Over the past 20 years or so, a small but growing literature has emerged with the aim of modeling agents who are unaware of certain things. In this paper we compare two different approaches to modeling unawareness: the object-based approach of Board and Chung (Object-based unawareness: theory and applications. University of Minnesota, Mimeo, 2008) and the subjective-state-space approach of Heifetz et al. (J Econ Theory 130: 78-94,2006). In particular, we show that subjectivestate-space models (henceforth HMS structures) can be embedded within (...) object-based models (henceforth OBU structures), demonstrating that the latter are at least as expressive. As long as certain restrictions are imposed on the form of the OBU structure, the embedding can also go the other way. A generalization of HMS structures (relaxing the partitional properties of knowledge) gives us a full converse. (shrink)

In a seminal paper, Aumann (1987, Econometrica 55, 1–18) showed how the choices of rational players could be analyzed in a unified state space framework. His innovation was to include the choices of the players in the description of the states, thus abolishing Savage’s (1954, The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, New York) distinction between acts and consequences. But this simplification comes at a price: Aumann’s notion of Bayes rationality does not allow players to evaluate what would happen were they to (...) deviate from their actual choices. We show how the addition of a causal structure to the framework enables us to analyze such counterfactual statements, and use it to introduce a notion of causal rationality. Under a plausible causal independence condition, the two notions are shown to be equivalent. If we are prepared to accept this condition we can dispense with the causal apparatus and retain Aumann’s original framework. (shrink)

This issue was published in the framework of a program that has been made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Department of State. The contents are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of State or the United States Government.

This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that strategic agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, i.e. they deliberately choose less precise messages than they have to among the ones available to them in equilibrium. Having to communicate with a vague language can be welfare enhancing because it mitigates conflict. In equilibria that satisfy a dynamic stability condition intentional (...) vagueness increases with the degree of conflict between sender and receiver. (shrink)