When discussing the general inertia in climate change mitigation, it is common to approach the analysis either in terms of epistemic obstacles (climate change is too scientifically complex to be fully understood by all in its dramatic nature and/or to find space in the media) and/or moral obstacles (the causal link between polluting actions and social damage is too loose, both geographically and temporally, to allow individuals to understand the consequences of their emissions). In this chapter I maintain that both (...) categories of obstacles now play a secondary role: many people have a clear understanding of the physical and social dynamics involved in climate change. The main reason why so few manage to reduce their ecological footprint is an ethical short-circuit that does not allow most people to reveal their “true” climate-related preferences in their daily choices. This short-circuit manifests itself in two phenomena that can be analysed through the lens of moral psychology. First, as the possibility of anticipated utility approaches, individuals further discount expected future utility and may even reverse their preferences (due to the so-called immediacy multiplier, in addition to the better known and discussed future utility discounting). Second, individuals struggle to order their preferences transitively when presented with the opportunity to obtain small net marginal utilities in the short run. The intertemporal and collective structure of the climate problem creates fertile ground for both phenomena, which means that even those who are sincerely convinced of the need to contribute to climate change mitigation end up trapped in loops of procrastination, both first and second level. If, however, we can understand the origin of these phenomena, then we will be able to devise counteracting solutions that will speed up individual mitigation efforts. I will therefore briefly propose three ethical/public strategies to break the procrastination loop: pre-commitment; increasing the costs of marginal postponements; reducing the disutility of action that is likely to be postponed. (shrink)

In this article, we elicit both individuals’ and couples’ preferences assuming prospect theory (PT) as a general theoretical framework for decision under risk. Our experimental method, based on certainty equivalents, allows to infer measurements of utility and probability weighting at the individual level and at the couple level. Our main results are twofold. First, risk attitude for couples is compatible with PT and incorporates deviations from expected utility similar to those found in individual decision making. Second, couples’ attitudes (...) towards risk are found to be consistent with a mix of individual attitudes, women being more influent on couples’ preferences at low probability levels. (shrink)

Macroeconomic events often require individuals and policy-makers to make decisions that they are not accustomed to making. For example, a sovereign debt crisis makes it necessary to either default on government debt, increase taxes, cut public spending or to impose a mixture of these measures. I argue that decisions on such matters are not derived from deep preferences; they require reflections and judgement under uncertainty. Past experiences and the interaction with other individuals are likely to influence the salience of preferences (...) in the situations of decision making. Using a simple model, I illustrate how the salience of preferences changes with different degrees of individuality and conformity. Individuality is associated with the importance of private habits, while conformity is related to the perceived dissonance between initial intuitions and social opinions. The results obtained from simple simulation exercises stress that a high degree of conformity or a low degree of individuality may lead to overreactions when social opinion makers err for a short period of time. At the same time, a low degree of conformity or a high degree of individuality or leads to delayed adjustments to new circumstances. (shrink)

Crutchfield and Redinger (2024) propose that the use of a chemical restraint that affects only a particular conscious state is ethically permissible if, and only if, (1) it is the least restrictive...

Background To describe the preferences for disclosure of individual biomarker results among mothers participating in a longitudinal birth cohort. Methods We surveyed 343 mothers that participated in the Health Outcomes and Measures of the Environment Study about their biomarker disclosure preferences. Participants were told that the study was measuring pesticide metabolites in their biological specimens, and that the health effects of these low levels of exposure are unknown. Participants were asked whether they wanted to receive their results and their (...) child's results. In addition, they were asked about their preferred method (letter vs in person) and format (more complex vs less complex) for disclosure of results. Results Almost all of the study participants wanted to receive their individual results (340/343) as well as their child's results (342/343). However, preferences for receiving results differed by education level. Mothers with less than a college degree preferred in-person disclosure of results more often than mothers with some college education or a college degree (34.3% vs 17.4% vs 7.9%, p<0.001). Similarly, mothers with less than a college education preferred a less complex disclosure format than mothers with some college education or a college degree (59.7% vs 79.1% vs 86.3%, p<0.0001). Conclusion While almost all study participants preferred to receive results of their individual biomarker tests, level of education was a key factor in predicting preferences for disclosure of biomarker results. To ensure effective communication of this information, disclosure of biomarker results should be tailored to the education level of the study participants. (shrink)

In this paper, the empirical performance of several preference functionals is assessed using individual and group experimental data. We investigate if there is a risky choice theory that fits group decisions better than alternative theories, and if there are significant differences between individual and group choices. Experimental findings reported in this paper provide answers to both of those questions showing that expected utility gains a “winning” position over higher-level functionals when risky choices are undertaken by individuals as (...) well as by small groups. However, in the group experiment, alternatives improve their relative performance, a fact that hints at the existence of differences between individual and group choices. We interpreted this result as evidence that feelings-like disappointment aversion become stronger in group decision. (shrink)

Standard economic theory usually analyzes the decisions made by individuals as a rational process in which each individual has sound and consistent preferences and makes decisions according to the principle of subjective expected utility maximization. Starting from the pioneering work of Herbert Simon and the research of cognitive psychologists Kahneman and Tversky, the contributions provided by cognitive-behavioral theory have repeatedly shown that real agents make choices in a way that differs systematically from standard theory, hence highlighting its limits. Rather (...) than considering standard normative theory as false or unable to explain the data obtained by behavioral economists, several economists decided to develop new formal models that could include the results of different experiments and empirical observations that captured all dimensions of the choice made by an individual. In this sense, they proposed new models that were not intended to challenge standard theory but rather designed to provide a kind of psychological expansion to it. This article has the aim of describing and analyzing the advantages and limitations of these new models, which unfortunately are not always suited to describe the individual behavior, the individuals’ actions, or the equilibria due to the combination of the actions of several players. To overcome the limits of these models, we decided to take into consideration the unfortunately unfinished work of Michael Bacharach, who strived to understand the individual and collective forms of rationality without applying only analytical devices or a theoretical vision of the world but bringing rationality back to the perception level of the agents. (shrink)

British marriage statistics (N = 311,564) suggest that women of breeding age choose young men. Women past breeding age who could still be raising children extend choices to include older men. After this, women do not marry. The choices of men over 50 are restricted to women between 40 and 55: past breeding but young enough to be raising children; the few men over 50 that marry choose women in this age range.

The author, the mother of two children in Amsterdam, describes her birth experiences, the first in the hospital, the second at home.

The author, the mother of two children in Amsterdam, describes her birth experiences, the first in the hospital, the second at home.

It is both a moral tragedy and a travesty of social justice that responses to present unacceptable levels of Greenhouse Gases often involve constraining development, and that the burden of t...

Economics without Preferences lays out a new microeconomics – a theory of choice behavior, markets, and welfare – when agents lack the preferences and marginal judgments that economics normally relies on. Agents without preferences defy the rules of the traditional model of rational choice but they can still systematically pursue their interests. The theory that results resolves several puzzles in economics. Status quo bias and other anomalies of behavioral economics shield agents from harm; they are expressions rather than violations of (...) rationality. Parts of economic orthodoxy go out the window. Agents will fail to make the fine-grained trade-offs between options ingrained in conventional economics, leading market prices to be volatile and cost-benefit analysis to break down. This book provides policy alternatives to fill this void. Governments can spur innovation, the main benefit markets can deliver, while sheltering agents from the upheavals that accompany economic change. (shrink)

In social networks, individual heterogeneity is widely existed, and an individual often tends to contact more frequently with friends of similar status or opinion. It is worth noting that the contact preference characteristic among heterogeneous individuals will have a significant effect on social contagions. Thus, we propose a social contagion model which takes the heterogeneity of individual influence and contact preference into account, and make a theoretical analysis of the social spreading process by developing an (...) edge-based compartmental theory. We find that the competition between simple contagion and complex contagion leads to the emergence of crossover phase transition phenomena when the influence of ordinary individuals is low: it changes from being hybrid to continuous, then to hybrid, and eventually to continuous phase transition with the increase of the contact probability of homogeneous individuals. However, it changes from being first-order to continuous phase transition when the influence strength of ordinary individuals is relatively high. In addition, there is an optimal value or range of contact probability of homogeneous individuals which maximizes the spreading size, and the optimal value or lower bound of the optimal range decreases with the increase of transmission probability. Our theoretical prediction results are in good agreement with the simulation results. (shrink)

The first goal of this study was to validate the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) through checking their relation to the transitivity axiom. The second goal was to test the relation between decision strategies and cognitive style as well as the relation between decision strategies and the transitivity of preferences. The following characteristics of strategies were investigated: requirements for trade-offs, maximization vs. satisficing and option-wise vs. attribute-wise information processing. Respondents were given choices between two multi-attribute options. (...) The options were designed so that the choice indicated which strategy was applied. Both the REI-R and the CRT were found to be good predictors of the transitivity of preferences. Respondents who applied compensatory strategies and the maximization criterion scored highly on the REI-R and in the CRT, whereas those who applied the satisficing rule scored highly on the REI-R but not in the CRT. Attribute-wise information processing was related to low scores in both measurements. Option-wise information processing led to a high transitivity of preferences. (shrink)

Recently, a multinomial process tree model was developed to measure an agent’s consequence sensitivity, norm sensitivity, and generalized inaction/action preferences when making moral decisions (CNI model). However, the CNI model presupposed that an agent considersconsequences—norms—generalizedinaction/actionpreferences sequentially, which is untenable based on recent evidence. Besides, the CNI model generates parameters at the group level based on binary categorical data. Hence, theC/N/Iparameters cannot be used for correlation analyses or other conventional research designs. To solve these limitations, we developed the CAN algorithm to (...) computenormandconsequencesensitivities and overallaction/inactionpreferences algebraically in a parallel manner. We re-analyzed the raw data of the original CNI model to test the methodological predictions. Our results demonstrate that: (1) theCparameter is approximately equal between the CNI model and CAN algorithm; (2) theNparameter under the CNI model approximately equalsN/(1 −C) under the CAN algorithm; (3) theIparameter andAparameter are reversed around 0.5 – the larger theIparameter, the more the generalized inactionversusaction preference and the larger theAparameter, the more overall actionversusinaction preference; (4) tests of differences in parameters between groups with the CNI model and CAN algorithm led to almost the same statistical conclusion; (5) parameters from the CAN algorithm can be used for correlational analyses and multiple comparisons, and this is an advantage over the parameters from the CNI model. The theoretical and methodological implications of our study were also discussed. (shrink)

I argue, first, that the deprived individuals whose predicaments Nussbaum cites as examples of "adaptive preference" do not in fact prefer the conditions of their lives to what we should regard as more desirable alternatives, indeed that we believe they are badly off precisely because they are not living the lives they would prefer to live if they had other options and were aware of them. Secondly, I argue that even where individuals in deprived circumstances acquire tastes for conditions (...) that we regard as bad, they are typically better off having their acquired preferences satisfied. If they are badly off it is because they cannot get what we and they, would regard as more desirable alternatives. Preference utilitarianism explains why individuals in such circumstances are badly off whether they have adapted to their deprived circumstances or not. Even if they prefer the conditions of their lives to all other available alternatives, most would prefer alternatives that are not available to them which would, on the preferentist account, make them better off. And that, on the preferentist account, is the basis for a radical critique of unjust institutions that limit people's options and prevent them from getting what they want. (shrink)

Behavioural welfare economics has lately been challenged on account of its use of the satisfaction of true preferences as a normative criterion. The critique contests what is taken to be an implicit assumption in the literature, namely that true preferences are context-independent. This assumption is considered not only unjustified in the behavioural welfare economics literature but unjustifiable – true preferences are argued to be, at least sometimes, context-dependent. This article explores the implications of this ‘critique of the inner rational agent’. (...) I argue that the critique does not support a wholesale shift away from the use of true preferences as an evaluative standard in normative economics; instead, the critique implies that behavioural welfare economists need to inquire into and establish the ‘source’ of particular context-dependent choices in individuals’ decision-making. The source determines the permissibility of correcting individuals’ context-dependent choices and can, in some situations, support decisive welfare judgements. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the stability of the aggregation procedure of individual preferences. In particular, we propose the stability under the addition of social preference, which is a normative property of democratic collective decision making. We establish impossibility and possibility theorems for non-dictatorial aggregation procedures.

Normative welfare economics commonly assumes that individuals’ preferences can be reliably inferred from their choices and relies on preference satisfaction as the normative standard for welfare. In recent years, several authors have criticized welfare economists’ reliance on preference satisfaction as the normative standard for welfare and have advocated grounding normative welfare economics on opportunities rather than preferences. In this paper, I argue that although preference-based approaches to normative welfare economics face significant conceptual and practical challenges, opportunity-based approaches (...) fail to provide a more reliable and informative foundation for normative welfare economics than preference-based approaches. I then identify and rebut various influential calls to ground normative welfare economics on opportunities rather than preferences to support my qualified defence of preference-based approaches. (shrink)

Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of (...) the human being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped in an outer psychological shell. This model is psychologically and philosophically problematic. (shrink)

Preference is a basic notion in human behaviour, underlying such varied phenomena as individual rationality in the philosophy of action and game theory, obligations in deontic logic (we should aim for the best of all possible worlds), or collective decisions in social choice theory. Also, in a more abstract sense, preference orderings are used in conditional logic or non-monotonic reasoning as a way of arranging worlds into more or less plausible ones. The field of preference logic (...) (cf. Hansson [10]) studies formal systems that can express and analyze notions of preference between various sorts of entities: worlds, actions, or propositions. The art is of course to design a language that combines perspicuity and low complexity with reasonable expressive power. In this paper, we take a particularly simple approach. As preferences are binary relations between worlds, they naturally support standard unary modalities. In particular, our key modality ♦ϕ will just say that is ϕ true in some world which is at least as good as the current one. Of course, this notion can also be indexed to separate agents. The essence of this language is already in [4], but our semantics is more general, and so are our applications and later language extensions. Our modal language can express a variety of preference notions between propositions. Moreover, as already suggested in [9], it can “deconstruct” standard conditionals, providing an embedding of conditional logic into more standard modal logics. Next, we take the language to the analysis of games, where some sort of preference logic is evidently needed ([23] has a binary modal analysis different from ours). We show how a qualitative unary preference modality suffices for defining Nash Equilibrium in strategic games, and also the Backward Induction solution for finite extensive games. Finally, from a technical perspective, our treatment adds a new twist. Each application considered in this paper suggests the need for some additional access to worlds before the preference modality can unfold its true power.. (shrink)

Although informed consent is an integral part of clinical practice, its current doctrine remains mostly a matter of law and mainstream ethics rather than empirical research. There are scarce empirical data on patients’ perceived purpose of informed consent, which may include administrative routine/courtesy gesture, simple honest permission, informed permission, patient-clinician shared decision-making, and enabling patient’s self decision-making. Different purposes require different processes.

This paper deals with various connections that are found to exist between statistical estimation methods for decision-making and rules of group choice in the social choice area. Initially the aggregation of individual opinions is formulated as a pattern recognition problem; firstly it is shown that individual preferences lead to a natural representation in terms of binary patterns. Then we proceed to show how the search for a group preference pattern can be conducted by classifying the input (...) class='Hi'>preference patterns into various ‘pattern classes’ and using the resulting classification boundaries to define the area of mutual agreement over some of the available alternatives. This leads to a decision-theoretic problem which consists in defining a decision rule (for classification) that is least likely to lead to misrecognition of arbitrary preference patterns. A maximum likelihood solution is obtained and compared with some well-known rules of group decision-making. Other solutions are also possible, on the basis of different optimality criteria, and their social choice interpretation is suggested. Finally, a method using Coleman's linear model for attributes is applied to yield group decision rules by feature weighting of election issues. (shrink)

This paper examines an extended framework of Arrovian social choice theory. We consider two classes of values: consequential values and non-consequential values. Each individual has a comprehensive preference based on the two. Non-consequential values are assumed to be homogeneous among individuals. It is shown that a social ordering function satisfying Arrovian conditions must be non-consequential: a social comprehensive preference gives unequivocal priority to non-consequential values. We clarify the role of common preferences over non-consequential features.

In this paper we argue that Sen's defence of liberal democracy suffers from a moralistic and pro-liberal bias that renders it unable to take pluralism as seriously as it professes to do. That is because Sen’s commitment to respecting pluralism is not matched by his account of how to individuate the sorts of preferences that ought to be included in democratic deliberation. Our argument generalises as a critique of the two most common responses to the fact of pluralism in contemporary (...) (i.e. post-Rawls) liberalism: a broadly procedural understanding of autonomy and the idea of deliberative democracy. That is to say, the difficulties with pluralism we identify can be traced back to the particular version of Kantian deontology prevalent in contemporary liberalism, and to the equally prevalent aspiration to ground political legitimacy in a moralised consensus. (shrink)

This paper offers a general approach to ethics before considering its implications for the question of how to respond to religious preferences in healthcare, especially those of patients and healthcare workers. The first section outlines the two main components of the approach: (1) demoralizing, that is, seeking to avoid moral terminology in the discussion of reasons for action; (2) welfarism, the view that our ultimate reasons are grounded solely in the well-being of individuals. Section 2 elucidates the notion of religious (...) preferences and describes the history and importance of their protection by human rights legislation. The following section defends the ‘Preference Principle’, according to which there is a reason to satisfy any preference (in so far as that satisfaction advances well-being). Section 4 discusses the implications of this principle for religious preferences in healthcare, again seeking to bring out the special social and political importance of respect, and respect for such preferences in particular. The paper ends with a brief description of how to approach such problems from the perspective of a demoralized welfarism. (shrink)

It is a longstanding problem for theorists of justice that many victims of injustice seem to prefer mistreatment, and perpetuate their own oppression. One possible response is to simply ignore such preferences as unreliable ‘adaptive preferences’. Capability theorists have taken this approach, arguing that individuals should be entitled to certain capabilities regardless of their satisfaction without them. Although this initially seems plausible, worries have been raised that undermining the reliability of individuals' strongly-held preferences impugns their rationality, and further excludes already (...) marginalised groups. I argue that such criticisms trade on an ambiguity between two uses of the term ‘adaptive preference’. An adaptive preference is often assumed to be irrational, and an unreliable guide to its possessor's best interests. However, I suggest a preference may also be adaptive in the sense that it is an unreliable guide to our distributive entitlements, and that this does not require an assessment of individuals' rationality. I consider this distinction in relation to disability, arguing that this clarification allows us to justifiably ignore some disabled individuals' preferences, in the context of theorising about distributive justice, without disrespecting or undermining their rationality or culture. (shrink)

We investigate the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare in a new framework of individual and social decisions, which distinguishes between two sources of uncertainty, here interpreted as an objective and a subjective source respectively. This framework makes it possible to endow the individuals and society not only with ex ante and ex post preferences, as is usually done, but also with interim preferences of two kinds, and correspondingly, to introduce interim forms of (...) the Pareto principle. After characterizing the ex ante and ex post criteria, we present a first solution to their conflict that extends the former as much possible in the direction of the latter. Then, we present a second solution, which goes in the opposite direction, and is also maximally assertive. Both solutions translate the assumed Pareto conditions into weighted additive utility representations, and both attribute to the individuals common probability values on the objective source of uncertainty, and different probability values on the subjective source. We discuss these solutions in terms of two conceptual arguments, i.e., the by now classic spurious unanimity argument and a novel informational argument labelled complementary ignorance. The paper complies with the standard economic methodology of basing probability and utility representations on preference axioms, but for the sake of completeness, also considers a construal of objective uncertainty based on the assumption of an exogeneously given probability measure. JEL classification: D70; D81. (shrink)