Genevieve Lloyd’s Spinoza is quite a different thinker from the arch rationalist caricature of some undergraduate philosophy courses devoted to “The Continental Rationalists”. Lloyd’s Spinoza does not see reason as a complete source of knowledge, nor is deductive rational thought productive of the highest grade of knowledge. Instead, that honour goes to a third kind of knowledge—intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva), which provides an immediate, non-discursive knowledge of its singular object. To the embarrassment of some hard-nosed philosophers, intellectual intuition has an (...) affective component; it is a form of love, and ultimately given that human beings are finite modes of God/Nature (Deus sive Natura), it is a form of the intellectual love of God (amor Dei intellectualis). Some philosophers do not know what to make of this mysterious aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy, which is nonetheless firmly anchored in a reading of Part V of the Ethics. Nonetheless, this note will insist with Lloyd’s “Reconsidering Spinoza’s Rationalism” that such doctrine is an integral part of Spinoza’s philosophy. Moreover, it will be shown that Spinoza is well aware of the limitations of reason (ratio) in gaining scientific knowledge of the world and requires intuition precisely because of the inability of reason to represent individuals in their full particularity. Imagination too has a role to play in shaping scientific knowledge, although reason performs a vital critical role in disciplining and liberating the human mind from inadequate imaginary ideas. The result is an interpretation of Spinoza’s epistemology as both rationalist and intuitionist. DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2021.1962652. (shrink)

The relation of philosophy to science, a problem of paramount importance for the future of philosophy, is reconsidered in this paper. Usually science has been accepted as the indubitable basis and philosophy has been made so dependent on it that it has become chiefly an investigation into the foundations, the results or the language of science. It has been wrongly assumed that science contains all possible material knowledge and that philosophy has but to analyse the language and grammar of science. (...) Even where science has been criticized, as in the French Critique of Science, it has been accepted in its present form and restricted merely to the analysis of matter whereas the access to life has been claimed for philosophy. (shrink)

This dissertation provides an analysis of both the text and the context of the philosophy of love developed by Judah Abravanel, also known as Leone Ebreo . As a member of one of the most prestigious Jewish families of the Renaissance, Leone Ebreo was born and raised in Portugal, found temporary refuge in Spain and, after the exodus of 1492, lived most of his life in Renaissance Italy as a man-in-exile. His Dialoghi d'amore, which were first published in Rome in (...) 1535, are a conversation of and about love between a man and a woman, i.e., Filone and Sofia . We defend that the work was intended as a parable or diagram about the very nature of Philo-Sophy, and, at the same time, as a profound elaboration of the cosmic or transcendental nature of love itself. The Dialoghi d'amore are, thus, both a dramatic representation of a particular philosophy of love and a demonstration of how philosophy as such constitutes a form of love. ;A detailed analysis of Leone Ebreo's thought, both a major example of Renaissance Philosophy and a model of interpretation, will here be the way toward progress in our own philosophical treatment of love and of the ontological condition it manifests. Since they constitute a paradigmatic example of philosophical eclecticism in the Renaissance, the Dialoghi d'amore will be read as the representative encyclopedia about the culture of sixteenth-century Europe that they in fact are. ;Through a con-textual reading of Leone Ebreo's work we try to illustrate both the philosophical importance and the existential relevance of a text that, located as it is at a crucial moment of transition between the Middle Ages and the Modern Age, is clearly centered upon the Idea of Love and, as such, came to play a significant role in the development of European thought and letters. (shrink)

Wichtige Aspekte der Spinoza-Rezeption sind lange Zeit im Hintergrund geblieben. Spinoza galt seit dem öffentlich gemachten Bekenntnis des Aufklärers Lessing zum Hen kai Pan als Vertreter einer Substanzenontologie für Atheisten. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi war es, der 1785 und 1789 eine breite Debatte um Pantheismus, Atheismus, letztbegründende Prinzipien der Metaphysik, ferner um Freiheit und Notwendigkeit auslöste. Spinozas Trieb- und Affektenlehre blieb in der Forschung weitgehend unbeachtet. Weniger lautstark als im ausgehenden 18. Jahrhundert, aber durchaus wirksam, ist Spinoza im 20. und 21. (...) Jahrhundert durch Denker wie Gilles Deleuze oder den Neurologen Antonio Damasio erneut in den Fokus der Aufmerksamkeit geraten. Diesmal ist es Spinozas vormals wenig beachtete Affektenlehre, die für Theorien vom ganzen, nicht bloß vom einseitig rationalen Menschen Interesse weckte. Galt das Interesse der Aufklärung der Rationalität des Denkens, die gegen Aberglauben und Irreführungen der Vernunft ins Recht zu setzen war, so wenden sich das 20. und das 21. Jahrhundert der Entdeckung der Intelligenz und Rationalität der Gefühle zu – zuerst in der Psychologie, bald auch in der Philosophie. Der Band nimmt das neue Interesse an Spinoza zum Anlass zu untersuchen, ob und inwieweit im Deutschen Idealismus, in der Romantik und im 19. Jahrhundert bis heute der andere Spinoza, der Spinoza einer bemerkenswerten Trieb- und Affektenlehre sowie des amor Dei intellectualis, wahrgenommen wurde. Die Beiträge zu Spinoza selbst, zu Jacobi, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Hardenberg/Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher, schließlich zu Nietzsche, Freud, Sartre, Lacan, Deleuze zeigen, dass dieser andere Spinoza durchaus in der einen oder anderen Weise gesehen wurde. Mit Beiträgen von Karl Ameriks, Andreas Arndt, Ulrich Barth, Wolfgang Bartuschat, Arno Böhler, Konrad Cramer, Bärbel Frischmann, Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch, Ulrike Kadi, Thomas Kisser, Jane Kneller, Konrad P. Liessmann, Elizabeth Millán, Ursula Renz, Helma Riefenthaler, Violetta L. Waibel, Reiner Wiehl und Jure Zovko. (shrink)

The notion of divine love was essential to medieval Christian conceptions of God. Jewish thinkers, though, had a much more ambivalent attitude about this issue. While Maimonides was reluctant to ascribe love, or any other affect, to God, Gersonides and Crescas celebrated God’s love. Though Spinoza is clearly sympathetic to Maimonides’ rejection of divine love as anthropomorphism, he attributes love to God nevertheless, unfolding his notion of amor Dei intellectualis at the conclusion of his Ethics. But is this a (...) legitimate notion within his system? In the first part of this article, I will explain some of the problems surrounding this notion, and then turn, in the second part, to consider two unsatisfactory solutions. In the third part, I will attempt to rework Spinoza’s amor Dei intellectualis from his definitions of love and the other affects in part three of the Ethics. In the fourth part, I will examine closely how Spinoza tweaks his definition of love in order to allow for the possibility of divine intellectual love, and conclude by trying to explain what motivated this move. (shrink)

Presentamos en este escrito la doctrina sufi relativa a la teleonomía y expresión divinas y al modo en que los hombres son interpelados por su actividad, luz, y beneficencia, con especial atención a la obra de Muhyi'd-din Ibn al-`arabi y conforme a los contenidos de una enseñanza que remite, asimismo, al horizonte temprano del pensar occidental. Querríamos contribuir con ello a esclarecer, desde una óptica filosófica, algunos de los motivos preliminares de la teoreticidad característica de la espiritualidad islámica.

In the course of his studies on Kabbalah, Moshe Idel has written on the influence of Kabbalists on philosophy. He suggests that Spinoza was influenced by the Kabbalah regarding his expressions “Deus sive Natura“ and “amor Dei intellectualis.” The 13th-century ecstatic Kabbalist Rabbi Abraham Abulafia and many authors after him cited the numerical equivalence of the Hebrew words for God and Nature: elohim = ha-teba` = 86. This striking numerical equivalence may be one of the sources of Spinoza’s expression (...) “Deus sive Natura.” The same Kabbalist used the Hebrew expression “ahabah elohit sikhlit“ (“divine intellectual love”), which may underlie Spinoza’s expression “amor Dei intellectualis.” Abulafia’s expression “ahabah elohit sikhlit“ is repeated by the popular 15th-century Maimonidean philosopher, Rabbi Abraham Shalom. (shrink)

The titile essay of this collection suggests that Bertrand Russell's lifelong preoccupation: the disentanglement, with ever-increasing precision, of what is subjective or intellectualy cloudy from what is objective or capable of logical demonstration. The first five essays he calls 'entirely popular': they include two on the revolutionary changes in mathematics in the last hundred years, and one on the value of science in human culture. The last five, 'somewhat more technical', are concerned with particular problems of philosophy: the ultimate nature (...) of matter, the connection between the sense-data and physics, the problem of casuality and different ways of knowing. In these one can see the Russell method in operation, intellectual analysis dissecting the problem to its bare bones. (shrink)

The titile essay of this collection suggests that Bertrand Russell's lifelong preoccupation: the disentanglement, with ever-increasing precision, of what is subjective or intellectualy cloudy from what is objective or capable of logical demonstration. The first five essays he calls 'entirely popular': they include two on the revolutionary changes in mathematics in the last hundred years, and one on the value of science in human culture. The last five, 'somewhat more technical', are concerned with particular problems of philosophy: the ultimate nature (...) of matter, the connection between the sense-data and physics, the problem of casuality and different ways of knowing. In these one can see the Russell method in operation, intellectual analysis dissecting the problem to its bare bones. (shrink)

In the Ethics Spinoza offers a fuller and more philosophical account of the religious ideal, bringing to full maturity a view he had expressed in his earliest works. By the time Spinoza introduces Amor Dei intellectualis in Ethics Part 5, he has already explicated its three components: God, knowledge, and love. God is the eternal, self‐causing, unique substance; God is absolutely infinite, expressing infinite power in infinitely many ways; God is reducible to nothing else, not even the whole universe. (...) Spinoza's definition of love admits a further important distinction: between external and internal objects of love. Spinoza introduces his concept of Amor Dei intellectualis by suggesting that, in the third kind of knowing, acquiescentia in se ipso becomes indistinguishable from love of God. Love has a particularly important place within Spinoza's account of the affects, and also, therefore, within his religion. (shrink)

Spinoza is commonly perceived as the great metaphysician of coherence. The Euclidean manner in which he presented his philosophy in the _Ethics _has led readers to assume they are facing a strict and consistent philosophical system that necessarily follows from itself. As opposed to the prevailing understanding of Spinoza and his work, _The Role of Contradictions in Spinoza's Philosophy_ explores an array of profound and pervasive contradictions in Spinoza’s system and argues they are deliberate and constitutive of his philosophical thinking (...) and the notion of God at its heart. Relying on a meticulous and careful reading of the _Theological-Political Treatise_ and the _Ethics_, this book reconstructs Spinoza's philosophy of contradictions as a key to the ascending three degrees of knowledge leading to the _Amor intellectualis Dei_. Offering an exciting and clearly-argued interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy, this book will interest students and scholars of modern philosophy and philosophy of religion, as well as Jewish studies. Yuval Jobani is Assistant Professor at the Department of Hebrew Culture Studies and the School of Education at Tel-Aviv University. (shrink)

Vir iste, de quo est sermo, nostro etiam tempore mentione dignus videtur qua insignis sui temporis testis, plurimorum diversissimi argumenti operum scriptor plurimis in locis non solum in Poloniae finibus, verum et apud exteras impressorum nationes, Ulm, Warszawa, Wien, Vilna-Wilno-Vilnius, Wroclaw, Würzburg). Homo igitur valde studiosus ac eruditissimus fuit, multarum linguarum gnarus ac polyhistor, textus suos lingua latina ac vulgari-polona conficiens, cuius nomen in culturae intellectualis historia perenniter inscriptum est nec de ea deleri debeat.

El objetivo de este trabajo es la interpretación de del más importante aspecto de la filosofía de Ibn Bayya a base de la lectura de su Kitab al nafs, primer comentario del De anima de Aristóteles en Occidente. Este estudio sobre el alma es, para Avempace, constituye la principal ciencia porque sin el análisis de la propia alma es imposible conocer el resto de las ciencias y del mundo. Este autor, en todas sus obras encentra el ideal del filósofo y (...) del hombre sabio, sobre todo, en la progresiva desmaterialización de toda su vida. Este objetivo se obtiene mediante el transcendeer de tres formas de vida, concretamente, las formas materiales, el primer nivel espiritual y, por fin, el segundo nivel espiritual. La culminación de este itinerario es alcanzar el segundo nivel espiritual, concretamente, la unión con el Intelecto Agente mediante un misticismo espiritual o «amor Dei intellectualis». Los materiales básicos de esta filosofía están conteniddos en este comentario al aristotélico al De anima. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – El fin del hombre. Las facultades humanas. Las formas humanas. Iq desmaterialización humana. Misticismo inelectual. (shrink)

As a neoplatonic philosopher for whom the intellect alone connects man with God, Nicholas of Cusa has without doubt a critical attitude towards the affective and emotional constitution of man. Accordingly, the deification of man is only imaginable as an interior quiet of all passions. But in analyzing his texts we can see that Nicholas, in order to describe the status of intellectual perfection, does not neglect affective and emotional categories and concepts. Not only the etymological deduction of sapientia as (...) a tasting and delicious science, but also his speaking of gaudium intellectuale und dulcedo intellectualis paints a different picture. (shrink)

Der Beitrag ist eine Besprechung von T. Irwin, The Development of Ethics, vol. 1: From Socrates to Reformation, Oxford 2007. Er gibt einen Überblick über die großen historischen Zusammenhänge, um dann auf den systematischen Schwerpunkt des Buches, den aristoteli-schen Naturalismus, näher einzugehen. Irwin spricht von Naturalismus, weil Aristoteles im Ergon-Argument seine These über das Gut des Menschen mit Aussagen über die Natur des Menschen begründet. Das ist jedoch kein Naturalismus im Sinne der gegenwärtigen Naturalismusdiskussion; die Tatsache, von der Aristoteles ausgeht, (...) ist die Vernunft, und sie ist eine normative Größe. In einer solchen naturalistischen Ethik müssen nicht nur die Mittel, sondern auch die Ziele der Vernunft entsprechen. Damit ist eine zentrale Frage des Buches angesprochen: Wie verhält sich Aristoteles‘ Begriff der boulêsis, des auf das Ziel gerichteten Strebens, zu Thomas‘ Begriff der voluntas? Nach Irwin sind beide ein wesentlich vernünftiges Streben. Das ist für Aristoteles aufgrund von NE I 13 zu bestreiten. Nach Thomas gehört der Wille zum Strebevermögen, das ein passives Vermögen ist; er ist rational, weil er durch den amor intellectualis bewegt wird.The paper is a review of T. Irwin, The Development of Ethics, vol.1: From Socrates to Re-formation, Oxford 2007. It gives an overview of the historical connections and discusses the central systematic issue of the book: Aristotelian Naturalism. Irwin uses the word ‘naturalism’ because Aristotle in his Function Argument uses the nature of the human being as an argument for his thesis about the human good. But this is not the concept of naturalism of the present discussion because the nature of the human being is reason and reason is a normative entity. In such a naturalistic ethics not only the means but also the ends must be rational. This leads to the question: What is the relation of the Aristotelian concept of boulesis to Aquinas’ concept of voluntas? According to Irwin, both are essentially rational desire. But this interpretation does not agree with EN I 13. According to Aquinas, voluntas belongs to appetitus which is a potentia passiva; it is rational because it is moved by amor intellectivus. (shrink)

The seventeenth century was an important period in the conceptual development of the notion of the infinite. In 1643, Evangelista Torricelli (1608-1647)—Galileo’s successor in the chair of mathematics in Florence—communicated his proof of a solid of infinite length but finite volume. Many of the leading metaphysicians of the time, notably Spinoza and Leibniz, came out in defense of actual infinity, rejecting the Aristotelian ban on it, which had been almost universally accepted for two millennia. Though it would be another two (...) centuries before the notion of the actually infinite was rehabilitated in mathematics by Dedekind and Cantor (Cauchy and Weierstrass still considered it mere paradox), their impenitent advocacy of the concept had significant reverberations in both philosophy and mathematics. In this essay, I will attempt to clarify one thread in the development of the notion of the infinite. In the first part, I study Spinoza’s discussion and endorsement, in the Letter on the Infinite (Ep. 12), of Hasdai Crescas’ (c. 1340-1410/11) crucial amendment to a traditional proof of the existence of God (“the cosmological proof” ), in which he insightfully points out that the proof does not require the Aristotelian ban on actual infinity. In the second and last part, I examine the claim, advanced by Crescas and Spinoza, that God has infinitely many attributes, and explore the reasoning that motivated both philosophers to make such a claim. Similarities between Spinoza and Crescas, which suggest the latter’s influence on the former, can be discerned in several other important issues, such as necessitarianism, the view that we are compelled to assert or reject a belief by its representational content, the enigmatic notion of amor Dei intellectualis, and the view of punishment as a natural consequent of sin. Here, I will restrict myself to the issue of the infinite, clearly a substantial topic in itself. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to determine and analyze the meaning of the transitio and the posset that not only enable the radical modal experience of the Amor Dei intellectualis but which are also central features in the attainment of human perfection and of the highest knowledge. I wish to answer the following questions. What power is attributable to the Amor Dei intellectualis? In other words, what is the power that corresponds to human perfection and to the (...) possession of blessedness? And why does Spinoza explain this relation in terms of love? In this article, I intend to give a possible definition of human nature, a definition whose determination implies a maximal affirmation of modal power. At this point more questions arise: by attributing this maximal power to human nature, are we underlining a specific necessity, i.e., a constitutive relation capable of giving a specific form to this power and to human nature? Does the third kind of knowledge imply modifications in human nature itself, e.g., in the body or soul? Finally, does the correlation between the third kind of knowledge and the Amor Dei intellectualis allow for the determination of a model of human nature that surpasses the one given by Spinoza in the preface to part four of the Ethics? (shrink)

In this paper, I ask whether Francis Bacon constitutes a revealing exception to the modern predilection for ‘system.’ First, I consider evidence for reading Bacon as a philosopher strongly attracted toward the ideal of system. Second, I show how reflecting on Bacon’s philosophical practice can motivate an ‘anti- system‘ reading of his texts. In considering the small number of works in which Bacon explicitly discusses ‘system’ under that name (in particular, the Descriptio globi intellectualis), I clarify what is and (...) is not meant by ‘philosophical system’ as distinct from other ideas of system (e.g. ‘system of the heavens’). Third, I draw from the Temporis Masculus Partum and Novum Organum to argue that Bacon’s doctrine of the ‘idols of the mind’ amounts to a thoroughgoing critique of system in philosophy. Fourth, I show how and why Bacon deploys the aphoristic form in Novum Organum as an alternative to system. I conclude by suggesting some ways in which an ‘anti-system’ reading of Bacon has the power to enhance our appreciation of other early modern authors who write philosophy without pretensions to system. (shrink)

One of the most famous and identifiable of Spinoza’s ideas is his amor Dei intellectualis (the intellectual love of God). It has been argued that this concept is somewhat alien to the main tenets of the Ethics, especially since it is reminiscent of more orthodox religious relations to God, and has a certain mystical (and so, nonrational) quality.In this paper, I will show that it is a consistent development of Spinoza’s interconnected and elaborate theories of knowledge and the affects. (...) Spinoza discusses three kinds of love: passionate love, friendship and the intellectual love of God.The intellectual love of God is nothing but a necessary outcome of Spinoza’s rationalistic project as a whole. Moreover, by culminating his ethical theory with such a concept, Spinoza is placing himself in a rich tradition of thinkers who develop epistemological and ethical systems that put love (either as eros or philia) as the backbone of their philosophy. In order to illustrate the similarities between Spinoza’s philosophical use of love and that of his predecessors, I will address salient features of Plato’s and Aristotle’s thought, emphasizing the relationship between love and ethics, as well as the nature of the philosophical impulse. (shrink)

One of the most famous and identifiable of Spinoza’s ideas is his amor Dei intellectualis (the intellectual love of God). It has been argued that this concept is somewhat alien to the main tenets of the Ethics, especially since it is reminiscent of more orthodox religious relations to God, and has a certain mystical (and so, nonrational) quality. In this paper, I will show that it is a consistent development of Spinoza’s interconnected and elaborate theories of knowledge and the (...) affects. Spinoza discusses three kinds of love: passionate love, friendship and the intellectual love of God. The intellectual love of God is nothing but a necessary outcome of Spinoza’s rationalistic project as a whole. Moreover, by culminating his ethical theory with such a concept, Spinoza is placing himself in a rich tradition of thinkers who develop epistemological and ethical systems that put love (either as eros or philia) as the backbone of their philosophy. In order to illustrate the similarities between Spinoza’s philosophical use of love and that of his predecessors, I will address salient features of Plato’s and Aristotle’s thought, emphasizing the relationship between love and ethics, as well as the nature of the philosophical impulse. (shrink)

O texto apresenta uma interpretação pouco comum da filosofia de Espinosa, pois recupera não só os elementos propriamente modernos sobre que ela se constitui, mas também a peculiar apropriação que o filósofo realiza de conceitos ligados à tradição neoplatônico-cristã como vida, amor Dei intellectualis, caridade ou a própria figura de Cristo consignados em sua correspondência. Neste sentido, a explicitação do conteúdo e da relação entre os conceitos de imanência e de amor surge como ponto de apoio para sublinhar que (...) a doutrina de Espinosa articula-se ao levar a cabo uma renovação de algumas das mais arcaicas posições religiosas judaico-cristãs — a concepção do amor ao outro como divinização do homem em Deus e como realização de Deus no homem, fundamentalmente —, que satisfazem as diretrizes de uma Modernidade que na afirmação da autonomia do sujeito encontra um dos pilares que asseguram sua emergência. (shrink)

According to the muslim faith of Ibn Bâyya (Avempace) and to the aristotelism and neoplatonism of his philosophy, this andalusian author in all his works asks for the first grounds of all reality and being. And Ibn Bâyya finds these grounds in the Agent Intellect (who, probably, is the philosophical version of God) and in the human reason and conscience. Thus, the ideal of the philosophe and of the wise is the union of both together: the reason/conscience and Agent Intellect (...) (i.e. God) by means of an intellectualis mystic or "amor Dei intellectualis". (shrink)

He upon whom has descended the “amor intellectualis Dei” must make up his mind to walk much alone. In the world of “intellectuals” he is at present “out of the swim,” and his work must be done against the prevailing current. And among the generality of religious people, he is regarded as rather a disturbing presence in matters of faith, apt to fall short, apparently, of their own standards in the service of God. “The love of the mind for (...) God” has little popular esteem in English-speaking Christianity. The nineteenth century valued feeling as the chief element in religion, and the emphasis of to-day is on the practical service of the will. But in our tradition, from Colet and the Cambridge Platonists to Westcott and von Hiigel, the “amor intellectualis Dei” has produced a line of great men of God, and surely will never be without its witnesses. Their message is a two-fold one. First that every experience of life can be “produced” into an experience of God by an effort of personality in which creative thought and constructive imagination has its part, second that this “love of the mind” is natural in some degree to all men, and an end in itself, giving to each lover an original vision. “It is Origen,” writes Dean Inge, “who in words thrilling alike by their humility and confidence, proclaims that ‘as the eye seeks the light, as our body craves for food, so our mind is impressed with the natural desire of knowing the truth of God and the causes of what we observe.’”. (shrink)

According to the muslim faith of Ibn Bâyya (Avempace) and to the aristotelism and neoplatonism of his philosophy, this Andalusian author in all his works asks for the first grounds of all reality and being. And Ibn Bâyya finds these grounds in the Agent Intellect (who, probably, is the philosophical version of God) and in the human reason and conscience. Thus, the ideal of the philosophe and of the wise is the union of both together: the reason/conscience and Agent Intellect (...) (i.e. God) by means of an intellectualis mystic or “amor Dei intellectualis”. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is the interpretation of the most important aspect of Ibn Bayya (Avempace)'s philosophy, reading his Kitab al-nafs, the first commentary of the aristotelian work in Occident, De anima. This study of the houl is, for Avempace, the principal science because without his analysis of the one´s soul it is imposible know the rest of sciences and the world. This author, in all his works finds the ideal of the philosopher and of the wise man, above (...) all, in the progressive dematerialization, of his total life. This objective is obtained through the transcending of the three kinds of forms, namely: materials formas first spiritual level and finally, the second spiritual level. The culmination of this itinerary is to reach the second spiritual level, to be exact, the union with the Agent Intellect by means of an intellectualist mysticism or «amor Dei intellectualis». The basic materials of this philosophy are contained in this aristoteleian commentaary about the soul. KEY WORDS – The human end. Human faculties. Human forms. Human dematerialization. Itellectual mysticism. (shrink)

Maimonides requires the multitude to observe many ceremonial commandments, while Spinoza makes no such demand. This chapter focuses on some of the main points of agreement between Maimonides and Spinoza on true religion, the religion of reason, or philosophic religion. True religion includes also piety, that is, moral conduct, which follows from the rational life. The piety of the philosopher and the non‐philosopher both consist in doing good to others. Maimonides’ approach to true religion adumbrates Spinoza's. Spinoza's concept of amor (...) Dei intellectualis echoes Maimonides’ concept of the passionate intellectual love of God. Spinoza's concept of piety is adumbrated in Maimonides. The Maimonidean thrust of Spinoza's concept of true religion is evident in his discussion of “the divine Law” or, more precisely, “the natural divine Law” and the summum bonum in TTP4. In Maimonides’ language, true religion is based on the intelligibilia and popular religion on generally accepted opinions. (shrink)

There are few aphorisms in Minima Moralia that display a less sympathetic attitude towards their subject than “They, the people”(§ 7). Adorno denounces the “amor intellectualis for [the] kitchen personnel” in the subsequent aphorism, but “They, the people” already seems to confirm all suspicions about the alleged elitism of critical theory. The idea that intellectuals mostly encounter those less educated when “illiterates come to intellectuals wanting letters written for them” is laughable, even for the 1950s, and the claim that, (...) among the “underdogs”,“envy and spite surpass anything seen among literati or musical directors”(ibid.) oozes with contempt, no matter how much Adorno insists that these alleged character deficits result from the social structures in which uneducated, working class people find themselves. Yet the point of Adorno’s remarks is not to disprove a deferential form of a Lukácsian “standpoint theory …. (shrink)

According to Spinoza, the implications of the new scientific worldview of his time are diametrically opposed to the fundamental philosophical-theological tenets of traditional thought and religion. Yet, paradoxically, this does not bring him to the rejection of the notion of God, of notions of good and bad, or even of ordinary religion. On the contrary, his philosophy as a whole can be seen as a radical reconsideration of religion in the light of the modern situation, and not at all as (...) an exit from it. In line with the new science, Spinoza develops a new metaphysics centered on the notion Deus sive Natura, a new rational ethics, and a new philosophical religion. The new philosophical religion, being at the same time the culmination of the ethical life, is based upon the non-anthropomorphic, but still somehow transcendent, notion of God, the one substance with infinite attributes, radically different from the modes, both finite and infinite. In the final part of this article, an attempt is made to acquire some form of inside perspective on what Spinoza may mean by true religion as consisting in amor Dei intellectualis. Anticipating Hume, Spinoza considers ordinary religion as a natural phenomenon, which he studies in detail in his Tractatus Theologico-politicus. Unlike later Enlightenment thinkers, he distinguishes between superstition and purified religion, and accepts that the latter can bring a specific kind of salvation for the common people. (shrink)

KANT’S GOAL IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION was to demonstrate that the categories are applicable to objects of sensible intuition. He carried out this task by disclosing the necessity of a transcendental synthesis. In the Transcendental Deduction in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason transcendental synthesis has two subspecies: synthesis intellectualis and synthesis speciosa. The distinction between the two types of transcendental synthesis is also mirrored in the structure of the proof of the B Deduction. As several (...) commentators have noted, the B Deduction in fact contains two parts. Each part seems to provide an account of a distinctive kind of transcendental synthesis. The first part provides an account of intellectual synthesis while the second part provides an account of figurative synthesis. (shrink)

The question whether Nicholas of Cusa had any influence on Schelling at all, is usually debated with regard to Giordano Bruno. The paper shows that there is also another possible trait of reception. We will find strong evidence that Johannes Kepler intermediates between both philosophers. Therefore five modi cogitandi are systematically analyzed as points of convergence between Cusa and Schelling: 1. docta ignorantia, 2. coincidentia oppositorum, 3. visio intellectualis, 4. coniectura, 5. the literary form of a ›philosophy of mysteries‹.

Spinoza has been variously represented as a pantheist, a sceptic or an atheist. But whatever about his pantheism, he would have been shocked at being called an atheist. For Spinoza, the pursuit of philosophy was never a mere academic exercise, but rather a search for a way to true happiness, for “the road to inner freedom”, the experience of the amor dei intellectualis. All his writings are characterised by this ethical aim, and to his greatest philosophical work he gave (...) the simple title Ethica. The Ethica has long since become a classic in philosophy and it is Dr. Runes’ very laudable intention in the present edition to bring it down to the level of the greatest number of people. Dr. Runes is a lifelong student of Spinoza and makes no secret of his enthusiasm for his favourite author. In the present work he gives us a selection of extracts from the Ethica which bears no trace of the complicated and almost forbidding lay-out of the original. But, in the attempt to popularise the Ethica, the editor has omitted most of the reasoning which gave the original its philosophical appearance. Not only must the reader be satisfied with extracts, but Spinoza’s order of treatises is changed and we are given parts 3, 4, 5, 1, 2, in that order. This means that, whereas Spinoza began with the treatise on God, the one substance, from which he deduced his whole system, Dr. Runes introduces the divinity only towards the end. Curiosity may lead the thoughtful student to read the original, where he cannot fail to be struck by the logical inconsistency of Spinoza’s philosophy. But if he bears in mind the sad circumstances of the philosopher’s personal life, he will not be too severe in his criticism of the persecuted Jew. (shrink)

There is a current debate about the interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of action concerning the role of reason in the establishment of practical ends, given that in some passages Aristotle assigns to character the role of establishing ends, and in others he gives reason the role of government in the soul. How can these two groups of textual evidence be reconciled? In this article I will argue that these two types of evidence explain two different psychological phenomena. For this (...) purpose, I will discuss the main and most recent interpretations in this debate, showing how, although character establishes our habitual representations, desires and actions, reason can question and oppose them, as we can see in the processes of character change. (shrink)

En este artículo examino la noción de amor a Dios (amour envers Dieu) en Descartes, conectándola con los principios metafísicos de su sistema y con los objetivos a los que da respuesta, y mostrando sus beneficios para la vida de todo hombre. Los desacuerdos de Spinoza en esta materia no constituyen una discrepancia menor, sino que adquieren relevancia sistémica desde el momento en que el amor Dei está conectado con nociones centrales de su filosofía, como la idea de Dios y (...) sus atributos, la relación del hombre con la sustancia infinita, la actividad mental-corporal, el conocimiento como expresión del deseo, la función liberadora de los afectos y la fruición del amor a Dios. Esta noción constituye una plataforma privilegiada para examinar las peculiaridades de los sistemas de Descartes y Spinoza, y deja ver notables diferencias en sus respectivos proyectos de naturalización de la realidad. (shrink)