Commentary: The Problem of Mental Action: Predictive Control Without Sensory Sheets

Frontiers in Psychology 9 (2018)
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10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01291

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A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
The Problem of Mental Action.Thomas Metzinger - 2017 - Philosophy and Predicitive Processing.

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