Judgments of blame for others are typically sensitive to what an agent knows and desires. However, when people act negligently, they do not know what they are doing and do not desire the outcomes of their negligence. How, then, do people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing? We propose that people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing based on perceived mental control, or the degree to which an agent guides their thoughts and attention over time. To acquire information about others’ (...) mental control, people self-project their own perceived mental control to anchor third-personal judgments about mental control and concomitant responsibility for negligent wrongdoing. In four experiments (N = 841), we tested whether perceptions of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Study 1 showed that the ease with which people can counterfactually imagine an individual being non-negligent mediated the relationship between judgments of control and blame. Studies 2a and 2b indicated that perceived mental control has a strong effect on judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and that first-personal judgments of mental control are moderately correlated with third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Finally, we used an autobiographical memory manipulation in Study 3 to make personal episodes of forgetfulness salient. Participants for whom past personal episodes of forgetfulness were made salient judged negligent wrongdoers less harshly compared to a control group for whom past episodes of negligence were not salient. Collectively, these findings suggest that first-personal judgments of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and indicate a novel role for counterfactual thinking in the attribution of responsibility. (shrink)

Mental control refers to the ability we have to control our own minds. Its primary expression—attention—has become a popular topic for philosophers in the past few decades, generating the need for a primer on the concept. It is related to self-control, which typically refers to the maintenance of preferred behavior in the face of temptation. While a distinct concept, criticisms of self-control can also be applied to mental control, such as that it implies (...) the existence of an unscientific homunculus-like agent or is not a natural kind. Yet, as this Element suggests, a scientifically-grounded account of mental control remains possible. The manuscript is organized into five main sections, which cover 1) the concept of mental control, 2) the relationship between mental control and attention, 3) the phenomena of meditation and mindwandering, 4) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and 5) emergence-based accounts of mental control, including an original account by the author. (shrink)

Sometimes it feels as though we can control our minds. We catch ourselves looking out the window when we should be paying attention to someone talking, for example, and we purposefully return our attention to the conversation. Or we wrest our minds away from the bothersome thought of an upcoming dental appointment to focus on anything we can find that makes us less nervous. Control attempts such as these can meet with success, leaving us feeling the masters of (...) our consciousness. Yet at other times.. (shrink)

For the first time, this volume brings together the research and theories of psychologists whose work explores the processes and strategies that are involved when people attempt to control their own thoughts, moods, and behavior. It covers the multiple dimensions of mental control - its causes, consequences, and components, and draws on current research within social, personality, cognitive, developmental, and clinical psychology. For professionals in the field of behavior analysis.

Drawing on theories of William James, Freud, and Dewey, as well as on studies in mood control, cognitive therapy, and artificial intelligence, this...

According to a standard picture of agency, a person’s actions always reflect what they most desire, and many theorists extend this model to mental illness. In this chapter, I pin down exactly where this “volitional” view goes wrong. The key is to recognize that human motivational architecture involves a regulatory control structure: we have both spontaneous states (e.g., automatically-elicited thoughts and action tendencies, etc.) as well as regulatory mechanisms that allow us to suppress or modulate these spontaneous states. (...) Our regulatory abilities, however, are bounded. Mental illnesses, I argue, arise precisely where these bounds are reached, thus allowing inappropriate spontaneous states to regularly manifest in thought and action. I conclude that the volitional view of mental illness is wrong: when a person with mental illness reaches the limits of control, what they do often does not reflect what they most prefer. (shrink)

I introduce the notion of a ‘control variable’ which gives us a way of seeing how mental causation could be an unproblematic case of causation in general, rather than being some sui generis form of causation. Psychological variables may be the control variables for a system for which there are no physical control variables, even in a deterministic physical world. That explains how there can be psychological causation without physical causation, even in a deterministic physical world.

The brain's reliance on glucose as a primary fuel source is well established, but psychological models of cognitive processing that take energy supply into account remain uncommon. One exception is research on self-control depletion, where debate continues over a limited-resource model of self-control depletion. This model argues that transient reduction in self-control after exertion of prior self-control is caused by the depletion of brain glucose, and that self-control processes are special, perhaps unique, in this regard. (...) This model has been argued to be physiologically implausible in several recent reviews. This paper attempts to correct some inaccuracies that have occurred during debate over the physiological plausibility of this model. We contend that not only is such limitation of cognition by constraints on glucose supply plausible, it is well established in the neuroscience literature across several cognitive domains. Conversely, we argue that there is no evidence that self-control is special in regard to its metabolic cost. Mental processes require physical energy, and the body is limited in its ability to supply the brain with sufficient energy to fuel mental processes. This article reviews current findings in brain metabolism and seeks to resolve the current conflict in the field regarding the physiological plausibility of the self-control glucose-depletion hypothesis. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for two main hypotheses. First, that self-control is not a natural mental kind and, second, that there is no dedicated mechanism of self-control. By the first claim, I simply mean that those behaviors we label as “self-controlled” are a somewhat arbitrarily selected hodgepodge that do not have anything in common that distinguishes them from other behaviors. In other words, self-control is a gerrymandered property that does not correspond to a natural (...) class='Hi'>mental or psychological kind. By the second claim, I mean that self-controlled behaviors are not produced by a mechanism that is not utilized in the production of other behaviors. Not only is there no natural mental property of self-control, there is no mechanism that is dedicated to producing self-controlled behavior. I further evaluate whether this account of self-control has enough explanatory power to account for a range of phenomena related to self-control. I argue that my account does a better job of explaining these phenomena than accounts which appeal to a dedicated self-control mechanism. (shrink)

Aesthetic evaluations of human bodies have important implications for moral recognition and for individuals’ access to social and material goods. Unfortunately, there is a widespread aesthetic disregard for non-white bodies. Aesthetic evaluations depend on the aesthetic properties we regard objects as having. And it is widely agreed that aesthetic properties are directly accessed in our experience of aesthetic objects. How, then, might we explain aesthetic evaluations that systematically favour features associated with white identity? Critical race philosophers, like Alia Al-Saji, Mariana (...) Ortega, Paul C. Taylor, and George Yancy, argue that this is because the perception of racialized bodies is affected by the social structures in which they are appreciated. The aim of this paper is to propose how social structures can affect aesthetic perception. I argue that mental imagery acquired through the interaction with aesthetic phenomena structures the perception of non-aesthetic properties of bodies, so that aesthetic properties consistent with racist stereotypes are attributed to individuals. (shrink)

Aesthetic evaluations of human bodies have important implications for moral recognition and for individuals’ access to social and material goods. Unfortunately, there is a widespread aesthetic disregard for non-white bodies. Aesthetic evaluations depend on the aesthetic properties we regard objects as having. And it is widely agreed that aesthetic properties are directly accessed in our experience of aesthetic objects. How, then, might we explain aesthetic evaluations that systematically favour features associated with white identity? Critical race philosophers, like Alia Al-Saji, Mariana (...) Ortega, Paul C. Taylor, and George Yancy, argue that this is because the perception of racialized bodies is affected by the social structures in which they are appreciated. The aim of this paper is to propose how social structures can affect aesthetic perception. I argue that mental imagery acquired through the interaction with aesthetic phenomena structures the perception of non-aesthetic properties of bodies, so that aesthetic properties consistent with racist stereotypes are attributed to individuals. (shrink)

Many philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about action and its explanation. Furthermore, current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action has it that intentions play a causal role with respect to the etiology and explanation of action. But action theory is not without its heretics. Some philosophers have challenged the orthodox view. In this paper I examine and critique one such challenge. I consider David-Hillel Ruben's case against the need for intentions to play a causal role (...) in the etiology and explanation of mental actions. Contra Ruben, I defend the orthodox view that intentions play an indispensable causal and explanatory role with respect to mental actions. (shrink)

The instrumental model offered by Müller & Schumann (M&S) is broadened to apply not only to drugs, but also to other methods of self-control, including the use of mental constructs to produce adaptive changes in behavior with the possibility of synergistic interactions between various instruments.

I argue in this essay that the phenomena we classify as "mental illness" result largely from the refusal of socially authorized "experts" to recognize - and thus to constitute - the Other as a subject. I suggest that Institutional Mental Health refuses to do this not merely because it seeks to aggrandize its own power but also because it fears to acknowledge that we are all participants in a process of historical development. It denies this because it is (...) historically conditioned by its own moment of origin in the project of the Enlightenment, It is conseqently wed to an ethos of rationalized order that does not accomodate, much less support, the unpredictable creative power of the Other and that sustains instead the project of mastery, of domination, of disovering eternal laws that will enable Reason to master history and to master the Other. For this reason Institutional Mental Health and its diverse ideologies, ranging from the pyschoanalytic to genetic defect models, constitute a major obstacle to the evolution of humanity. (shrink)

Contents: PART I BASIC ASPECTS AND VARIETIES OF CONTROL: - Emotion, Cognition, and Control: Limits of Intentionality - Self-Efficacy: The Foundation of Agency - The Orchestration of Selection, Optimization and Compensation: An Action-Theoretical Conceptualization of a Theory of Developmental Regulation - Freedom of the Will -- the Basis of Control. PART II CONSCIOUS, AUTOMATIC, AND CONTROLLED PROCESSES: - Automatic and Controlled Uses of Memory in Social Judgments - Are Controlled Processes Conscious? - Intuition and Levels of (...) class='Hi'>Control: The Non-Rational Way of Reacting, Adapting, and Creating. PART III PERCEPTION, KNOWLEDGE, MEMORY, AND LEARNING: - The Issue of Control in Sensory and Perceptual Processes: Attention Selects and Modulates the Visual Input - The Control of Knowledge Activation in Discourse Comprehension - Working Memory and Attentional Control - Problem-Oriented Learning: Facilitating the Use of Domain-Specific and Control Strategies through Modeling by an Expert - The Role of Cognitive Structure in the Development of Behavioral Control: A Dynamic Skills Approach. (shrink)

While temporal preparation has frequently been examined through the manipulation of foreperiods, the role of force level during temporal preparation remains underexplored. In our study, we propose to manipulate mental training of attentional control in order to shed light on the role of the force level and autonomic nervous system in the temporal preparation of an action. Forty subjects, divided into mental training group (n = 20) and without mental training group (n = 20), participated in (...) this study. The influence of the attentional control and force levels on the autonomic nervous system were measured using the skin conductance response and the heart rate variability; the accuracy of the motor responses was measured using a method derived from machine learning. Behaviorally, only the mental training group reinforced its motor and attentional control. When using short foreperiod durations and high force level, motor and attentional control decreased, consistent with the dominant sympathetic system. This resulted in an increased anticipation rate of responses with a higher reaction time compared to the long foreperiods duration and low force level, in which the reaction time significantly decreased, with enhancement of the expected force level, showing consistency with the dominant parasympathetic system. Interestingly, results revealed a predictive relationship between the sympathovagal balance and motor and attentional control during the long foreperiods and low force level. Finally, results demonstrate that attentional mental training leads to the reinforcement of interactions between the autonomic nervous system and attentional processes which are involved in the temporal preparation of a force task. (shrink)

The term “mental illness” implies that persons with such illnesses are more likely to be dangerous to themselves and/or others than are persons without such illnesses. This is the source of the psychiatrist’s traditional social obligation to control “harm to self and/or others,” that is, suicide and crime. The ethical dilemmas of psychiatry cannot be resolved as long as the contradictory functions of healing persons and protecting society are united in a single discipline.Life is full of dangers. Our (...) highly developed consciousness makes us, of all living forms in the universe, the most keenly aware of, and the most adept at protecting ourselves from, dangers. Magic and religion are mankind’s earliest warning systems. Science arrived on the scene only about 400 years ago, and scientific medicine only 200 years ago. Some time ago I suggested that “formerly, when religion was strong and science weak, men mistook magic for medicine; now, when science is strong and religion weak, men mistake medicine for magic”.1We flatter and deceive ourselves if we believe that we have outgrown the apotropaic use of language .Many people derive comfort from magical objects , and virtually everyone finds reassurance in magical words . The classic example of an apotropaic is the word “abracadabra,” which The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines as “a magical charm or incantation having the power to ward off disease or disaster”. In the ancient world, abracadabra was a magic word, the letters of which were arranged in an inverted pyramid and worn as an amulet around the neck to protect the wearer against disease or trouble. One fewer letter appeared in each line of the pyramid, until only the letter “a” remained to form the vertex of the triangle. As …. (shrink)

BackgroundMental illness among Malaysian children is gradually reaching a fundamentally alarming point as it persistently shows increasing trend. The existing literature on the etiologies of children’s mental illness, highlights the most common cause to be ineffective or impaired parenting. Thus, efforts to combat mental illness in children should focus on improving the quality of parenting. Documented interventional studies focusing on this issue, particularly in Malaysia, are scarce and commonly report poor treatment outcomes stemming from inconvenient face-to-face instructions. Consequently, (...) proposing an accessible online and digital-assisted parenting program is expected to reach a larger number of parents, as it can overcome substantial barriers. Hence, this study aims to develop a universal digital-assisted preventive parenting intervention called DaPI, that aims to enhance mental health of children in Malaysia.MethodsA total of 200 parents of children aged 10–14 years will be recruited and randomized into two groups either intervention or waitlist-control based on a 1:1 ratio for a duration of 8 weeks. Those in the intervention group will receive eight sessions of the DaPI program that focus mainly on parenting and children’s mental health. The primary outcome of this study will essentially focus on the changes in parent-reported parenting behavior and parental self-efficacy. The secondary outcome will be changes in children’s mental health. Assessments will be arranged pre- and post-intervention as well as at the 1-month follow-up. Analyses will be conducted using a paired t-test and multivariate analysis of covariance.DiscussionThe expected outcome will be the establishment of DaPI in promoting children’s mental health by targeting changes in parenting behavior and parental self-efficacy in Malaysia. Findings from this study will be beneficial for policymakers to invest in parenting programs that could provide support to parents in enhancing their child’s overall development.Clinical trial registration[www.irct.ir], identifier [IRCT20211129053207N1]. (shrink)

Mental health surveys are used extensively in epidemiological research worldwide. The ethical questions that arise regarding their risk of causing psychological distress or other potential harm have not been studied in the general population. We have investigated how study participants serving as controls in a population-based study perceived an anonymous postal questionnaire focusing on mental health and wellbeing. Parents were contacted from the Swedish Census Bureau as part of a larger follow-up study on palliative care conducted in 2001. (...) Eligible parents had a child of the same gender, year of birth and were from the same counties in Sweden as parents who had lost a child to cancer. Five percent reported being negatively affected. The principle negative effect on participants was that self-reflection reminded them of their difficulties. Of the 418 respondents, 52% reported that they were positively affected by study participation and 95% perceived the inquiry as valuable. These findings support the use of population-based controls in future research. (shrink)

In the theoretical literature on moral responsibility, one sometimes comes across cases of manipulated agents. In cases of this type, the agent is a victim of wholesale manipulation, involving the implantation of various pro-attitudes (desires, values, etc.) along with the deletion of competing pro-attitudes. As a result of this manipulation, the agent ends up performing some action unlike any that she would have performed were it not for the manipulation. These sorts of cases are sometimes thought to motivate historical views (...) of responsibility, on which the agent’s past is relevant to whether she is responsible for a specific action. In a recent paper, Daniel Sharp and David Wasserman bring these theoretical discussions on moral responsibility to bear on practical issues regarding neurological modifications of individuals. After proposing and arguing for a historical view, Sharp and Wasserman offer some insight into how such a view may help us in determining the responsibility of subjects who have undergone Deep Brain Stimulation. This paper aims to join this discussion, by arguing that the correct historical view to be applied will also appeal to the agent’s control over her mental life and the fact that this was bypassed. I conclude with some brief comments on the practical implications of such a historical view. (shrink)

In the wake of the Stoneman Douglas School shooting, Republican and Democratic leaders—like the American electorate they represent—remain sharply divided in their responses to gun violence. They are united in their condemnation of these mass shootings, but they disagree about whether stricter or looser gun control laws are the answer. Those on the right side of the political aisle suggest that the issue is one of mental illness rather than gun control. Conversely, those who are more liberal (...) or progressive in their political learnings are quick to condemn attempts to reframe the issue of mass shootings as a mental health problem. Both sides are wrong. Mass shootings are indeed partially a mental health problem, albeit one poorly addressed by our current laws and policies. But the solution to mass shootings also needs to consider strategies that may reduce gun violence in general. (shrink)

Despite its association with individual health, few studies have focused on the relationship between adolescent self-control and individual physical and mental health in adulthood. We aimed, therefore, to explore the impact of adolescent self-control on individual physical and mental health in adulthood. We employed the dataset of China Labor-Force Dynamics Surveys [CLDS]. 13,389 respondents with an average age of 45.621 years are consisted in this study. The respondents were asked to report their adolescent self-control through (...) recall. The ordered probit and the ordinary least squares models were employed to estimate the effects of adolescent self-control on physical and mental health in adulthood, respectively. We adopted the propensity score matching method to address the self-selection bias of samples. The results indicated that adolescent self-control significantly affected individual physical health and mental health in adulthood. The mechanism analysis suggested that adolescent self-control partially promoted physical and mental health in adulthood by education and income instead of self-control in adulthood. In conclusion, paying attention to the cultivation of self-control before adulthood may be an effective way to improve individual physical and mental health in adulthood. (shrink)

The effects of mental fatigue on both cognitive and physical performance are well described in the literature, but the recovery aspects of mental fatigue have been less investigated. The present study aimed to fill this gap by examining the persistence of mental fatigue on behavior and electrophysiological mechanisms. Fifteen participants performed an arm-pointing task consisting of reaching a target as fast as possible, before carrying out a 32-min cognitively demanding task [Time Load Dual Back task], and immediately, (...) 10 and 20 min after completion of the TLDB task. During the experiment, electroencephalography was continuously recorded. The significant increase in mental fatigue feeling after the TLDB task was followed by a decrease during the 20 min of recovery without returning to premeasurement values. Brain oscillations recorded at rest during the recovery period showed an increase in both theta and alpha power over time, suggesting a persistence of mental fatigue. Arm-pointing movement duration increased gradually over time during the recovery period, indicating that behavioral performance remained impaired 20 min after the end of the cognitively demanding task. To conclude, subjective measurements indicated a partial recovery of mental fatigue following a cognitively demanding task, whereas electrophysiological and behavioral markers suggested that the effects of mental fatigue persisted for at least 20 min. While the subjective evaluation of mental fatigue is a very practical way to attest the presence of mental fatigue, electrophysiological and behavioral measures seem more relevant to evaluate the time course of mental fatigue effects. (shrink)

Since the era of deinstitutionalisation, many clinical approaches have emerged to enable the care and treatment of people suffering from mental illness. In recent years, the use of coercive approaches in the community (e.g., outpatient commitment or community treatment orders) has also increased internationally. Although nurses' role regarding these coercive approaches is central and significant, few empirical and theoretical writings have tackled this controversial nursing practice. The purpose of this paper is to analyse coercive nursing care through the lens (...) of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze's concept of ‘societies of control’. Taking up Michel Foucault's work on disciplinary power, Deleuze explores how the move from the striated spaces of closed institutions to the smooth spaces of societies of control took place since the middle of the 20th century. According to Deleuze, the overall objective of ‘societies of control’ is no longer simply to govern deviant behaviour in closed environments (e.g., psychiatric hospitals and prisons) but to ensure a regime of unrelentless surveillance in the open spaces of our communities. (shrink)

We agree with the authors that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is needed. However, we believe that the answer will not be found in a common representational structure encoding distal events, as the authors propose, but in Gibson's notion of ecological information, which, as we demonstrate, specifies not only perspective but also prospective and retrospective states of affairs.

Stress and mental ill-health carry considerable costs for both individuals and organizations. Although interventions targeting compassion and self-compassion have been shown to reduce stress and benefit mental health, related research in organizational settings is limited. We investigated the effects of a 6-week psychological intervention utilizing compassion training on stress, mental health, and self-compassion. Forty-nine employees of two organizations were randomly assigned to either the intervention or a physical exercise control condition. Multilevel growth models showed that stress (...) and mental ill-health decreased over 3 months in both groups, while self-compassion only increased in the intervention group. There were no significant effects on life satisfaction in any of the groups. The findings show promising results regarding the ability of compassion training within organizations to decrease stress and mental ill-health and increase self-compassion. (shrink)

There is a gap of knowledge about the extent to which gratitude is indeed the working mechanism of change in gratitude interventions aiming to promote mental well-being. This study explores the mediational role of gratitude as mood in the context of a recently conducted randomized controlled trial on the effects of a 6-week gratitude intervention on mental well-being in comparison with a waitlist control group. Gratitude as mood was measured at 2, 4, and 6 weeks. Both simple (...) and multiple mediation models were conducted as well as various sensitivity analyses. Results showed a gradual increase of gratitude as mood during the intervention. The effects of the 6-week gratitude intervention on mental well-being were mediated by increases of gratitude as mood at 4 weeks but not at 2 weeks. These findings suggest a dose-response relationship for gratitude interventions, but more research is warranted. (shrink)