Mercy killing in battle is an illegal activity, yet, the evidence suggests, it happens on battlefields the world over and it has probably done so throughout human history. This may be a ?silent? part of the battlefield that few survivors wish to remember or to report subsequently. The practice is illegal, yet it raises difficult, perhaps sometimes impossible, ethical problems. A framework derived from the ethos of the just war tradition is developed here to analyse and to evaluate (...) such battlefield killings. (shrink)

Sadly, there are people in very bad medical conditions who want to die. They are in pain, they are suffering, and they no longer find their quality of life to be at an acceptable level anymore. -/- When people like this are kept alive by machines or other medical treatments, can it be morally permissible to let them die? -/- Advocates of “passive euthanasia” argue that it can be. Their reasons, however, suggest that it can sometimes be not wrong to (...) actively kill some patients, i.e., that “active euthanasia” can be permissible also. This essay reviews these arguments. (shrink)

Analysis of ethical and legal issues in battlefield euthanasia or military mercy-killing.

As a follow-up to Stephen Deakin's analysis on the ethics of mercy killing on the battlefield in this journal, this article proposes a moral justification for this type of action, as well as a judicial framework that could clarify what qualifies as such morally permissible action. Based upon contemporary cases, it argues that the current military codes of conduct are incoherent when it comes to the punishment of soldiers who commit mercy killings, and that the military codes (...) of justice should be amended accordingly. (shrink)

In Thursday's New England Journal of Medicine, two doctors from the University Medical Center Groningen in the Netherlands outline the circumstances in which doctors in their hospital have, in 22 cases over seven years, carried out euthanasia on newborn infants. All of these cases were reported to a district attorney's office in the Netherlands. None of the doctors were prosecuted.

Euthanasia has been a subject of debate worldwide. It has brought up multiple controversies in different countries and among different societies. Over the years, euthanasia has been an active topic of research in the field of bioethics, owing to its numerous ethical and legal implications. In this article, we take a brief look into the laws and legislation surrounding euthanasia in different parts of the world.

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 6, Page 613-620, July 2022.

This article responds to Anh Le’s critique of my Journal of Military Ethics article entitled “The Morality of Retributive Targeted Killing.” Le argues that while retribution can in theory function...

Is it worse to kill someone than to let someone die? It seems obvious to common sense that it is worse. We allow people to die, for example, when we fail to contribute money to famine-relief efforts; but even if we feel somewhat guilty, we do not consider ourselves murderers. Nor do we feel like accessories to murder when we fail to give blood, sign an organ-donor card, or do any of the other things that could save lives. Common sense (...) tells us that, while we may not kill people, our duty to give them aid is much more limited. Some philosophers, however, have argued that common sense is wrong about this. They have defended the Equivalence Thesis, which says that killing and letting die are equally bad. This is a more specific version of the idea that there is no moral difference between making something happen and allowing it to happen. The Equivalence Thesis is a radical conception that would require changes in our ordinary moral beliefs. If it is true, then obviously our duty to give aid is much stronger than we commonly assume. But our views about other matters, such as euthanasia, will also be affected. Many people believe that “passive euthanasia”--allowing terminal patients to die, rather than pointlessly prolonging their lives--is sometimes permissible; but they also believe that killing patients is always wrong. If the Equivalence Thesis is true, this combination of beliefs is inconsistent. The idea behind the Equivalence Thesis is not that every individual case of letting die is equally as bad as every individual case of killing. Obviously, if we compare an ordinary murder--say, a man killing his wife out of jealousy--with the actions of a physician who humanely permits a suffering patient to die, the murder is much worse. Rather, the idea is that the difference between killing and letting die does not itself make a difference to the moral assessment of the actions. Other factors may still be important. (shrink)

Debates over how best to ensure appropriate conduct in battle typically draw a binary distinction between rule compliance and rule violation. This framing is problematic, excluding a critical third element of battlefield conduct, supererogation—that is, positive acts that go beyond what is demanded by the explicit rules of war. This article investigates this moral category of action; specifically, situations in which combatants refrain from taking the life of an enemy despite their moral and legal license to do so. It first (...) considers the moral tension between the duty of combatants to kill and battlefield mercy, and goes on to explore the factors that motivate the latter. The article then shifts to consider the significance of supererogation to the ongoing efforts to moderate the conduct of contemporary war. As the article illustrates, supererogatory restraint is constituted by values that when cultivated also incentivize adherence to the more explicit rules and standards of the battlefield. This is demonstrated through analysis of the conduct of Western special forces. The concept of supererogation is of further use when evaluating the origins and implications of “moral injury.” This is verified empirically in the context of armed unmanned aerial vehicles. (shrink)

This book sets stories of morally decent actions in a wider context of the essential barbarism of war. It charts the wider path of obscenity and atrocity in war to highlight moments of moral grace, of goodwill toward the enemy and civilians inside a frame of jarring ugliness and malice. It does not seek traditional war heroes or elevate anyone to secular sainthood. It presents ordinary people caught up in the extraordinary swirl of war, who did not see themselves as (...) saints or heroes at the time yet showed rare courage, notwithstanding. It presents portraits of everyday folk who reacted in a moment of crisis with mercy and sensitivity, with empathy for shared humanity with an enemy or the innocent. The goal is to recognize those brave few who refused immoral acts and orders, even at grave personal risk. Who in the midst of degradation and dehumanization saw common humanity, then chose not to pull the trigger. And others who put themselves outside suffocating conformity, to help rather than kill a wounded enemy or stop an atrocity. And those who made a simple gesture of kindness to a suffering enemy that had no larger consequence. Uninterested in saints, it looks to map a more modest, achievable and relatable lesson taken from the annals of war: an accounting best captured in a simple yet compelling word 'decency.'. (shrink)

This article provides an ethical evaluation of the CIA's use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to target so-called terror suspects and insurgents. It utilises Christian informed deontological and virtue-ethical criteria to assess this practise. These criteria include just intent, charity, proportionality, moral consistency, truthfulness, mercy, courage and prudence. The article concludes that the UAV target programme is morally problematic. The United States’ ‘kill not capture’ policy as exemplified in the use of ‘signature’ strikes defies the virtues at stake. By using (...) UAV's as tools for preventive warfare, utilising armed UAV's that are weapons of war outside areas of armed conflict and disregarding the principles of transparency, last resort and proportionality, the United States is employing UAV's in a morally illegitimate and imprudent way, and is setting precedents that might have dire consequences for global peace and the security of future generations. (shrink)

Human attitudes about killing nonhuman animals are complex, ambivalent, and contradictory. This study attempts to elucidate those attitudes through a linguistic analysis of the terms used to refer to the killing of animals. Whereas terms used for killing human beings are highly specific and differentiated on the basis of the motivation for the killing, the nature of the participants, and evaluative and emotional content, terms used for killing animals are vague and interchangeable. Terms for animal- (...) class='Hi'>killing often background aspects of the act, making it more palatable to humans. When a term is extended from use with humans to use with animals, it lends a connotation of compassion and mercy to the killing. When a term is extended from use with animals to use with humans, it gives the killing a connotation of brutality. These findings reflect assumptions about the human "right" to take animals' lives while serving to ameliorate the negative feelings such killings evoke. (shrink)

This essay explores what we might mean by good and evil, and argues that these terms remain salient for a critical, socio-historical, understanding of criminal law. It draws upon a meta-ethics of freedom and solidarity to explain what good means in recent mercy killing cases in England and Wales, and what evil means in Arendt’s phrase, the ‘banality of evil’.

Battlefield euthanasia, the purposeful killing of wounded soldiers (or even civi- lians) in order to hasten their foreseeable death, has been an issue in military medicine and in soldiers’ moral codes at all times. During conflicts since anti- quity, there have been severely wounded who would not die immediately but whose fate seemed clear, nevertheless. But can it ever be morally justified to kill those wounded out of mercy in order to end their suffering? Can death ever be (...) the better option? And if so, what conditions have to be fulfilled? This paper investigates some of the moral aspects of battlefield euthanasia. Analogies to physician-assisted suicide in civil settings will be drawn and contrasted with the additional aspects that the military environment adds to the problem. (shrink)

Euthanasia or mercy killing is, now a day, a major problem widely discussed in medical field. Medical professionals are facing dilemma to take decision regarding their incompetent patient while tend to do euthanasia. The dilemma is by nature moral i.e. whether it is morally permissible or not. In some countries of Europe and in some provinces of USA euthanasia is legally permitted fulfilling some conditions. It is claimed by Rachels that in our practical medical practice we do euthanasia (...) by forbidding patients from taking drugs. He concludes that if that type of euthanasia can be practiced in our society without any hesitation then why assisting euthanasia will not be permitted1. There are so many arguments both pro and con of euthanasia. But it is not the function of the current paper to discuss all the arguments. Philippa Foot in her article „Euthanasia‟ and J Velleman in his article titled as „A Right to Self-termination‟ discussed about the permissibility of euthanasia. The objective of the paper is to justify their arguments and then come to a conclusion regarding the permissibility of euthanasia. The focus will be given mainly on non- voluntary active and non-voluntary passive euthanasia. The method of discussion will be that an example will be given from Bangladesh and then the arguments provided by Foot and Velleman in their above mentioned papers will be discussed to justify the act of euthanasia on concerned patient. In the last section of the paper the situation of Bangladesh will also be considered for the permissibility of euthanasia i.e. whether the act of euthanasia can be permitted in our country considering the existing socio-cultural-religious practice. (shrink)

Collected and edited by Noah Levin -/- Table of Contents: -/- UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TECHNOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND IMMIGRATION 1 The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings (Noah Levin) 2 What is Ethics and What Makes Something a Problem for Morality? (David Svolba) 3 Letter from the Birmingham City Jail (Martin Luther King, Jr) 4 A Defense of Affirmative Action (Noah Levin) 5 The Moral Issues of Immigration (B.M. Wooldridge) 6 The Ethics of our (...) Digital Selves (Noah Levin) -/- UNIT TWO: TORTURE, DEATH, AND THE “GREATER GOOD” 7 The Ethics of Torture (Martine Berenpas) 8 What Moral Obligations do we have (or not have) to Impoverished Peoples? (B.M. Wooldridge) 9 Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing (Nathan Nobis) 10 An Argument Against Capital Punishment (Noah Levin) 11 Common Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob) 12 Better (Philosophical) Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob) -/- UNIT THREE: PERSONS, AUTONOMY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND RIGHTS 13 Animal Rights (Eduardo Salazar) 14 John Rawls and the “Veil of Ignorance” (Ben Davies) 15 Environmental Ethics: Climate Change (Jonathan Spelman) 16 Rape, Date Rape, and the “Affirmative Consent” Law in California (Noah Levin) 17 The Ethics of Pornography: Deliberating on a Modern Harm (Eduardo Salazar) 18 The Social Contract (Thomas Hobbes) -/- UNIT FOUR: HAPPINESS 19 Is Pleasure all that Matters? Thoughts on the “Experience Machine” (Prabhpal Singh) 20 Utilitarianism (J.S. Mill) 21 Utilitarianism: Pros and Cons (B.M. Wooldridge) 22 Existentialism, Genetic Engineering, and the Meaning of Life: The Fifths (Noah Levin) 23 The Solitude of the Self (Elizabeth Cady Stanton) 24 Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Douglas E. Hill) -/- UNIT FIVE: RELIGION, LAW, AND ABSOLUTE MORALITY 25 The Myth of Gyges and The Crito (Plato) 26 God, Morality, and Religion (Kristin Seemuth Whaley) 27 The Categorical Imperative (Immanuel Kant) 28 The Virtues (Aristotle) 29 Beyond Good and Evil (Friedrich Nietzsche) 30 Other Moral Theories: Subjectivism, Relativism, Emotivism, Intuitionism, etc. (Jan F. Jacko). (shrink)

The legal consensus that has evolved through adjudication and legislation since the Karen Quinlan case in 1976 is founded on the premise that there is a bright line between passive euthanasia and active euthanasia. Indeed, the term passive euthanasia is often eschewed in favor of less emotionally-laden terminology such as "forgoing life-sustaining treatment" or "terminating life support" so as to further sever any possible connection with active euthanasia. Legal approval has been bestowed upon passive euthanasia under certain circumstances while active (...) euthanasia is routinely condemned. This consensus was put to a test in 1990 when the United States Supreme Court ruled on the Cruzan case. However, the Court's narrow decision did not upset the consensus, and in the most significant appellate decisions handed down by state courts since Cruzan, there has been a reaffirmation-and possibly even an extension-of the consensus. Two other threats to the legal consensus about forgoing life-sustaining treatment have begun to manifest themselves: the increasing pressure for mercy killing and "futility" cases. Both of these challenge the fundamental premises on which the consensus is grounded. (shrink)

This essay explores some of the conceptual and moral issues raised by illegal actions in health care. The author first identifies several types of illegal action, concentrating on civil disobedience, conscientious objection or refusal, and evasive noncompliance. Then he sketches a framework for the moral justification of these types of illegal action. Finally, he applies the conceptual and normative frameworks to several major cases of illegal action in health care, such as "mercy killing" and some decisions not to (...) treat incompetent patients. Keywords: illegal actions, mercy killing, non-treatment of incompetent patients, civil disobedience, conscientious objection, evasive non-compliance, moral justification and disobedience, dissent in health care CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma’s writings have had a worldwide impact on discourse about the philosophy of medicine, professionalism, bioethics, healthcare ethics, and patients’ rights. Given their works’ importance, it is surprising that commentators have ignored their admission of an unresolved and troubling dilemma and inconsistency in their theory. The purpose of this article is to identify and state what problems worried them and to consider possible solutions. It is argued that their dilemma stems from their concerns about how to (...) justify professional rules restricting colleagues from performing acts they view as direct, active, and formal killings, such as physician-assisted suicide, mercy killing, and abortion. It is further argued that their inconsistency is that they both assert and deny that professional colleagues should not use their moral or theological values to impose professional restrictions on other colleagues without adequate philosophical grounds. At risk are their arguments about the nature of an internal morality for medicine, a secular and multicultural basis for medical ethics, and a nonarbitrary way to determine what acts fall outside the ends of medicine. These are arguments they claim also apply to other healthcare professions. The article begins with a brief overview of their key positions to provide the context in which they make their admission. (shrink)

Jay Rosenberg's penetrating and persuasively argued analysis of the central metaphysical and moral questions pertaining to death has been updated and revised to expand and deepen several of its key arguments and to address conceptual developments of the past fifteen years. Among the topics discussed are: Life After Death; The Limits of Theorizing; The Limits of Imagination; Death and Personhood; Values and Rights; Mercy Killing; Prolonging Life; Rational Suicide; and One's Own Death. Rosenberg's prose is lucid, lively, thoroughly (...) absorbing, and accessible to introductory-level readers. Essential reading for anyone interested in reflecting on this engaging topic. (shrink)

During spring 2009 a Swedish senior paediatric intensivist and associate professor was detained and later prosecuted for mercy-killing a child with severe brain damage. The intensivist was accused of having used high doses of thiopental after having withdrawn life-sustaining treatment when the child was imminently dying. After more than 2.5 years of investigation the physician was acquitted by the Stockholm City Court. The court additionally stated that the physician had provided good end-of-life care. Since the trial it has (...) become evident that the accusation was based on a problematic medicolegal report. Nevertheless, the event has had severe negative consequences for the physician personally and professionally, and probably also, in general, for patients in the final stage of life. This case illustrates, together with other cases, that there is a lack of correspondence between ethical soft law/healthcare law and the Penal Code. To optimise medical practice we suggest that the criminal law be carefully examined and if possible changed. Furthermore, we suggest a peer-review system for assessing medicolegal reports in cases of suspected homicide. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Table of Cases xi -- Table of legislation xv -- Introduction: Medicine Men, Outlaws and Voluntary Euthanasia 1 -- 1. To Kill or not to Kill; is that the Euthanasia Question? 9 -- Introduction-Why Euthanasia? 9 -- Dead or alive? 16 -- Euthanasia as Homicide 25 -- Euthanasia as Death with Dignity 29 -- 2. Euthanasia and Clinically assisted Death: from Caring to Killing? 35 -- Introduction 35 -- The Indefinite Continuation of Palliative Treatment 38 (...) -- Withholding or Withdrawing Treatment 44 -- The Principle of Double Effect 54 -- Physician Assisted Suicide 60 -- Mercy Killing 64 -- Conclusions 66 -- 3. Consent to Treatment but Not to Death 69 -- Introduction-Why Consent? 69 -- Without Consent 70 -- Killing and Consent 73 -- Valid Consent, Freely Given? 74 -- Old Enough to Consent 80 -- Deciding for Others 82 -- Conclusions-A Consent Too Far? 93 -- 4. Autonomy, Self-determination and Self-destruction 95 -- Introduction-Autonomous Choices 95 -- Choosing to Die-Suicide and Autonomy 100 -- Suicidal Intentions 107 -- Autonomous Clinical Discretion 110 -- Deciding to Live or Die-Whose Decision? 112 -- 5. Living Wills and the Will to Die 115 -- Introduction 115 -- I Know My Will 118 -- This is My Will 121 -- I Will Decide 128 -- Will My Will be Done? 134 -- Where There's a Will 137 -- Conclusions 143 -- 6. Is Euthanasia a Dignified Death? 145 -- Introduction-Why Dignity? 145 -- Needing Dignity 146 -- Finding Dignity 149 -- Achieving Dignity in Dying 151 -- Dignifying Death 157 -- 7. Conclusions: Dignified Life, Dignified Death and Dignified Law 165 -- Select Bibliography 175 -- Index 183. (shrink)

The Thai concern for bioethics has been stimulated by the departure of Thai medicine from its long tradition through the introduction of Western medical models. Bioethics is now being taught to Thai medical students emphasizing moral insights and principles found within Thai culture. These are to a large extent Buddhist themes. Veracity is always a duty for people in general and medical personnel in particular. Falsehoods and deception cannot be morally justified simply on the grounds that we think it is (...) good for another. Buddhism also prohibits killing. The doctrine of kamma holds that joys and sorrows are the result of one's own past actions. Kamma must run its course or will be manifest in a future life. Mercy-killing also violates the Buddhist psychology. A physician who kills subconsciously transfers his aversion to suffering to the one who embodies the suffering. Buddhist justice is understood in terms of impartiality and equal treatment. Compassion goes beyond justice to self-giving and self-denial. It is central to the path to the attainment of highest human fulfillment. Keywords: Buddhism, Thailand, veracity, euthanasia, justice, compassion, teaching CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Active Euthanasia and Assisted SuicidePat Milmoe McCarrick (bio)Although the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in its 1983 report, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, described the words and terms "euthanasia," "right to die," and "death with dignity" as slogans or code words—"empty rhetoric," (I, p. 24), the literature reviewed for this Scope Note continues to use these terms. Therefore, to (...) discuss the termination of a patient's life by a physician at the patient's request, the phrase active euthanasia is used, and the supplying of a means by a physician whereby a patient can end his or her life is referred to as assisted suicide.Euthanasia, either as the "good death" from classical Greek or "mercy killing" to end unbearable suffering in the dying, has long been a topic of interest in western civilization (III, Brody 1989). In recent years, public awareness of this discussion about control over the time of one's death has been informed by a series of well-publicized events. They include the November 1991 rejection by a vote of 54 percent to 46 percent of the Washington state Initiative 119, which would have allowed the option of requesting one's physician to "aid-in-dying" for adult patients in a "medically terminal condition" (V, Gross 1991); two medical journal articles describing physician's actions in helping bring death to two patients (V, Anonymous 1988; V, Quill 1991); Dr. Jack Kevorkian's assistance in the suicide of three women (V, Belkin 1990; V, Wilkerson 1991); and the best seller status of a how-to book on committing suicide with opiates obtained from a physician (III, Humphry 1991).For the most part, material included in the annotated bibliography in Scope Note 18 has been chosen from works published in the four years since "It's Over, Debbie" (V, Anonymous 1988) appeared in early January 1988 in the Journal of the American Medical Association.Dr. Edmund D. Pellegrino (V, 1991, pp. 3118-19) presented opposing views about active voluntary euthanasia as follows:Those who favor voluntary euthanasia argue that it is a beneficent and compassionate act; it respects autonomy by preserving the patient's control of the manner, method, [End Page 79] and timing of death; it takes the matter outside the reach of "medical power" (accessed in this Scope Note's bibliography at V, Fletcher 1973; V, Nowell-Smith 1989) and scrupulosity; and it prevents the injustice that allows some patients to choose death by refusal of life-support measures, while denying others the right to do so by active euthanasia....The opponents of active euthanasia argue that it undermines the value of, and respect for, all human life (V, Kass 1989; V, Coyle 1990; V, Singer 1990). They fear that guidelines cannot avoid sliding down the "slippery slope" to involuntary euthanasia and selective devaluation of the lives of the most vulnerable among us.... If euthanasia is legal, it is predicted that patients will feel subtle pressure to conform so as to relieve the economic and emotional burdens they impose on family and friends.Euthanasia, its opponents further argue, is socially destructive: it undermines trust in physicians, desensitizes society to killing, and imperils the ground already gained in legitimating passive euthanasia(IV, Wolf 1989).Physicians were not particularly involved with a patient's death until after World War II when participation grew in proportion to the growth of technology. Since the complex, life-sustaining equipment that could forestall death was located in a hospital, death itself became almost completely medicalized (V, Dagi 1991). For terminally ill persons who would like to die a painless death, either by their own hand or with assistance, physicians have almost a monopoly on obtaining strong drugs for distribution to patients (V, Abrams 1990).Active euthanasia for human beings is not legalized anywhere in the world (V, VonDrehle 1991). It is classified as homicide or murder in all fifty states and in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and the Phillippines (V, Nerland 1989). Twentysix states in the United States prohibit assisted suicide by statute (V, Rosenblum 1990).In 1969 in the Netherlands, a physician named Jan Hendrik van... (shrink)

I found a manin a roomsprawl awkwardat a dying angletickingat his bed’s endat his life’s endpast the end of his witsand his wife’sin a roomround the end of their lives.He trembled his vows againheld his cachectic bellepast her life’s endtheir last toast the mercy kill.I found himticking slowlyshe colddeliveredwaiting on his life.His survivalobliging inquiryof motiveof methodI hurriedhim off to hergentlest of homicides.Two mounds in a room, coolingpast fear, post suicide.

A questionnaire survey was conducted at the annual meeting of the Japanese Society for Hospice and Home Care to study attitudes toward euthanasia. Respondents were asked how they agreed with the doctor's decision regarding several forms of euthanasia in hypothetical clinical situations dealing with terminal and non-terminal patients. Their acceptance of euthanasia was correlated with respect to patient's autonomy. Results showed 54% and 62% of respondents agreed with voluntary and non-voluntary passive euthanasia at the terminal stage, respectively. Indirect euthanasia was (...) accepted by 71%. In voluntary active euthanasia, 21% agreed with the doctor's act. In non-voluntary active euthanasia, 13% and 37% agreed with the use of potassium chloride and sedative, respectively. In dealing with a quadriplegic patient, 18% and 37% agreed with voluntary active euthanasia with a sedative and voluntary passive euthanasia. Voluntary passive euthanasia in the terminal stage and voluntary active and passive euthanasia and mercy killing were more likely to be favoured by the respondents who respected patient's autonomy than those who did not. (shrink)

Attitudes towards euthanasia and death-with-dignity of people who participated in the seminar on "life" were studied with questionnaires before and after a lecture regarding these issues. The results indicated that the number of the participants who accepted patient's autonomy increased after the lecture. However, the respondents who accepted the idea of patient's autonomy were less likely to accept euthanasia in general or wish for it in their own case. These data suggest that in this Japanese group, the acceptance of euthanasia (...) may stem from a form of mercy-killing as part of cultural and historical background, not from the autonomy principle. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the view that the requested euthanasia of adults is morally permissible and should be legalised; I use an argument from analogy which compares physician-assisted euthanasia with morally less ambiguous and, in my opinion, an acceptable instance of mercy killing. I also respond to several objections that either try to prove that the instance of mercy killing is not acceptable, or that there is a fundamental difference between these two cases of (...) class='Hi'>killing. Furthermore, in the remainder of the paper I defend the moral permissibility and legalisation of euthanasia against several objections that appeared in local disputes on this issue, based on the concepts of the limits of freedom, the slippery slope, and the needlessness of euthanasia. (shrink)

This paper is divided into three sections. The first presents some examples of the killing/letting die distinction. The second draws a further distinction between what I call negative and positive cases of acting or refraining. Here I argue that the moral significance of the acting/refraining distinction is different for positive and for negative cases. In the third section I apply the above distinction to euthanasia, and argue that mercy killing should be regarded as analogous to positive rather (...) than negative cases. On the basis of this, I then support active rather than passive euthanasia. (shrink)

This deeply informed history traces the controversial record of "mercy-killing," a source of heated debate among doctors and laypeople alike. Dowbiggin examines evolving opinions about what constitutes a good death, taking into account the societal and religious values placed on sin, suffering, resignation, judgment, penance, and redemption. He also examines the bitter struggle between those who stress a right to compassionate and effective end-of-life care and those who define human life in terms of either biological criteria, utilitarian standards, (...) a faith in science, humane medical treatment, the principle of personal autonomy, or individual human rights. Considering both the influence of technological and behavioral changes in the practice of medicine and the public's surprising lack of awareness of death's many clinical and biological dimensions, this book raises profound personal and collective questions on the future of euthanasia. (shrink)

Several cases which have been considered by the courts in recent years have highlighted the legal dilemmas facing doctors whose decisions result in the ending of a patient's life. This paper considers the case of Dr Cox, who was convicted of attempting to murder one of his patients, and explores the roles of motive, diminished responsibility and consent in cases of "mercy killing". The Cox decision is compared to that of Tony Bland and Janet Johnstone, in which the (...) patients were in a persistent vegetative state. In all three cases, the doctors believed that their patients' quality of life was so poor that their continued existence was of no benefit to them, and decided that their lives should not be unduly prolonged, yet the doctor who was prosecuted was the one whose dying patient had requested that her death be hastened. The paper examines the law's seemingly contradictory approaches to such cases. (shrink)

This essay argues that critical realism provides a philosophical perspective from which to talk about good and evil. It draws on dialectical critical realism’s meta-ethics of freedom and solidarity, and the different grades of freedom identified there: from the basic spontaneity in agency to the possibility of a fully flourishing, eudaimonic social condition. It argues that evil acts can be understood as those which fundamentally deny basic human freedom (spontaneity) and solidarity, and that good acts are those which affirm human (...) flourishing and solidarity. It draws upon Hannah Arendt’s depiction of what was morally evil in the Holocaust, and recent English criminal trials involving mercy killing to depict the good. It suggests that moral framing in terms of good and evil lies beyond the terms in which modern law thinks of human actions. (shrink)

Epicurus wrote that death cannot be bad for a person who dies, since when someone dies they no longer exist to be the subject of harm. But his conclusion also applies in the converse: Death cannot be good for someone, since after their death they will not exist to be the subject of benefit. This conclusion is troubling when it is brought to bear on the question of physician assisted suicide. If Epicurus is right, as I think he is, then (...) it means that even when someone is dying of a long and painful illness, we cannot say that they would be better off dead. I defend this conclusion by first presenting Epicurus’s argument, and defending it against some of its more important contemporary critics. I then re-examine the conclusion that someone cannot be better off dead by looking at the issue of mercy killing and euthanasia. Drawing on the work of philosophers who examine the ethics of animal euthanasia, I argue that killing someone who is suffering severe agony can be good, but it cannot be good for the person who suffers – it is just good in itself. This, I think, is why we have the intuitions that we do around physician assisted suicide: we are mistaken about the idea that someone can be better off dead, but we can be correct in thinking that sometimes someone’s death is good. (shrink)

Recently, Bonnie Steinbock has argued that there is still not a convincing case to support the legalisation of doctor-assisted suicide.1 The argument is framed in consequentialist terms: rather than contend that there is something intrinsically wrong with mercy killing itself, caution is recommended because of the risk that a system may be open to sufficient abuse to warrant its non-implementation. A welcome criticism is made of partisanship that obstructs useful progress in the debate, which she suggests should be (...) based on objective, empirical evidence on both the need for, and the risks associated with, legalised doctor-assisted suicide.1 The main presumption underlying Professor Steinbock’s argument is that a proportionately large number of people would become vulnerable to great and unacceptable harm under a regime that was not strictly regulated. She asserts certain values, which, on a consequentialist calculation, support her conclusion that currently the case for legalisation is not made.Here I would like to question how useful objective, empirical data can be. Although data that show some assertions to be objectively right or wrong may be obtained and are doubtless valuable, I will show that the debate on assisted suicide is unavoidably partisan and that the protagonists will therefore receive data differently, necessarily because of their moral and philosophical convictions. Steinbock would like the question of legalisation to “turn on objective, empirical evidence about both the need for PAS [physician-assisted suicide] and the risk of mistake and abuse.”1 But to be understood, the concepts of “need” and “abuse” require pre-existing value judgements. Furthermore, even if the values of these concepts are quantifiable, they are probably parts of distinct metrics, so offsetting one against the other will become a matter of qualitative assessment. This does not entirely disvalue the use of objective data, but it means that the …. (shrink)

After briefly narrating the evolution of Western ethical reflections on suicide and euthanasia, I argue that because people have a prima facie right not to be killed, it is usually unethical to kill anyone who poses no imminent lethal threat to others or who has not committed a capital crime. But I’m also persuaded that some instances of mercy killing in war are not only morally justifiable, they can be more ethical than allowing someone to die in agony (...) and distress from their wounds. Thus I am uncomfortable with the current strict prohibition on battlefield euthanasia in the Geneva Conventions, which I think unfairly punishes some morally justified acts. But after considering the potential consequences of legalizing battlefield euthanasia, I conclude nonetheless that it is best to leave the prohibition intact. (shrink)

The problem of physician-assisted death, assisted suicide and active euthanasia, has been debated predominantly in the ethically familiar vocabulary of rights, duties, and consequences. Patient autonomy and the right to die with dignity vie with the duty of physicians to heal, but not to kill, and the specter of “the slippery slope” from voluntary euthanasia as a last resort for patients suffering from terminal illness to PAD on demand and mercy killing of “hopeless” incompetent patients. Another dimension of (...) the debate over PAD concerns the evaluative question of what constitutes a good death. At stake are Issues of character and virtue in the face of death and dying and their Implications for legitimizing the practice of PAD. Critics of PAD argue that “natural” death in the context of comfort care, as provided by hospice programs, is the good death. In contrast, PAD amounts to an easy way out, an evasion of the ultimate human challenge and task of dying. Because hospice care is clearly preferable to PAD, the former should be encouraged and the latter remain prohibited. (shrink)

Well and Good presents a combination of "classic" and little-known but real-life cases. Included are a range of cases involving nurses and other health professionals as well as many involving doctors. The cases in the main body of the book are accompanied by the editors' impartial discussions of the issues involved. The final section is comprised of unanalysed cases for further study. For the new edition, the introduction has been expanded to include discussions of feminist bioethics and of virtue ethics, (...) alongside the Kantian, Rossian and utilitarian frameworks discussed in previous editions. Most of the existing cases have been updated to reflect these additional foci, and four analysed cases have been added. Several cases have been added to the group of unanalysed cases, which now includes questions for discussion. Among cases new to this edition are the "mercy killing" case of Robert Latimer, the assisted suicide of Sue Rodriguez, the pregnancy solvent-abuse case of Ms. G., and a case involving sex-selection and abortion on gender grounds. (shrink)

Questions concerning the role of doctors, abortion, mercy killings and genetics are troubling and highly problematic. They require a thorough examination and careful probing. This volume takes a step towards tackling them. Its design is both interdisciplinary and comparative, offerin g philosophical, legal and medical perspectives of scholars from North America, Europe and Israel who analyze how their respective countries try to cope with and find answers for pressing concerns.

A genuine bioethics would be fiercely devoted to human life (bios) and would express that devotion by articulating as well as advocating moral virtues that rigorously protect that value against the temptation to see life in purely instrumental terms. In my view, no genuine bioethics exists today. In what follows, I will question two fundamental assumptions often presumed in discussions of euthanasia and assisted suicide. These are (i) the agent does will her victim (i.e., her putative beneficiary) some significant human (...) good, e.g., relief from pain, escape from becoming a burden to loved ones, a dignified death, or simply self-determination; (ii) in purposely helping someone to kill herself or in killing her for her own good, the agent wills her no serious harm. Put differently, I question the assumption of ‘mercy’ in so-called ‘mercy-killing’. (shrink)

You have not opened the wrong journal!The police have a duty to protect the public and to investigate any, and all, serious crimes. The article by Lynøe and Leijonhufvud raises important issues about the interaction between hospital staff and police in cases in which suggested medical negligence crosses into the arena of serious legal offences, which range from murder and homicide to serious assault.1Although arising in Sweden, the issues raised in this case are generalisable. While our understanding is limited to (...) the journal article there seem several uncontested facts: a children's intensive care doctor was arrested, charged and acquitted of the mercy killing of an infant in a Swedish hospital. The baby had sustained severe brain injury prior to this clinician's involvement, either due to birth asphyxia or to an accidental overdose of salt. The baby died after withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment with parental agreement. At a later stage, the family asked the police to investigate the initial salt incident. Despite the team attending the baby after WLST stating that only a morphine infusion was administered, a 25-day postmortem femoral artery sample showed ‘an extremely high level of thiopentone’ , although no control sample was analysed.Healthcare staff are subject to the laws of their country. However, Lynøe and Leijonhufvud raise the issue of a conflict between what they term ‘soft law’—the rules, regulations and ethics of healthcare practice and the law of the land. …. (shrink)

This paper studies the connections between the notions of prolonging life and a good death in Antiquity. It is demonstrated that while prolonged life generally meant forestalling the human constitution’s death, ancient philosophers also pointed to the limitations of prolongation. The paper shows how philosophers welcomed prolonged life when it was shown to foster movement toward the good, such as self-realization and social usefulness. Yet, they rejected prolongation when it led to the perpetuation of evil, such as social uselessness and (...) suffering. We ask whether a contemporary good death is a mercy killing or an improvement of prolonged life, as the ultimate end of “goods practicable for man”. (shrink)

The attitude towards death and dying reflects the society’s view on a human being as a subject. Due to the progress in medical science a growing interest has been observed in the problem of death, including the right to dignified dying. One of the issues connected with the phenomenon of dying is the problem of euthanasia seen as one’s right to decide on one’s own death in extreme cases. The question of the legality of euthanasia is becoming a subject of (...) consideration more and more often, which is a result of a celebratory culture of death and the obsolescence of faith and religious practice. The aim of the following report is to show the attitude of major religions of the world towards euthanasia. What arguments of religious nature are against the legality of mercy killing? Both Christian and non-Christian religions rise to speak on the matter. All religions stress their veto over mercy killing, justifying their view in various ways. Christians claim that God is the donor and lord of life; a man cannot decide on ending human life as he or she is only the user, not the owner of it. Judaism assumes that human life has an absolute value, is sacred, untouchable, as God’s gift. Islam, quoting Koran, also preserves life as God’s gift. According to Buddhist ethics, the annihilation of both one’s own and someone else’s life is the worst of evil deeds. Will the arguments of religious nature mean enough to stop the legality of euthanasia? (shrink)

La eutanasia entendida como muerte por misericordia tiene un contexto puramente moral que determina las posturas asumidas ante los problemas y las discusiones que esta problemática presenta. Se pregunta por la contribución de la filosofía en el propósito de aclarar y demostrar de qué modo las diferentes opiniones y posiciones remiten a diversas creencias morales. En el discurso se consideran principalmente tres concepciones: 1) la concepción cristiana que tiene por fundamento moral: sólo la vida humana es sagrada y toda vida (...) humana es santa; 2) la concepción de la moral moderna que se basa en fundamentos naturales, a saber, el efecto natural de la compasión, que durante la trama tejida se reconocerá como utilitarismo, y, 3) el interés racional que todos los hombres tienen de observar unas normas bajo la asunción que todos los otros harán lo mismo. Estas concepciones se sustentarán a partir del análisis argumentativo de las mismas con especial énfasis en la creencia moral de la cual se derivan. (shrink)

The paper classifies euthanasia and discusses its typological presence in storytelling video games. It aims to illustrate the importance of experiencing simulated moral challenges in the context of gameworlds as a significantly influential, exponentially growing form of interactive media. In contrast to older works of art and media, such as film and literature, the difference should be emphasized in light of the player’s ability to make choices in video games. Although the influence of gameworld content depends on the player, the (...) experiences and knowledge gained from playing storytelling video games may influence the player’s problem-solving orientation in the landscape of difficult moral dilemmas they may encounter throughout their lives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:714 BOOK REVIEWS The End of Life. By JAMES RACHELS. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Pp. 204. The rise of advanced medical technologies, especially life-sustaining ones, has brought to center stage the hioethical issues which arise in acute and long-term care contexts. Especially pressing have been problems about the nature and permissibility of euthanasia. Roughly speaking, there are two major views about euthanasia. The traditional view holds that it (...) is wrong intentionally to kill an innocent human being, hut that, given certain circumstances, it is permissible to withhold or withdraw treatment and allow a patient to die. A more radical view, embraced by groups like the Hemlock Society and the Society for the Right to Die, denies that there is a morally significant distinction between passive and active euthanasia. Further, mercy killing, assisted suicide, and the like are permissible. James Rachels's hook is the most articulate expression of the radical view. The work contains 'ten chapters which can he broken down into l:wo main sections. In chapters one through four, Rachels draws a distinction between what he calls biographical and biological life, and he maintains that, whereas ithe traditional view places emphasis on the latter, the former is what should he considered in euthanasia cases. In chapters five through ten, the distinction between active and passive euthanasia is analyzed. Rachels argues that ithere is no distinction between the two and that euthanasia is permissible in certain circumstances. Chapter one traces the rise of the traditional view in the west from 1the Greeks and Romans to the development of Christanity. According to Rachels, the Greeks and Romans allowed aotive euthanasia-infanticide, suicide-in some cases, because they believed that life held little value apart from the chance of a meaningful or happy existence. But the coming of Christianity caused the traditional doctrine to arise. Until Augustine, the Church taught ·that all killing was wrong. But Christendom during Augustine's time made a politically expedient decision to change its views in 1the face of pressure from the state. The Church adopted the position that all taking of innocent human life was wrong. Two observations should be made here. First, Rachels would have a difficult time proving that the Church changed its views for reasons of political expediency. He makes no attempt to analyze the theological aspects of the situation during Augustine's time, e.g. the shift from a premillenial to an amillenial eschatology with a concomitant change in how the two kingdoms should he related, Second, and more importantly, Rachels discussion of 1the Greeks and Romans contains a serious BOOK REVIEWS 715 omission which is quite revealing in light of later chapters. He does not distinguish happiness and the good life in its formal and material aspects. For many Greek and Roman thinkers, e.g. Aristotle, happiness was more than a mere formal principle. It contained substantive content, viz. the progressive embodiment of intellectual and moral virtues. For Rachels, the good life is whatever an individual finds to be in his own best interests. Chapter.two focuses on the sanctity of life. After surveying eastern views (all life is equally sacred, including that of insects), Rachels criticizes the sanctity-of-life view. As it is expressed in Christianity, this view, as understood by Rachels, holds that all human life is sacred merely because it is biological human life. Being homo sapiens is what gives value to human life. According to Rachels, this is a mistaken understanding of why life is valuable. The sanctity of life should he construed as protecting biographical life, not mere biological life. One's life has value from tlie individual's point of view because he has a biographical life; that is, he can pursue interests and goals that are important to him. The importance of being alive is derivative from the importance of having a life. The traditional view, says Rachels, has lost sight of the point of the rule against killing. H we fail to ask for the purpose of a moral rule, we may sometimes fulfill its letter by going against its spirit. For example, we are taught to drive on,the right side of the road. But if we... (shrink)