Depuis quelque temps, les spécialistes de Machiavel ont dédié leur attention, d’une part, au rôle des tumultes et de l’autre, à la présence de la langue de la jurisprudence dans son œuvre. Jusqu’à présent, ces deux lectures de Machiavel ne sont pas rencontrées. Cette contribution entend montrer jusqu’à quel point la langue de la jurisprudence est présente dans l’écriture de Machiavel sur les tumultes, dans ses premiers textes comme, surtout, dans ses Histoires florentines. En partant de l’analyse machiavélienne de la (...) rébellion de la Valdichiana (1503), la première partie de l’article traite de la rébellion comme problème juridique et politique, comme cas spécifique du crime de lèse-majesté, traité par les juristes de droit civil et de droit canon, depuis les commentaires des lois impériales d’Henri VII (1313) jusqu’aux consilia rédigés en défense de Laurent de Médicis et de la cité de Florence à l’occasion de la conjuration des Pazzi (1478), ainsi qu’au premier traité dédié aux séditions écrit par le juriste français Nicolas Bohier. Dans un second temps, on prend en considération le discours du Ciompo anonyme des Histoires florentines (livre III) et on analyse un passage rarement pris en compte par les commentateurs : « Là où beaucoup se trompent, peu sont châtiés ». Dans ce passage, Machiavel utilise un principe juridique, une regula iuris, certes controversée et souvent non acceptée, mais théoriquement admise comme telle. Les considérations finales proposent de possibles parcours pour de futures recherches. (shrink)

Avant avoir été accusée de lèse majesté (trahison) Kaneko Fumiko (1903-1926) avait fait cause commune avec les nihilistes coréens au Japon. À partir de ce moment, comme son amant et co-accusé coréen, elle critiquait les abus coloniaux des japonais. Il est facile de comprendre pourquoi sa position politique a souvent été comprise comme un simple effet secondaire de dévouement « pour son homme ». Comment expliquer autrement le martyr d’une Japonaise pour un homme et pour la Corée, sinon (...) par référence à sa fémininité? Kaneko n’a pas été écoutée et cette non-écoute constitue une sorte de « colonisation » de sa position. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.2 (2000) 189-202 [Access article in PDF] Spinoza in Denmark and the Fall of Struensee, 1770-1772 John Christian Laursen * Baruch (Benedict) de Spinoza was the arch-heretic of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He was denounced in half a dozen languages from the time he began to publish until at least the 1780s, when Lessing's allegiance to Spinoza became the heart of (...) a literary scandal. 1 In time-honored fashion, some of these denunciations led to the burning of books and the imprisonment or banning of authors. The most spectacular case, however, led to the trial of a prime minister, the cutting off of his right hand and of his head, and the drawing and quartering of his body in full public ceremony. The year was 1772, the prime minister was Johann Friedrich Struensee, and the country was Denmark.Late eighteenth-century Denmark was not known for barbarities of the type represented by Struensee's execution. Previously disgraced prime ministers had merely been imprisoned, and other political enemies of the ruling powers had [End Page 189] merely been exiled. 2 Why such harshness with Struensee? What was at stake in the fall of Struensee?The answers to these questions are complex, but an important element of those answers lies in Struensee's public image, which made it seem both necessary and justifiable to treat him with such harshness. In turn, public opinion about Struensee was closely tied to the reputation of Spinoza. This essay will show that charges of Spinozism were part of the campaign that poisoned public opinion against Struensee. This was an unusually clear case of a theological and philosophical debate having direct political effects.Before getting to the role of Spinozism and anti-Spinozism in eighteenth-century Denmark, let us fill in important points of the story. The charge against Struensee was lèse majesté, for plotting the death of the King and for usurping power in violation of the constitution. Behind these charges was a further element which encouraged outrage: sleeping with Queen Caroline Matilda. That much was true, as both the Queen, a sister of George III of England, and Struensee admitted, each in order to save the other. The King knew about it all along but did not care. He did not care because he had become a libertine, going out to whorehouses most nights with rowdy friends, and he figured that what was good for the gander was good for the goose. He was also schizophrenic and easily manipulable by those around him, so that Struensee and the Queen encountered no disapproval from him until he fell under other people's influence. After Struensee and the Queen were taken into custody, the King was forced to divorce the Queen and she was sent to live in a Hannoverian castle in Celle because her brother did not want the embarrassment of having her back in England. She died there a few years later. 3It is an irony that we owe our knowledge of the state of public opinion in Denmark in this period to Struensee. Until shortly before the fatal events mentioned above, the Danish press had been subject to censorship that might have prevented the expression of many of the subsequent attacks on Struensee. But in September 1770 Struensee persuaded the king to declare freedom of the press in all his realms (consisting of the kingdoms of Denmark and Norway, the Duchies of Slesvig and Holsten [Schleswig and Holstein in German], Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes, and colonies in India, Africa, and the Caribbean). 4 It is not widely [End Page 190] known that Denmark was the first country to declare unlimited freedom of the press as official public policy. For much of the century England and the Netherlands had effective freedom of the press, but it had never been declared official policy. The next to do so was rebellious Virginia, in the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), followed by other colonies and then the Bill of Rights of the new... (shrink)

Depuis quelque temps, les spécialistes de Machiavel ont dédié leur attention, d’une part, au rôle des tumultes et de l’autre, à la présence de la langue de la jurisprudence dans son œuvre. Jusqu’à présent, ces deux lectures de Machiavel ne sont pas rencontrées. Cette contribution entend montrer jusqu’à quel point la langue de la jurisprudence est présente dans l’écriture de Machiavel sur les tumultes, dans ses premiers textes comme, surtout, dans ses Histoires florentines. En partant de l’analyse machiavélienne de la (...) rébellion de la Valdichiana, la première partie de l’article traite de la rébellion comme problème juridique et politique, comme cas spécifique du crime de lèse-majesté, traité par les juristes de droit civil et de droit canon, depuis les commentaires des lois impériales d’Henri VII jusqu’aux consilia rédigés en défense de Laurent de Médicis et de la cité de Florence à l’occasion de la conjuration des Pazzi, ainsi qu’au premier traité dédié aux séditions écrit par le juriste français Nicolas Bohier. Dans un second temps, on prend en considération le discours du Ciompo anonyme des Histoires florentines et on analyse un passage rarement pris en compte par les commentateurs : « Là où beaucoup se trompent, peu sont châtiés ». Dans ce passage, Machiavel utilise un principe juridique, une regula iuris, certes controversée et souvent non acceptée, mais théoriquement admise comme telle. Les considérations finales proposent de possibles parcours pour de futures recherches. (shrink)

La question de l’autorité illégitime et a fortiori de la résistance à cette autorité est toujours délicate à manier, à la fois en termes de définition de l’autorité, d’appréciation du critère d’illégitimité et de mise en œuvre d’un éventuel droit de résistance. Les difficultés d’approche sont encore plus grandes s’agissant d’une période comme le Moyen-Âge, au cours de laquelle la conception, la structuration et les effets de l’autorité ont considérablement évolué. En se centrant sur les xiii e - xv e (...) siècles, l’article se propose d’examiner d’une part les critères de qualification de l’autorité publique comme illégitime et d’autre part les voies ouvertes pour lui résister, en fait comme en droit. (shrink)

Do “majestic Christologies” violate the principle of non-competitive relationship? Majestic Christologies are diverse according to conceptual delineation, but share the common affirmation that Jesus’ humanity participates in the divine majesty in a transformative manner. This notion seems to transgress the principle of non-competitive relationship by behaving as if the fullness of Christ’s deity requires a displacement or transmogrification of his creatureliness. This paper argues that majestic Christology does not necessarily contradict the non-competitive principle by emphasizing the elasticity of theological anthropology (...) from an eschatological point of view. (shrink)

La Philosophie de la Révélation propose une véritable philosophie de la fonction diabolique. Le diable est le principe des religions païennes en même temps que celui du mal . Cette double fonction donne la mesure de l’Erhabenheit du diable, sa « majesté », qui traduit l’idée du mot grec kyriotès, de souveraineté. Cette analyse s’oppose aux représentations qui manquent le principe de la majesté diabolique. Négativement, le diable n’est ni une créature ni un principe éternellement mauvais. Positivement, Schelling (...) repense en termes philosophiques, par sa théorie des Potenzen divines, les interprétations traditionnelles non spéculatives : le diable ne diffère pas de la première puissance réactivée par l’homme alors même qu’elle devait se reposer en lui ; c’est conformément à l’essence de cette puissance, qui est ce qui ne doit pas mais peut être manifeste, qu’il ravage l’homme. Pour jouir d’une existence usurpée, le diable ne peut qu’user du soupçon, du mensonge et de la jalousie, vouloir tenter et perdre l’homme. Cette nécessité en fait l’outil paradoxal de la révélation.In Philosophy of Revelation, Schelling suggests a true philosophy of the diabolical function. The devil is the principle of pagan religions as well as of evil . Such a twofold function gives measure of the devil’s Erhabenheit, i.e. the devil’s majesty which indeed well translates the idea intrinsic of the term kyriotès, i.e. the idea of sovereignty. Shelling’s analysis is critical against representations which seem quite apart from the diabolical principle and its majesty. Negatively, the devil is no more a creature than an eternally evil principle. Positively, Schelling recaptures through philosophical terms according to his theory of divine Potenzen non speculative tradition : the devil is in no way different from the first power reactivated by man when in fact it were to rest in him ; thus does he play havoc with man in a manner identical to the essence of this latter power which is what should not but may be manifest. In order to enjoy a so-called usurped existence, the devil can but use suspicion, lies and jealousy, the only stake is to tempt and mislay man. It is such a necessity which turns him into the paradoxical tool of revelation. (shrink)

This article discusses the PISA framework’s concept of reading. The main argument is that PISA’s cognitive approach to literacy only to a small extent captures the normative dimension of reading. Consequently, the test fails to reflect key aspects of literacy, such as identity, identity formation and the ability to participate in society on a deeper level. The argument is based on a normative or moral conception of meaning and reading comprehension, based on Hegel’s concept of recognition.

Anatole France’s The Red Lily is best known for this ironic aphorism: ‘The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.’ The laws mentioned in this aphorism are open to two criticisms. The first criticism is that they forbid conduct that oughtn’t to be forbidden. The second criticism is that they unfairly place greater burdens of compliance on some than on others. It (...) may be onerous for the poor to comply with the law against, say, sleeping under bridges; not so for the rich. It is this second criticism that I read France as expressing, and it is the reach of this criticism that I explore in this essay. Specifically, I want to ask whether the second criticism may apply to a law even if the first criticism does not – whether there can be laws that are good in the sense that they forbid behavior that genuinely ought to be forbidden, but that are nonetheless unfair in the distribution of compliance burdens they yield. Some examples may tempt us to say ‘no.’ It may be more burdensome for thrill-seekers than for the rest of us to comply with laws against speeding, but that does not make speeding laws unfair. But I argue that the answer is ‘yes.’ Good laws can, and surprisingly often do, yield unfair distributions of compliance burdens. I conclude the essay by showing how remedies for this sort of unfairness might work. (shrink)

Sixteenth-century Christological debates sought to clarify the philosophical implications of the hypostatic union thesis formulated at Chalcedon. The genus maiesticatum, in particular, permitted that Christ’s created human nature could be said to possess divine attributes and powers. Other systematic regions like theological anthropology were implicated in this concept as well; the elevation of Christ’s human nature provided a conceptual framework for understanding the way divine indwelling might elevate human moral capacities in the elect. Medieval Scholastics after Lombard sought to clarify (...) what type of relation indwelling might be. Was it a hypostatic union as in Christology or something else? At the start of the sixteenth-century, Protestant reformers inherited this question. Their engagement with it demonstrates the systematic implications of Christological metaphysics and clarifies conceptual continuities and shifts that occurred across this historical moment of reform. (shrink)

The ‘confessions of the flesh’ in the central Middle Ages: An expansion of Foucault’s reading in Histoire de la sexualité 1 ( La volonté de savoir ). This article expands Michel Foucault’s (1926–1984) reading of the ‘confessions of the flesh’ in handbooks of penance written during the central Middle Ages in the first volume La volonté de savoir of his (current) four-volume series Histoire de la sexualité. After the posthumous publication of the fourth volume Les aveux de la chair (2018), (...) in which Foucault takes his analysis of the historical foundations of confessional practices in the late 12th century to the first half of the 14th century even further back, to the ‘confessions of the flesh’ in the patristics of the 3rd to the 5th centuries, it has become sensible to illuminate Foucault’s condensed reading of confessional scripts in La volonté de savoir itself. This exposition pertinently applies to Foucault’s correct conclusion that sex was prioritised above all other ‘sins’, ‘vices’, and ‘transgressions’ in central Medieval confessional scripts; therefore, as he famously noted, becoming a ‘seismograph of subjectivity in Christian cultures’. Against this backdrop, it is considered how thinkers from the central Middle Ages themselves reflected on the sacramentalisation of confession after the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 – since Foucault himself did not substantially elaborate on it. The reflections of three philosophers from the central Middle Ages on the relation between sex, confession and absolution are subsequently presented as an expansion of Foucault’s reading in La volonté de savoir. Firstly, Alan of Lille’s (d.1203) interpretation of the Summae confessorum in his Liber poenitentialis is revisited, concluding that Lille’s perspective was ‘hermeneutical’, in terms of his insistence that the confessor should adjust his interrogations according to seven Aristotelian topoi or detailed questions, designate the context in which the transgression occurred very thoroughly and ‘actively participate’ in the confessional act, rather than simply recording it. Lille’s ‘hermeneutical’ approach to confession is also reflected in Robert Grosseteste’s (ca.1168–1253) De modo confitendi et paenitentias iniungendi, in which a moderate phronetic approach allows for the full discretion of the confessor, rather than following the rigid prescriptions of the Summae confessorum only. Secondly, William of Auvergne’s (ca.1180–1249) contribution to the interpretation of the Summae confessorum in his Poenitentia is indicated in his utilitarian ethics, in which the interests of the ethical ‘other’ is related to the confessing ‘self’: even though matrimony is for Auvergne the only realm where the other’s interests are not necessarily compromised by sexual contact, several considerations regarding ‘improper sex’, precisely within matrimony, apply according to the relevant penitential guidelines. Thirdly, Paul of Hungary’s (ca.1180–1241) De confessione is considered in terms of his reflections on ‘paying sexual debt’, and on the relation between regulated sexual release and the legitimacy of sexual gratification, again within the context of matrimony. Contribution: This article contributes to Foucault-scholarship by elucidating and expanding Foucault’s condensed reading of 13th-century confessional scripts in La volonté de savoir, with reference to the relevant texts of Alan of Lille (d.1203), William of Auvergne (ca.1180–1249) and Paul of Hungary (ca.1180–1241). (shrink)

Peacemakers as children of God (Mt 5:9): A pragmatic-linguistic reading. The article investigates different options of the pragmatic meaning (implicature) of the beatitude in the Gospel of Matthew, ‘blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God’ (Mt 5:9). It also explores this Jesus logion’s seemingly contradiction with Jesus’ remark in die Matthean mission discourse, ‘Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword’ (Mt (...) 10:34). The pragmatic use of the concept ‘peace’ in Matthew is probed against the background of scribal activity in the context of the restoration of villages in north-Galilee and south-Syria after the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem by the Romans. The pax Romana and Josephus’ appeal to the inhabitants of these villages to collaborate with the Romans is described as the context of these Matthean Jesus-logia. It argues that Matthew interprets Jesus as a ‘Mosaic Joshua’ in continuum with the Judaic tradition of Solomon as the ‘king of peace’, especially 1 Chronicles 22:5-11. The macarism about the ‘peacemakers as children of God’ is interpreted in correlation with the macarism ‘blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted’ (Mt 5:4). The article concludes with the finding that the sword-motif in Matthew 10:4 does not contradict the beatitude on peace in Matthew 5:9. (shrink)

Peacemakers as children of God (Mt 5:9): A pragmatic-linguistic reading. The article investigates different options of the pragmatic meaning (implicature) of the beatitude in the Gospel of Matthew, ‘blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God’ (Mt 5:9). It also explores this Jesus logion’s seemingly contradiction with Jesus’ remark in die Matthean mission discourse, ‘Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword’ (Mt (...) 10:34). The pragmatic use of the concept ‘peace’ in Matthew is probed against the background of scribal activity in the context of the restoration of villages in north-Galilee and south-Syria after the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem by the Romans. The pax Romana and Josephus’ appeal to the inhabitants of these villages to collaborate with the Romans is described as the context of these Matthean Jesus-logia. It argues that Matthew interprets Jesus as a ‘Mosaic Joshua’ in continuum with the Judaic tradition of Solomon as the ‘king of peace’, especially 1 Chronicles 22:5-11. The macarism about the ‘peacemakers as children of God’ is interpreted in correlation with the macarism ‘blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted’ (Mt 5:4). The article concludes with the finding that the sword-motif in Matthew 10:4 does not contradict the beatitude on peace in Matthew 5:9. (shrink)

A majestic socio-political message underlies Dante's Divine Comedy: how, in a warring Europe, could mankind create a universal peace under which humanity might fully develop its talents? In Dante and Governance, leading scholars in the field discuss major preoccupations reflected in Dante's great poem, ranging from free-will and personal responsibility to Papal power, from popular sovereignty to French imperialism, from royal justice to the role of women.

The most majestic scientific achievement, of this century in mathematical beauty, axiomatic consistency, and experimental verifications has been special relativity with its unitary structure at the operator level, and canonical structure at the classical levels, which has turned out to be exactly valid for point particles moving in the homogenenous and isotropic vacuum (exterior dynamical problems). In recent decades a number of authors have studied nonunitary and noncanonical theories, here generally calleddeformations for the representation of broader conditions, such as extended (...) and deformable particles moving within inhomogeneous and anisotrophic physical media (interior dynamical problems). In this paper we show that nonunitary deformations, including, q-, k-, quatum-, Lie-isotopic, Lie-admissible, and other deformations, even thoughmathematically correct, have a number of problematic aspects ofphysical character when formulated on conventional spaces over conditional fields, such as lack of invariance of the basic space-time units, ambiguous applicability to measurements, loss of Hermiticity-observability in time, lack of invariant numerical predictions, loss of the axions of special relativity, and others. We then show that the classical noncanonical counterparts of the above nonunitary deformations are equally afflicted by corresponding problems of physical consistency. We also show that the contemporary formulation of gravity is afflicted by similar problematic aspects because Riemannian spaces are noncanonical deformations of Minkowskian spaces, thus having noninvariant space-time units. We then point out that new mathematical methods, calledisotopies, genotopies, hyperstructures and their isoduals, offer the possibilities of constructing a nonunitary theory, known asrelativistic hadronic mechanics which: (1) is as axiomatically consistent as relativistic quantum mechanics, (2) preserves the abstract axioms of special relativity, and (3) results in a completion of the conventional mechanics much along the celebrated Einstein-Podolski-Rosen argument. A number of novel applications are indicated, such as a geometric unification of the special and general relativity via the isominkowskian geometry in which the two relativities are differentiated via the invariant basic unit, while preserving conventional Riemannian metrics, Einstein's field equations, and related experimental verifications; a novel operator form of gravity verifying the axioms of relativistic quantum mechanics under the universal isopoincaré symmetry; a new structure model of hadrons with conventional massive particles as physical constituents which is compatile with composite quarks and with established unitary classifications; and other novels applications in nuclear physics, astrophysics, theoretical biology, and other fields. The paper ends with the proposal of a number of new experiments, some of which may imply new practical applications, such as conceivable new forms of recycling nuclear waste. The achievement of axiomatic consistency in the study of the above physical problems has been possible for the first time in this paper thanks to mathematical advances that recently appeared in a special issue of theRendiconti Circolo Matematico Palermo, and in other journals identified in the Acknowledgements. (shrink)

Howard Adelmann’s majestic five volume Marcello Malpighi and the Evolution of Embryology was published nearly 50 years ago. A mix of paraphrase and translation, as well as extended commentary, Adelmann described Malpighi as “one of the cardinal figures in the history of biology. As we look back over the three centuries that separate him from us, he may, for all his towering stature, at first glance seem a distant figure. And yet he and his work are not so remote after (...) all” . Much has changed in the history of biology since Adelmann’s groundbreaking work, and among the many lessons to be taken from Domenico Bertoloni-Meli’s carefully researched, persuasive and, at times, beautifully rendered book is that the life sciences in the early modern period must be studied with an eye to the history of science, medicine and philosophy—i.e., calling Malpighi simply a “biologist” is very liable to mislead. This point, though only implicit in Meli’s choice to study Malpighi “in relati .. (shrink)

In the unequaled and majestic contemporary technological phase of our cultural development, where democratic liberties and the means of well being are accessible to everyone; man is unsatisfied, insecure, rebellious, confused and lost. More than ever before he seems to lack the sureness of his way in life. The abundance of theories, doctrines and various philosophical, social or religious systems and moral teachings fails to provide the individual today with any clarity whatsoever. Lacking this, he turns to peripheral events, to (...) sensational occurrences; he turns his attention to more and to glaring new models of technological products. more new things, mostly Acquiring a great multitude of these and various other things, he seems to stress his own importance, thus making an inquiry in its fundamental validity superfluous. In this way he escapes the search of his very own mission; he betrays the superior powers which demand from him his existential contribution in finding his ideals and outlining the way of his life. (shrink)

A reviewer of the original edition in 1970 of "The Perfectibility of Man" well summarizes the scope and significance of this renowned work by one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century: "Beginning with an analytic discussion of the various ways in which perfectibility has been interpreted, Professor Passmore traces its long history from the Greeks to the present day, by way of Christianity, orthodox and heterodox, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, anarchism, utopias, communism, psychoanalysis, and evolutionary theories of man (...) and society. Both in its broad sweep and in countless supporting reflections, it is a journey through spiritual scenery of the most majestic and exhilarating kind." Thoroughly and elegantly, Passmore explores the history of the idea of perfectibility--manifest in the ideology of perfectibilism--and its consequences, which have invariably been catastrophic for individual liberty and responsibility in private, social, economic, and political life.John Passmore served for many years as a Professor of Philosophy at Australian National University. (shrink)

Fearful Symmetry brings the incredible discoveries of contemporary physics within everyone's grasp. A. Zee, a distinguished physicist and skillful expositor, tells the exciting story of how today's theoretical physicists are following Einstein in their search for the beauty and simplicity of Nature. Animated by a sense of reverence and whimsy, the book describes the majestic sweep and accomplishments of twentieth-century physics. In the end, we stand in awe before the grand vision of modern physics--one of the greatest chapters in the (...) intellectual history of humankind. (shrink)

In strict opposition to the prevailing positivist conception of nature as senseless and deprived of meaning Jakob von Uexküll claimed that a certain planmässigkeit was operative in nature. This idea however might be taken to mean that organic evolution is not itself a creative process but a gradual, if majestic, unfolding of Nature's own master plan. Such an idea would threaten to restore determinism in the center of biological theory, and this would seriously contradict the vision of biosemiotics shared by (...) most of its proponents. It lies at the heart of biosemiotics and of Peircean cosmological philosophy that indeterminacy is primary, that “habit taking” or interpretation are real processes in the world, and therefore that belief in the law of necessity is unfounded. It is suggested that Uexküllian planmässigkeit is in fact reconcilable with a modern non-deterministic understanding. In a certain sense the Umwelten of animals have indeed developed in accordance to a natural planmässigkeit, but this is a plan that incessantly traps life in certain strategic choices and in the same time diversifies the dimensionality of options for dealing with these choices, i. e. “the adjacent possible” in the terms of Stuart Kauffman. (shrink)

The Industrial Revolution caused an expansion of our ideas of property to include other forms of wealth, such as innovations and productive techniques. And the modern age has caused a further expansion of our ideas of property to include inchoate items, particularly information. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution presumed that government not only took an expansive view of the nature of property rights, they also believed that such rights should be protected. To James Madison and the other Framers, property (...) was a “broad and majestic term” that “embraces everything which may have a value to which man may attach a right.”. (shrink)

I Alderdommen (1970) fremsetter Simone de Beauvoir en filosofisk analyse av alderdom og eldre menneskers situa- sjon, og hevder at behandlingen de får er «skandaløs»; samfunnet «returnerer dem som en vare det ikke lenger er bruk for». Hun tilkjennegir et like stort engasjement mot den urett som eldre utsettes for som hun gjør i Det annet kjønn (1949) når det gjelder undertrykkelsen av kvinner. Likevel påstår Beauvoir at alderdommen først og fremst er et problem for mannen, og det har blitt (...) hevdet at Alderdommen er et verk om aldersdiskriminering hvor mannens aldringsprosess gjøres til norm – ikke et feministisk verk på linje med Det annet kjønn. I denne artikkelen argumen- terer Tove Pettersen for at det nettopp er den feministiske filosofien Beauvoir utvikler i Det annet kjønn som ligger til grunn for hennes undersøkelser av undertrykkelse og diskriminering av eldre. I tillegg demonstrerer Beauvoirs omfattende analyse av alderdommen at hverken alder eller kjønn kan studeres uavhengig av hverandre. Alder og kjønn virker sammen, og må ses i lys av den situasjon disse fenomenene fremtrer i hvor også klasse er av stor betydning. Alderdommen kan derfor leses som et verk hvor Beauvoir viser hvordan ulike former for undertrykkelse virker sammen og bidrar til marginalisering og diskriminering av eldre. Nøkkelord: Simone de Beauvoir, Alderdommen, Det annet kjønn, feministisk filosofi, Den andre, aldersdiskriminering, alderisme******* -/- In The Coming of Age (1970), Simone de Beauvoir presents a philosophical analysis of old age and the elderly’s situa- tion, and claims that the treatment they receive is “scandalous”; society ‘returns them as a commodity that is no longer needed.’ She exhibits the same level of commitment regarding the injustice to which the elderly are exposed as she does in The Second Sex (1949) when it comes to the oppression of women. Nevertheless, Beauvoir claims that old age first and foremost is a problem for men, and it has been argued that The Coming of Age is a work on age discrim- ination where the male aging process is made the norm – not a feminist work on par with The Second Sex. In thisarticle, Tove Pettersen argues that it is precisely the feminist philosophy that Beauvoir develops in The Second Sex that enables her to analyze the oppression and discrimination of the elderly. Additionally, Beauvoir's comprehensive analysis of old age demonstrates that neither age nor gender can be studied independently. Age and gender intersect, and must be be seen in light of the situation in which class is of great importance. Thus, The Coming of Age can be read as a work in which Beauvoir shows how different forms of oppression work together and contribute to the mar- ginalization and discrimination of the elderly. Keywords: Simone de Beauvoir, The Coming of Age, The Second Sex, Feminist Philosophy, The Other, Age Discrimination, Ageism. (shrink)

continent. 2.2 (2012): 66–75 ~*~ We’re Doomed. Pessimism is the night-side of thought, a melodrama of the futility of the brain, a poetry written in the graveyard of philosophy. Pessimism is a lyrical failure of philosophical thinking, each attempt at clear and coherent thought, sullen and submerged in the hidden joy of its own futility. The closest pessimism comes to philosophical argument is the droll and laconic “We’ll never make it,” or simply: “We’re doomed.” Every effort doomed to failure, every (...) project doomed to incompletion, every life doomed to be unlived, every thought doomed to be unthought. Pessimism is the lowest form of philosophy, frequently disparaged and dismissed, merely the symptom of a bad attitude. No one ever needs pessimism, in the way that one needs optimism to inspire one to great heights and to pick oneself up, in the way one needs constructive criticism, advice and feedback, inspirational books or a pat on the back. No one needs pessimism, though I like to imagine the idea of a pessimist activism. No one needs pessimism, and yet everyone—without exception—has, at some point in their lives, had to confront pessimism, if not as a philosophy then as a grievance—against one’s self or others, against one’s surroundings or one’s life, against the state of things or the world in general. There is little redemption for pessimism, and no consolation prize. Ultimately, pessimism is weary of everything and of itself. Pessimism is the philosophical form of disenchantment—disenchantment as chanting, a chant, a mantra, a solitary, monophonic voice rendered insignificant by the intimate immensity surrounding it. In pessimism, the first axiom is a long, low, funereal sigh. ~*~ We’re Still Doomed. No one has time for pessimism. After all, there are only so many hours in a day. Whatever our temperament, happy or sad, engaged or disengaged, we know pessimism when we hear it. The pessimist is usually understood as the complainer, forever pointing out what is wrong with the world without ever once offering a solution. But more often than not pessimists are the quietest of philosophers, submerging their own sighs within the lethargy of discontent. What little sound it makes is of interest to no one—“I’ve heard it all before,” “tell me something I don’t know,” sound and fury, signifying nothing. In raising problems without solutions, in posing questions without answers, in retreating to the hermetic, cavernous abode of complaint, pessimism is guilty of that most inexcusable of Occidental crimes—the crime of not pretending it’s for real. Pessimism fails to live up to the most basic tenet of philosophy—the “as if.” Think as if it will be helpful, act as if it will make a difference, speak as if there is something to say, live as if you are not, in fact, being lived by some murmuring non-entity both shadowy and muddied. Had it more self-assurance and better social skills, pessimism would turn its disenchantment into a religion, possibly calling itself The Great Refusal. But there is a negation in pessimism that refuses even such a Refusal, an awareness that, from the start, it has already failed, and that the culmination of all that is, is that all is for naught. Pessimism tries very hard to present itself in the low, sustained tones of a Requiem Mass, or the tectonic rumbling of Tibetan chant. But it frequently lets loose dissonant notes at once plaintive and pathetic. Often, its voice cracks, its weighty words abruptly reduced to mere shards of guttural sound. ~*~ Maybe It’s Not So Bad, After All. If we know pessimism when we hear it, this is because we’ve heard it all before—and we didn’t need to hear it in the first place. Life is hard enough. What you need is a change of attitude, a new outlook, a shift in perspective... a cup of coffee. If we have no ears for pessimism, this is because it is always reducible to something as reliably mutable as a voice. If pessimism is so frequently disparaged, it is because it brings everyone down, determined as it is to view each day as a bad day, if only by virtue of the fact that it is not yet a bad day. For pessimism the world is brimming with negative possibility, the collision of a bad mood with an impassive world. In fact, pessimism is the result of a confusion between the world and a statement about the world, a confusion that also prevents it from fully entering the hallowed halls of philosophy. If pessimism is so often dismissed, this is because it is often impossible to separate a “bad mood” from a philosophical proposition (and do not all philosophies stem from a bad mood?) The very term “pessimism” suggests a school of thought, a movement, even a community. But pessimism always has a membership of one—maybe two. Ideally, of course, it would have a membership of none, with only a scribbled, illegible note left behind by someone long forgotten. But this seems unrealistic, though one can always hope. ~*~ Anatomy of Pessimism. Though it may locate itself at the margins of philosophy, pessimism is as much subject to philosophical analysis as any other form of thought. Pessimism’s lyricism of failure gives it the structure of music. What time is to the music of sorrow, reason is to a philosophy of the worst. Pessimism’s two major keys are moral and metaphysical pessimism, its subjective and objective poles, an attitude towards the world and a claim about the world. For moral pessimism, it is better not to have been born at all; for metaphysical pessimism, this is the worst of all possible worlds. For moral pessimism the problem is the solipsism of human beings, the world made in our own image, a world-for-us. For metaphysical pessimism, the problem is the solipsism of the world, objected and projected as a world-in-itself. Both moral and metaphysical pessimism are compromised philosophically; moral pessimism by its failure to locate the human within a larger context, and metaphysical pessimism by its failure to recognize the complicity in the very claim of realism. This is how pessimism makes its music of the worst, a generalized misanthropy without the anthropos . Pessimism crystallizes around this futility—it is its amor fati , rendered as musical form. ~*~ Melancholy of Anatomy. There is a logic of pessimism that is fundamental to its suspicion of philosophical system. Pessimism involves a statement about a condition . In pessimism each statement boils down to an affirmation or a negation, just as any condition boils down to the best or the worst. With Schopenhauer, that arch-pessimist, the thinker for whom the philosopher and the curmudgeon perfectly overlap, we see a no-saying to the worst, a no-saying that secretly covets a yes-saying (through asceticism, mysticism, quietism), even if this hidden yes-saying is a horizon at the limits of comprehension. With Nietzsche comes the pronouncement of a Dionysian pessimism, a pessimism of strength or joy, a yes-saying to the worst, a yes-saying to this world as it is. And with Cioran yet another variation, futile yet lyrical, a no-saying to the worst, and a further no-saying to the possibility of any other world, in here or out there. With Cioran one approaches, but never reaches, an absolute no-saying, a studied abandonment of pessimism itself. The logic of pessimism moves through three refusals: a no-saying to the worst (refusal of the world-for-us, or Schopenhauer’s tears); a yes-saying to the worst (refusal of the world-in-itself, or Nietzsche’s laughter); and a no-saying to the for-us and the in-itself (a double refusal, or Cioran’s sleep). Crying, laughing, sleeping—what other responses are adequate to a life that is so indifferent? ~*~ Cosmic Pessimism. Both moral and metaphysical pessimism point to another kind, a pessimism that is neither subjective nor objective, neither for-us nor in-itself, and instead a pessimism of the world-without-us. We could call this a cosmic pessimism ... but this sounds too majestic, too full of wonder, too much the bitter aftertaste of the Great Beyond. Words falter. And so do ideas. And so we have a cosmic pessimism, a pessimism that is first and last a pessimism about cosmos , about the necessity and possibility of order. The contours of cosmic pessimism are a drastic scaling-up or scaling-down of the human point of view, the unhuman orientation of deep space and deep time, and all of this shadowed by an impasse, a primordial insignificance, the impossibility of ever adequately accounting for one’s relationship to thought—all that remains of pessimism is the desiderata of affects—agonistic, impassive, defiant, reclusive, filled with sorrow and flailing at that architectonic chess match called philosophy, a flailing that pessimism tries to raise to the level of an art form (though what usually results is slapstick). ~*~ Song of Futility. An ethics of futility pervades pessimism. Futility, however, is different from fatality, and different again from simple failure (though failure is never simple). Failure is a breakage within the heart of relations, a fissure between cause and effect, a fissure hastily covered over by trying and trying again. With failure, there is always plenty of blame to go around; it’s not my fault, it’s a technical difficulty, it’s a miscommunication. For the pessimist, failure is a question of “when,” not “if”—failure as a metaphysical principle. Everything withers and passes into an obscurity blacker than night, everything from the melodramatic decline of a person’s life to the banal flickering moments that constitute each day. Everything that is done undone, everything said or known destined for a kind of stellar oblivion. When scaled up in this way, failure becomes fatality. Fatality is the hermeticism of cause and effect. In fatality, everything you do, whatever you do, always leads to a certain end, and ultimately to the end—though that end, or the means to that end, remain shrouded in obscurity. Nothing you do makes a difference because everything you do makes a difference. Hence the effects of your actions are hidden from you, even as you deceive yourself into thinking that, at last, this time you will outwit the order of things. By having a goal, planning ahead, and thinking things through carefully, we attempt, in a daily Prometheanism, to turn fatality to our advantage, to gain a glimpse of an order that seems buried deeper and deeper in the fabric of the universe. But even fatality has its comforts. The chain of cause and effect may be hidden from us, but that’s just because disorder is the order we don’t yet see; it’s just complex, distributed, and requires advanced mathematics. Fatality still clings to the sufficiency of everything that exists... When fatality relinquishes even this idea, it becomes futility. Futility arises out of the grim suspicion that, behind the shroud of causality we drape over the world, there is only the indifference of what exists or doesn’t exist; whatever you do ultimately leads to no end, an irrevocable chasm between thought and world. Futility transforms the act of thinking into a zero-sum game. ~*~ Song of the Worst. At the center of pessimism lies the term pessimus , “the worst,” a term as relative as it is absolute. The worst is about as bad as it gets, “the worst” as “the best” in disguise, shrouded by the passage of time or the twists and turns of fortune. For the pessimist, “the worst” is the propensity for suffering that gradually occludes each living moment, until it eclipses it entirely, overlapping perfectly in death... which, for the pessimist, is no longer “the worst.” Pessimism is marked by an unwillingness to move beyond “the worst,” something only partially attributable to a lack in motivation. In pessimism “the worst” is the ground that gives way beneath every existent—things could be worse, and , things could be better. “The worst” invariably implies a value judgment, one made based on scant evidence and little experience; in this way, pessimism’s greatest nemesis is its moral orientation. Pessimism’s propositions have all the gravitas of a bad joke. Perhaps this is why the true optimists are the most severe pessimists—they are optimists that have run out of options. They are almost ecstatically inundated by the worst. Such an optimism is the only possible outcome of a prolonged period of suffering, physical or metaphysical, intellectual or spiritual. But does this not also describe all the trials and tribulations of each day—in short, of “life?” It seems that sooner or later we are all doomed to become optimists of this sort (the most depressing of thoughts...) ~*~ Song of Doom. Rather than serving as a cause for despair, gloom and doom are the forms of consolation for any pessimist philosophy. Neither quite affects nor quite concepts, gloom and doom transform pessimism into a mortification of philosophy. Doom is not just the sense that all things will turn out badly, but that all things inevitably come to an end, irrespective of whether or not they really do come to an end. What emerges from doom is a sense of the unhuman as an attractor, a horizon towards which the human is fatally drawn. Doom is humanity given over to unhumanity in an act of crystalline self-abnegation. Gloom is not simply the anxiety that precedes doom. Gloom is literally atmospheric, climate as much as impression, and if people are also gloomy, this is simply the by-product of an anodyne atmosphere that only incidentally involves human beings. Gloom is more climatological than psychological, the stuff of dim, hazy, overcast skies, of ruins and overgrown tombs, of a misty, lethargic fog that moves with the same languorousness as our own crouched and sullen listening to a disinterested world. In a sense, gloom is the counterpoint to doom—what futility is to the former, fatality is to the latter. Doom is marked by temporality—all things precariously drawn to their end—whereas gloom is the austerity of stillness, all things sad, static, and suspended, a meandering smoke hovering over cold lichen stones and damp fir trees. If doom is the terror of temporality and death, then gloom is the horror of a hovering stasis that is life. At times I like to imagine that this realization alone is the thread that connects the charnel ground Aghori and the graveyard poets. ~*~ Song of Spite. There is an intolerance in pessimism that knows no bounds. In pessimism spite begins by fixing on a particular object of spite—someone one hardly knows, or someone one knows too well; a spite for this person or a spite for all of humanity; a spectacular or a banal spite; a spite for a noisy neighbor, a yapping dog, a battalion of strollers, the meandering idiot walking in front of you on their smart phone, large loud celebrations, traumatic injustices anywhere in the world regurgitated as media blitz, spite for the self-absorbed and overly performative people talking way too loud at the table next to you, technical difficulties and troubleshooting, the reduction of everything to branding, spite of the refusal to admit one’s own errors, of self-help books, of people who know absolutely everything and make sure to tell you, of all people, all living beings, all things, the world, the spiteful planet, the inanity of existence... Spite is the motor of pessimism because it is so egalitarian, so expansive, it runs amok, stumbling across intuitions that can only half-heartedly be called philosophical. Spite lacks the confidence and the clarity of hatred, but it also lacks the almost cordial judgment of dislike. For the pessimist, the smallest detail can be an indication of a metaphysical futility so vast and funereal that it eclipses pessimism itself—a spite that pessimism carefully places beyond the horizon of intelligibility, like the experience of dusk, or like the phrase, “it is raining jewels and daggers.” ~*~ Song of Sleep. A paraphrase of Schopenhauer: what death is for the organism, sleep is for the individual. Pessimists sleep not because they are depressed, but because for them sleep is a form of ascetic practice. Sleep is the askesis of pessimism. If, while sleeping, we have a bad dream, we abruptly wake up, and suddenly the horrors of the night vanish. There is no reason to think that the same does not happen with the bad dream we call “life.” ~*~ Song of Sorrow. Nietzsche, commenting on pessimism, once castigated Schopenhauer for taking things too lightly. He writes: ...Schopenhauer, though a pessimist, really —played the flute. Every day, after dinner: one should read his biography on that. And incidentally: a pessimist, one who denies God and the world but comes to a stop before morality—who affirms morality and plays the flute... what? Is that really—a pessimist? We know that Schopenhauer did possess a collection of instruments, and we also know that Nietzsche himself composed music. There is no reason to think that either of them would ever banish music from the Republic of philosophy. But Nietzsche’s jibes at Schopenhauer are as much about music as they are about pessimism. For the pessimist who says no to everything and yet finds comfort in music, the no-saying of pessimism can only be a weak way of saying yes—the weightiest statement undercut by the flightiest of replies. The least that Schopenhauer could’ve done is to play the bass. I’m not a big fan of the flute, or, for that matter, wind instruments generally. But what Nietzsche forgets is the role that the flute has historically played in Greek tragedy. In tragedy, the flute ( aulos ) is not an instrument of levity and joy, but of solitude and sorrow. The Greek aulos not only expresses the grief of tragic loss, but it does so in a way that renders weeping and singing inseparable from each other. The classicist Nicole Loraux calls this the mourning voice . Set apart from the more official civic rituals of funerary mourning, the mourning voice of Greek tragedy constantly threatens to dissolve song into wailing, music into moaning, and the voice into a primordial, disarticulate anti-music. The mourning voice delineates all the forms of suffering—tears, weeping, sobbing, wailing, moaning, and the convulsions of thought reduced to an elemental unintelligibility. In the collapsed space between the voice that speaks and the voice that sings, pessimism discovers its mourning voice. Pessimism: the failure of sound and sense, the disarticulation of phone and logos . Have we rescued Schopenhauer from Nietzsche? Probably not. Perhaps Schopenhauer played the flute to remind himself of the real function of the mourning voice—sorrow, sighs, and moaning rendered indistinguishable from music, the crumbling of the human into the unhuman. Failure par excellence of pessimism. ~*~ Song of Nothing. In Buddhist thought, the First Noble Truth of existence is encapsulated in the Pali term dukkha , conventionally translated as “suffering,” “sorrow,” or “misery.” The Buddhist teachings are clear, however, that this is an objective claim, and not simply one point of view among others. Existence is suffering and sorrow—and yet this is not, the teachings tell us, a pessimistic attitude. It is likely that Schopenhauer, reading the Buddhist texts available to him, recognized some filiation with the concept of dukkha . But dukkha is a multi-faceted term. There is, certainly, dukkha in the usual sense of the suffering, strife, and loss associated with living a life. But this is, in turn, dependent on the finitude and temporality of dukkha , existence as determined by impermanence and imperfection. And this ultimately points to the way in which both suffering and finitude are grounded by the paradoxical groundlessness of dukkha as a metaphysical principle—the insubstantiality and the emptiness of all that is. Beyond what is worse to me, beyond a world ordered for the worst, there is the emptiness of dukkha as an impersonal suffering... the tears of the cosmos. In this context, it is easy to see how Schopenhauer’s pessimism attempts to compress all the aspects of dukkha into a nothingness at the core of existence, a Willlessness coursing through the Will. Though one thing for certain is that with Schopenhauer we do not find the “ever-smiling” countenance of Buddhism—or do we? The texts of the Pali Canon also contain lists of the different types of happiness—including the happiness of renunciation and the strange happiness of detachment. But Buddhism considers even the different types of happiness as part of dukkha , in this final sense of nothingness or emptiness. Perhaps Schopenhauer understood Buddhism better than he is usually given credit for. Thus the experiment of Schopenhauer’s philosophy—the point at which a Western pessimus and an Eastern dukkha overlap or exchange glances. Empty sorrow, a lyricism of indifference. The result is a strange, and ultimately untenable, nocturnal form of Buddhism. ~*~ Cioran once called music a “physics of tears.” If this is true, then perhaps metaphysics is its commentary. Or its apology. ~*~ Pessimism would be more mystical were it not for its defeatism. Mysticism is much too proactive for the pessimist, and pessimism too impassive even for the mystic. At the same time, there is something enviable about mysticism—despite its sufferings. There is a sense in which pessimists are really failed mystics. ~*~ You, the Night, and the Music. In a suggestive passage, Schopenhauer once noted that, “music is the melody to which the world is the text." Given Schopenhauer’s view on life—that life is suffering, that human life is absurd, that the nothingness before my birth is equal to the nothingness after my death—given all this, one wonders what kind of music Schopenhauer had in mind when he described music as the melody to which the world is text—was it opera, a Requiem Mass, a madrigal, or perhaps a drinking song? Or something like Eine kleine Nachtmusik , a little night music for the twilight of thought, a sullen nocturne for the night-side of logic, an era of sad wings sung by a solitary banshee. Perhaps the music Schopenhauer had in mind is music eliminated to non-music. A whisper would suffice. Perhaps a sigh of fatigue or resignation, perhaps a moan of despair or sorrow. Perhaps a sound just articulate enough that it could be heard to dissipate. ~*~ Teach me to laugh through tears. ~*~ Pessimism always falls short of being philosophical. My back aches, my knees hurt, I couldn’t sleep last night, I’m stressed-out, and I think I’m finally coming down with something. Pessimism abjures all pretenses towards system—towards the purity of analysis and the dignity of critique. We didn’t really think we could figure it out, did we? It was just passing time, taking a piss, something to do, a bold gesture put forth in all its fragility, according to rules that we have agreed to forget that we made up in the first place. Every thought marked by a shadowy incomprehension that precedes it, and a futility that undermines it. That pessimism speaks, in whatever voice, is the singing testimony to this futility and this incomprehension—take a chance and step outside, lose some sleep and say you tried... ~*~ Is there a music of pessimism? And would such a music be audible? ~*~ The impact of music on a person compels them to put their experience into words. When this fails, the result is a faltering of thought and language that is itself a kind of music. Cioran writes: “Music is everything. God himself is nothing more than an acoustic hallucination.” ~*~ If a thinker like Schopenhauer has any redeeming qualities, it is that he identified the great lie of Western culture—the preference for existence over non-existence. As he notes: “If we knocked on the graves and asked the dead whether they would like to rise again, they would shake their heads.” In Western cultures it is commonly accepted that one celebrates birth and mourns death. But there must be a mistake here. Wouldn’t it make more sense to mourn birth and celebrate death? Strange though, because the mourning of birth would, presumably, last the entirety of that person’s life, so that mourning and living would the be same thing. ~*~ To the musical idea of the harmony of the universe corresponds the philosophical principle of sufficient reason. Like the music of mourning, pessimism gives voice to the inevitable breakdown of word and song. In this way, music is the overtone of thought. ~*~ The Patron Saints of Pessimism. The patron saints of pessimism watch over suffering. Laconic and sullen, the patron saints of pessimism never seem to do a good job at protecting, interceding, or advocating for those who suffer. Perhaps they need us more than we need them. Lest we forget, there do exist patron saints of philosophy, but their stories are not happy ones. There is, for instance, the fourth century Saint Catherine of Alexandria, or Catherine of the Wheel, named after the torture device used on her. A precocious fourteen year old scholar, Catherine was subject to continual persecution. After all forms of torture failed—including the “breaking wheel”—the emperor finally settled for her decapitation, a violent yet appropriate reminder of the protector of philosophers. There are also patron saints of music and musicians, but theirs too are sad stories. In the second century, Saint Cecilia was also subject to persecution and torture. As she knelt to receive the blade that would separate her head from her body, she ardently sang a song to God. It took three attempts before she was fully decapitated, all the while she continued, perhaps miraculously, to sing. Does pessimism not deserve its own patron saints, even if they are unworthy of martyrdom? But in our search, even the most ardent nay-sayers frequently lapse into brief moments of enthusiasm—Pascal’s love of solitude, Leopardi’s love of poetry, Schopenhauer’s love of music, Nietzsche’s love of Schopenhauer, and so on. Should one then focus on individual works of pessimism? We could include Kierkegaard’s trilogy of horror— Sickness Unto Death , The Concept of Dread , and Fear and Trembling —but all these are undermined by their fabricated and unreliable authors. Besides, how can one separate the pessimist from the optimist in works like Unamuno’s The Tragic Sense of Life , Shestov’s Postetas Clavium , or Edgar Saltus’ under-read The Philosophy of Disenchantment ? Even in cases where the entire corpus of an author is pessimistic, the project always seems incomplete—witness Cioran’s trajectory, from his first book, On the Heights of Despair , to the last unpublished notebooks of acrid and taut aphorisms. And this is to say nothing of literary pessimism, from Goethe’s sorrowful Werther, to Dostoevsky’s underground man, to Pessoa’s disquiet scribbler; Baudelaire’s spleen and ennui, the mystical Satanism of Huysmans and Strindberg, the hauntologies of Mário de Sá-Carniero, Izumi Kyoka, H.P. Lovecraft, grumpy old Beckett... even the great pessimist comedians. All that remains are singular, perhaps anomalous statements of pessimism, a litany of quotes and citations crammed into fortune cookies. Patron saints are traditionally named after a locale, either a place of birth or of a mystical experience. Perhaps the better approach is to focus on the places where pessimists were forced to live out their pessimism—Schopenhauer facing an empty Berlin lecture hall, Nietzsche mute and convalescent at the home of his sister, Wittgenstein the relinquished professor and solitary gardener, Cioran grappling with Alzheimer’s in his tiny writing alcove in the Latin Quarter. ~*~ There’s a ghost that grows inside of me, damaged in the making, and there’s a hunt sprung from necessity, elliptical and drowned. Where the moving quiet of our insomnia offers up each thought, there’s a luminous field of grey inertia, and obsidian dreams burnt all the way down. ~*~ If pessimism has any pedagogical value, it is that the failure of pessimism as a philosophy is inextricably tied to the failure of pessimism as voice. I read the following, from Shestov’s The Apotheosis of Groundlessness : When a person is young he writes because it seems to him he has discovered a new almighty truth which he must make haste to impart to forlorn humankind. Later, becoming more modest, he begins to doubt his truths: and then he tries to convince himself. A few more years go by, and he knows he was mistaken all round, so there is no need to convince himself. Nevertheless he continues to write, because he is not fit for any other work, and to be accounted a superfluous person is so horrible. (shrink)

In mainstream analytic epistemology, Reformed theology has made its presence prominently felt in Reformed epistemology, the view of religious belief according to which religious beliefs can be properly basic and warranted when formed by the proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis, an inborn capacity or faculty for belief in God that can be prompted to generate certain religious beliefs when presented with things (e.g., certain majestic aspects of creation). A major competitor to Reformed epistemology is Wittgensteinian quasi-fideism, a position drawn (...) from the epistemology of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, according to which some foundational religious commitments are not properly basic beliefs but some kind of apodictic, unshakeable certainties that form part of the structure of one’s rationality and worldview. I argue that the Reformed tradition has contained elements of quasi-fideism at least as far back as Calvin’s account of faith from the Institutes of the Christian Religion, book 3, chapter 2. (shrink)

Why does tragedy give pleasure? Why do people who are neither wicked nor depraved enjoy watching plays about suffering and death? Is it because we see horrific matter controlled by majestic art? Or because tragedy actually reaches out to the dark side of human nature? A. D. Nuttall's wide-ranging, lively, and engaging book offers a new answer to this perennial question. Writers discussed include Aristotle, Shakespeare, Nietzsche, and Freud.

Martin Heidegger regnes som den mest innflytelsesrike filosofen i det 20. århundre. Det er også kjent at han hadde nazistiske sympatier og var medlem av NSDAP i perioden 1933-1945. Utgivelsen av Svarte hefter (Schwarze Hefte) - hans filosofiske dagbøker skrevet i perioden fra 1931-1975 - gir et mer detaljert bilde av Heideggers nazisme. Vi får en tydelig dokumentasjon ikke bare av hans dyrking av Hitler og nasjonalsosialismen, men også av et verdenssyn preget av antisemittisme. I heftene kan vi lese flere (...) konspiratoriske passasjer om en ±metafysisk jødedom?, der jødene er representanter for en verdensomspennende instrumentell rasjonalitet som har banet vei for materialisme og kapitalisme.I lys av dette må vi revurdere vårt forhold til Heidegger som filosof og stille oss følgende spørsmål: Skal vi lese alt Heidegger skrev, i lys av hans tid som nazist? Eller er tenkningen av et slikt format at den uansett går fri fra Heideggers politiske engasjement?Denne antologien er et forsøk på å gå inn på disse spørsmålene. Foruten oversettelser av blant annet deler av Svarte hefter fra tysk til norsk, får vi perspektiver fra en rekke internasjonalt anerkjente Heidegger-forskere som analyserer Heideggers politiske engasjement, antisemittisme, sivilisasjonskritikk og religionskritikk. (shrink)

Dans ses cours sur la théologie protestante, donnés à Bonn entre 1932 et 1933, Karl Barth engage une confrontation magistrale avec Hegel, la « confiance en soi » de la pensée humaine et « l’événement de la raison » qui sont au centre de cette œuvre. Hegel, mieux que les théologiens, fut aussi le penseur de la majesté, de la seigneurie de Dieu, mais il ne conçut pas, au centre de la vérité, « l’inconcevable de Dieu ».

Majestueuse, puissante et révérée souveraine, ma dame Isabeau, reine de France par la grâce de Dieu. Très noble, puissante et révérée reine, Que Votre Haute Majesté veuille ne point mépriser ni dédaigner la voix éplorée de sa misérable servante, Christine, mais qu'elle condescende à entendre ces paroles dictées par un sentiment sincère qui ne cherche qu'à faire le bien. Vous pourriez certes croire qu'une personne aussi humble, indigne et ignorante que moi-même ne devrait pas se mêler...

Et je remercie mon Createur! de m'avoir fait vivre en ces journees! ou vous, noble Monsieur, eclairez en cette fin du XVIIIe siecle le monde comme une vive et brillante lumiere... Pas de bonne action, pas de bonne parole qui se perde; la recompense ne peut manquer de venir! On peut le dire au public pour l'attirer et l'inciter a faire pareil! le sage agit par devoir! celui qui est plus sage encore agit par respect pour le devoir! il se (...) prosterne profondement devant la saintete du devoir! il croit en Dieu! il en pressent la majeste! Ainsi disait la lettre... Lettre de Johann Plucker a Kant, le 5 janvier 1796. (shrink)

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Pages de début Préface Sigles utilisés Tableau synchronique Politique et religion des employeurs de Leibniz A - La philosophie politique L'architectonique archaïque : le rapport puissance > sagesse L'inversion du rapport structural : sagesse > puissance L'empire (...) de la sagesse sur les perfections finies et infinies B - La politique philosophique La socialité Souveraineté et majesté Les trois formes du gouvernement de la République Entre paix et guerre Les facteurs matériels de la paix Les facteurs culturelsde la paix Futurition Utopie et optimum Bibliographie Pages de fin. (shrink)

Seeing is a matter of perspective. A perspective is the vantage point by which we view the reality or the world around us. That is why it is called a worldview or paradigm. In other words, what we see is a by product of how we look at the reality around us based on our idea and image of ourselves. Thus, a philosopher once said that if a bird is given the necessary intelligence and the faculty to express its idea (...) of God it will speak of a God that majestically sings and flies with His mighty wings. (shrink)

Airuijiena is a medieval philosophy in the ninth century AD, the rise of a peak, it is the essence of mystical experience with God or with God, God included two adults and people of God into history. This article focuses on the Gospel of John describes Airuijiena Introduction sermons, also known as "Eagle Spirit Music," which contains the secret Qisi think, to be explored, but also involves its philosophy, theology and intellectual history of some of the relevant problem. This article (...) will first discuss the Airuijiena inherited traditions, such as the Irish spirit, Seven Arts in humanities education, Augustine Xing Greek Fathers, etc., and in "On the distinction between natural" will include them in a large integrated system. His "Gospel of St. John preaching preamble", or "Eagle Spirit Music," is a delicate little synthesis, which contains a wealth of secret Qisi want. This article will focus on St. John that he admired the mystical soul, show the people must continue to run away, until all finite things out, into the infinite God. This is a "self out of the" meaning of "extrapolation" of the most extreme, the most profound example. Then this paper to discuss Airuijiena by Zhu Zhong Jing's knowledge of God, to God and experience God together with their philosophical significance, particularly to understand the basis of the theory of divine light and darkness, which indicates not only the Word is the light itself, and all things even one grain of sand stone, they are the beacon. However, their theory of the divine darkness, God is also revealed that he is the ultimate person. In short, Airuijiena extrapolation of ideas and filled with the spirit of comparison, the system's deep and majestic, worthy I inspired. In the development of mediaeval philosophy, Johannes Scotus Eriugena stood like a "lofty rock in the midst of a plain", as Copleston puts it. His mysticism emphasized the union of God and Man in the double process of incarnation and deification. This paper will focus on his mysticism and its philosophical and historical implications in his Homily on the Prologue to the Gospel of St. John, also know as Vox Spiritualis Aquilae. We will discuss, first of all, what Eriugena had received from his Irish tradition, Neo-Platonism as interpreted by Greek fathers and St. Augustine and how he synthesized them into his Periphyseon. His Homily, as a marvelous work of synthesis in miniature, is very rich of mystic insights. We'll focus fist on his understanding of St. John's speculative mind, as a mind always going beyond itself that finally reaches the divine and thereby becomes deified in order to know God in himself. For me this is an extreme case of strangification. Then we will proceed to discuss Eriugena's mystic and philosophical concept of gnosis and theosis, and also his understanding of Logos as Light and that all things, even so tiny and low, are lights too. By contrast, his notion of Darkness of God leads us to the concept of God as totally Other , or the Ultimate Other. In sum, Eriugena's system of mystical philosophy is always deep and magnanimous, enough to inspire more generations to come. (shrink)

Artikkelen er en fenomenologisk og hermeneutisk betraktning av Trondheims minnepark for 22. juli-ofrene. Bakgrunnen ligger i et etisk moment av hermeneutisk selvkritikk, som utspilte seg i storsamfunnets reaksjoner på terroren, og som parken må sees i lys av. Artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i at flere av diktene som er slipt inn i minneparkens hvite betong, tematiserer behovet for mellommenneskelig anerkjennelse. Ved hjelp av kunstteoretikeren Bourriaud og filosofene Fichte og Hegel synliggjøres det hvordan dette temaet – mellommenneskelig anerkjennelse – kan sies å (...) være integrert i parkens helhetlige estetikk. Siste del drøfter ved hjelp av Gadamer hvordan anerkjennelse også er relevant for aktiviteten med å gå omkring og lese diktene i parken. Til sammen belyser artikkelen hvordan minneparken utgjør en sammenveving av det etiske og det estetiske, og hvordan ordet minne her har to betydninger. Med parken minnes vi ofrene for terroren i betydningen kollektiv hukommelse, eller in memoriam. Samtidig blir vi påminnet vår evne til å være i relasjon med andre mennesker, og til å vokse i relasjonelt samspill. Den siste betydningen er filosofisk, og spiller på betydningen gjenerindring. Nøkkelord: hermeneutisk selvkritikk, anerkjennelse, deltakelse, hverdagslighet, lesning English summary: "Becoming fully oneself by being seen." On the connection between ethics and aesthetics in Trondheim's Memorial Park for the July 22 victims This article presents a phenomenological and hermeneutical consideration of Trondheim's Memorial Park for the July 22 victims. The background evolves in an ethical and hermeneutical form of self-criticism, which emerged in Norway in the public reactions to the terror. The article observes the fact that several of the poems embedded in the white concrete of the Memorial Park promote the need for interpersonal recognition. Through considering ideas of Bourriaud, Fichte, and Hegel, the author demonstrates how this very theme of interpersonal recognition is integrated into the park's overall aesthetics. The author considers how recognition is also relevant to the activity of reading the poems in the park through evoking Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. In sum, the article demonstrates how the Memorial Park constitutes a joining of the ethical and aesthetic dimensions and how the word memorial [Norwegian: minne] here gains two meanings. In the park we remember the victims of the terror in the sense of collective memory, or in memoriam. At the same time, we are reminded of our ability to be in relationship with other people and to grow in relational interaction. The latter sense is philosophical and draws on the meaning of recollection. Keywords: hermeneutical self-criticism, recognition, participation, everyday life, reading. (shrink)

Több politikatudománnyal foglalkozó kötettel jelentkezett már Szabó Márton, aki eddigi kutatásait összegezve, egy alternatív szemléletű politikatudomány szemléletébe és kutatásába kívánja bevezetni olvasóit. Célja, hogy bizonyítsa: a politika reális valóságában meghatározó módon jelen van az egyének nyilvános és közös értelmezése és diskurzusa. Hogy a politika ezért nem tekinthető pusztán csak objektív rendszernek, hanem emberek által teremtett és értelmezett valóság. A szerző ezen szemlélet jegyében hét nagyobb egységben mutatja be a politika minden fontos területét, kezdve a politikai tények összetett természetével, folytatva a (...) politikai cselekvések és megismerési módok sajátosságaival. Külön vizsgálja az intézményi kereteket, a politika szereplőit, a politikai ügyeket. Kritikailag elemzi az empirikus politikatudományi kutatás meghatározó területeit, végül a politikatudomány sokféleségével foglalkozik. A vaskos kötetet forrás- és irodalomjegyzék zárja. (shrink)