En la presente investigación propongo el concepto de prudencia epistémica. La prudencia epistémica es la habilidad social para influir en los demás para fines socio-cognitivos. Como habilidad pragmática, la prudencia epistémica consiste no sólo en una descripción de los orígenes empíricos del error, sino en la habilidad social para evitar el error y otros males cognitivos frutos del egoísmo lógico y otros vicios epistémicos.

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar o conceito de Egoísmo de Schopenhauer elaborado na obra “O mundo como Vontade e como Representação”, ligando-o à defesa da necessidade da instituição de um Estado Civil como é realizado por Hobbes no Leviatã. De onde se parte do pressuposto que egoísmo seria o ponto de partida das ações dos indivíduos, o que em um Estado de Natureza, sem um poder comum a todos, levaria os homens a uma situação de “guerra de (...) todos contra todos”, por isso a necessidade da instituição do Estado Civil. Por meio dos conceitos expostos por Schopenhauer e Hobbes em suas obras, será feita uma análise de até que ponto se pode levar essa afirmação como verdadeira, assim como ligar os pontos em comum das duas teorias acerca das ações morais dos homens, sem deixar de lado as diferenças conceituais e práticas das teorias de Hobbes e Schopenhauer. (shrink)

Perhaps the most important work of philosophy written in the twentieth century, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus first appeared in 1921 and was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme compression and brilliance, it immediately convinced many of its readers and captivated the imagination of all. Its chief influence, at first, was on the Logical Positivists of the 1920s and 30s, but many other philosophers were stimulated by its philosophy (...) of language, finding attractive, if ultimately unsatisfactory, its view that propositions were pictures of reality. Perhaps most of all, Wittgenstein himself, after his return to philosophy in the late 1920s, was fascinated by its vision of an inexpressible, crystalline world of logical relationships. The posthumous publication of other writings has, therefore, only served to reawaken interest in the Tractatus and to illuminate its more neglected aspects. David Pears and Brian McGuinness revised their translation in the light of Wittgenstein's own suggestions and comments in his correspondence with C.K. Ogden about the first translation. In addition, this edition contains the introduction by Bertrand Russell which appeared in the original English translation. (shrink)

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein: three parallel tree-structured editions. (1) Tree-structured arrangement of the German text, edited by David G. Stern, Joachim Schulte and Katia Saporiti. (2) Tree-structured arrangement of the English translation by Ogden and Ramsey, edited by David G. Stern. (3) Tree-structured arrangement of the English translation by Pears and McGuinness, edited by David G. Stern.

Este ensaio pretende levantar as seguintes questões: 1. de que modo é possível reconstituir o sentido de moral segundo um amor-próprio cujo conteúdo é dado menos por um isolamento ou negaçáo do outro do que por um trabalho pessoal sobre si mesmo, em vista de um êthos , de uma ética? 2. em que medida o valor da moral hoje em dia pode ser deslocado da lei universal para uma atitude de diferença, da normalidade do comportamento para o cultivo de (...) si e, por fim, da verdade sobre o sujeito para uma subjetivaçáo ascética que náo exige a prerrogativa de uma identidade, mas a transformaçáo de si na relaçáo consigo e com os outros? Tais questões sáo levantadas a partir de Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault e Fernando Savater. Palavras-chave: Amor-próprio, Estética da existência, Ética, Identidade. (shrink)

No livro IV, de O mundo como vontade e representação, Arthur Schopenhauer afirma que as ações humanas podem acontecer por motivos e quietivos. As ações que levam em consideração uma cadeia de motivações são sempre auto-dirigidas, tendo em mente que os indivíduos agem pra satisfação dos seus quereres particulares. Tais ações são classificadas pelo autor de egoístas por não levarem em consideração o outro, mas os desejos que preenchem a consciência humana no ato de agir. Nesse primeiro momento a leitura (...) schopenhaueriana da “natureza humana” corrobora com o egoísmo psicológico, pois os indivíduos procuram afirmar a sua vontade de vida por entenderem intuitivamente que a impossibilidade de efetivação dessa pulsão vital denominada vontade promove carência, sofrimento. Porém, Schopenhauer reconhece que existem ações, embora raras, desinteressadas. Nesse momento o egoísmo é suprimido e o agente moral é tomado por uma compreensão metafísica do mundo que o faz agir por compaixão. Nossa pretensão é clarificar como se dá essa passagem do egoísmo psicológico à compaixão metafísica, segundo a visão de mundo schopenhaueriana, recolocando o autor no debate metaético contemporâneo.: In Book IV of The World as Will and Representation, Arthur Schopenhauer asserts that human actions can happen for reasons and quietivos. The actions that take into account a chain of motives are always self-addressed, bearing in mind that individuals act to the satisfaction of his wants private. Such actions are classified by the author as selfish by not taking into consideration the other, but the desires that fill the human consciousness in the act of acting. In that first moment reading Schopenhauer's "human nature" corroborates psychological egoism, since individuals seek to assert their will to live because they understand intuitively that the impossibility of effecting this vital instinct called deficiency promotes ease suffering. But Schopenhauer recognizes that there are actions, although rare, disinterested. At that moment the selfishness and deleted and moral agent is taken by a metaphysical understanding of the world that makes him act out of compassion. Our intention is to clarify how is this passage from psychological egoism to compassion metaphysics, according to Schopenhauer's worldview, placing the author in contemporary meta-ethical debate. Keywords : Will. Representation. Selfishness. Compassion. (shrink)

El egoísmo psicológico es una teoría sobre la motivación que afirma que nuestros deseos últimos son autoccntrados. Las crío ticas contra el egoísmo psicológico se pueden dividir en tres categorías: a) se dice que no es una auténtica teoría; b) que es una teoría refutada por la observación de la conducta; c) que se debería rechazar en favor de una teoría alternativa según la cual los seres humanos tienen deseos últimos tanto egoístas como altruistas. Se analizan estos tres (...) tipos de crítica y se concluye que la situación del debate entre egoísmo y pluralismo motivacional es de tablas. Situación que puede encontrar alguna salida a partir de consideraciones evolucionistas. El egoísmo no merece ser considerado como hipótesis por defecto. Aunque sea en un grado pequeño, el peso de la evidencia favorece al pluralismo. (shrink)

This reissue of his collection of early essays, Logico-Linguistic Papers, is published with a brand new introduction by Professor Strawson but, apart from minor ...

Physical dimensions like “mass”, “length”, “charge”, represented by the symbols [M], [L], [Q], are not numbers, but used as numbers to perform dimensional analysis in particular, and to write the equations of physics in general, by the physicist. The law of excluded middle falls short of explaining the contradictory meanings of the same symbols. The statements like “m tends to 0”, “r tends to 0”, “q tends to 0”, used by the physicist, are inconsistent on dimensional grounds because “m”, “r”, (...) “q” represent quantities with physical dimensions of [M], [L], [Q] respectively and “0” represents just a number—devoid of physical dimension. Consequently, due to the involvement of the statement “q tends to 0'', where q is the test charge” in the definition of electric field leads to either circular reasoning or a contradiction regarding the experimental verification of the smallest charge in the Millikan–Fletcher oil drop experiment. Considering such issues as problematic, by choice, I make an inquiry regarding the basic language in terms of which physics is written, with an aim of exploring how truthfully the verbal statements can be converted to the corresponding physico-mathematical expressions, where “physico-mathematical” signifies the involvement of physical dimensions. Such investigation necessitates an explanation by demonstration of “self inquiry”, “middle way”, “dependent origination”, “emptiness/relational existence”, which are certain terms that signify the basic tenets of Buddhism. In light of such demonstration I explain my view of “definition”; the relations among quantity, physical dimension and number; meaninglessness of “zero quantity” and the associated logico-linguistic fallacy; difference between unit and unity. Considering the importance of the notion of electric field in physics, I present a critical analysis of the definitions of electric field due to Maxwell and Jackson, along with the physico-mathematical conversions of the verbal statements. The analysis of Jackson’s definition points towards an expression of the electric field as an infinite series due to the associated “limiting process” of the test charge. However, it brings out the necessity of a postulate regarding the existence of charges, which nevertheless follows from the definition of quantity. Consequently, I explain the notion of undecidable charges that act as the middle way to resolve the contradiction regarding the Millikan–Fletcher oil drop experiment. In passing, I provide a logico-linguistic analysis, in physico-mathematical terms, of two verbal statements of Maxwell in relation to his definition of electric field, which suggests Maxwell’s conception of dependent origination of distance and charge ) and that of emptiness in the context of relative vacuum. This work is an appeal for the dissociation of the categorical disciplines of logic and physics and on the large, a fruitful merger of Eastern philosophy and Western science. Nevertheless, it remains open to how the reader relates to this work, which is the essence of emptiness. (shrink)

A short discussion of the notions of self-love and self-interest in early modern ethics and the shaping of political economy.

A short discussion of the emergence of the self-interest axiom during the classical phase of political economy, its roots in the previous discussion on self-love in early modern ethics and its development in the following formulation of the notion of 'homo economicus' and the definition of the agent's rationality.

En este artículo, exploro la posibilidad de aplicar los métodos y resultados de la Agregación de Juicios al problema del desacuerdo lógico. Es decir, desarrollo y evalúo maneras en que individuos que desacuerdan lógicamente pueden generar una lógica colectiva. Pruebo una versión de la paradoja discursiva, donde el voto por mayoría en un grupo de lógicos estructurales puede generar lógicas subestructurales, y luego elaboro un resultado de imposibilidad más general. Más adelante, analizo diferentes maneras de evitar la paradoja, en (...) particular aquellas que apelan a restricciones de dominio. Finalmente, analizo brevemente la aplicación de estos resultados al debate sobre paradojas semánticas. (shrink)

This book is meant as a part of the larger contemporary philosophical project of naturalizing logico-mathematical knowledge, and addresses the key question that motivates most of the work in this field: What is philosophically relevant about the nature of logico-mathematical knowledge in recent research in psychology and cognitive science? The question about this distinctive kind of knowledge is rooted in Plato’s dialogues, and virtually all major philosophers have expressed interest in it. The essays in this collection tackle this important philosophical (...) query from the perspective of the modern sciences of cognition, namely cognitive psychology and neuroscience. _Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge _contributes to consolidating a new, emerging direction in the philosophy of mathematics, which, while keeping the traditional concerns of this sub-discipline in sight, aims to engage with them in a scientifically-informed manner. A subsequent aim is to signal the philosophers’ willingness to enter into a fruitful dialogue with the community of cognitive scientists and psychologists by examining their methods and interpretive strategies. (shrink)

In questo articolo si analizzano congiuntamente l'origine delle idee e il loro uso regolativo. A questo scopo si comincia considerando la connessione tra uso logico della ragione e definizione della ragione in generale come facoltà dei principi. Si considera poi come la rappresentazione di un incondizionato derivi necessariamente dall'uso logico, e come quindi questo implichi necessariamente un uso reale della ragione. Si considera poi come le varie rappresentazioni dell'incondizionato diano origine alle idee trascendentali. Infine, si considera l'uso regolativo delle idee (...) alla luce della pratica di inferire dal quale derivano. (shrink)

The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus first appeared in 1921 and was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme compression and brilliance, it immediately convinced many of its readers and captured the imagination of all. Its chief influence, at first, was on the Logical Positivists of the 1920s and 1930s, but many other philosophers were stimulated by its philosophy of language, finding attractive, even if ultimately unsatisfactory, its view that propositions (...) were pictures of reality. Perhaps most of all, its own author, after his return to philosophy in the late 1920s, was fascinated by its vision of an inexpressible, crystalline world of logical relationships. C.K. Ogden's translation of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has a unique provenance. As revealed in Letters of C.K. Ogden (1973) and in correspondence in The Times Literary Supplement , Wittgenstein, Ramsey and Moore all worked with Ogden on the translation, which had Wittgenstein's complete approval. The very name Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was of Ogden's devising; and there is very strong feeling among philosophers that, among the differing translations of this work, Ogden's is the definitive text - and Wittgenstein's version of the English equivalent of his Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. (shrink)

Perhaps the most important work of philosophy written in the twentieth century, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus first appeared in 1921 and was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme compression and brilliance, it immediately convinced many of its readers and captivated the imagination of all. Its chief influence, at first, was on the Logical Positivists of the 1920s and 30s, but many other philosophers were stimulated by its philosophy (...) of language, finding attractive, if ultimately unsatisfactory, its view that propositions were pictures of reality. Perhaps most of all, Wittgenstein himself, after his return to philosophy in the late 1920s, was fascinated by its vision of an inexpressible, crystalline world of logical relationships. The posthumous publication of other writings has, therefore, only served to reawaken interest in the Tractatus and to illuminate its more neglected aspects. David Pears and Brian McGuinness revised their translation in the light of Wittgenstein's own suggestions and comments in his correspondence with C.K. Ogden about the first translation. In addition, this edition contains the introduction by Bertrand Russell which appeared in the original English translation. (shrink)

En deux parties: pensée logico-mathématique et psychologie; pensée logico-mathématique et sciences cognitives.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_ is among the most ambitious and influential philosophical works of the early twentieth century, and in recent years it has again occupied a central position in discussions of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Written in an austere and meticulous style, the _Tractatus_ addresses questions in the philosophy of language, logic, and metaphysics, and, according to its author, provides a solution to all the problems of philosophy. This Broadview Edition contains the original English translation by C.K. Ogden and Frank P. (...) Ramsey, annotated and revised by the editor for improved accuracy and clarity. Appendices include important material by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, as well as excerpts from Wittgenstein’s other writings. (shrink)

The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus first appeared in 1921 and was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme compression and brilliance, it immediately convinced many of its readers and captured the imagination of all. Its chief influence, at first, was on the Logical Positivists of the 1920s and 1930s, but many other philosophers were stimulated by its philosophy of language, finding attractive, even if ultimately unsatisfactory, its view that propositions were (...) pictures of reality. Perhaps most of all, its own author, after his return to philosophy in the late 1920s, was fascinated by its vision of an inexpressible, crystalline world of logical relationships. C.K. Ogden's translation of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has a unique provenance. As revealed in Letters of C.K. Ogden and in correspondence in The Times Literary Supplement , Wittgenstein, Ramsey and Moore all worked with Ogden on the translation, which had Wittgenstein's complete approval. The very name Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was of Ogden's devising; and there is very strong feeling among philosophers that, among the differing translations of this work, Ogden's is the definitive text - and Wittgenstein's version of the English equivalent of his Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. (shrink)

Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’un sonunda, kendisini anlayan okuyucunun, söylediklerinin saçma olduğunu göreceğini söyler. Eserin bu paradoksu eserle tanışan hemen her okuyucu için bir kafa karışıklığı vesilesidir. Eğer eserde dile getirilenler saçmaysa bunların saçma olduğu da dahil olmak üzere eserin dile getirdiklerini ciddiye almamak gerekir, eğer eser ciddiye alınacaksa söylenenlerin saçma olduğunu kabul etmek gerekir. Eserin bu paradoksunun nasıl ele alınması gerektiğine dair hatırı sayılır bir literatür vardır. Bu çalışmada, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’taki bu paradoksun, saçmanın sağaltıcı işleviyle değerlendirildiğinde eseri anlamayı engellemeyeceği fikri savunulacaktır. (...) Bunun için öncelikle genel olarak Resim Kuramı’nın ana hatlarından söz ederek Wittgenstein için saçmanın ne olduğunu anlatacağım. Daha sonra, Wittgenstein için saçmanın işlevinin ne olduğuna dair iyi gerekçelendirildiğini düşündüğüm fikirlerden söz edeceğim. Son olarak, saçmaya işaret edebilmenin ancak saçma ile mümkün olduğunu, Wittgenstein’ın bu yolla yaygın bir yanılgıyı sağalttığını ve dolayısıyla saçmanın sağaltıcı bir işlevi olduğunu iddia edeceğim. (shrink)

O artigo consiste num exame da alegação de Schopenhauer segundo a qual o imperativo categórico se apoia no egoísmo. Para o autor de Sobre o Fundamento da Moral, o imperativo categórico é apenas uma perífrase, um ornamento, uma expressão floreada da regra “não faças ao outro o que não queres que o outro te faça”, a conhecida regra de ouro.Tento mostrar que as observações de Kant quanto à aplicação do imperativo categórico aos exemplos da falsa promessa e da indiferença (...) com o sofrimento alheio são questionáveis.O modo como Kant apresenta tais exemplos dá ensejo a críticas razoáveis sobre o egoísmo ser a base do imperativo categórico. Apesar disso, argumento que é possível defender a tese de que o imperativo categórico, ao contrário do que pensa Schopenhauer,não se apoia em nenhuma forma de egoísmo. Quando Schopenhauer entende o imperativo categórico como princípio do egoísmo, ele pensa que os exemplos de aplicação do imperativo categórico contêm elucidações da motivação moral, o que não é o caso. (shrink)

O artigo consiste num exame da alegação de Schopenhauer segundo a qual o imperativo categórico se apoia no egoísmo. Para o autor de Sobre o Fundamento da Moral, o imperativo categórico é apenas uma perífrase, um ornamento, uma expressão floreada da regra “não faças ao outro o que não queres que o outro te faça”, a conhecida regra de ouro.Tento mostrar que as observações de Kant quanto à aplicação do imperativo categórico aos exemplos da falsa promessa e da indiferença (...) com o sofrimento alheio são questionáveis.O modo como Kant apresenta tais exemplos dá ensejo a críticas razoáveis sobre o egoísmo ser a base do imperativo categórico. Apesar disso, argumento que é possível defender a tese de que o imperativo categórico, ao contrário do que pensa Schopenhauer,não se apoia em nenhuma forma de egoísmo. Quando Schopenhauer entende o imperativo categórico como princípio do egoísmo, ele pensa que os exemplos de aplicação do imperativo categórico contêm elucidações da motivação moral, o que não é o caso. (shrink)

P.F. Strawson has been a major and influential spokesman for ordinary language philosophy throughout the late twentieth century, studying the relationship between common language and the language of formal logic. This reissue of his collection of early essays, Logico-Linguistic Papers, is published with a brand new introduction by Professor Strawson but, apart from minor corrections to the text, these classic essays remain original and intact. Logico-Linguistic Papers contains Strawson's major essay, 'On Referring', in which he disputed Bertrand Russell's theory of (...) definite descriptions, distinguishing between referring to an entity and asserting its existence. The book contains twelve essays in all, grouped by subject matter. The first five are concerned with the topic of singular reference and predication and the last three are all responses to J.L. Austin's treatment of the topic of truth. Strawson disputes the correspondence theory of truth, maintaining that facts are what statements state. The remaining papers deal with meaning, speech acts, logical truth and Chomsky's views on syntax. (shrink)

This second companion paper to a logico-mathematic, structural methodology and its findings address theoretical issues underlying sub-literal phenomena. The concept of a “cognitive psycho-dynamics” is introduced. In addition, research on masked priming and automatic activation of “chronic goals and motives” schemata are presented as initial and partial explanatory theoretical bases. Corroborating findings from fMRI and other neurological research suggest that some of the cognitive operations are biologically based. A biological evolutionary framework is then presented to explain the origin and development (...) of SubLit cognition and lexical referents. Implications are discussed throughout. (shrink)

In this first of three papers, a novel cognitive and psycho-linguistic non metric or non quantitative methodology developed for the analysis and validation of unconscious cognition and meaning in ostensibly literal verbal narratives is presented. Unconscious referents are reconceptualized as sub-literal referents. An integrally systemic, structural, and internally consistent set of operations is delineated and instantiated. The method is related to aspects of two models. The first is logico-mathematic structure; the second is linguistic syntax. After initially framing the problem that (...) the method addresses, along with some theoretical implications, historical precursors are briefly outlined. The method presents novel cognitive and linguistic operations. Though the method raises a number of issues of theory, research, and methodology, and makes a contribution to these areas, it stands independently, qua method. (shrink)

In this first of two companion papers to a logico-mathematic, structural methodology , a meta-level analysis of the non metric structure is presented in relation to critiques based on standard experimental, statistical, and computational methods of contemporary psychology and cognitive science. The concept of a non metric methodology is examined as it relates to the epistemological and scientific goals of experimental, statistical, and computational methods. While sharing in these goals, differences and similarities between the two methodological approaches are outlined. It (...) is argued that typical experimental methods are not sufficient to extract and validate semantic information in verbal narratives. It is further suggested that a logico-mathematic, structural methodology can yield invariant law-like cognitive processes by careful methodological control of the specific case — instead of those found by current methods that produce “laws” based on statistical frequency. Lastly, the issue of experimental manipulation in relation to the logico-mathematic, structural methodology is examined. (shrink)

Es éste un trabajo donde, partiendo de la dicotomía discurso lógico / discurso retórico, se infiere que nuestra representación del mundo e interacción con él -esencialmente metafórica y de índole retórica respectivamente- recaban la conjunción, como Vico pretendiera, de filosofía y filología.This is a paper that, putting aside the logic discourse / rhetorical discourse dichotomy, infers that our representation of the world and interaction with it -essentially metaphoric and of rhetorical nature, respectively- bring philosophy and philology together, as Vico (...) intended. (shrink)