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Julien Deonna [31]Julien A. Deonna [25]
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Julien Deonna
University of Geneva
  1. The emotions: a philosophical introduction.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2012 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Fabrice Teroni.
    The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? (...)
  2. Emotions as Attitudes.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.
    In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think (...)
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  3. In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion.Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno & Fabrice Teroni - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press.
    Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything worthwhile about the value of shame and its potential legal and political applications? -/- In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account of (...)
  4. Being moved.Florian Cova & Julien Deonna - 2014 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-20.
    In this paper, we argue that, barring a few important exceptions, the phenomenon we refer to using the expression “being moved” is a distinct type of emotion. In this paper’s first section, we motivate this hypothesis by reflecting on our linguistic use of this expression. In section two, pursuing a methodology that is both conceptual and empirical, we try to show that the phenomenon satisfies the five most commonly used criteria in philosophy and psychology for thinking that some affective episode (...)
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  5. In what sense are emotions evaluations?Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2014 - In Sabine Roeser & Cain Samuel Todd (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 15-31.
    In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue (...)
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  6. Emotion, perception and perspective.Julien A. Deonna - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (1):29–46.
    Abstract The content of an emotion, unlike the content of a perception, is directly dependent on the motivational set of the subject experiencing the emotion. Given the instability of this motivational set, it might be thought that there is no sense in which emotions can be said to pick up information about the environment in the same way that perception does. Whereas it is admitted that perception tracks for us what is the case in the environment, no such tracking relation, (...)
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  7. Which Attitudes for the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value?Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1099-1122.
    According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these concepts. The (...)
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  8.  95
    Getting Bodily Feelings Into Emotional Experience in the Right Way.Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2017 - Emotion Review 9 (1):55-63.
    We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, i.e. that (1) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings (Specificity), and that (2) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling (Constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against Specifity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that Constitution, too, can withstand (...)
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  9.  62
    Being moved.Florian Cova & Julien A. Deonna - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):447-466.
    In this paper, we argue that, barring a few important exceptions, the phenomenon we refer to using the expression “being moved” is a distinct type of emotion. In this paper’s first section, we motivate this hypothesis by reflecting on our linguistic use of this expression. In section two, pursuing a methodology that is both conceptual and empirical, we try to show that the phenomenon satisfies the five most commonly used criteria in philosophy and psychology for thinking that some affective episode (...)
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  10.  28
    In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2014 - In Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd (ed.), Emotion and Value. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.
    Why think that emotions are kinds of evaluations? This chapter puts forward an original account of emotions as evaluations apt to circumvent some of the chief difficulties with which alternative approaches find themselves confronted. We shall proceed by first introducing the idea that emotions are evaluations (sec. I). Next, two well-known approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are in and of themselves unemotional but are alleged to become emotional when directed towards evaluative contents are (...)
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  11. From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):55-77.
    ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the (...)
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  12. Differentiating Shame from Guilt.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1063-1400..
    How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we (...)
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  13.  27
    Which Attitudes for the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value?Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1099-1122.
    According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these concepts. The (...)
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  14.  14
    Differentiating shame from guilt.Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):725-740.
    How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we defend specific interpretations of (...)
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  15. Taking Affective Explanations to Heart.Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2009 - Social Science Information 48 (3):359-377.
    In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions) is to ascribe a certain stability to the subject's moods (episodes). The rationale for this (...)
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  16.  78
    Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory.Fabrice Teroni & Julien Deonna - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 102-123.
    This paper explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology so as to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, we focus on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such (...)
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  17.  37
    On the Good that Moves Us.Julien A. Deonna - 2020 - The Monist 103 (2):190-204.
    In this article, I provide a detailed characterization of being moved, which I claim is a distinct emotion. Being moved is the experience of being struck by the goodness of some specific positive value being exemplified. I start by expounding this account. Next, I discuss three issues that have emerged in the literature regarding it. These concern respectively the valence of being moved, the scope of the values that may constitute its particular objects, and the cognitive sophistication required for experiencing (...)
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  18. The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion.Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.
    Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not (...)
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  19. Introduction: Moral Emotions.Florian Cova, Julien Deonna & David Sander - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):397-400.
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  20.  78
    Why are emotions epistemically indispensable?Fabrice Teroni & Julien Deonna - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Contemporary philosophers are attracted by the Indispensability Claim, according to which emotions are indispensable in acquiring knowledge of some important values. The truth of this claim is often thought to depend on that of Emotional Dogmatism, the view that emotions justify evaluative judgements because they (seem to) make us aware of the relevant values. The aim of this paper is to show that the Indispensability Claim does not stand or fall with Emotional Dogmatism and that there is actually an attractive (...)
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  21. Introduction. Reconsidering Some Dogmas About Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Desire has not been at the center of recent preoccupations in the philosophy of mind. Consequently, the literature settled into several dogmas. The first part of this introduction presents these dogmas and invites readers to scrutinize them. The main dogma is that desires are motivational states. This approach contrasts with the other dominant conception: desires are positive evaluations. But there are at least four other dogmas: the world should conform to our desires (world-to-mind direction of fit), desires involve a positive (...)
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  22.  84
    Qu’Est-Ce Qu’Une Émotion?Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2008 - Vrin.
    Cet ouvrage répond à la question « Qu’est-ce qu’une émotion? » à la lumière des débats les plus contemporains en philosophie des émotions tout en s’appuyant sur les recherches empiriques les plus récentes au sujet de l’affect. Une fois exposée la manière dont les émotions se distinguent d’autres phénomènes affectifs tels que les humeurs, les sentiments et les dispositions affectives, l’étude propose une élucidation originale du problème majeur auquel fait face aujourd’hui la philosophie des émotions : comment comprendre la spécificité (...)
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  23.  61
    Lost in Intensity: Is there an empirical solution to the quasi-emotions debate?Steve Humbert-Droz, Amanda Ludmilla Garcia, Vanessa Sennwald, Fabrice Teroni, Julien Deonna, David Sander & Florian Cova - 2020 - Aesthetic Investigations 4 (1):460-482.
    Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the ‘paradox of fiction’), and has led some philosophers to claim that the emotions we feel for fictional characters are not genuine emotions but rather “quasi-emotions”. Since then, the existence of quasi-emotions has been a hotly debated issue. Recently, philosophers and psychologists (...)
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  24. The structure of empathy.Julien Deonna - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):99-116.
    If Sam empathizes with Maria, then it is true of Sam that (1) Sam is aware of Maria's emotion, and (2) Sam ‘feels in tune’ with Maria. On what I call the transparency conception of how they interact when instantiated, I argue that these two conditions are collectively necessary and sufficient for empathy. I first clarify the ‘awareness’ and ‘feeling in tune’ conditions, and go on to examine different candidate models that explain the manner in which these two conditions might (...)
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  25. Emotions and Their Correctness Conditions: A Defense of Attitudinalism.Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    In this paper, we contrast the different ways in which the representationalist and the attitudinalist in the theory of emotions account for the fact that emotions have evaluative correctness conditions. We argue that the attitudinalist has the resources to defend her view against recent attacks from the representationalist. To this end, we elaborate on the idea that emotional attitudes have a rich profile and explain how it supports the claim that these attitudes generate the wished-for evaluative correctness conditions. Our argument (...)
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  26. Emotions: Philosophical Issues About.Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - WIREs Cognitive Science 1:193-207.
    We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then (...)
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  27.  26
    The Emotion of Being Moved.Julien Deonna - 2018 - In C. Tappolet, F. Teroni & A. Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Shadows of the Soul: Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions.
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  28. The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Desires matter. What are desires? Many believe that desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire's role in explaining action. According to a second influential approach, however, desire is first and foremost an evaluation: desiring is representing something as good. After all, we seem to desire things under the guise of the good. Which understanding of desire is more accurate? Is the guise (...)
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  29. Is Shame a Social Emotion?Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2011 - In Anita Konzelmann Ziv, Keith Lehrer & Hans Bernard Schmid (eds.), Self-Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality. Springer. pp. 193-212.
    In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is essentially social. We start by presenting several theses which the social claim has motivated in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regard shame as displaying a structure in which "others" play an essential role. We argue that while all these theses are true of some important families of shame episodes, none of them generalize so as to motivate the conclusion (...)
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  30. What Role for Emotions in Well-being?Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2013 - Philosophical Topics 41 (1):123-142.
    It is striking that for each major theory of well-being, there exists a companion theory of the emotions. Thus, to classical hedonic views of well-being, there corresponds no less classical pure feeling views of the emotions; to desire views that conceive of well-being in terms of desire satisfaction, there corresponds a variety of theories approaching the emotions in terms of the satisfaction/frustration of desires; and finally, to so called objective list theories of well-being, there corresponds a variety of theories that (...)
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  31. A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa.Christine Tappolet, Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (eds.) - 2022
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  32.  34
    Emotion Meets Action: Towards an Integration of Research and Theory.Bernhard Hommel, Agnes Moors, David Sander & Julien Deonna - 2017 - Emotion Review 9 (4):295-298.
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  33. Shame's Guilt Disproved.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2008 - Critical Quarterly 50 (4):65-72.
    The contemporary consensus on shame is pessimistic. Three main reasons, all connected with the alleged fact that, in shame, you allow yourself to become the victim of external pressures, appear to motivate this conclusion. First, shame is said to be the emotion of social sanction: when you feel shame, you submit to the judgements of others. Second, shame is supposed to be triggered by the way you look in the eyes of others. Thirdly, and as a result, shame allegedly motivates (...)
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  34.  67
    The tangled web of agency.Alain Daniel Pe-Curto, Julien Deonna & David Sander - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
    We characterize Doris's anti-reflectivist, collaborativist, valuational theory along two dimensions. The first dimension is socialentanglement, according to which cognition, agency, and selves are socially embedded. The second dimension isdisentanglement, the valuational element of the theory that licenses the anchoring of agency and responsibility in distinct actors. We then present an issue for the account: theproblem of bad company.
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  35.  34
    Two kinds of respect for two kinds of contempt: Why contempt can be both a sentiment and an emotion.Florian Cova, Julien Deonna, David Sander & Fabrice Teroni - 2017 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40.
    Gervais & Fessler argue that because contempt is a sentiment, it cannot be an emotion. However, like many affective labels, it could be that “contempt” refers both to a sentiment and to a distinct emotion. This possibility is made salient by the fact that contempt can be defined by contrast with respect, but that there are different kinds of respect.
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  36. The Self of Shame.Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2009 - In Mikko Salmela & Verena Mayer (eds.), Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity. John Benjamins. pp. 33-50.
    The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame about permanent traits). One feels ashamed of one’s dishonest behavior (moral shame), etc. The variety of evaluations in shame is striking; and it is even more so if one takes a cross-cultural perspective on this emotion. So the difficulty – the “unity problem” (...)
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  37. Affective intentionality and practical rationality.Julien Deonna, Christine Clavien & Ivo Https://Orcidorg Wallimann-Helmer - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):311-322.
    ‘Emotions are Janus-faced,’ writes de Sousa. ‘This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truth of emotions, one of which is about the self, and the other about conditions in the world’. Emotions, it is claimed, disclose facts about how the world is and about who we are. The articles in this volume all focus on one, the other, or both of these aspects of emotions – How do they contribute to provide reasons for (...)
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  38. Simulation versus theory-theory. A plea for an epistemological turn.Julien Deonna & Bence Nanay - 2014 - In Anne Reboul (ed.), Mind, Value and Metaphysics. Springer.
    Simulation, if used as a way of becoming aware of other people’s mental states, is the joint exercise of imagination and attribution. If A simulates B, then (i) A attributes to B the mental state in which A finds herself at the end of a process in which (ii) A has imagined being in B’s situation. Although necessary, imagination and attribution are not sufficient for simulation: the latter occurs only if (iii) the imagination process grounds or justifies the attribution. Depending (...)
     
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  39. Value and Emotion.Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Handbook of Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 155-174.
    What is the role of emotions in elucidating the nature of value? For example, should dangerousness be understood in term of the fear response? What is the role of emotions in our getting access to values? For example, what may be the role of fear in becoming aware that a given animal is dangerous? What value do emotions have? For example, is fear of special value because it helps behaving appropriately towards its object? We shall take up these three questions (...)
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  40.  73
    The emotional shape of our moral life: Anger-related emotions and mutualistic anthropology.Florian Cova, Julien Deonna & David Sander - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):86 - 87.
    The evolutionary hypothesis advanced by Baumard et al. makes precise predictions on which emotions should play the main role in our moral lives: morality should be more closely linked to emotions (like contempt and disgust) than to emotions (like anger). Here, we argue that these predictions run contrary to most psychological evidence.
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  41. Darker sides of guilt: The case of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.Juliette Vazard & Julien Deonna - 2019 - In Bradford Cokelet & Corey Maley (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Guilt.
    Why do thoughts involving harm and damage trigger guilt in certain individuals and not in others? The significance of this question comes into view when considering the medical and psychological literature on patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Patients with OCD feel guilt in response to having certain recurring, negative thoughts whose content evoke scenarios of harm and damage. This, however—at least in most readings of what those thoughts consist of—is puzzling. The transition from having a thought about being the source (...)
     
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  42. Two Faces of Shame: Moral Shame and Image Shame Differently Predict Positive and Negative Responses to Ingroup Wrongdoing.Rupert Brown, Jesse Allpress, Roger Giner Sorolla, Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2014 - Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40 (10):1270-1284.
    This article proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: Guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterized by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened moral essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three correlational studies are reported, set in the context of atrocities committed by (British) ingroup members during the Iraq war (Ns = 147, 256, 399). Results showed that the two forms (...)
     
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  43.  19
    Introduction: Emotions and Rationality in Moral Philosophy.Christine Clavien, Julien Deonna & Ivo Wallimann - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2):5-9.
    This volume includes essays presented at the conference on Emotions and Rationality in Moral Philosophy held at the Universities of Neuchâtel and Bern in October 2005. The authors of this volume share the Humean insight that the ‘sentiments’ have a crucial role to play in elucidating the practice of morality. In a Humean fashion, they warn us against taking an intellectualist view of emotions and reject the rationalist account of morality.
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  44.  29
    Introduction: Emotions and Rationality in Moral Philosophy.Christine Clavien, Ivo Https://Orcidorg Wallimann-Helmer & Julien Deonna - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2.
    This volume includes essays presented at the conference on Emotions and Rationality in Moral Philosophy held at the Universities of Neuchâtel and Bern in October 2005. The authors of this volume share the Humean insight that the ‘sentiments’ have a crucial role to play in elucidating the practice of morality. In a Humean fashion, they warn us against taking an intellectualist view of emotions and reject the rationalist account of morality.
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  45. Dictionnaire des valeurs.Emma Dayer-Tieffenbach & Julien Deonna (eds.) - forthcoming - Edition d’Ithaque.
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  46.  53
    Affective intentionality and practical rationality.Christine Clavien, Julien A. Deonna & Ivo Wallimann - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):311–322.
    ‘Emotions are Janus-faced,’ writes de Sousa. ‘This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truth of emotions, one of which is about the self, and the other about conditions in the world’. Emotions, it is claimed, disclose facts about how the world is and about who we are. The articles in this volume all focus on one, the other, or both of these aspects of emotions – How do they contribute to provide reasons for (...)
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  47.  4
    Petit traité des valeurs.Julien A. Deonna & Emma Tieffenbach (eds.) - 2018 - [Genève, Switzerland]: Fondation Ernst et Lucie Schmidheiny.
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  48.  8
    Présentation.Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2022 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 114 (2):147-154.
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  49. Petit dictionnaire des valeurs.Emma Tieffenbach & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2018 - Paris: Ithaque.
     
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  50.  9
    Petit Traité des Valeurs.Julien A. Deonna & Emma Tieffenbach (eds.) - 2018 - [Genève, Switzerland]: Edition d’Ithaque.
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