compétition, un simple changement de signe suffit pour obtenir les équations décrivant (...) les variations d’effectifs des populations mutualistes. En termes de modélisation, le mutualisme resta longtemps ignoré face au développement des modèles de compétition. Les modèles Lotka-Volterra appliqués au mutualisme aboutissent à un point d’équilibre lorsque les croissances relatives des deux populations sont les mêmes. Des modèles cherchent à distinguer les formes obligatoires et facultatives de mutualisme ; l’existence d’un point d’équilibre et le caractère dominant du mutualisme biologique (obligatoire ou facultatif) sont requis pour la validité de ces modèles. C est ce qui fait leur limite. Depuis la fin des années 1990, divers chercheurs ont mis au point des modèles plus réalistes en termes biologiques, c est-à-dire admettant un passage possible du parasitisme au mutualisme, dans un continuum et selon les densités des deux partenaires. D’un point de vue épistémologique, ces modèles demeurent relatifs au niveau populationnel, donc à l’étude des populations biologiques, ils demandent à être complétés par une analyse du même phénomène biologique au niveau individuel. (shrink)

While women’s participation at research stations has been celebrated as a success story for women in science, their experiences were not quite equal to that of men scientists. This article shows how women interested in practicing marine science at research institutions experienced different living and research environments than their male peers; moreover, it illustrates how those gendered experiences reflected and informed the nature of their scientific practices and ideas. Set in Roscoff, France, this article excavates the work and social worlds (...) of a Russian scientist, Natalie Karsakoff (1863–1941), and a British émigré in France, Anna Vickers (1853–1906), to show how a small group of single women who studied algae created a “central bureau of feminine algology.” The social aspects of this bureau, and the physical space and support funded by Vickers, allowed these women scientists to both participate in male-dominated practices of science and lend evidentiary support to an ecological category that emphasized benign coexistence rather than struggle. This study adds an empirical case of single women scientists managing successful careers in science and contributing to science through publication and research. (shrink)

The evolutionary hypothesis advanced by Baumard et al. makes precise predictions on which emotions should play the main role in our moral lives: morality should be more closely linked to emotions (like contempt and disgust) than to emotions (like anger). Here, we argue that these predictions run contrary to most psychological evidence.

Baumard et al. propose a functional explanation for the evolution of a sense of fairness in humans: Fairness preferences are advantageous in an environment where individuals are in strong competition to be chosen for social interactions. Such conditions also exist in nonhuman animals. Therefore, it remains unclear why fairness (equated with morality) appears to be properly present only in humans.

This commentary argues that the observed heterogeneity in fairness views, documented in many economic experiments, poses a challenge to the partner choice theory developed by Baumard et al. It also discusses the extent to which their theory can explain how people consider inequalities due to pure luck.

On the basis of the previous publications, a new fractional-order prey-predator model is set up. Firstly, we discuss the existence, uniqueness, and nonnegativity for the involved fractional-order prey-predator model. Secondly, by analyzing the characteristic equation of the considered fractional-order Lotka–Volterra model and regarding the delay as bifurcation variable, we set up a new sufficient criterion to guarantee the stability behavior and the appearance of Hopf bifurcation for the addressed fractional-order Lotka–Volterra system. Thirdly, we perform the computer simulations with Matlab software (...) to substantiate the rationalisation of the analysis conclusions. The obtained results play an important role in maintaining the balance of population in natural world. (shrink)