SATS 21 (1):21-38 (2020)
AbstractIn recent attempts to define ‘harm’, the most promising approach has often been thought to be the counterfactual comparative account of harm. Nevertheless, this account faces serious difficulties. Moreover, it has been argued that ‘harm’ cannot be defined without reference to a substantive theory of well-being, which is itself a fraught issue. This has led to the call for the concept to simply be dropped from the moral lexicon altogether. I reject this call, arguing that the non-comparative approach to defining harm has not been sufficiently explored. I then develop such an account that avoids the difficulties faced by comparative accounts whilst not presupposing a substantive theory of well-being. I conclude that this definition renders a concept of harm that can be meaningfully employed in our moral discourse.
Similar books and articles
A Counterexample to Two Accounts of Harm.Duncan Purves - 2014 - Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (1):243-250.
"Did the Bills Harm Tom Brady?" - Overview of Temporal Comparative Account of Harm.Ryan Holt - 2015 - Http://Www.Freshphilosophy.Com/Journal.
More Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit.Erik Carlson - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):795-807.
Harm: The counterfactual comparative account, the omission and pre-emption problems, and well-being.Tanya De Villiers-Botha - 2018 - South African Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):1-17.
Reply to Klocksiem on the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm.Erik Carlson - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):407-413.
The Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Reasons for Action and Preference: Reply to Carlson.Justin Klocksiem - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (3):673-677.
Harm: Omission, Preemption, Freedom.Nathan Hanna - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):251-73.
Harm and Discrimination.Katharina Berndt Rasmussen - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):873-891.
The preemption problem.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):351-365.
A Defense of the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm.Justin Klocksiem - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):285 – 300.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
No citations found.
References found in this work
The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life.Jeff McMahan - 2002 - Oup Usa.
Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm.Seana Shiffrin - 1999 - Legal Theory 5 (2):117-148.