The essentially comparative conception of value entails that the value of a state of affairs does not depend solely upon features intrinsic to the state of affairs, but also upon extrinsic features, such as the set of feasible alternatives. It has been argued that this conception of value gives us reason to abandon the transitivity of the better than relation. This paper shows that the support for intransitivity derived from this conception of value is very (...) limited. On its most plausible interpretations, it merely provides a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for intransitivity. It is further argued that the essentially comparative conception of value appears to support a disjunctive conclusion: there is incommensurability of value or betterness is not transitive. Of these two alternatives, incommensurability is preferable, because it is far less threatening to our other axiological commitments. (shrink)

:One view of practical reasoning is that it involves the weighing of reasons. It is not clear, however, how the weights of reasons combine, especially given the logical and substantive relations among different reasons. Nor is it clear how the weighing of reasons relates to decision theoretic maximization of expected value. This paper constructs a formal model of reasons and their weight in order to shed light on these issues. The model informs philosophical debates about reasons, such as the (...) question of whether reasons or values are more fundamental and the opposing doctrines of atomism and holism about reasons. (shrink)

The primary aim of this thesis is to examine some of the arguments that have been leveled against the idea that all value bearing entities are comparable. A secondary aim is to investigate some putative properties of the relation ‘better than', especially transitivity and vagueness. Also, some of the consequences of accepting incomparability are investigated, both with regards to other value theoretical issues, such as the implications for monadic value predicates, and with regards to more applied issues, (...) such as the comparison of risks. PAPER I is a critical examination of the so-called small-improvement argument for incomparability. It is demonstrated that the value structure this argument is able to distinguish is compatible not only with incomparability but also with a kind of evaluative indeterminacy that is distinct from incomparability. PAPER II argues that if the possibility of non-conventional value relations is granted it follows that some things that have value are neither good, bad, nor neutral. This counterintuitive conclusion is reached by combining two individually plausible analyses of value. PAPER III addresses the phenomenon of incomplete preferences. It is shown how it is possible to model incomplete preference orderings by means of probabilistic preferences, and how to reveal an agent's incomplete preference ordering within a behaviorist framework. PAPER IV examines another version of the small-improvement argument designed to establish the rationality of incomplete preferences. It is argued that while there might be reasons to believe each of the premises in this version, there is a conflict between these reasons. The conflict is such that we are not provided with a reason to believe the conjunction of the premises. And without support for the conjunction of the premises the small-improvement argument for incomparability fails. PAPER V defends the common sense claim that ‘better than' is transitive against the compelling counterexamples provided by Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels. It is demonstrated that the contradiction that follows from accepting Temkin and Rachels' premises trades on the vagueness of ‘better than', and so does not warrant the rejection of transitivity, but rather the conclusion that ‘better than' is vague. PAPER VI applies the notions of incommensurability and incomparability to comparative risk analysis. It is argued that if risks are incommensurable, and thereby resistant to accurate comparisons in terms of severity, we cannot perform accurate and cost effective trade-offs between risks and their associated benefits. (shrink)

In "The Value of Vagueness," Timothy Endicott argues that vague law can be better than precise law. I think he is in many respects correct, but will suggest that we modify and supplement his framework in order to get a firmer grip on what I call the Lawmakers' Challenge: the scenario in which lawmakers find themselves when they must determine whether the consequences of precision are worse than the consequences of vagueness. This will allow us to identify several points (...) of actual and possible disagreement regarding the value of vagueness for law, each of which could affect Endicott's claim that vagueness is sometimes preferable to precision. The framework will also allow us to compare positions that seem - on the face of it - hard to compare, due to the fact that they rest on different theories of value and/or different theories of law. (shrink)

While investigating the value of achievements, Dunkle claims that lucky achievements are possible. For instance, if a person does great works, then it is possible that the works have the status of achievements, even if luck plays a crucial role in doing the great works. Rather than examining Dunkle’s claim, this paper proceeds discussion under the assumption that lucky achievements are possible. In particular, based on this assumption, this paper suggests a new approach to the nature of achievement named (...) the Comparative Value Approach. According to the comparative value approach, a product can have the status of an achievement if the product is valuable in an achievement-relevant domain, and in that domain the product is valuable more than most other items which either have been achieved or can be achieved by others. This paper shows that the comparative value approach successfully explains the cases of achievements, including the cases of lucky achievements. Besides this reason, this paper provides three more reasons to show that the comparative value approach is a feasible view of achievements. The comparative value approach can accommodate the fact that there are various kinds of achievements; the approach can explain the relation between the nature of achievement and the achievement-value of a product; and the approach can show why in determining the status of a product it matters that for average people achieving a similar kind of product is sufficiently difficult. Based on these four reasons, this paper concludes that the comparative value approach is a plausible understanding of achievements. (shrink)

By stipulation, the Human Superiority Thesis [HST] consists of two claims: (1) the interests of humans should be given preferential consideration relative to the like interests of nonhuman animals, and (2) the lives of humans are more valuable than the lives of nonhuman animals. In his recent book, Mark Bernstein argues that both claims are false. I present and assess Bernstein’s main arguments, pointing out where they succeed and where they fall short. I then suggest ways of shoring up and (...) strengthening these arguments. So augmented, Bernstein’s arguments provide a compelling case for rejecting both HST claims. (shrink)

In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan defends the view that all animals who are “subjects of a life” have an equal moral right to life. In this chapter, I consider whether it makes sense to think that animals have an equal right to life in light of the challenge that life has less value for animals than humans. This challenge raises two central questions: (1) does life have less value for animals than humans and (2) if (...) it does, does this fact justify the view that animals do not have an equal right to life. I argue, first, that life has greater value for most humans than animals because most humans are capable of experiencing higher qualities of enjoyment in life, in the form of creative, intellectual pleasures. However, this does not justify denying that animals have an equal right to life. Whether beings’ lives deserve strong respect depends on whether the value of life for those beings meets a certain threshold. I argue that the value of life for many animals meets this threshold because it is compatible with the virtue of compassion. (shrink)

In this article, I argue, adverting to critical practices, that film adaptations are comparable with the comics that serve as their sources. The possibility of comparison presumes the existence of covering values according to which these comparisons are made. I raise four groupings of covering values for comics—narrative, pictorial, historical, and referential—and show how they apply to film adaptations as well, and argue that a fifth kind of value, fidelity, is relevant to comparisons of source comics to film adaptations. (...) I close with a discussion of different types of fidelity that might be brought to bear in evaluation. (shrink)

Given a 21st century context of sophisticated market economies and other Western influences such as Christianity, what similarities and differences are there between characteristic indigenous values of sub-Saharan Africa and China, and how do they continue to influence everyday life in these societies? Establishing that central to both non-Western, indigenous value systems are ideals of harmonious relationships, I compare and contrast traditional African and Chinese conceptions of harmony and analyze a number of respects in which an appeal to this (...) value affects contemporary political, economic and social interaction. (shrink)

Gert (2004) has suggested that several different types of value relations, including parity, can be clearly distinguished from each other if one interprets value comparisons as normative assessments of preference, while allowing for two levels of normativity - requirement and permission. While this basic idea is attractive, the particular modeling Gert makes use of is flawed. This paper presents an alternative modeling, developed in Rabinowicz (2008), and a general taxonomy of binary value relations. Another version of (...) class='Hi'>value analysis is then brought in, which appeals to appropriate emotions rather than preferences. It is also shown what the modeling of value relations would look like from such an emotion-centered perspective. The preference-based and the emotion-based approaches differ importantly from each other, but they give rise to isomorphic taxonomies. (shrink)

There are several different forms of comparability involving prudential values. Comparisons of values in the abstract, of realizations of some value, and of options which realize values, are distinct, and related, though not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, if rough equality is thought of as an evaluative relation in terms of which comparisons can be made, it does not imply incomparability. If it involves epistemic vagueness, this does not imply incomparability, since our not knowing which relation holds does not imply that (...) no relation holds. Finally, if it is true to some degree that some relation holds, there may be some fuzzy ordering. Given that we may not be able coherently to talk about degrees of truth, I propose an open-ended comparability condition, which takes account of rough equality, epistemic vagueness and fuzziness. (shrink)

This paper addresses the field of economic measurements of the value of assets, carried out by the methods of independent expert evaluation. The mathematical principles of application, within a comparative methodical approach, of additive and multiplicative models for correcting the cost of single indicator of compared objects have been considered. The differences of mathematical basis of the compared models were analyzed. It has been shown that the ambiguity in the methodology of correction procedure requires studying the advantages and (...) disadvantages of known models, as well as the justification and elaboration of recommendations for their application. Possible forms of correction representation using several alternative units of measurement have been defined; formulas for their interconnection have been built. Analytic expressions have been derived that mathematically describe the algorithms for performing the evaluation correction procedure using various forms of correction representation. The influence of the correction execution model on the characteristics of uncertainty in the independent evaluation result has been analyzed. The scope of two possible types of correction introduction models has been determined. A specific numerical example was used to demonstrate the methodological advantages of using a multiplicative model when summarizing percentage corrections. The independence of the correction result on the sequence of correction introduction has been confirmed. It is proposed to use the selected measure of partial corrections as a criterion for the adequacy of the correction introduction model. It is proved that the result of the independent expert evaluation depends on the chosen model and does not depend on the sequence of correction introduction. The reported study results are important in terms of theory and practice since they make it possible to improve the accuracy and reliability of the result of independent expert evaluation. (shrink)

Industrial pollution is of both national and international concern in the context where one country's emissions contribute to the problem of global warming. Existing studies have focused on government and regulations rather than on employees. The context of this study is in respect of 472 workers in seven Chinese energy companies in Shanxi province in China, one of the biggest coal mining regions and a region most responsible for environmental pollution. The key findings are two-fold: first, employees' values were positively (...) correlated with attitudes toward the environment, which also correlates with perceived corporate citizenship; second, the ownership type of the firm had a significant influence on corporate citizenship, employee values and their attitudes toward environment. Contrary to existing beliefs, Stateowned enterprises in China have much poorer ratings on all the three constructs compared to privately owned companies. The results highlight the role of the government and policy makers in shaping employees' attitudes toward the environment, and in turn the corporate citizenship of the Chinese energy industry. (shrink)

There is broad agreement in aesthetics that some artworks are greater than others despite bearing equivalent (or lesser) aesthetic value. One explanation of this difference in artistic value is that creation of the greater artwork represents a greater achievement. The aim of this article is to refine this explanation and to defend it against recent criticisms. First, I present a prima facie case in favor of the achievement explanation. Second, I draw on the history of photography to motivate (...) three objections to it: namely, that it wrongly excludes (1) lucky, (2) easy, and (3) failed creations from being artistically great. Third, I present my refined version of the achievement explanation and show how it avoids these objections. On my view, an artistic achievement consists in creating a work it would have been especially hard for comparable artists to create. Finally, I raise and address several additional objections. In responding to these objections, I argue, among other things, that my explanation of artistic value enhances our understanding of good-bad art: specifically, it allows us to see how good-bad art is artistically great despite being aesthetically flawed. (shrink)

What is the nature of the decision-related personal values of corporate management? Managers' attitudes and behaviors are built upon their personal value systems (PVS). Knowledge about the structure of management's PVS assists in understanding the attributes of corporate decision making. Utilizing a survey instrument developed and used by England (1967, 1975), this article updates this research into corporate managers' personal value systems. England's PVS consists of sixty-six pre-tested values clustered into five groups. As one could expect with personal (...) values, statistical tests reveal that even with dramatic changes in the business environment the overall personal values structure has not changed over the intervening three decades. The results also reveal that corporate managers retain their pragmatic value orientation as discussed by England. (shrink)

At the beginning of the twentieth century, human and veterinary surgeons faced the challenge of a medical marketplace transformed by technology. The socioeconomic value ascribed to their patients was changing, reflecting the increasing mechanization of industry and the decreasing dependence of society on nonhuman animals for labor. In human medicine, concern for the economic consequences of fractures “pathologized” any significant level of posttherapeutic disability, a productivist perspective contrary to the traditional corpus of medical values. In contrast, veterinarians adapted to (...) the mechanization of horsepower by shifting their primary professional interest to companion animals; a type of patient generally valued for the unique emotional attachment of the owner and not their productive capacity. The economic rationalization of human fracture care and the “sentimental” transformation of veterinary orthopedic expertise indicate how these specialists utilized increasingly convergent rhetorical arguments to justify the application of innovative fracture care technologies to their human and animal patients. (shrink)

This text attempts to show why the academic split between ethics and social sciences has been disastrous and argues that advances in vigour and sensitivity are made possible by closing this artificial divide.

We consider first-order infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic and its expansion, first-order rational Pavelka logic RPL∀. From the viewpoint of provability, we compare several Gentzen-type hypersequent calculi for these logics with each other and with Hájek’s Hilbert-type calculi for the same logics. To facilitate comparing previously known calculi for the logics, we define two new analytic calculi for RPL∀ and include them in our comparison. The key part of the comparison is a density elimination proof that introduces no cuts for one of (...) the hypersequent calculi considered. (shrink)

Nowadays, there is a growing interest in the study of various philosophical concepts. One of the relevant topics is the mutual influence or antagonism of Eastern and Western teachings about ethics and morality. One of the insufficiently studied problems is the mutual influences of I. Kant’s ideas and Confucius’ teachings. The goal of the study is to analyse the rational ethics of I. Kant and the spiritual and moral values of Confucianism within the comparative philosophical perspective, to consider their (...) common and distinctive features. The novelty of this study is an integrated approach and a detailed approach to the study of the outlined problems. In this study, the directions for further research were outlined, which deal with a deeper analysis of certain aspects of the teachings of I. Kant and Confucius. The materials and conclusions can be used for the preparation of various courses. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This thesis considers the place of values in comparative political inquiry. After a review of the debate in the philosophy of social science between the positivist and hermeneutic approaches , the argument is divided into two parts. The first part looks at the origins, and consequences, of the attempt to establish a positivistic value-free comparative political science. The second part considers the basis, and the potential (...) nature, of a self-consciously normative discipline of comparative politics. ;The idea of value-freedom is criticised; it is argued: that the failure to take into account the values of the comparative theorist results in the imposition of a non-neutral framework on the phenomena under investigation; and that the failure to take into account the values of the agents under investigation makes it impossible to properly describe or explain political phenomena. ;Examples are used to illustrate these points but also to show how, and why, the rhetoric of neutrality is sustained in practice. It is suggested that mainstream comparative political science conflates a positivist epistemology and a quantitative research methodology. This mixture results in a variety of confusions but is seen to protect comparative politics from "the problem of relativism", which is treated as the principal weakness of the hermeneutic approach. ;Two possible foundations for a normative comparative politics are considered. Firstly, the idea that it is possible to found comparative politics on a non-relative moral theory is reviewed and rejected. It is argued that the best candidates for such a theory, utilitarianism and "thin" theories of the good, cannot be established a priori. Secondly, the assumption that the existence of a plurality of cultures, moral beliefs, and theoretical perspectives leads to relativism is rejected. Instead it is argued that the existence of diversity and disagreement itself provides the basis for a coherent and self-critical discipline, and enhances the scope of comparative politics. (shrink)

Building on Goldman 2008 and 2009, which argue that objective values would be strange in coming in degrees but in no determinate number of degrees, this paper argues that related properties having to do with degrees of value make a further case against objective values. The properties of giving rise to intransitive orderings and being essentially comparative are explained by Larry Temkin in Rethinking the Good. He shows that “better than” is intransitively ordered. Many subjective states are too. (...) But similar arguments for the intransitive orderings of intrinsic objective properties fail. Furthermore, subjective properties and states can change without these changes being explained by changes in their objects. This is similar to the essentially comparative nature of goodness. Given the analogies to subjective states and lack of analogies to objective properties that the present article points out, it argues that we should infer, as Temkin does not, that values are subjective. (shrink)

The study draws attention to the transfer of management theories and practices from traditional capitalist countries such as the USA and UK to post-socialist countries that are currently experiencing radical change as they seek to introduce market reforms. It is highlighted that the efficacy of this transfer of management theories and practices is, in part, dependent upon the extent to which work-related attitudes and values vary between traditional capitalist and former socialist contexts. We highlight that practices such as Human Resource (...) Management (HRM) and Organization Development (OD) are inextricably associated with conceptions surrounding culture and society, as well as to variables such as job satisfaction and organisational commitment. The main aim of this study is to compare various attitudes and values of employees in traditional capitalist countries and post-socialist countries. On the basis of the findings of an attitudinal survey of (N = 5914) workers in 15 countries we conclude that certain aspects of the attitudes and values of workers in post-socialist countries and traditional capitalist countries differ significantly. Specifically, these differences were found in respect of context-related and job-related attitudes, and also in relation to the importance that the respondents attached to the subject of ethics more generally. The implications of the study are discussed particularly in relation to the transfer of management theory and practices between traditional capitalist and post-socialist contexts. (shrink)

Much has been written about the ethics and values of today's business student, but this research has generally been characterized by a variety of methodological shortcomings — the use of convenience samples, a failure to establish the relevance of comparison groups employed, attempts to understand behavior in terms of unidimensional values preselected by the researcher, and the lack of well-designed longitudinal studies. The research reported here addresses many of these concerns by comparing the values and ethical decision making behavior of (...) a large cohort of students entering an M. B. A. program to students entering law school. Using the Rokeach value survey and several ethical decision making vignettes, significant differences were found between the two groups which have important implications for both the business and legal professions and the education of their future leaders. (shrink)

With the advent of responsible business, ensuring social responsibility in sourcing is of interest to both academics and practitioners. In this study, we examine one way of achieving this goal: ethical sourcing initiatives (ESIs). ESIs refer to a firm’s formal and informal actions to manage sourcing processes in an ethical and socially responsible manner. While ESIs have been established as an important part of corporate social responsibility, it is unclear whether, how, and when this corporate effort is economically beneficial. We (...) conduct an event study estimating the shareholder value effect of 159 publicly traded firms’ ESIs and find that the stock market reacts positively to ESIs in general. We also compare market reactions under different conditions including reactive versus proactive ESIs, and their interactions with initiative timing, firm size, and financial risk. Additionally, we find that ESIs are associated with long-term stock price and operating performance. Overall, our findings clarify the potential economic benefits of corporate ESIs and encourage buying firms to take these initiatives selectively according to business contexts. (shrink)

Increasing attention is paid to ethical issues and values when designing and deploying artificial intelligence (AI). However, we do not know how those values are embedded in artificial artefacts or how relevant they are to the population exposed to and interacting with AI applications. Based on literature engaging with ethical principles and moral values in AI, we designed an original survey instrument, including 15 value components, to estimate the importance of these values to people in the general population. The (...) article is based on representative surveys conducted in Estonia, Germany, and Sweden (_n_ = 4501), which have varying experiences with implementing AI. The factor analysis showed four underlying dimensions of values embedded in the design and use of AI: (1) protection of personal interests to ensure social benefit, (2) general monitoring to ensure universal solidarity, (3) ensuring social diversity and social sustainability, and (4) efficiency. We found that value types can be ordered along the two dimensions of resources and change. The comparison between countries revealed that some dimensions, like social diversity and sustainability evaluations, are more universally valued among individuals, countries, and domains. Based on our analysis, we suggest a need and a framework for developing basic values in AI. (shrink)

An examination of the tensions between different conceptions of objectivity and subjectivity, and impartiality and partiality, as they arise in epistemology, ethical theory, and metaethics. Resources from classical Chinese philosophy are leveraged throughout the work to showcase new alternative ways of resolving these tensions.

English reprint of part of an article first appearing in Philosophy East and West (2017).

In recent attempts to define ‘harm’, the most promising approach has often been thought to be the counterfactual comparative account of harm. Nevertheless, this account faces serious difficulties. Moreover, it has been argued that ‘harm’ cannot be defined without reference to a substantive theory of well-being, which is itself a fraught issue. This has led to the call for the concept to simply be dropped from the moral lexicon altogether. I reject this call, arguing that the non-comparative approach (...) to defining harm has not been sufficiently explored. I then develop such an account that avoids the difficulties faced by comparative accounts whilst not presupposing a substantive theory of well-being. I conclude that this definition renders a concept of harm that can be meaningfully employed in our moral discourse. (shrink)

Expanded version of article appearing in Philosophy East and West (2017).

In his book Iris Murdoch: The Saint and the Artist, Peter J. Conradi suggests that “a task for critics today would seem to be to understand the indebtedness of her demonic, tormented sinners and saints and of the curious coexistence in her work of malevolence and goodness, to the dark tragi-comedies of Dostoevski.”1 In his 1986 essay “Iris Murdoch and Dostoevskii,” Conradi goes even further to argue that Fyodor Dostoevsky has been “unnoticed by commentators, a hovering or brooding presence for (...) at least two decades.”2 Both here and in his book Fyodor Dostoevsky, Conradi demonstrates “convergence” through a number of remarkable similarities: the parallels between Dostoevsky’s holy... (shrink)