The monadology.--On the notions of right and justice.--New system of the nature of substances and of the communication between them.--Explanation of the new system--Third explanation of the new system.--On the ultimate origination of things.--New essays on the human understanding.--Introduction.--Principles of nature and of grace.

Leibniz coined the word “dynamics,” but his own dynamics has never been completed. However, there are many illuminating ideas scattered in his writings on dynamics and metaphysics. In this paper, I will present my own interpretation of Leibniz’s dynamics and metaphysics. To my own surprise, Leibniz’s dynamics and metaphysics are incredibly flexible and modern. In particular, the metaphysical part, namely Monadology, can be interpreted as a theory of information in terms of monads, which generate both physical phenomena and mental (...) phenomena. The phenomena, i.e., how the world of monads appears to each monad must be distinguished from its internal states, which Leibniz calls perceptions, and the phenomena must be understood as the results of these states and God’s coding. My distinctive claim is that most interpreters ignored this coding. His dynamics and metaphysics can provide a framework good enough for enabling Einstein’s special relativity. And finally, his dynamics and metaphysics can provide a very interesting theory of space and time. In Part 1, we will focus on the relationship between metaphysics and dynamics. Leibniz often says that dynamics is subordinated to metaphysics. We have to take this statement seriously, and we have to investigate how dynamics and metaphysics are related. To this question, I will give my own answer, based on my informational interpretation. On my view, Leibniz’s metaphysics tries, among others, to clarify the following three: How each monad is programmed. How monads are organized into many groups, each of which is governed by a dominant monad ; this can be regarded as a precursor of von Neumann’s idea of cellular automata. And how the same structure is repeated in sub-layers of the organization. This structure is best understood in terms of the hierarchy of programs, a nested structure going down from the single dominant program to subprograms, which again controls respective subprograms, and ad infinitum. If we may use a modern term, this is a sort of recursion, although Leibniz himself did not know this word. And one of my major discoveries is that the same recursive structure is repeated in the phenomenal world, the domain of dynamical investigations. Recursion of what, you may ask. I will argue that it is elastic collision. For Leibniz, aside from inertial motions, dynamical changes of motion are brought about by elastic collisions, at any level of the infinite divisibility of matter. This nicely corresponds to the recursive structure of the program of a monad, or of the program of an organized group of monads. This is the crux of his claim that dynamics is subordinated to metaphysics. Moreover, the program of any monad is teleological, whereas the phenomenal world is governed by efficient cause of dynamics. And it is natural that the pre-established harmony is there, since God is the ultimate programmer, as well as the creator. (shrink)

Drawing on my previous paper “Monadology and Music”, I will further pursue the analogy between Monadology and music. I wish to emphasize that good examples of “pre-established harmony” can be extracted from this analogy. Also, a good illustration of “Leibniz’s Demon” can be obtained. This Demon is such that it can tell, given a piece of matter, the whole history of the world, past, present, and future. In terms of finite examples of musical pieces and their performances, Leibniz’s (...) point of this Demon can be better understood. (shrink)

Written in 1714, the “Monadology” is widely regarded as a classic statement of much of Leibniz’s mature philosophical system. In just 90 numbered paragraphs, Leibniz outlines—and argues for—the core features of his system, starting with his famous doctrine of monads (simple substances) and ending with the uplifting claim that God is concerned not only for the world as a whole but for the welfare of the virtuous in particular. This chapter begins by considering the circumstances of composition of the (...) “Monadology” and its publication history before offering a detailed analysis of the claims and arguments found therein; I suggest the text is best read as dealing with three distinct realms, the metaphysical (§§1–-60), the physical (§§61–-82), and lastly the moral (§§83–-90). The chapter concludes with a consideration of the fate and influence of this seminal text. (shrink)

This book reconstructs, both from the historical and theoretical points of view, Leibniz's geometrical studies, focusing in particular on the research Leibniz ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MONADOLOGY OF 7HE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV by Michael Wreen THE WORLD AND THOUGHT of Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov are not easily entered into. There is something, some barrier, which seems to hinder, if not prevent, a feeling of belonging, a feeling of ease, citizenship, and camaraderie. What is it diat holds die reader back, what makes him feel particularly Ul-at-ease in the world of The Brothers Karamazov, and especially (...) in die presence of the Karamazovs? The answer is that the world of the novel resembles the world of Leibniz's Monadology, a world so different from the world of our everyday conceptions, and so different from the world of most novels, that the reader is left "freefloating," so to speak, until he, as a spirit, has been accommodated and then assimilated by it. To begin with, there is the matter of setting. There are practically no landscapes in The Brothers Karamazov and no extended descriptions of nature. Secondly, buildings, both their interiors and exteriors, are barely sketched, and when described at all, it is usually the psychological state that the human design excites ("It was an odd arrangement ofrooms") that is important, and not the design or structure itself. Objects existing in their own right and "pure surfaces" are not to be found. The one building (with grounds) that is described at length is the monastery, but even here description is used symbolically, as a reflection ofthe spiritual states ofthe monks and The Elder. Similarly, clothing exists only as a clue to the psychological or spiritual state of its wearer. Dmitri's rag with the 1,500 roubles is the analogue of his condition, just as Smerdyakov's hoped-for foppish apparel is of his. 318 Michael Wreen319 Still more unusual is the infrequent mention of two of the biological necessities of life, food and sleep. Food seems to be something that the characters can take or leave, but more often than not, simply forget about; the stomach does not seem to exist for any except one of them. Once or twice the characters do eat, but eating seems to be an accidental side-effect of spending time with, a spiritual infection caught from, the thoroughly carnal Fyodor. The monks, it must be admitted, are concerned with food — though it would be more accurate to say diat they are concerned with die lack of it, or even more strongly, widi maintaining the lack of it. As for sleep, collapse from complete exhaustion (from sustained physical exertion and/or emotional excitement, or from orgiastic debauchery), sickness, and brain fever seem to be preferred to normal sleep. Days are long— so long, in fact, that night is more like an extension of day dian night. Another descriptive element which warrants notice is the physical appearances and personal histories of die dramatic personae. The truth, as far as physical appearances are concerned, is clear and simple: everyone, with the exception ofIvan, is described once and briefly. In the first thirtyfive pages or so, most of the major personages are introduced, "outfitted" with noses, eyes, ears, bearings, statures, mannerisms, traits, etc., and — here we come to the second aspect noted above — then given summary histories. After that, diey are set in dramatic motion. The opening chapters are descriptive and expository, a report of what was and is the case as far as mise en scene and physical equipage are concerned; and except for brief moments when the never-named narrator indulges in short "sermons" about man or God, the mode of narration never returns to descriptive exposition, but remains dramatic and focused on the interplay and clash of personality. Characters do act and think for themselves, and we see diem directly in the acting out of dieir lives. A bit of background information having been provided, we don't have to be told anydiing more; we can observe for ourselves, from the inside. The catalogue offacts is discarded, and in its place is put the experience of events and feelings. The objective, external perspective yields to the internal, subjective perspective, and the reader crosses over from the familiar and cozy world of Dickensian externality to the strange and disconcerting world ofDostoyevskian intemality... (shrink)

A fresh translation and in-depth commentary of Leibniz's seminal text, the Monadology. -/- Written in 1714, the Monadology is widely considered to be the classic statement of Leibniz's mature philosophy. In the space of 90 numbered paragraphs, totalling little more than 6000 words, Leibniz outlines - and argues for - the core features of his philosophical system. Although rightly regarded as a masterpiece, it is also a very condensed work that generations of students have struggled to understand. -/- (...) Lloyd Strickland presents a new translation of the Monadology, alongside key parts of the Theodicy, and an in-depth, section-by-section commentary that explains in detail not just what Leibniz is saying in the text but also why he says it. The sharp focus on the various arguments and other justifications Leibniz puts forward makes possible a deeper and more sympathetic understanding of his doctrines. (shrink)

Kant elaborated his dynamical theory of matter in two quite different systematic accounts, the first in the Monadologia physica, the second in the Dynamics chapter of the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft. In this paper I investigate the transition from the monadological to the “continuum” dynamical theory of matter, whose exact timing and motives are not explicitly clarified in Kant’s writings. I locate Kant’s turn around the middle 1760s, presenting Kant’s abandonment of his own physical monadology as a way out (...) of controversies about monads and materialism which characterized the German intellectual world of his time. Among the results of this crucial modification in matter theory stands out the new interpretation of Newtonian forces in the critical writings, which is not only relevant for Kant’s account of physics, but also plays a major exemplary role for his critical theory of knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I will present an analogy between Leibniz’s Monadology and musical works. A musical work is usually written down in a score. It is divided into many voice parts, and for every part, it gives all musical information necessary for performance. Now, since any such score specifies all notes of that musical work, at once, it can be regarded as atemporal; musical time does not flow in a score. And it does not specify spatial relations among the (...) voice parts. Thus, the musical work described in a score exists as an informational entity. A score is a kind of “program” for playing. This program contains invariant structures, and such structures define the identity of the work. On the other hand, it allows freedom for performers. Any performer has to “interpret” the work, and his or her performance is an expression of that interpretation. Any such interpretation may be regarded as a kind of “coding” for transforming the specified invariant structures into actual sounds in space and time. This dual aspect of musical works is the basis of my analogy. It should be conducive to improving our interpretation of Monadology. (shrink)

About the text and translation -- The Monadology -- The structure of the Monadology -- The Monadology : text with running commentary -- Appendix: Theodicy -- The principles of nature and grace, founded on reason -- Leibniz to Nicole Remond : appendix on monads.

Copyright © 2010–2015 All rights reserved. Jonathan Bennett [Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is (...) worth. (shrink)

This introductory overview comprises a brief account of Leibniz's own monadology; a discussion of the reception of his philosophy up to Kant; and a short overview of the monadologies developed after Kant's first Critique, made via a summary of key points raised in this guest issue, highlighting recurrent themes, which include questions of historiography.

The following proposes an interpretation of Husserl's sustained exegetical commentary on Leibniz's metaphysics from 1922 (Hua XIV 298300), with reference to textual and historical resources. The leading historical index for the following interpretation is a minor contribution to Leibniz scholarship from 1917 by Dietrich Mahnke, a work with which Husserl was intimately familiar. Textual references are to works by Husserl which would have been available to Mahnke- i.e., the Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen—I as well as relevant notes and lectures from (...) the period ni question. Husserl's brief manuscript from 1922, I claim, can be read as a critique of the Mahnke interpretation that attempts to provide a more expansive and thorough-going phenomenological explication of Leibniz' doctrine of universal harmony. Thereby, Husserl offers some important clues as to how he himself understands his own uses of the terms "monad" and "monadology." The phenomenological reformation of Leibnizian Monadology must be understood as a methodological reconception with internal reference to Husserl's own theory of intersubjectivity. (shrink)

In Part 3, I will discuss the problems of inertia and gravity in Leibniz, and present three conjectures: If Leibniz were really ready to insist on relativity, he would have to assert the relativity of inertial motion. In Leibniz’s theories of dynamics and geometry, there was a struggle between his predilection for straight line and his adherence to an optimality principle. Gravity, as well as inertia, can be considered as a universal feature of the world, so that the foundation of (...) both may have a common root. Further, drawing on the results in Part 1 and Part 2, I will argue for the need of a unified interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics and dynamics. My three conjectures as regards Leibniz’s possible treatment of inertia and gravity are proposed along a unified interpretation, in terms of my informational reconstruction of Leibniz’s philosophy. Finally, the most important features of the informational interpretation are summarized. The synopsis of the whole paper is added. (shrink)

In Part 3, I will discuss the problems of inertia and gravity in Leibniz, and present three conjectures: If Leibniz were really ready to insist on relativity, he would have to assert the relativity of inertial motion. In Leibniz’s theories of dynamics and geometry, there was a struggle between his predilection for straight line and his adherence to an optimality principle. Gravity, as well as inertia, can be considered as a universal feature of the world, so that the foundation of (...) both may have a common root. Further, drawing on the results in Part 1 and Part 2, I will argue for the need of a unified interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics and dynamics. My three conjectures as regards Leibniz’s possible treatment of inertia and gravity are proposed along a unified interpretation, in terms of my informational reconstruction of Leibniz’s philosophy. Finally, the most important features of the informational interpretation are summarized. The synopsis of the whole paper is added. (shrink)

Nikolai Bugaev was a mathematician keenly interested in philosophy. He stressed the role of discontinuity in his mathematical research that he called arithmology. He also emphasized the importance of discontinuity in nature which he embodied in his version of monadology. The article discusses the viability of his philosophical investigations.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz presents the idea of monads, as non-communicative, self-actuating system of beings that are windowless, closed, eternal, deterministic and individualistic. For him, the whole universe and its constituents are monads and that includes humans. In fact, any ‘body’, such as the ‘body’ of an animal or man has, according to Leibniz, one dominant monad which controls the others within it. This dominant monad, he often refers to as the soul. If Leibniz’s conception of monads is accepted, it merely (...) establishes human subjectivity, idiosyncrasies, biases, prejudices and individual points of view as the norm. How then do we ensure inter-subjectivity and the kind of social interaction requisite for the achievement of social order, since Leibniz’s system forecloses the possibility of interaction and communication among monads? In this essay, we argue that just as Leibniz’s monads synchronize only through the Supreme Monad (Monas Monadum), humans as social monads should also interact through a matrix of ideals like truth, honesty, sincerity, integrity, altruism, impartiality, compassion and trust. Since social order is actualised only within the context of linked social structures, relations and values, these utopian ideals would form the fulcrum through which humans relate and the very foundation that would anchor a viable social order. Our aim here is to establish a relationship between Leibniz’s metaphysics and the physical domains of life by showing that metaphysical constructs can impinge on human social relations and wellbeing. The study employed the qualitative method of research through critical analysis of texts, library and archival materials. (shrink)

In Part 2, drawing on the results of Part 1, I will present my own interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy of space and time. As regards Leibniz’s theory of geometry and space, De Risi’s excellent work appeared in 2007, so I will depend on this work. However, he does not deal with Leibniz’s view on time, and moreover, he seems to misunderstand the essential part of Leibniz’s view on time. Therefore I will begin with Richard Arthur’s paper, and J. A. Cover’s (...) improvement. Despite some valuable insights contained in their papers, I have to conclude their attempts fail in one way or another, because they disregard the order of state-transition of a monad, which is, on my view, one of the essential features of the monads. By reexamining Leibniz’s important text Initia Rerum, I arrived at the following interpretation. Since the realm of monads is timeless, the order of state-transition of a monad provides only the basis of time in phenomena. What Leibniz calls “simultaneity” should be understood as a unique 1- to-1 correspondence of the states of different monads. With this understanding, whatever is correct in Arthur’s and Cover’s interpretation can be reproduced in my interpretation. On this basis, we can introduce a metric of time based on congruence of duration. Leibniz connected time with space in Initia Rerum by means of motion, and introduced the notion of path of a moving point; thus the congruence of duration can be reduced to congruence of distance. Then, I can show both classical metric and relativistic metric can be reconstructed on the same basis, depending on the coding for phenomena. The relativistic metric can be combined with Leibniz’s idea of internal living force, suggesting a relation of mass with energy. However, since Leibniz has never shown the ground of constant speed of an inertial motion, there may be a vicious circle. In order to avoid this, we can extend the notion of path to whole situation, thus yielding a trajectory of the whole phenomenal world. Then, by applying optimality to possible paths, we may arrive at the law of motion, without vicious circle. A comparison of Leibniz’s dynamics with Barbour’s concludes Part 2. (shrink)

In the early twentieth century, a rare strain of British idealism emerged which took Leibniz's Monadology as its starting point. This paper discusses a variant of that strain, offered by Hilda Oakeley. I set Oakeley's monadology in its philosophical context and discuss a key point of conflict between Oakeley and her fellow monadologists: the unreality of time. Oakeley argues that time is fundamentally real, a thesis arguably denied by Leibniz and subsequent monadologists, and by all other British idealists. (...) This paper discusses Oakeley's argument for the reality of time, and Oakeley's attack on the most famous account of the unreality of time offered in her day: that of J. M. E. McTaggart. I show that Oakeley's critique of McTaggart can be extended to challenge all monadologists, including that of the great monad, Leibniz himself. (shrink)

This article is an introduction to Herbart's monadology. It discusses the fundamental concepts of his monadology and its similarity to Leibniz's monadology. A final section discusses the vexed question of Herbart's realism. It is argued that Herbart is more a transcendental idealist than a realist.

Precipitated largely by publication of the Theodicy in 1706, requests for a systematic exposition of Leibniz’s philosophy led to his self-described Éclaircissement sur les monades, begun in the summer of 1714 at the request of Remond. Unlike the treatise on philosophical theology, Leibniz’s Monadology is at once broadly systematic but sketchy and compressed: so it is useful, but then not so useful, as an introduction to his philosophy. Leibniz later decompressed it somewhat by adding references to the Theodicy, where (...) certain issues received fuller treatment. Rescher’s new book goes several steps further, still reckoning Leibniz as his own best commentator: in addition to those passages from the Theodicy, other passages from the Leibniz corpus are brought alongside each section of the Monadology, letting them pretty much speak for themselves about the ideas of that section, with a miminum of added commentary. This is a swell idea, and I think Rescher succeeds in executing it. The result is a useful work for students, who in a single edition get Leibniz’s original effort at carving his system at its joints—the principles of philosophy, he called them—and enough additional text to flesh out a full-bodied picture of his mature philosophy. (shrink)

In Part 2, drawing on the results of Part 1, I will present my own interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy of space and time. As regards Leibniz’s theory of geometry and space, De Risi’s excellent work appeared in 2007, so I will depend on this work. However, he does not deal with Leibniz’s view on time, and moreover, he seems to misunderstand the essential part of Leibniz’s view on time. Therefore I will begin with Richard Arthur’s paper, and J. A. Cover’s (...) improvement. Despite some valuable insights contained in their papers, I have to conclude their attempts fail in one way or another, because they disregard the order of state-transition of a monad, which is, on my view, one of the essential features of the monads. By reexamining Leibniz’s important text Initia Rerum, I arrived at the following interpretation. Since the realm of monads is timeless, the order of state-transition of a monad provides only the basis of time in phenomena. What Leibniz calls “simultaneity” should be understood as a unique 1-to-1 correspondence of the states of different monads. With this understanding, whatever is correct in Arthur’s and Cover’s interpretation can be reproduced in my interpretation. On this basis, we can introduce a metric of time based on congruence of duration. Leibniz connected time with space in Initia Rerum by means of motion, and introduced the notion of path of a moving point; thus the congruence of duration can be reduced to congruence of distance. Then, I can show both classical metric and relativistic metric can be reconstructed on the same basis, depending on the coding for phenomena. The relativistic metric can be combined with Leibniz’s idea of internal living force, suggesting a relation of mass with energy. However, since Leibniz has never shown the ground of constant speed of an inertial motion, there may be a vicious circle. In order to avoid this, we can extend the notion of path to whole situation, thus yielding a trajectory of the whole phenomenal world. Then, by applying optimality to possible paths, we may arrive at the law of motion, without vicious circle. A comparison of Leibniz’s dynamics with Barbour’s concludes Part 2. (shrink)

The scientific paradigm which I rely upon in the framework of this article is quantum mechanics, whose “cognitive revolution” consisted of replacing the classical principle of separability with the principle of nonseparability or global intercorrelation. According to this intercorrelation, highlighted at the subatomic level, the part cannot be separated from the whole, because every part has a global and instantaneous connection with the whole universe. For this reason the foundation of the world cannot be the part, but the whole, which (...) is therefore logically and ontologically prior to the part, i.e., self-consistent. Consequently, the principle of global intercorrelation elucidates and validates some of the oldest philosophical problems and intuitions about the unity or self-consistency of the world. An example in this sense is the bootstrap theory of American physicist Geoffrey Chew, which presents such striking similarities to the metaphysical system of Leibniz's Monadology that the two intertwine and mirror each other, like twin souls, to the extent that it could be stated that if Chew’s bootstrap theory represents the explanatory physical level of Leibniz’s metaphysics, then, analogously, Leibniz’s Monadology represents the explanatory metaphysical level of Chew’s physics. (shrink)

In this paper, I will try to exploit the implication of Leibniz's statement in Monadology (1714) that "there is a kind of self-sufficiency which makes them [monads] sources of their own internal actions, or incorporeal automata, as it were" (Monadology, sect.18). Leibniz's monads are simple substances, with no shape, no magnitude; but they are supposed to produce the phenomena resulting from their activities, which for us humans look as the whole world, the nature. The activities of a monad (...) are characterized by mental terms, perceptions (internal states) and appetites (which change the internal state). By means of perceptions, a monad becomes a "perpetual living mirror of the universe"; it can receive the information of other monads and it can send its own, in turn, to others. The communication and interconnection thus produced result in the physical and the psychical phenomena observed by us, humans. According to Leibniz, all monads are governed by the teleological law given by the God, and the world of phenomena are governed by the causal and mechanical law. Leibniz argues that there is a pre-established harmony among the monads so that this double character is no problem. Now, I will propose an informational interpretation of monadology, which regards the monads as an automaton governed by the God's program and arranged appropriately; and I will argue that Leibniz's scenario can be defended in terms of this interpretation. The crucial part of this interpretation is that the God's program and the monads' activities are related with the phenomenal world by means of a coding by God. This interpretation is also defended on the textual basis, with a special reference to Leibniz's distinction between primitive and derivative forces. Drawing on R. M. Adams's careful reading of Leibniz's texts (Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, 1994), I will argue that his rendering is quite in conformity with my interpretation, although he does not seem to be aware of the notion of coding. (shrink)

This paper is about the relationship between actuality and potentiality. Two paradigms are considered: Leibnizian possible worlds, which is rooted in classical physics; and the consistent histories quantum theory of Griffiths, Gell-Mann, Hartle, and Omnès. I explore an interesting connection between these two paradigms. The analysis goes beyond a comparison of classical and quantum physics to consider how modern physics might be integrated into a more comprehensive view of the world, in the spirit of Leibniz’s own philosophy.

Bernard Bolzano, known in his lifetime as ‘the Bohemian Leibniz’, is best known as a logician and mathematician, but he also developed a monadology in which the monads, which he called ‘atoms’, have spatial location and physical properties. This essay summarizes and assesses his monadology.

The article discusses fascinating points of similarity and difference between Leibniz's Monadology and Heidegger's 'The Thing', two of the greatest short works in the history of philosophy. But the key point of intersection between them is not widely recognised: indirect causation.

The mind-body problem is a central problem of modern philosophy. Leibniz’s Monadology as a model of a solution is picked up again and again even today. In order to characterize three of these completely different new monadologies of today, the basic difficulty of the mind-body-problem is outlined as a background, followed by a short sketch of the Leibnitian solution. - The first new monadology, here, is the metaphysical solution of U. Meixner, who chooses consciousness as a fundament, seeing (...) a monad as a stream of consciousness. This is contrasted with a second new monadology, namely N. Rescher’s process-theoretical approach, which takes the monad not as a substance, but as a process. The third new monadology is the quantum monadology of T. Nakagomi, where the monad is embedded in a quantum ontological concept that elaborates a reconciliation of the macroscopic, material world with a quantum theoretical world of consciousness, both sides seen as an interpretation. Finally there are some reflections on a merger of elements of these three concepts of monadology for an approach of today. (shrink)

Leibniz is a major figure in western philosophy and, with Descartes and Spinoza, one of the most influential philosophers of the Rationalist School. The _Monadology_ is his most famous work and one of the most important works of modern philosophy. _Leibniz and the Monadology_ introduces and assesses: *Leibniz's life and the background to the _Monadology_ *the ideas and text of the _Monadology_*Leibniz's continuing importance to philosophy Leibniz and the Monadology is ideal for anyone coming to Leibniz for the first (...) time. It also includes the text of the _Monadology_, specially translated for this _GuideBook_ by Anthony Savile. (shrink)

The essay explores the systematic relationship in the work of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) between his monadology, his metaphysics as presented in works such as De la causa, principio et uno, the mythopoeic cosmology of Lo spaccio de la bestia trionfante, and practical works like De vinculis in genere. Bruno subverts the conceptual regime of the Aristotelian substantial forms and its accompanying cosmology with a metaphysics of individuality that privileges individual unity (singularity) over formal unity and particulars over substantial forms (...) without sacrificing a metaphysical perspective on the cosmos. The particular is individuated as a unique site of desire, continually transforming but able to entrain itself and others through phantasmatic ‘bonding’, the new source of regularity in Bruno’s polycentric universe. Bruno thus tries to do justice to the demands of intelligibility as well as transformative eros. The essay concludes with a note on Bruno’s geometry as it relates to his general conception of form. (shrink)

Two of Leibniz's most studied and often quoted works appear in this volume. Published in 1686, the Discourse on Metaphysics consists of the philosopher's explanation of individual perception as an expression of the rest of the universe from a unique perspective. The whole world--the best of all possible worlds, as he famously remarks--is thus contained in each individual substance. The Monadology, written in 1714, offers a concise synopsis of Leibniz's philosophy, establishing the laws of final causes, which underlie God's (...) free choice to create the best possible world--a world that serves as dynamic and perfectly ordered evidence of the wisdom of its creator. Translated by George R. Montgomery. (shrink)