When Logic Meets Politics: Testimony, Distrust, and Rhetorical Disadvantage

Informal Logic 15 (2) (1993)
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Abstract

The contested testimony in the Hill-Thomas ease is an illuminating test case for universalistic theories about the reliability of testimony. There is no reasonable alternative to universalistic standards of epistemic appraisal. And yet the charge by feminists and others that such criteria can be applied selectively and used to discredit and silence people is shown to be accurate. The road to a solution is to offer guidelines for the interpretation and application of these norms

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10.22329/il.v15i2.2476

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Citations of this work

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References found in this work

The community of knowledge.Michael Welbourne - 1981 - Philosophical Quarterly 31 (125):302-314.
What is it to Believe Someone?Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1979 - In C. F. Delaney (ed.), Rationality and Religious Belief. University of Notre Dame Press.
A rhetorical view of the ad hominem.Alan Brinton - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):50 – 63.

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