Van Heijenoort's main contribution to history and philosophy of modern logic was his distinction between two basic views of logic, first, the absolutist, or universalist, view of the founding fathers, Frege, Peano, and Russell, which dominated the first, classical period of history of modern logic, and, second, the relativist, or model-theoretic, view, inherited from Boole, Schröder, and Löwenheim, which has dominated the second, contemporary period of that history. In my paper, I present the man Jean van Heijenoort (Sect. 1); then (...) I describe his way of arguing for the second view (Sect. 2); and finally I come down in favor of the first view (Sect. 3). There, I specify the version of universalism for which I am prepared to argue (Sect. 3, introduction). Choosing ZFC to play the part of universal, logical (in a nowadays forgotten sense) system, I show, through an example, how the usual model theory can be naturally given its proper place, from the universalist point of view, in the logical framework of ZFC; I outline another, not rival but complementary, semantics for admissible extensions of ZFC in the very same logical framework; I propose a way to get universalism out of the predicaments in which universalists themselves believed it to be (Sect. 3.1). Thus, if universalists of the classical period did not, in fact, construct these semantics, it was not that their universalism forbade them, in principle, to do so. The historical defeat of universalism was not technical in character. Neither was it philosophical. Indeed, it was hardly more than the victory of technicism over the very possibility of a philosophical dispute (Sect. 3.2). (shrink)

Prior's project of tense logic has both a formal-logical and a philosophical side. Both aspects were important for Prior. The paper suggests viewing Prior's philosophical project as a continuation of the tradition of "logic as language", or "universalism", identified by van Heijenoort and Hintikka, respectively. The label "tense-logical universalism" is chosen in order to stress Prior's emphasis on the foundational role of natural language for the three fields of logic, semantics, and philosophy of science. The paper (...) draws on Prior's works in all three mentioned areas. In particular, we comment on Prior's universalist approach to model theory, which has recently given rise to hybrid logic, and on the interesting perspective on relativity theory offered through his writings. (shrink)

Van Heijenoort’s main contribution to history and philosophy of modern logic was his distinction between two basic views of logic, first, the absolutist, or universalist, view of the founding fathers, Frege, Peano, and Russell, which dominated the first, classical period of history of modern logic, and, second, the relativist, or model-theoretic, view, inherited from Boole, Schröder, and Löwenheim, which has dominated the second, contemporary period of that history. In my paper, I present the man Jean van Heijenoort (Sect. 1); then (...) I describe his way of arguing for the second view (Sect. 2); and finally I come down in favor of the first view (Sect. 3). There, I specify the version of universalism for which I am prepared to argue (Sect. 3, introduction). Choosing ZFC to play the part of universal, logical (in a nowadays forgotten sense) system, I show, through an example, how the usual model theory can be naturally given its proper place, from the universalist point of view, in the logical framework of ZFC; I outline another, not rival but complementary, semantics for admissible extensions of ZFC in the very same logical framework; I propose a way to get universalism out of the predicaments in which universalists themselves believed it to be (Sect. 3.1). Thus, if universalists of the classical period did not, in fact, construct these semantics, it was not that their universalism forbade them, in principle, to do so. The historical defeat of universalism was not technical in character. Neither was it philosophical. Indeed, it was hardly more than the victory of technicism over the very possibility of a philosophical dispute (Sect. 3.2). (shrink)

The paper critically scrutinizes the widespread idea that Russell subscribes to a "Universalist Conception of Logic." Various glosses on this somewhat under-explained slogan are considered, and their fit with Russell's texts and logical practice examined. The results of this investigation are, for the most part, unfavorable to the Universalist interpretation.

In this article I present a special contribution to universalism by the Cracow Circle (Bocheński, Drewnowski, Salamucha). Presented thinkers were scientists, philosophers and theologians, and tried to combine these disciplines in their works. They took standards of rationality from logic and other sciences, and applied them to Christian philosophy and theology. This kind of rationality can be considered universal and when we use this rationality in dialogue between religion and other worldviews, the dialogue has a chance to be really (...) universal. (shrink)

We shift attention from the development of model theory for demarcated languages to the development of this theory for fragments of a language. Although it is often assumed that model theory for demarcated languages is not compatible with a universalist conception of logic, no one has denied that model theory for fragments of a language can be compatible with that conception. It thus seems unwarranted to ignore the universalist tradition in the search for the origins and development of model theory. (...) This point is illustrated by Carnap’s early semantics and model theory, which he developed within a type theoretical framework and which stand out both for their universalistic treatment and for certain idiosyncratic technicalities by which the construction is supported. One special property is that individuals are context relative in Carnap’s system. This leads to a model theory in which the model domains are more flexible than has been suggested in the literature. (shrink)

Enlightenment thought and its contemporary followers usually support two contradictory principles simultaneously. The first is universality. Truth is universal because it is truth for all. Claims to universality are made in logic and science, but also in areas that are culturally or politically controversial. Recently, universalism has become a key term to express a fundamental critique of identity politics. For much of European history, Christianity provided such a universal truth. But with the decline of its cultural hegemony and the (...) rise of particular nation-states, conflicting truth claims became weapons in violent conflicts, leading Hobbes to argue that dangerous truth claims must be neutralized by robust political power. In the eighteenth century, rationalism became more optimistic, interpreting universalism as cosmopolitanism based on universal reason and progress through history. The second principle is historicism, which is the self-reflexive look at the historical origins of universal claims and theories. Historicism emerged in the nineteenth century as a response to the application of rationalism to history. It challenged the universal claims of the French Revolution, emphasizing instead the unique value of each historical entity. This revealed a fundamental paradox: when universalism becomes self-reflexive, it recognizes that it has non-universal historical origins, thereby undermining itself. After the devastation of World War II and the Holocaust, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) represented a significant effort toward a new universalism. It sought to establish human rights as universal principles for the emerging world order. But history repeated itself: Historicism once again weakened confidence in human rights. The enemies of human rights take advantage of this weakness. We therefore have to live with the paradox that universalism is necessary because humanity shares a single world, but that historical self-reflection is also unavoidable. In other words, the Enlightenment principle of universalism must accept historicism as an integral part of itself. (shrink)

We present a new notion of mereological sum that is inequivalent to extant ones in the literature and does not fall prey to reasonable complaints that can be raised against some such notions. In light of this notion, we then revisit the relation between mereological universalism and extensionalism. In particular we argue that Varzi’s claim to the point that universalism entails extensionalism is justified only insofar as one sticks to Varzi’s notion of sum. In effect, we distinguish different (...) versions of extensionalism and argue that universalism—when cashed out in terms of our new notion of sum—entails some versions but not others. Most significantly it does not entail extensionality of proper parthood. In the light of the above we set forth a new mereological system, Universalist Quasi-Supplemented Mereology, that can be considered a worthy alternative to different mereological systems in the literature. (shrink)

Logical universalism, a label that has been pinned on to Frege, involves the conflation of two features commonly ascribed to logic: universality and radicality. Logical universality consists in logic being about absolutely everything. Logical radicality, on the other hand, corresponds to there being the one and the same logic that any reasoning must comply with. The first part of this paper quickly remarks that Frege’s conception of logic makes logical universality prevail and does not preclude (...) the admission of different contexts of discourse. The paper then aims to make it clear how Frege’s universalism can make sense of contextuality. Drawing on a suggestion made by Frege in his discussion of Hilbert, it shows that a properly Fregean notion of model can be devised. Taking up a suggestion from Wilfrid Hodges and William Demopoulos that the non-logical constants of a formal language can be compared to indexicals, this paper shows,paceHodges and Demopoulos, that such an understanding of non-logical constants is not beyond Frege’s horizon. A formal framework, based on the modern tool of fibrations, is set out to explain and justify this point. This framework allows one to compare Frege and Tarski, by formalizing Frege’s suggestion and by presenting Tarski’s semantics in a generalized setting. (shrink)

I. THE ORIGINS OF THE COMPLEMENTARITY CONCEPT IN SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS UNIVERSALISMa) Keywords, categoriesb) G. McLean: the emergence of philosophical and social complementarity from the Polish dialogue and Solidarityc) Secularity open to all human dimensions including the sacral (the structure of religious values approved not ontologically but on the ethical and cultural plane)d) The Catholicism of John Paul from Cracow and Rome as realistic global and dialogue-based universalisme) Laborem Exercens—source of modern universalismf) “John Paul II’s ‘Labour Manifesto’ and universal society (...) visiong) Sacrality as the highest form of recognitionII. DŁUGIE NARODZINY I KSZTAŁTOWANIE SIĘ SEKULARYZMU [LAICYZMU?] HUMANISTYCZNEGO I PRZEŁOM – KU UNIWERSALIZMOWI, KOMPLEMENTARNYM AKCEPTOWANIEM SEKULARNOŚCI I SAKRALNOŚCIa) Narodziny dialogu z ducha Polskiego Października: od tylko ekskluzji do „dialogu przeciwieństw” b) Laicyzm, a nie ateizm, czyli uznanie pluralizmu za cenę obojętności: ideologia „naszej małej stabilizacji”c) Kontrpartner światopoglądowy jako sojusznik w praktyce społecznejd) Współpraca międzynarodowa jako inspiracja najszersza i ‘parasol ochronny’e) Patriotyzm jako ‘religia obywatelska’ oraz jako mediatyzacja materializmu i chrześcijaństwaIII. KU NOWEMU ETAPOWI UNIWERSALIZMU, RODZĄCEGO SIĘ Z KOMPLEMENTARNOŚCI I SYNERGIIa) Nazwy, problemyb) Synopsis i aktualizacjac) Kolejny etap eksperymentalnej realizacji projektu UW D&UThe present issue of Dialogue and Universalism is exceptional in that it marks out a new phase—not only for our periodical, but also the historical path it attempts to illuminate—and at times even co-create.In fact, similarly as Plato’s great concept, this can be well expressed by one idea, an idea that in its unique, mutually penetrating relation to existence is at once a summary and an illumination. An idea which, like the Sun, brings out diffused things and facts from the darkness of fragmentary, in a sense undeveloped and almost empty existence and the absurdity of mutually-destructive objects, events and people.Yes—this idea is a path leading away from absurdity and the logical, or, rather, ontological partiality and particularism (hence, in a sense, social meaninglessness) of mutually-destructive and mutually-degrading “incomplete existences”.It is, of course, no new idea—it is present in the history of philosophy, anthropology and biology, and in quantum mechanics: complementarity. However, thanks to the penetrating visions of George McLean, this idea now appears in a new role—putting it most simply (if somewhat impoverishingly): as an instrument enabling comprehension of society, including human relations, over history. This, however, will only be possible if we rise above fact—and even regularity—towards the essence of life and history in their most all-embracing sense. In other words, towards the essence of existence, history and the world. And the key to this will be our understanding and application of complementarity.Complementarity in the here-proposed understanding emerges from the historical process and historical theory as a unique form of maturity, a synthesis bearing the most precious intellectual and moral values for all sides involved in co-creating it. (shrink)

Gordon Knight recently challenged my assumption, which I made for the purpose of organizing and classifying certain theological disputes, that a specific set of three propositions is logically inconsistent . In this brief rejoinder, I explain Knight’s objection and show why it rests upon a misunderstanding.

The paper presents different arguments against the necessity of mereological universalism. First, it argues that they are examples of a much more general argumentative structure. It then contends that some of these arguments cannot be resisted by distinguishing different variants of universalism that have been recently proposed in the literature—in contrast with recent suggestions to the contrary. Finally, it provides different ways to resist such contingentist arguments on behalf of universalists.

The paper presents different arguments against the necessity of mereological universalism. First, it argues that they are examples of a much more general argumentative structure. It then contends that some of these arguments cannot be resisted by distinguishing different variants of universalism that have been recently proposed in the literature—in contrast with recent suggestions to the contrary. Finally, it provides different ways to resist such contingentist arguments on behalf of universalists.

Logical pluralism is the view according to which there is more than one relation of logical consequence, even within a given language. A recent articulation of this view has been developed in terms of quantification over different cases: classical logic emerges from consistent and complete cases; constructive logic from consistent and incomplete cases, and paraconsistent logic from inconsistent and complete cases. We argue that this formulation causes pluralism to collapse into either logical nihilism or logical (...) class='Hi'>universalism. In its place, we propose a modalist account of logical pluralism that is independently well motivated and that avoids these collapses. (shrink)

Logic is concerned with the design or structure of arguments. It describes the forms of valid argument and is concerned with the public presentation and reception of arguments. Hence it has a close connection with politics and the public sphere, and with rhetoric as the science of persuasion. Philosophers have analysed the objective conditions of validation, that is, the justifiability of assertions about the world. This quest for objective and scientific validity in argumentation about the nature of reality dominated much (...) of the development of logic in the 20th century. Logical arguments are held to be successful as a result of the ‘force of reason’ rather than because one's opponents have been bribed or coerced. Logic involves the study of the abstract, deductive moves in argumentation rather than an empirical study of how actual arguments are conducted. However, there is also a tension between rhetoric and philosophy; Plato drew a clear distinction between knowledge and persuasion. Logic is intended to give security to the former. The historical drift of logic is towards abstraction, especially the use of mathematical forms of representation. The study of logic is an important component of any project on encyclopaedic knowledge, that is, with knowledge that circulates in the public sphere, but the globalization of culture has raised an important problem about the universalistic claims of traditions of logic, namely, are there different forms of logical reasoning? (shrink)

The focus of the article is the notion of normativity in logic and politics and their possible intersections. The twentieth-century divide between the analytical and the continental idea of logic is explored, by noting that they both – with significant differences – can be seen as proposing a ‘bottom-up normativity’, which may have immediate political effects. Logical normativity postulates universality, and a connection between reality and reason able to orient actions universalistically. For a bottom-up conception (as specifically advanced by (...) Deleuze’s logic of sense), the universalistic approach does not descend from above on an elusive reality but is a self-organization of multiple processes occurring in a horizon which is typically affected by political facts and choices. (shrink)

"In this highly original book, Ada Agada responds to the question of how a philosophy can be African and at the same time universally relevant by constructing an original philosophical system that is at once African and universal. Drawing on African forms of thought and conceptual schemes like ethnophilosophy, ubuntu, sage philosophy, négritude, ibuanyidanda philosophy, and ezumezu logic, the author introduces new concepts and conceptual schemes like mood and proto-panpsychism into philosophical vocabulary and weaves them into a coherent and original (...) system that promises to significantly impact contemporary African philosophy. Arguing for intercultural and comparative philosophy as a desirable mode of philosophising in a continually globalising and interconnected world, the book demonstrates the universal applicability of consolationism. This book will be of interest to scholars in the fields of African Studies, intercultural philosophy, philosophy of mind, and existentialism"--. (shrink)

Since its publication in 1967, van Heijenoort’s paper, “Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language” has become a classic in the historiography of modern logic. According to van Heijenoort, the contrast between the two conceptions of logic provides the key to many philosophical issues underlying the entire classical period of modern logic, the period from Frege’s Begriffsschrift (1879) to the work of Herbrand, Gödel and Tarski in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The present paper is a critical reflection on (...) some aspects of van Heijenoort’s thesis. I concentrate on the case of Frege and Russell and the claim that their philosophies of logic are marked through and through by acceptance of the universalist conception of logic, which is an integral part of the view of logic as language. Using the so-called “Logocentric Predicament” (Henry M. Sheffer) as an illustration, I shall argue that the universalist conception does not have the consequences drawn from it by the van Heijenoort tradition. The crucial element here is that we draw a distinction between logic as a universal science and logic as a theory. According to both Frege and Russell, logic is first and foremost a universal science, which is concerned with the principles governing inferential transitions between propositions; but this in no way excludes the possibility of studying logic also as a theory, i.e., as an explicit formulation of (some) of these principles. Some aspects of this distinction will be discussed. (shrink)

The contested testimony in the Hill-Thomas ease is an illuminating test case for universalistic theories about the reliability of testimony. There is no reasonable alternative to universalistic standards of epistemic appraisal. And yet the charge by feminists and others that such criteria can be applied selectively and used to discredit and silence people is shown to be accurate. The road to a solution is to offer guidelines for the interpretation and application of these norms.

Poses of the World develops a theory of the pluralistic coexistence of politics with aesthetic, scientific, ethical and economic procedures that have sought to influence, dominate or even replace politics. We are accustomed to saying that everything is political. It is true that politics has throughout history ventured into the domains that used to be non-political, be they art, science or economy. However, rather than being totally dominated by politics, our societies are marked by the coexistence of diverse procedures, whose (...) logics are distinct but nonetheless remain in contact, ranging from frontal conflict to lasting syntheses. This book develops a theory of this pluralistic coexistence. It builds upon the findings of the first two volumes of Void Universalism to outline an account of pluralism that affirms the incommensurable character of the procedures that regulate the manners of our being and acting in the world. Neither reducible to nor insulated from each other, politics, ethics, art, economy, science and numerous other procedures persist in errancy without ever cohering into any overarching unity. The book demonstrates how the abandonment of the aspiration for such coherence opens up new perspectives on the key sociopolitical debates of our time, from the critique of neoliberalism to concerns over cancel culture. Systematic and accessible, this volume will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, philosophy, sociology, anthropology and cultural studies as well a wider readership beyond academia. (shrink)

This article addresses the ontological presuppositions of the discourse on world politics in political and international relations theory. We argue that the ambivalent status of world politics is due to the understanding of its central concept, that is, the world, in terms of totality or ‘the whole’. Drawing on Alain Badiou's set-theoretical ontology, this article demonstrates that such a concept is logically inconsistent, which leads the discourse on world politics to a perpetual oscillation between the presupposition of a universal totality (...) and the unmasking of its impossibility. We then proceed to the particularistic concept of the world as a limited totality with no pretense to universality, as developed in Heidegger's phenomenological ontology and Badiou's objective phenomenology. Although this approach affirming the existence of the infinity of infinite worlds appears of little use to the universalist problematic of world politics, it provides us with a pathway to the third concept of the world as the void, in which a plurality of positive worlds coexist and which is their ontological condition of possibility. We argue that only this concept of the world enables a logically consistent notion of universality as non-totalizable and immediate. The final section addresses the implications of this concept for rethinking world politics as a practice of transformation of particular worlds in accordance with the universal principles derived from the disclosure of the world as void. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical analysis of two central issues in Luigi Ferrajoli’s Principia iuris , and more generally of his theory of rights. One is the way in which ‘expectations’ play a crucial role in his deontic theory by establishing the logical basis for his guarantee-based conception of law and rights. The axiomatic way in which Ferrajoli arrives at his conception of fundamental rights is questioned, for it fails to give a full account of the nature of subjective (...) rights. The other issues discussed here is Ferrajoli’s own defence of the universality of fundamental rights, and how this is made to depend on a ‘normative technique’ that one can associate with legal discourse and modern law in Western societies. This, however, poses the problem of how this formal universalism can be reconciled with the intercultural dialogue that Ferrajoli also advocates. (shrink)

This paper discusses Jean van Heijenoort’s (1967) and Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka’s (1986, 1997) distinction between logic as auniversal language and logic as a calculus, and its applicability to Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. Although it is argued that Husserl’s phenomenology shares characteristics with both sides, his view of logic is closer to the model-theoretical, logic-as-calculus view. However, Husserl’s philosophy as transcendental philosophy is closer to the universalist view. This paper suggests that Husserl’s position shows that holding a model-theoretical view of (...) logic does not necessarily imply a calculus view about the relations between language and the world. The situation calls for reflection about the distinction: It will be suggested that the applicability of the van Heijenoort and the Hintikkas distinction either has to be restricted to a particular philosopher’s views about logic, in which case no implications about his or her more general philosophical views should be inferred from it; or the distinction turns into a question of whether our human predicament is inescapable or whether it is possible, presumably by means of model theory, to obtain neutral answers to philosophical questions. Thus the distinction ultimately turns into a question about the correct method for doing philosophy. (shrink)

The post-classical genre of the “protocols for dialectical inquiry and disputation” has its more proximate origins in the famed Risāla of Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī. The greater part of his conceptions and methodology, however, consists in a streamlining and universalizing of the more strictly juristic dialectic of his teacher Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī ; and this in turn draws on the highly logicized dialectic of Rukn al-Dīn al-ʿAmīdī and his teacher Raḍī al-Dīn al-Nīsābūrī. At the heart of methods in this lineage, and (...) carried forward by al-Samarqandī into the universal ādāb al-baḥth, are three truth-preserving logical relationships critical to the truth-seeking enterprise of dialectic: entailment, mutual negation or exclusion, and causal concomitance. The practical elaboration of these relations reveals a logic in action—a premodern dialogical logic for living disputation praxis. In fact, so critical were these to the dialectical enterprise that al-Samarqandī devoted a specialized treatise entirely to summarizing their defining features and rules, aptly naming it the ʿAyn al-Naẓar, or “Wellspring of Rational Investigation.” In this article, and drawing upon a recently published digital critical edition, I will present an analytical outline of these core logical relations as presented in the ʿAyn al-Naẓar. Then I will address a number of points of interest in this text, grouped under six themes: the potential for cross-disciplinary advancement; notions in discursive development; significant or uniquely contributive formulations; peculiarities of content; signs of an evolving, universalist agenda; and evidence that the ʿAyn al-Naẓar was designed as an aide-mémoire for the active disputant. (shrink)

With their book Logical Pluralism, Jc Beall and Greg Restall have elaborated on their previous statements on logical pluralism. Their view of logical pluralism is centred on ways of understanding logical consequence. The essay tries to come to grips with their doctrine of logical pluralism by highlighting some points that might be made clearer, and questioning the force of some of Beall’s and Restall’s central arguments. In that connection seven problems for their approach are put (...) forth: (1) The Informal Common Core Problem, (2) The Formal Common Core Problem, (3) The Superior Judge Problem, (4) The Problem of the Conditional, (6) The Problem of an Unsettled Concept of Consequence, (7) The Methodological Problem, (8) The General Logical Form Problem. It seems that the case for logical pluralism is far from clear. It is even unclear what exactly logical pluralism is and where is stops. It is also unclear if logical pluralism could be stated as it is, if it were true. So far universalism seems to be the better position to take. (shrink)

Although Wittgenstein’s influence on logic and foundations of mathematics is well recognized, nonetheless, his legacy concerning other sciences is much less elucidated, and in this article we aim at shedding new light on physics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science from a Wittgensteinian perspective. We focus upon three issues amongst other things: the Chosmky versus Norvig debate on the nature of language; a Neo-Kantian parallelism between Bohr’s philosophy of physics and Hilbert’s philosophy of mathematics; the relationships between cognitive contextuality and physical (...) contextuality as shown by recent Bell-type results. The Chosmky versus Norvig debate may be seen as a battle between Wittgenstein’s earlier and later conceptions of meaning, i.e., picture theory and use theory. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, quantum physics may be seen as a physical version of the Linguistic Turn. The parallelism between Bohr’s philosophy of classical concepts and Hilbert’s philosophy of finitism builds upon transcendental philosophy in the Kantian tradition, both Bohr and Hilbert having been influenced by Neo-Kantian thinkers, such as Hertz, whose sign theory is actually a common root of Wittgenstein’s picture theory and Hilbert’s axiomatics. Wittgenstein is considered a root of contextualism in contemporary philosophy. Contextuality has different manifestations in physics and cognitive science, and contextuality studies across the sciences are rapidly developing in cutting-edge research. We elucidate both analogies and disanalogies between contextuality of reality and contextuality of reason in terms of the nature of probabilities involved. In passing, we also give a reformulation of Penrose’s quantum mind thesis. (shrink)

Although Wittgenstein’s influence on logic and foundations of mathematics is well recognized, nonetheless, his legacy concerning other sciences is much less elucidated, and in this article we aim at shedding new light on physics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science from a Wittgensteinian perspective. We focus upon three issues amongst other things: the Chosmky versus Norvig debate on the nature of language; a Neo-Kantian parallelism between Bohr’s philosophy of physics and Hilbert’s philosophy of mathematics; the relationships between cognitive contextuality and physical (...) contextuality as shown by recent Bell-type results. The Chosmky versus Norvig debate may be seen as a battle between Wittgenstein’s earlier and later conceptions of meaning, i.e., picture theory and use theory. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, quantum physics may be seen as a physical version of the Linguistic Turn. The parallelism between Bohr’s philosophy of classical concepts and Hilbert’s philosophy of finitism builds upon transcendental philosophy in the Kantian tradition, both Bohr and Hilbert having been influenced by Neo-Kantian thinkers, such as Hertz, whose sign theory is actually a common root of Wittgenstein’s picture theory and Hilbert’s axiomatics. Wittgenstein is considered a root of contextualism in contemporary philosophy. Contextuality has different manifestations in physics and cognitive science, and contextuality studies across the sciences are rapidly developing in cutting-edge research. We elucidate both analogies and disanalogies between contextuality of reality and contextuality of reason in terms of the nature of probabilities involved. In passing, we also give a reformulation of Penrose’s quantum mind thesis. (shrink)

I. THE ORIGINS OF THE COMPLEMENTARITY CONCEPT IN SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS UNIVERSALISMa) Keywords, categoriesb) G. McLean: the emergence of philosophical and social complementarity from the Polish dialogue and Solidarityc) Secularity open to all human dimensions including the sacral (the structure of religious values approved not ontologically but on the ethical and cultural plane)d) The Catholicism of John Paul from Cracow and Rome as realistic global and dialogue-based universalisme) Laborem Exercens—source of modern universalismf) “John Paul II’s ‘Labour Manifesto’ and universal society (...) visiong) Sacrality as the highest form of recognitionII. DŁUGIE NARODZINY I KSZTAŁTOWANIE SIĘ SEKULARYZMU [LAICYZMU?] HUMANISTYCZNEGO I PRZEŁOM – KU UNIWERSALIZMOWI, KOMPLEMENTARNYM AKCEPTOWANIEM SEKULARNOŚCI I SAKRALNOŚCIa) Narodziny dialogu z ducha Polskiego Października: od tylko ekskluzji do „dialogu przeciwieństw” b) Laicyzm, a nie ateizm, czyli uznanie pluralizmu za cenę obojętności: ideologia „naszej małej stabilizacji”c) Kontrpartner światopoglądowy jako sojusznik w praktyce społecznejd) Współpraca międzynarodowa jako inspiracja najszersza i ‘parasol ochronny’e) Patriotyzm jako ‘religia obywatelska’ oraz jako mediatyzacja materializmu i chrześcijaństwaIII. KU NOWEMU ETAPOWI UNIWERSALIZMU, RODZĄCEGO SIĘ Z KOMPLEMENTARNOŚCI I SYNERGIIa) Nazwy, problemyb) Synopsis i aktualizacjac) Kolejny etap eksperymentalnej realizacji projektu UW D&UThe present issue of Dialogue and Universalism is exceptional in that it marks out a new phase—not only for our periodical, but also the historical path it attempts to illuminate—and at times even co-create.In fact, similarly as Plato’s great concept, this can be well expressed by one idea, an idea that in its unique, mutually penetrating relation to existence is at once a summary and an illumination. An idea which, like the Sun, brings out diffused things and facts from the darkness of fragmentary, in a sense undeveloped and almost empty existence and the absurdity of mutually-destructive objects, events and people.Yes—this idea is a path leading away from absurdity and the logical, or, rather, ontological partiality and particularism (hence, in a sense, social meaninglessness) of mutually-destructive and mutually-degrading “incomplete existences”.It is, of course, no new idea—it is present in the history of philosophy, anthropology and biology, and in quantum mechanics: complementarity. However, thanks to the penetrating visions of George McLean, this idea now appears in a new role—putting it most simply (if somewhat impoverishingly): as an instrument enabling comprehension of society, including human relations, over history. This, however, will only be possible if we rise above fact—and even regularity—towards the essence of life and history in their most all-embracing sense. In other words, towards the essence of existence, history and the world. And the key to this will be our understanding and application of complementarity.Complementarity in the here-proposed understanding emerges from the historical process and historical theory as a unique form of maturity, a synthesis bearing the most precious intellectual and moral values for all sides involved in co-creating it. (shrink)

The paper attempts to show that Christian hope is not a product of religious fantasy. It finds today an ally in the dialogue with the natural sciences which started in recent years on the topic of the ultimate destiny of the world. The natural sciences have confirmed that the universe is doomed to physical annihilation. Humanity with its cultural riches, scientists say, is only an episode in universal history and doomed to perish. Hence, if the Earth is nothing more than (...) an island of rationality in a cosmic void, then the only thing we can do is to keep up a heroic attitude worthy of human beings towards our own fragile existence. Contemporary science’s visions of the future are pessimistic: abundant, though short-lived, evolution culminating in a sense of final futility and the ultimate destruction of all life in the universe. Such forecasts question religion’s claims for the eschatological transformation of all creation. Christian eschatology does not accept, however, reductionist presuppositions about the very nature of reality. The universe contains levels of meaning far richer than what we have been able to discover sofar. Theology’s task is not to provide easy consolation, or generate false hopes. It has a good reason to avoid catastrophism, and maintain calm in its strivings to keep up our faith in God’s concern for the destiny of all His creatures. Theologians have to take a serious stand on the very concept of finitude, furthered by natural and social sciences. This, in turn, will require critical review of such concepts as the world’s future in God, hope and new creation. This effort must be undertaken in dialogue with the scientific views of the world’s finitude. Both sides are prone to stereotype judgements and shallow answers which must be corrected in consideration of the complexity of the issue at hand. Christian theology has to justify its claim to truth, but certainly not by launching battles with science. Christian hope shows the new creation not as annihilation and destruction of the old but as its ultimate transfiguration and salvific transformation. It speaks about the paradox of continuity/discontinuity in this new universe’s emergence. Special attention is paid in the paper to the “logical” structure of matter. If the world ofultimate events is, in fact, to be a new world of the resurrection, created by transition into new reality, then certain scientific suggestions and data on the present world’s processes could prove helpful in grasping the truly cosmic dimensions of Christian hope. Crucial here will not so much be particular data but rather a sort of meta-science allowing the deduction of general concepts from the detailed achievements of scientific research. Such generalized insights include today the following elements: 1) the dynamic concept of physical reality, 2) the relationality of its processes and, 3) a deeper understanding of the complexity of matter/energy as carriers of a specific information-bearing pattern. It appears that there are some similarities in science’s and theology’s strivings for a deeper understanding of the truth of reality, which continues to evade our theories and teaches us modesty. Neither method nor concept has yet managed to explaineverything. There exists no universal key to a comprehensive interpretation. The postulate to avoid reductionism in approaching the manifold richness of reality is addressed to scientists and theologians alike. (shrink)

The paper attempts to show that Christian hope is not a product of religious fantasy. It finds today an ally in the dialogue with the natural sciences which started in recent years on the topic of the ultimate destiny of the world. The natural sciences have confirmed that the universe is doomed to physical annihilation. Humanity with its cultural riches, scientists say, is only an episode in universal history and doomed to perish. Hence, if the Earth is nothing more than (...) an island of rationality in a cosmic void, then the only thing we can do is to keep up a heroic attitude worthy of human beings towards our own fragile existence. Contemporary science’s visions of the future are pessimistic: abundant, though short-lived, evolution culminating in a sense of final futility and the ultimate destruction of all life in the universe. Such forecasts question religion’s claims for the eschatological transformation of all creation. Christian eschatology does not accept, however, reductionist presuppositions about the very nature of reality. The universe contains levels of meaning far richer than what we have been able to discover sofar. Theology’s task is not to provide easy consolation, or generate false hopes. It has a good reason to avoid catastrophism, and maintain calm in its strivings to keep up our faith in God’s concern for the destiny of all His creatures. Theologians have to take a serious stand on the very concept of finitude, furthered by natural and social sciences. This, in turn, will require critical review of such concepts as the world’s future in God, hope and new creation. This effort must be undertaken in dialogue with the scientific views of the world’s finitude. Both sides are prone to stereotype judgements and shallow answers which must be corrected in consideration of the complexity of the issue at hand. Christian theology has to justify its claim to truth, but certainly not by launching battles with science. Christian hope shows the new creation not as annihilation and destruction of the old but as its ultimate transfiguration and salvific transformation. It speaks about the paradox of continuity/discontinuity in this new universe’s emergence. Special attention is paid in the paper to the “logical” structure of matter. If the world ofultimate events is, in fact, to be a new world of the resurrection, created by transition into new reality, then certain scientific suggestions and data on the present world’s processes could prove helpful in grasping the truly cosmic dimensions of Christian hope. Crucial here will not so much be particular data but rather a sort of meta-science allowing the deduction of general concepts from the detailed achievements of scientific research. Such generalized insights include today the following elements: 1) the dynamic concept of physical reality, 2) the relationality of its processes and, 3) a deeper understanding of the complexity of matter/energy as carriers of a specific information-bearing pattern. It appears that there are some similarities in science’s and theology’s strivings for a deeper understanding of the truth of reality, which continues to evade our theories and teaches us modesty. Neither method nor concept has yet managed to explaineverything. There exists no universal key to a comprehensive interpretation. The postulate to avoid reductionism in approaching the manifold richness of reality is addressed to scientists and theologians alike. (shrink)

The suggestion of this paper is that we need again widely to practice and teach “the science of the soul” in order to produce the renaissance required to keep civilization going. A metaphor is not the saying of one thing while meaning another. In fact, metaphor is not limited to speech and writing. The understanding offered here is that, properly understood and employed, metaphor is a powerful and indispensable precision tool for radical improvement in thought. It is a prime guide (...) and cause effecting leaps of mind from one axiomatic train of thought or mind set to a better, higher, and seemingly incommensurable one. It is at once a tool for teaching those insights which founded the civilization and a training regimen for strengthening rational creativity to solve new problems. (shrink)

The paper attempts to show that Christian hope is not a product of religious fantasy. It finds today an ally in the dialogue with the natural sciences which started in recent years on the topic of the ultimate destiny of the world. The natural sciences have confirmed that the universe is doomed to physical annihilation. Humanity with its cultural riches, scientists say, is only an episode in universal history and doomed to perish. Hence, if the Earth is nothing more than (...) an island of rationality in a cosmic void, then the only thing we can do is to keep up a heroic attitude worthy of human beings towards our own fragile existence. Contemporary science’s visions of the future are pessimistic: abundant, though short-lived, evolution culminating in a sense of final futility and the ultimate destruction of all life in the universe. Such forecasts question religion’s claims for the eschatological transformation of all creation. Christian eschatology does not accept, however, reductionist presuppositions about the very nature of reality. The universe contains levels of meaning far richer than what we have been able to discover sofar. Theology’s task is not to provide easy consolation, or generate false hopes. It has a good reason to avoid catastrophism, and maintain calm in its strivings to keep up our faith in God’s concern for the destiny of all His creatures. Theologians have to take a serious stand on the very concept of finitude, furthered by natural and social sciences. This, in turn, will require critical review of such concepts as the world’s future in God, hope and new creation. This effort must be undertaken in dialogue with the scientific views of the world’s finitude. Both sides are prone to stereotype judgements and shallow answers which must be corrected in consideration of the complexity of the issue at hand. Christian theology has to justify its claim to truth, but certainly not by launching battles with science. Christian hope shows the new creation not as annihilation and destruction of the old but as its ultimate transfiguration and salvific transformation. It speaks about the paradox of continuity/discontinuity in this new universe’s emergence. Special attention is paid in the paper to the “logical” structure of matter. If the world ofultimate events is, in fact, to be a new world of the resurrection, created by transition into new reality, then certain scientific suggestions and data on the present world’s processes could prove helpful in grasping the truly cosmic dimensions of Christian hope. Crucial here will not so much be particular data but rather a sort of meta-science allowing the deduction of general concepts from the detailed achievements of scientific research. Such generalized insights include today the following elements: 1) the dynamic concept of physical reality, 2) the relationality of its processes and, 3) a deeper understanding of the complexity of matter/energy as carriers of a specific information-bearing pattern. It appears that there are some similarities in science’s and theology’s strivings for a deeper understanding of the truth of reality, which continues to evade our theories and teaches us modesty. Neither method nor concept has yet managed to explaineverything. There exists no universal key to a comprehensive interpretation. The postulate to avoid reductionism in approaching the manifold richness of reality is addressed to scientists and theologians alike. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to discuss in what sense one can speak about universal character of logic. The authors argue that the role of logic stands mainly in the generality of its language and its unrestricted applications to any field of knowledge and normal human life. The authors try to precise that universality of logic tends in: (a) general character of inference rules and the possibility of using those rules as a tool of justification of theorems of every (...) science, (b) principles of correct formulating of thoughts and using language, and (c) general deductive method of reasoning, i.e in the study of language syntax and semantics. The authors present two theories of language syntax and semantics as exemplifications based on the Tarski’s famous results in metalogic: (1) a formalization of universal syntax system by Andrzej Grzegorczyk based on a new primitive notion of quotation-marks operator, and (2) an enlarged system of axiomatic theory of syntax of any categorial language of Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska’s in which the main role plays the relation of concatenation understood as a set-theoretical function. The study concludes in arguing that the importance of the result (2) lies not only in solving some philosophical problems but also in different fields of knowledge and spheres of human life as ex. in discussion and education as well. (shrink)

While universalistic assumptions have been undermined by experiences of cultural difference, the notion of culture has been universalized. But it seems that the notion of culture, the way it has prevailed in public discourse as well as in social and cultural studies, has to be seen as the main stumbling block to intercultural dialogue. The article argues for an interactional concept of culture, or interpretation, as also of research and representation. Emphasis has to be put on modes of linkage between (...) social action and discourses and on social reflexivity. While attempting to avoid the logic of identity, epistemologically, identity has to be understood as a social project. Thus universalism, which `as such' is underdetermined and shows only contextually, has to be seen not as something achieved and secured, but as an objective. Universalism has to prove itself within difference, it cannot be imposed by one side. (shrink)

I show that resolution-oriented discourse has a distinctive normative structure, partially subject to theoretical explication.Those with a keen commitment to the idea of working out differences of opinion dialogically may fail to grasp what such a commitment entails. In the heat of discursive conflict, discerning our obligations is often difficult. These difficulties yield a general lack of clarity concerning the norms in question. Yet theory can inform reason-giving practice by clarifying the normative structures underlying such discourse. A logic of disputation (...) must be anchored in the relevant features of concrete discursive contexts, even as it abstracts from their particularities. Different types of challenge present claimants with different options for redeeming the claim challenged, and defending moves, too, open up and close off various options for the challenger. I show that the structure of the normative "field" at any point in the dialectic can be characterized with surprising precision. (shrink)

In Schelling’s “On the Relation between the Real and the Ideal in Nature", not only does the titular copula bond real and ideal, but it is itself bonded in and by nature. If the copula doesn't merely bond nature and judgment, but bonds the latter to the former as an instance of the nature from which is derives, what relation does the essay's search for nature's primals bear to the universalism of logical law? What, moreover, is the relation (...) of the copula to its environing nature? I here aim to explore the claim that, for Schelling, something is logically exhibited when the nature in the judgment differs for that reason from the nature in which it is itself contained or conceived. (shrink)

Peirce's Law of Triviality: The Implementation of the Trivium of Logic, Rhetoric and Grammar. Basic Categories for Linguistics and Literature Studies from a Universal Semiotic Theory This article focuses on the aspects that refer to linguistics in the works of Charles S. Peirce. His pragmatic philosophy implemented many other sciences and among them is the traditional trivium of logic, grammar, and rhetoric, which Peirce divided into different kinds of logic, grammar, and rhetoric. While the impact of the work of Peirce (...) on theses sciences is weak, the integration of the sciences in his philosophy is interesting as a step in the history of science and his work is an example for ecclecticism and historism of science in the 19th century and the universalism of science deducted from a philosophy that uses the sign as an unitarian principle. Triple constructions are a very common feature in the writings of Peirce, and the trivium is an example of an academic construction Peirce implemented. (shrink)

The 2016 launch of the courier giant—Dalsey, Hillblom, and Lynn’s Advanced Regional Centre in Singapore—was significant not just for the scale of the facility and its impressive level of innovation, but for the visual identity and branding of DHL’s red and yellow corporate colours. These colours, as is evident in all branding, set it out from the rest, and have become a symbol of power and domination. This resonates with the use of colour categories to isolate human beings into unjust (...) classes that manifest divisive social and racial hierarchies. The symbolism of colourism and ethnicism viewed either plainly or as metaphors, lies in the “othering” of fellow human beings for discrimination and scapegoating. The markers are the same, whether in the case of George Floyd or the victims of discrimination and/or recurrent massacres in Nigeria. This essay explores how, by creating a visible barge of “otherness,” the current political leadership either shirked responsibility in the face of discriminations, or contrived excuses for the endless massacre of minorities in Nigeria. (shrink)

In today’s world, on the one hand, the traditional networks of civic solidarity face an increasing number of challenges to overcome in the context of the politically uncontrolled economic modernization. On the other hand, the mere fact that we have become neighbours by virtue of globalization does not make us automatically brothers. At stake is the question of solidarity; civic cooperation in the today specific situation. In order to get a glimpse of the problem, this article attempts to examine some (...) outlines of the current situation of global market economy as it is understood by Joseph Ratzinger. It is an important sign of our times that demands pre-political morality from societies across the world so as to bring about an authentic cooperation. (shrink)

The phenomena of truth, truthfulness, veracity and “truthiness” discussed widely in logic, epistemology as theory of science and gnoseology as general theory of knowledge, have received many interpretations—and not a single one to be generally accepted. Discussions continue not only upon narrow technical, operational questions of the predicate calculus and/or propositions calculus, but also on logic-gnoseological problems, one of which casts doubt on the maxim “logic is the house of truth,” and the other highlights the laxity of the opposition of (...) “truth—falsehood” meanings as the main categories of the two-valued logic. These evaluations of proposition do not in fact oppose each other in the sense of a contradiction. Verity and falsity are controversial (opposite), but not contradictory (antithetical) concepts; it is truth and non-truth that are contradictory. Therefore, there is not only the possibility, but also the reality of the existence of a field, or zone, of transition between the values “true—false.”. (shrink)

I read Stefan Collini’s What are Universities For? last week with very mixed feelings. In the past, I’ve much admired his polemical essays on the REF, “impact”, the Browne Report, etc. in the London Review of Books and elsewhere: they speak to my heart. If you don’t know those essays, you can get some of their flavour from his latest article in the Guardian yesterday. But I found the book a disappointment. Perhaps the trouble is that Collini is too decent, (...) too high-minded, has too unrealistically exalted a view about what actually happens in universities which is too coloured by attitudes appropriate to the traditional humanities. And he is optimistic to the point of fantasy if he thinks that people are so susceptible to “the romance of ideas and the power of beauty” that they will want, or can be brought to want, lots and lots of universities in order to promote the ideas (as if they would suppose that the task of “conserving, understanding, extending and handing on to subsequent generations the intellectual, scientific, and artistic heritage of mankind” was clearly ill-served when there were only forty universities in England, as opposed to a hundred and whatever). (shrink)