According to some critics of liberal individualism, it is fundamentally problematic that individualists focus on rights instead of community and on decision-making processes instead of substantial goods. Among other things, it is claimed that liberal individualism therefore fails to provide meaning to people’s lives. The view has recently gained momentum as it has been incorporated in novel conservative and nationalist arguments. This article presents an individualist theory of meaning in response to a recent nationalist reiteration of the critique. The (...) theory is that a continuous pursuit of self-endorsement by a perfected, liberal, version of oneself provides purpose and direction in life. This allows the individual to be the ultimate arbiter in meaning-building matters, as the theory locates meaning in the individual’s decision-making processes rather than in factors external to her. The theory acknowledges the interdependence of human beings but remains loyal to the view that the value of the individual generally trumps competing values, such as that of the collective. (shrink)

This article offers a solution to the numbers problem within an individualist moral framework. Its central aims are as follows: to rescue individualist moral theories, such as moral contractualism, from their long-standing problem with interpersonal aggregation; to demonstrate how, proceeding from an individualist mode of justification, we can nevertheless make the numbers count without directly counting the numbers; to provide an individualist rationale for accepting a partially aggregative criterion of adjudication for resolving interpersonal trade-offs; and finally, to develop an extensionally (...) adequate version of partial aggregation that finds application in more structurally complex cases. (shrink)

박재연은 고유명을 다른 종류의 어휘들과 구별해주는 변별적 속성이 그 발생적 조건에 있다고 주장한다. 박재연에 따르면 고유명이 한 자연언어에 속하는 표현이 되기 위해서는 사회적 공인이 필요하지 않다. 이러한 주장은 고유명이 사회적 성격을 갖는다는 언어 철학계의 주류 입장과 충돌하는 것으로 보인다. 만일 박재연의 이론이 성공적이라면 이는 고유명의 사회성에 대한 주류 입장을 수정해야 함을 보여주는 중요한 기여가 될 것이다. 그러나 나는 실제로는 그렇지 못하다는 것을 논증할 것이다. 최성호는 주류 입장을 바탕으로 박재연의 이러한 주장을 공격한다. 이러한 비판은 고유명이 공적 언어 표현이며 그 유의미성은 공적인 (...) 규칙에 바탕을 두고 있다는 전제를 바탕으로 작동한다. 그러나 맥킨지는 이러한 고유명의 사회성에 대한 전제를 명시적으로 부정하면서 고유명의 지시체 결정이 개별 화자의 지시체 식별 능력에 기초하고 있다는 개인주의 이론을 제기한다. 맥킨지에 의하면 고유명은 애당초 공적인 자연언어의 일부가 아니다. 박재연의 이론과는 달리 개인주의 이론은 최성호의 비판을 회피할 수 있으며 고유명의 변별적 속성, 의미, 지칭 결정의 문제 모두에 대한 통합적인 이론적 답을 제시해줄 수 있다. 그러나 사회적인 이름사용관행을 통해서 고유명의 의미론적 지시체가 결정되며, 고유명이 공적 자연언어의 일부로서 사회적 규약의 지배를 받는다는 입장 역시 적어도 동등한 수준으로 맥킨지가 설명하고 있는 지칭 결정의 영역을 설명할 수 있다. 이러한 입장은 또한 앞서 언급한 세 가지의 문제 모두에 대해서도 개인주의와 마찬가지로 통합적 설명을 제공할 수 있다. 더 나아가, 지칭 결정에 대한 이름사용관행 중심 이론의 설명은 일반성과 단순성 차원에서 개인주의 이론에 비해 상대적인 이점을 갖는다. 따라서 개인주의 이론이 고유명의 사회성을 배제하는 데 성공했다고 볼 수 없으며 사회적 이름사용관행에 기초한 고유명 이론은 여전히 설득력이 있다. (shrink)

Research suggests that organizational justice has important impacts on work-related attitudes and behaviors, such as organizational citizenship behavior. In this article, we explore the extent to which individualism moderates the relationship between organizational justice and OCB among citizens in Kyrgyzstan. We make additional contributions to the literature because we know very little about these constructs in this former Soviet Union country, Kyrgyzstan, an under-researched and under-represented region of the world. Results of our data collected from 402 managers and employees in (...) Kyrgyzstan offer the following new discoveries. All three justice constructs are related to OCB. Individualism moderates only the distributive and interactive justice to OCB relationships. We develop an intricate theory with provocative implications: Procedural justice produces obedience. For “individualists,” interactional justice inspires loyalty and, interestingly, distributive justice “can only buy” participation, but “can’t buy” loyalty. Therefore, for individualists, interactional justice outweighs distributive justice for organizational loyalty. Based on Kyrgyz citizens’ justice, OCB, and individualism, our theory reveals novel insights regarding culture, money attitude, and intrinsic motivation and provides critical and practical implications to the field of business ethics. (shrink)

According to the popular-choice theory of secession, the inhabitants of any territory, as a group, should have an internationally recognized right to secede from a sovereign state if their majority chooses by referendum to do so, and if they are capable of sustaining legitimate state institutions. Prior efforts to defend this group right on individualistic grounds—such as the individual right to associate freely or to participate as an equal in democratic decision-making—have failed. As a result, some recent defenders (...) of the choice theory have suggested that the group right the theory implies is “irreducibly collective.” I argue, to the contrary, that this group right can be grounded fully in the fundamental right of each individual to be treated as an equal by the political institutions to which he is subject. The territorial implications of the choice theory are, moreover, consistent with a plausible account of the territorial rights of states. (shrink)

The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage foetus. Holists accord no moral status to any (...) of these beings, assigning it only to groups to which they belong, while individualists such as welfarists grant an equal moral status to humans and many animals, and Kantians accord no moral status either to animals or severely mentally incapacitated humans. I argue that an underexplored, modal-relational perspective does a better job of accounting for degrees of moral status. According to modal-relationalism, something has moral status insofar as it capable of having a certain causal or intensional connection with another being. I articulate a novel instance of modal-relationalism grounded in salient sub-Saharan moral views, roughly according to which the greater a being's capacity to be part of a communal relationship with us, the greater its moral status. I then demonstrate that this new, African-based theory entails and plausibly explains the above judgments, among others, in a unified way. (shrink)

A great deal of philosophical work has addressed the question of whether Man’s computational theory of early vision is individualistic. Burge and Davies have argued that, according to Marr’s theory, visual states are individuated non-individualistically. Segal has denied that Marr’s theory has these non-individualistic implications. More recently, Shapiro has argued that the entire debate has been misguided. I argue that Shapiro is mistaken in a fairly deep way, attention to which allows us to raise and (...) clarify several important issues involved in discussions of individualism. Contrary to Burge and Davies, and by a route rather different from Segal’s, I defend the claim that Man’s theory offers no reason to think that visual states are individuated non-individualistically. (shrink)

Introduction. The roots of liberal-democratic theory -- Problems of interpretation -- Hobbe : the political obligation of the market. Philosophy and political theory -- Human nature and the state of nature -- Models of society -- Political obligation -- Penetration and limits of Hobbe's political theory -- The Levellers : franchise and freedom. The problem of franchise -- Types of franchise -- The record -- Theoretical implications -- Harrington : the opportunity state. Unexamined ambiguities -- The balance (...) and the gentry -- The bourgeois society -- The equal commonwealth and the equal agrarian -- The self-cancelling balance principle -- Harrington's stature --Locke : the political theory of appropriation. Interpretations -- The theory of property right -- Class differentials in natural rights and rationality -- The ambiguous state of nature -- The ambiguous civil society -- Unsettled problems reconsidered -- Possessive individualism and liberal democracy. The seventeenth-century foundations -- The twentieth-century dilemma -- Appendix : Social classes and franchise classes in England, circa 1648. (shrink)

This seminal work by political philosopher C.B. Macpherson was first published by the Clarendon Press in 1962, and remains of key importance to the study of liberal-democratic theory half-a-century later. In it, Macpherson argues that the chief difficulty of the notion of individualism that underpins classical liberalism lies in what he calls its "possessive quality" - "its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them." Under such a (...) conception, the essence of humanity becomes freedom from dependence on the wills of others; society is little more than a system of economic relations; and political society becomes a means of safeguarding private property and the system of economic relations rooted in property. As the New Statesman declared: "It is rare for a book to change the intellectual landscape. It is even more unusual for this to happen when the subject is one that has been thoroughly investigated by generations of historians.... Until the appearance of Professor Macpherson's book, it seemed unlikely that anything radically new could be said about so well-worn a topic. The unexpected has happened, and the shock waves are still being absorbed." A new introduction by Frank Cunningham puts the work in a twenty-first-century context. (shrink)

The present dissertation deals with the issue of the individuation of beliefs. This is an issue that falls into philosophy of psychology as well as philosophy of language. There are two major schools of thought that are involved in the debate. Individualism claims that the individuation does not need to take intentional, semantic properties of beliefs into account, while Anti-Individualism claims that it does. The former is represented by Jerry Fodor and the latter is represented by Tyler Burge. ;This dissertation (...) is divided into three parts. In Part I, I review Tyler Burge's several attempts to refute Individualism. My conclusion is that Burge does not give us a viable alternative theory of content. In Part II, I examine Jerry Fodor's arguments for a new form of Individualism, one that proposes to individuate beliefs with respect to their causal powers. My conclusion is that Fodor runs into a problem in arguing that the individuation of mental states should be based on causal powers alone, since he would have to sacrifice the causal relevance of intentional mental properties. Finally in Part III, I formulate my arguments against Fodor's Individualism. I first present a holistic view of beliefs according to which, beliefs cannot be considered in isolation from the individual's system of beliefs. My view is that the individuation of beliefs not only needs to consider the semantic properties of the belief in question, it also needs to consider the semantic properties of relevant beliefs. I then argue for the causal relevance of intentional mental properties. My conclusion is that since the individuation of beliefs has to be based on groupings of their intentional, semantic properties, Individualism cannot be accepted. (shrink)

An account of the ontological nature of collectives would be useful for several reasons. A successful theory would help to show us a route through the thicket of views known as “methodological individualism”. It would have a bearing on the plausibility of legal positivism. It would be relevant to the question whether collectives are capable of acting. The debate about the ontology of collectives is therefore important for such fields as the theory of action, social and political philosophy, (...) the philosophy of law and the philosophy of social science. I hope to contribute to the debate by proposing an account of collectives, and by showing its theoretical soundness and utility. In its essentials, my proposal is that collectives are “mereological sums” of “stages” of persons linked by a “unity relation”. The influence on this account of some theories of personal identity will perhaps be obvious. But the motivation is different, for it lies at least as much in the ability of the theory to help us deal with the issues already mentioned as in problems concerning the identity of collectives over time. I acknowledge that my proposal is not commonsensical; however, I believe that no account could be both commonsensical and adequate. I will begin by introducing some constraints on a theory of collectives. (shrink)

The status and nature of the state have been the traditional source of claims about the reality of supra-individual social entities. Kelsen was the dissolver of this problematic, by asserting the identity of state and law, and asserting that law was the authorized actions of individuals. But this required an account of the origin of law itself. He traced this to pre-state law, and the normative order of retribution, which he explained as part of a primitive mentality that depended on (...) an undeveloped ego and conceived causality collectively and magically, to include the dead and nature. The casually responsible individual as understood in modern law resulted from the overcoming of these notions. (shrink)

Reprint of an article that initially appeared in _Ethical Theory and Moral Practice_ (2012).

In recent years, philosophers trained in the techniques and constrained by the style of what is known in the Anglo-American world as ‘analytic philosophy’ have in growing numbers undertaken to include within their methodological ambit the theories and insights of Karl Marx.

China has undergone a rapid process of modernization since 1949. The modernization process has accelerated with the development of the market economy and rural-to-urban migration after the 1980s. Nevertheless, Chinese regions still exhibit substantial differences in terms of individualist/collectivist cultural orientations. The rice theory and the climato-economic theory have attempted to explain this variation by analyzing provincial-level data. Based on a quantitative analysis of more granular, county-level variables spanning from the early 1990s until 2010, we offer an alternative (...) account of this cultural variety based on lineage development in different Chinese regions. Using the ArcGIS geographic information system, we first present the regional distribution of individualism/collectivism indicators at the county level through descriptive statistics and spatial analysis. We also run a regression model to analyze county-level data on individualism/collectivism that includes three periods. Our multi-level analysis shows that lineage development is a critical variable that explains more regional variation of culture in China when compared to other variables. While rice farming, the key variable of the rice theory, is a significant variable, its explanatory power is less than the lineage variable. Finally, our analysis shows that the climato-economic theory fails to explain the regional variation of culture. (shrink)

The argument from multiple realization is currently considered the argument against intertheoretic reduction. Both Little and Kincaid have applied the argument to the individualism-holism debate in support of the antireductionist holist position. The author shows that the tenability of the argument, as applied to the individualism-holism debate, hinges on the descriptive constraints imposed on the individualist position. On a plausible formulation of the individualist position, the argument does not establish that the intertheoretic reduction of social theories is highly unlikely. Nonetheless, (...) the reductive project may run into other potential obstacles. For this reason, it is concluded that the prospect of intertheoretic reduction is uncertain rather than unlikely. Key Words: argument from multiple realization • intertheoretic reduction • reductionism • individualism • holism. (shrink)

Throughout the history of social thought, there has been a constant battle over the true nature of society, and the best way to understand and explain it. This volume covers the development of methodological individualism, including the individualist theory of society from Greek antiquity to modern social science. It is a comprehensive and systematic treatment of methodological individualism in all its manifestations.

Throughout the history of social thought, there has been a constant battle over the true nature of society, and the best way to understand and explain it. This volume covers the development of methodological individualism, including the individualist theory of society from Greek antiquity to modern social science. It is a comprehensive and systematic treatment of methodological individualism in all its manifestations.

Political science is divided between methodological individualists, who seek to explain political phenomena by reference to individuals and their interactions, and holists (or nonreductionists), who consider some higher-level social entities or properties such as states, institutions, or cultures ontologically or causally significant. We propose a reconciliation between these two perspectives, building on related work in philosophy. After laying out a taxonomy of different variants of each view, we observe that (i) although political phenomena result from underlying individual attitudes and behavior, (...) individual-level descriptions do not always capture all explanatorily salient properties, and (ii) nonreductionistic explanations are mandated when social regularities are robust to changes in their individual-level realization. We characterize the dividing line between phenomena requiring nonreductionistic explanation and phenomena permitting individualistic explanation and give examples from the study of ethnic conflicts, social-network theory, and international-relations theory. (shrink)

How can one examine the sources of people's beliefs, tastes, and preferences without falling into the self‐refuting determinism that has so often characterized the most systematic theory of preferences, Marxism? Cultural Theory's attempt to do so posits five anthropologically derived, competing “ways of life"— individualism, egalitarianism, hierarchism, fatalism, and withdrawal from social life—that are intended to apply to all forms of culture and, therefore, to provide a universal framework for explaining people's preferential biases. Richard Ellis's defense of Cultural (...) Theory, however, does not adequately address the concerns expressed in my critique of it. Ellis fails to instance a single case of a premodern culture containing the five ways of life; he does not show that exclusivist premodern versions of “individualism” and “egalitarianism” are more than superficially comparable to the inclusive modern variants of these alleged universals; and he adds new evidence to support my claim that in modern societies, people's preferences are largely unlinked to the particular social relations identified by Cultural Theory. While Ellis overtly denies that Cultural Theory is deterministic, his search for links between preferences and social relations shows that this denial cannot be sustained.Cultural Theory's reductionism stems from its neglect of historically contingent cultural traditions that thwart a priori attempts to predict culture. This ahistori‐cism transforms a myopic view of American politics as a battle of egalitarianism against individualism into a timeless truth, providing ideological self‐affirmation for “individualists” but diminishing the prospects for being able to explain or criticize individualism—or any other political preference. (shrink)

This paper considers Western Australia as a sign, comparing what it meant during the America’s Cup campaign of 1986–7, when world media attention was focused on the state, with what it represents 30 years later. In the 1980s, it is argued, WA was hard to represent at all, with natural, governmental and social horrors bespeaking a place unable to signify itself. These realities had to be ‘forgotten’ if a ‘politics of euphoria’ suitable to the Cup festival – and to the (...) mood of credit-fuelled capitalist deregulation – was to prevail. The media, popular culture and tourism were on hand for that task. They far outstripped official efforts to represent WA as a symbol of mobility, globalization and the progressive development of state and capital, arm in arm. Returning after a generation, it seems clear that the state apparatus is motivated by a will to control, but that the same horrors attend the lives and deaths of first-nation citizens. What has changed is that policy has shifted from deregulation to privatization, which means an authoritarian state leaves both development and social justice to individuals. The progressive individualism of the ‘WA Inc.’ era has given way to what might be called ‘tradie individualism’ – signalling sociality with a boat of one’s own, a funny car rego or a coin in the charity donation box. Now, if you want to express euphoria, then you must paddle your own canoe. (shrink)

How should deontological theories that prohibit actions of type K — such as intentionally killing an innocent person — deal with cases of uncertainty as to whether a particular action is of type K? Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, who raise this problem in their paper "Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty" (2006), focus on a case where a skier is about to cause the death of ten innocent people — we don’t know for sure whether on purpose or not — (...) by causing an avalanche; and we can only save the people by shooting the skier. One possible deontological attitude towards such uncertainty is what Jackson and Smith call the threshold view, according to which whether or not the deontological constraint applies depends on our degree of (justified) certainty meets a given threshold. Jackson and Smith argue against the threshold view that it leads to implausible paradoxical moral dilemmas in a special kind of case. In this response, we show that the threshold view can avoid these implausible moral dilemmas, as long as the relevant deontological constraint is grounded in individualistic patient-based considerations, such as what an individual person is entitled to object to. (shrink)

Management scholars, practitioners, and policy makers alike have sought to develop a deeper understanding of recent business crises—including corporate scandals, the collapse of financial institutions, and deep recession—in order to prevent their recurrence. Among the “culprits” that have been identified is Conventional management theory based upon a moral-point-of-view founded on assumptions of materialism and individualism. There have been calls to move beyond the dominant profit maximization paradigm and think about other, potentially more compelling, corporate objectives (Hamel, 2009 ). In (...) this article, we respond to those calls, and seek to develop what we call Radical resource-based theory (RBT), which draws from and contrasts with the highly-influential Conventional RBT. Radical RBT defines the value of resources more broadly than profit maximization, rarity as an occasion for stewardship, inimitability as an opportunity for teaching, and non-substitutability as an opportunity to meet a panoply of human needs. This augmentation of RBT promises to help managers and scholars address a myriad of problems that are insoluble under Conventional assumptions. More generally, it shows the value of broadening management theory to a radical perspective by relaxing assumptions of self-interest and materialism. (shrink)

This two-volume work provides a new understanding of Western subjectivity as theorized in the Augustinian Rule. A theopolitical synthesis of Antiquity, the Rule is a humble, yet extremely influential example of subjectivity production. In these volumes, Jodra argues that the Classical and Late-Ancient communitarian practices along the Mediterranean provide historical proof of a worldview in which the self and the other are not disjunctive components, but mutually inclusive forces. The Augustinian Rule is a culmination of this process and also the (...) beginning of something new: The paradigm of the monastic self as protagonist of the new, medieval worldview. Three main theoretical challenges leading to, and present in the Rule are tackled: What are the sources of our modern understanding of subjectivity? Can Ancient sources provide an alternative genealogy that resists the individualistic turn of Modernity? And can the commons be saved without suppressing individuality? Jodra seeks to prove that the synthesis-which is also an appropriation-of Greek and Judaic sources carried out by the first Christians allowed for two contrasting models of subjectivity, the self-less and the other-less, to 'take turns' to dominate our understanding of human nature. The Greek world provided the political dimension and the Jewish world established the key theological principles of a Mediterranean synthesis which took place in Rome. Coherently and progressively, Jodra emphasizes the theopolitical nature of our worldview even today, and claim that the subject of the primitive Church is its most visible incarnation. These volumes therefore restore the unity of the Hellenistic and Judaic world as found by the first Christians, proving that the self and the other are two essential pieces in the construction of our world. (shrink)

Explores the theories of democratic individualism articulated in the works of the American transcendentalist writer Ralph Waldo Emerson, pragmatic philosophers William James and John Dewey, and African-American novelist and essayist Ralph Ellison.

Within much contemporary social ontology there is a particular methodology at work. This methodology takes as a starting point two or more asocial or atomic individuals. These individuals are taken to be perfectly functional agents, though outside of all social relations. Following this, combinations of these individuals are considered, to deduce what constitutes a social group. Here I will argue that theories which rely on this methodology are always circular, so long as they purport to describe the formation of all (...) social groups, as they must always presuppose a pre-existing collectivity. Such methodology also produces various distortions in our theories, such as voluntarism. I focus on the workings of Plural Subject Theory as laid out by Margaret Gilbert in On Social Facts. I show that the formation of a plural subject always requires communication, and that communication always requires a pre-existing collectivity. i examine the elements within Plural Subject Theory which protect gilbert from these accusations of circularity, and argue against them. I finalise by suggesting that what Plural Subject Theory, and social ontology in general, requires as a theoretical starting point is not atomic individuals and their combinations, but rather combinations of already socialised or embedded individuals. (shrink)

An abridged and slightly modified version of an article first published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2012).

Theories of Social Change played a central role in explaining the development of modern societies. There are two classes of such approaches: structural (i.e. evolutionary and functionalistic) theories and individualistic theories (based for instance on learning, psychoanalytic or rational choice theories). The question is to what extend these theories fit the framework of Methodological Individualism. The answer is given in two steps: First, the article describes the logic of micro-foundational explanation that Methodological Individualism presupposes. Second, presenting some paradigmatic theories (...) of social change it is argued that none of these theories does fulfill the requirements of this explanatory model; the reasons for these insufficiencies are discussed. (shrink)

Methodological individualism has a long, successful, and controversial track record in the social sciences. Its record in ecology is much shorter but proving as successful and controversial with so-called individual-based models. Distinctions and debates about methodological individualism in social sciences clarify the commitments of this general, individualistic approach to modeling ecological phenomena and show that there is a lot recommending it. In particular, a representational priority on individual organisms yields a cogent albeit deflationary account of ecological emergence and helps (...) reveal how quite disparate models and theories in ecology might be unified. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Liberals versus Communitarians? Individualism Community From Community to Republic Acknowledgments Notes References.

Recent years have seen a renewed debate over the importance of groupselection, especially as it relates to the evolution of altruism. Onefeature of this debate has been disagreement over which kinds ofprocesses should be described in terms of selection at multiple levels,within and between groups. Adapting some earlier discussions, we presenta mathematical framework that can be used to explore the exactrelationships between evolutionary models that do, and those that donot, explicitly recognize biological groups as fitness-bearing entities.We show a fundamental set (...) of mathematical equivalences between these twokinds of models, one of which applies a form of multi-level selectiontheory and the other being a form of ``individualism.'' However, we alsoargue that each type of model can have heuristic advantages over theother. Indeed, it can be positively useful to engage in a kind ofback-and-forth switching between two different perspectives on theevolutionary role of groups. So the position we defend is a``gestalt-switching pluralism.''. (shrink)