Mental overpopulation and mental action: Protecting intentions from mental birth control

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):49-65 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about action and its explanation. Furthermore, current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action has it that intentions play a causal role with respect to the etiology and explanation of action. But action theory is not without its heretics. Some philosophers have challenged the orthodox view. In this paper I examine and critique one such challenge. I consider David-Hillel Ruben's case against the need for intentions to play a causal role in the etiology and explanation of mental actions. Contra Ruben, I defend the orthodox view that intentions play an indispensable causal and explanatory role with respect to mental actions.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,764

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mental causation: Sustaining and dynamic.Robert N. Audi - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
How (not) to think about mental action.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):83-89.
Intentions are mental states.Jing Zhu & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242.
Actions and Their Parts.David-Hillel Ruben - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2:73-80.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
151 (#113,682)

6 months
4 (#314,058)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andrei Buckareff
Marist College

References found in this work

The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will and Freedom.Hugh McCann - 1998 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Ironic processes of mental control.Daniel M. Wegner - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (1):34-52.
Practical Reflection.Dudley Knowles - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (161):524-527.

View all 19 references / Add more references