Ignacio de Luzán escribió la poética española más influyente del siglo xviii, en un período en el que la ópera italiana ocupaba un lugar esencial en todas las cortes de Europa. Sin embargo, este género recibe un tratamiento marginal en su obra. Esto puede resultar sorprendente en un autor que no solo conoció las óperas realizadas en España durante los reinados de Felipe V y Fernando VI, sino que además fue un gran defensor de Metastasio como poeta, traduciendo algunos de (...) sus libretos por encargo de la corte. En este artículo analizamos el lugar del melodrama en su obra, mostrando la influencia recibida de las poéticas italianas, sobre todo de Crescimbeni, Gravina, Muratori y Maffei, que entendieron el género desde las ideas aristotélicas sobre la tragedia griega. Como veremos, la clave de su poética es la contraposición entre artes liberales y serviles, que le obliga a situar la música en un lugar inferior respecto a la poesía. (shrink)

Este escrito apunta a mostrar el camino histórico seguido por el conocimiento liberal y por la Universidad en la tradición educativa anglosajona. En este contexto de ideas, el campo de estudio ha sido limitado a los siguientes temas: primero, precisar, en términos generales, qué es la educación liberal y qué elementos componen su syllabus; segundo, describir las características esenciales que definen esta tradición educativa en el mundo anglosajón, principalmente en Inglaterra y en los Estados Unidos; y tercero, mostrar en qué (...) consiste la superioridad cualitativa de este tipo de educación. (shrink)

It is a relatively uncontroversial proposition that without “ethics,” an “ethics of homelessness” is impossible. What is less uncontroversial, though, is that philosophy—or at least philosophical analysis—is a necessary condition of ethical discourse. The distrust—or skepticism regarding the utility of— philosophical analysis is predicated on rendering philosophy as useless. This, though, should create a sense of cognitive dissonance, since we universally acknowledge that ethics informs how we interact with ourselves and others, while we also accept, and rightly so, the uselessness (...) of philosophy. While pop- ular parlance has it that uselessness is logically and semantically equivalent to not needed or conceptually irrelevant, this, I will argue, is mistaken. This mis- take, as I see it, is a result of the failure to recognize that liberal arts are intrinsi- cally useless—and ought to be treated as such. To mend this mistake, I will outline the liberal arts in contrast to the servile arts and explain how Aristotle, and his later defender Josef Pieper, correctly understood the distinction. I will then move onto suggest that while philosophy—as a liberal art—is useless, and rightfully so, it is a conceptually relevant, necessary condition for dealing with conceptual problems which arise in ethics—and therefore in the ethics of homelessness. To explicate and defend this thesis, I argue that Plato’s three- fold division of goods, originating in Book ii of his Republic, helps to amalgamate our reservations in accepting philosophy as useless—strictly speaking—and simultaneously useful. From this, I move on to provide various ways in which philosophy is relevant to questions of home and homelessness generally, and display how philosophers themselves have, historically, taken seriously the question of home and homelessness as serious philosophical concepts. Finally, I outline how philosophers can work on the ethics of home- lessness by taking seriously the necessary presuppositions which make work- ing on the alleviation of homelessness not merely possible, but morally obligatory. Having sketched a broad picture of how philosophy interacts with the practical problems of homelessness, I conclude that progress in the field of the ethics of homelessness—as a conceptual endeavor—will ultimately arise from overcoming our prima facie interpretation of the liberal/servile arts distinction and thereby preserve its original meaning. (shrink)

Parte de un trabajo de investigación post-doctoral realizado en 2005 en la Universitat Internacional de Catalunya (Barcelona) con beca de la Generalitat de Catalunya, este artículo analiza las definiciones y clasificaciones de las siete artes liberales y mecánicas en las siguientes obras del filósofo Ramón Llull: el Libre de contemplació en Déu (1274-1276), la Doctrina pueril (c. 1274) y el Arbre de ciencia (1295-1296).

Reseñado por ENCARNACIÓN RUIZ CALLEJÓNUniversidad de Granada, [email protected].

ZusammenfassungDer Ausdruck »Liberale Theologie« bezeichnet nicht nur eine bestimmte Periode der Theologie, sondern eine eigene Haltung zur Theologie, die wir von den Kirchenvätern und von der Renaissance bis zur gegenwärtigen Theologie finden können. Die moderne Form dieser Haltung ist die so genannte Liberale Theologie, die ihre Blütezeit im späten 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert hatte. Ihr Programm besteht aus den folgenden zentralen Punkten: 1) Religion basiert auf der persönlichen Erfahrung des – in der Terminologie Rudolf Ottos – Heiligen. Daher ist (...) die Religion eine Art der Weltinterpretation im Lichte der Erfahrung von Transzendenz. 2) Diese Erfahrung macht es notwendig, zwischen dem Grund und dem Ausdruck der Religion zu unterscheiden. 3) Daher sind Freiheit und Kritik die wichtigsten Haltungen gegenüber der eigenen Religion. In diesem Sinne stellt die Liberale Theologie eine besondere Weise dar, mit der Religion unter den Bedingungen der Moderne umzugehen.SummaryThe term ‘liberal theology’ denotes not only a certain period, but also a specific attitude to theology which we can find beginning from the church fathers and certain Renaissance theologians to contemporary theology. The modern form of this attitude is the so-called liberal theology which had its great time in the late 19th and early 20th Century. Its program consists in the following main points: 1) Religion is based on the personal experience of – in the terminology of Rudolf Otto – the holy; Religion is therefore a way of interpreting the world in the light of the experience of transcendence; 2) This experience makes it necessary to distinguish between the foundation and the expression of religion; 3) Therefore liberty and criticism are the main attitudes towards one's own religion. In this sense liberal theology is a particular way of dealing with religion under the conditions of modernity. (shrink)

La concepción de _disciplina_ y la reflexión sobre las disciplinas liberales en la filosofía temprana de Agustín se encuentran mayormente en su obra _De ordine_. Allí, el Hiponense describe la sabiduría de las artes liberales como modesta y sucinta, de modo más prescriptivo que descriptivo. Por otra parte, en _Retractationes_, el autor reseña su proyecto de volver a pensar las disciplinas liberales dedicando una obra a cada una de ellas. Esta empresa inconclusa dio lugar a una (...) obra sobre la gramática, perdida en tiempos de Agustín, y otra sobre la música. En _De musica_, Agustín describe el funcionamiento de la sensibilidad y su articulación con la racionalidad que culmina en el reconocimiento de Dios en el alma. Intentaremos mostrar cómo la dimensión psicológica del funcionamiento de la sensibilidad permite volver sobre el concepto de disciplina y comprender las disciplinas liberales mediante el desarrollo de una de ellas en particular tomando como eje el acercamiento a lo divino por la vía racional. (shrink)

El artículo estudia la fuente varroniana de la exposición que de las artes liberales hace san Agustín en la segunda parte del "De ordine". Primero demuestra que la interpretación que de esa sección da I. Hadot es excesivamente neoplatónica. Después presenta argumentos nuevos a favor de la inspiración varroniana del discurso agustiniano sobre las artes liberales.

Augustine’s discussion of our memoria of the liberal arts in Confessions X poses a series of challenging questions which are best tackled in the broader context of his ideas on teaching, learning, understanding and the acquisition of knowledge. The contents of the liberal arts are stored in our memory (a non-physical and non-spatial receptacle often meta­phorically depicted through spatial imagery) by themselves, and not through images (like the objects of sense-perception) or ‘notions’ (like the affections of the soul). When we (...) learn the disciplinae liberales, actually we do not absorb new information from our teachers, but we are triggered by their words to retrieve from the most remote ‘caves’ of our memory contents already present in a latent form since birth (I address the question of what exactly these con­tents might be). In the Confessions, unlike in earlier writings, Augustine cautiously eschews expressions which might suggest full-blown Platonic recollection of things known in previous lives and subsequently forgotten, and thus presuppose the pre-existence and reincarnation of the soul (not even the claim that cogitare is, literally, ‘re-collecting’ involves recalling forgotten knowledge). I argue that for Augustine divine illumination (as presented, e.g., in the De magistro and the De Trinitate) and recollection are not two rival and incompatible theo­ries, but two different and yet consistent sets of metaphors meant to illustrate the same family of ideas and intuitions (sometimes underdetermined in their details); I also explain why the illumination metaphor ultimately appears more appropriate. (shrink)

Aux frontières de l’art et de l’expérience scientifique, des artistes s’aventurent à reprogrammer les mécanismes du vivant, à les réincarner en s’appuyant sur les données les plus récentes de la biologie pour produire des réalités vivantes inédites. Transposés du monde clos des laboratoires au monde de l’art, ces artefact vivants, sont-ils en mesure de modifier le regard que nous portons sur la science et plus encore sur le vivant et d’infléchir nos comportements à l’égard d’entités vivantes reprogrammées sur mesure? Sont-ils (...) les pièces à conviction d’une science en train de transformer la société et les valeurs qui s’y rattachent? L’identité humaine court-elle le risque de se perdre à travers cette collection d’entités biologico-futuristes qui transgressent la logique du vivant? Dans une société libérale où prévaut l’autonomie artistique, quand la performance technique semble se confondre avec la valeur esthétique de l’œuvre et que l’artiste relève autant de l’ingénieur que du concepteur, cet art protéiforme qui œuvre en laboratoire hors de tout programme appliqué à la médecine et à l’industrie, est-il en mesure de produire tous les possibles en matière de fabrication du vivant? Notre propos consistera à interroger d’un point de vue éthique la production de ces artistes qui érigent en dogme la rationalisation des phénomènes biologiques, interfèrent l’organisation spontanée des organismes vivants, et dessinent les contours d’une biosphère inédite. (shrink)

"Sommes-nous entrés dans l'ère du déclin démocratique, voire dans un âge postdémocratique? Admettons au moins l'existence d'une triple déception : la démocratie libérale souffre d'une terrible crise de la représentation, d'une grave impuissance publique et d'un profond déficit de sens. Autrement dit, elle aurait perdu, en cours de route, à la fois le peuple qui la fonde, le gouvernement qui la maintient et l'horizon qui la guide. " P.-H. T. Pour Pierre-Henri Tavoillot, ce que nous avions pris pour un progrès (...) acquis — la démocratie — se révèle en réalité un vertigineux chantier. Avec ce livre qui renoue avec la tradition oubliée des traités d'art politique, il nous invite à réfléchir à ce qui fait le secret de l'obéissance volontaire. Car, en démocratie, l'art de gouverner est surtout un art d'être gouverné. Comment l'envisager aujourd'hui? Entre le cauchemar de l'impuissance publique et le spectre de l'autoritarisme, comment réconcilier la liberté du peuple et l'efficacité du pouvoir? (shrink)

The concept of the artes liberales originates in antiquity and was, especially in the Anglo-Saxon area and during the 17th and 18th centuries, remodelled into a socially, educationally, and politically modern educational concept. In this process, the progress within the empirical sciences and the formation of an early civil public are of the utmost importance. In the course of these transformations, the absolute force of church and state is called into question; educational concepts which have to be called (...) modern emerge from it. (shrink)

En esta ponencia se propone realizar una revisión crítica del modelo de enseñanza por competencias- actualmente vigente en la mayoría de las Universidades de todo el mundo, que hemos dado en llamar “profesionalizante”, para transformarlo en un modelo de formación basado en las originarias “artes liberales”, con las que nacie- ron las Universidades y que hemos dado en llamar “humanizante” o humanista.

En El artista y la ciudad, el filósofo Eugenio Trías propone una recuperación ontológica de la relación entre eros y poiesis. Plantea esta aproximación como antídoto frente al desencantamiento del mundo que, a su juicio, se deriva del dualismo moderno que se manifiesta en la distinción mecánica entre producción y deseo. Para remediar el problema de la enajenación y la dispersión de la modernidad tardía, Trías retoma las figuras del artista y la ciudad como puntos de referencia que encuentran resonancias (...) paideicas en el símbolo renacentista de la academia platónica. (shrink)

A review is undertaken of the contributions of 38 classical authors, from Pythagoras in the 6th century BCE to Isidore in the 6th century CE, to the classification of the sciences. Such classifications include some that are more theoretical in function, some that are more practical. The emergence of the quadrivium and trivium is charted; the Greek concept of “enkýklios paideía” and the Latin term “artēs liberales” are defined; and the ways in which the form, content, and function of (...) science classifications change during this period are assessed. (shrink)

Through an exegetic reading of Peirce’s minor texts on higher education, I find that Peirce’s conception of a “Liberal Education” is close to the Herbartian conception of Bildung. Peirce calls for a general education with the ambition of qualifying critical thinkers with the capacity to go beyond the strict rules and narrow borders of the artes liberales, – the different subject matters or sciences taught at a university. Thus, Peirce’s conception of a liberal education is closely linked to (...) his interpretation of common sense – or sensis communis – as a critical commonsensism. To him, it is urgent to educate and nurture “the first rule of reason,” described as a will to learn, a curiosity, a dissatisfaction of what you already incline to think, and an intense desire to find things out. The nurturing of this “first rule of reason” is thus about educating an intellectual community of critical thinkers who are able to question authoritative beliefs, knowing how to debunk them, and how to turn away from obiter dictum. (shrink)

El artículo estudia el sentido que el nombre disciplina tiene en los primeros escritos de Agustín, como término que se refiere a una ciencia teórica o a un método de estudio, particularmente en el contexto de la teoría de Agustín sobre las artes liberales.

Příspěvek připomíná filosofii „posledního Římana a prvního scholastika“ Anicia Bo­ethia, který je nejznámější díky své filosofické básni Útěcha z filosofie. Tento článek se soustředí na jinou stránku Boethiovy tvorby, na jeho překladatelské úsilí z řečtiny do latiny, kdy vytvořil novou terminologii a tak mohl syntetizovat filosofickou roztříš­těnost názorů jeho současníků pomocí exaktní metodologie. Ve svém vědeckém jazyce používal umění i logiku dohromady, s důrazem na větší srozumitelnost.Boethius sjednotil díky svému filosofickému jazyku mnoho rozdílných filosofic­kých škol – Platóna, Aristotela, pythagorejce, novoplatonismus (...) a křesťanskou teologii. Zformalizoval vědecký výzkum podle aritmetiky, dokázal reformovat svobodná umění do křesťanského světa a sjednotit vědu a filosofii pomocí matematiky. Svoji metodu nazval quadrivium, tedy čtyři cesty k moudrosti, jako součást Sedmi svobodných umění (lat. Septem artes liberales). Quadrivium se sestávalo z aritmetiky, geometrie, astronomie a hudby. Tyto čtyři způsoby považoval Boethius za nejlepší pe­dagogickou cestu k poznání fyzikálních zákonitostí našeho světa (lat. naturalia). Díky abstraktnosti této matematické cesty preferoval i důležitost jazyka a terminologie, která se používá. I přes logickou koherentnost je dle něj možné používat umělecká vyjádření pro větší srozumitelnost.Článek ukazuje i obtíže současné vědy, která je také limitována jazykem. Protože v minulosti filosofové stáli před podobným problémem, může Boethius svým důrazem na svobodnou cestu filosofie stále inspirovat. (shrink)

Notkers um 1000 entstandene Bearbeitung der spätantiken »Consolatio Philosophiae« steht in der Tradition der karolingischen Rezeption, die die »Consolatio« zur Vermittlung christlicher Bildung im Rahmen des didaktischen Konzepts der artes liberales nutzt, und bedeutet gleichzeitig eine Innovation: Notker bedient sich tradierter Techniken der Texterschließung, indem er auf die Glossierungstypen lateinischer Textkommentare zurückgreift. Zugleich bezieht er die althochdeutsche Volkssprache in Form von Kommentar und Übersetzung in seine Texterklärung ein und nutzt die Lektüre der »Consolatio« als Ausgangspunkt für theoretische Wissensvermittlung, (...) vor allem auf dem Gebiet des Trivium und philosophisch-theologischer Fragenkomplexe. Seine Bearbeitung ist die erste umfassende Werkinterpretation zur »Consolatio«. Die vorliegende Studie ist die erste Monographie zu diesem Text seit dem Buch von Ingeborg Schröbler (1953). Sie bestimmt Notkers Ort innerhalb der Textgeschichte der »Consolatio« unter Einbeziehung zum Teil noch ungedruckter lateinischer Kommentare und arbeitet in Detailanalysen und im systematischen Überblick die formal-technischen und inhaltlichen Charakteristika seiner Bearbeitung vor dem Hintergrund der St. Galler Bildungstradition, der Unterrichtsmethoden und der wissenschaftlichen Entwicklungen seiner Zeit heraus. (shrink)

Ramón Llull se propuso instruir y educar en las disciplinas más relevantes de su tiempo -artes liberales, teología, física, medicina, astronomía- a iletrados y no cristianos, y diseñó con ese fin un instrumento de aprendizaje al que llamó "Arte". El Arte, con sus principios, figuras combinatorias y símbolos fundó un camino especulativo interdisciplinario en el que diversas ciencias hallaron una convergencia epistémica, ética y religiosa. El propósito luliano se multiplicó en cerca de 270 obras: literarias, científicas, apologéticas y (...) en las distintas versiones del Arte. Uno de los aspectos más interesantes del pensamiento de Llull es el lenguaje de los correlativos: un conjunto de términos, acuñados al modo de la gramática especulativa del siglo XII, cuyo objetivo es la expresión de los principios del Arte. En el "Liber correlativorum innatorum", que aquí se presenta, Llull describe la formación de estos "nuevos nombres", su significado metafísico y su estructura lingüística, y enseña el modo de usarlos. Se trata de un modelo de lenguaje universal cuya estructura gramatical está vinculada con el contenido metafísico de los principios del Arte y su significación metafórica en la naturaleza y el orden intelectual. (shrink)

El artículo analiza la noción de régimen de veridicción como posible elemento de análisis político, tomando como foco los planteamientos de Foucault en el curso de 1979 Nacimiento de la biopolítica. En este curso, dicha noción es explicada por primera vez y aunque el tema de la veridicción tiene un importante protagonismo en los trabajos posteriores de Foucault, este curso tiene una especial relevancia pues relaciona la operación de veridicción con unas tecnologías políticas de gobierno, como son las artes (...) liberales de gobierno e incluso sus modificaciones en el contexto del neoliberalismo. (shrink)

En distintos momentos de su producción intelectual, Agustín se refirió al asunto de la música. En este artículo mostraremos que Agustín uso dos esquemas conceptuales distintos para describir el fenómeno de la música práctica en su relación con el mundo espiritual, el esquema de las Artes Liberales y el de la teoría del signo, y que en virtud de ello la música sería concebida de dos modos diferentes: como vestigium y como signum del mundo espiritual, respectivamente. Al final (...) del artículo analizaremos la diferencia entre las dos concepciones considerando tres elementos: la naturaleza de la relación entre mundo material y espiritual, el contenido espiritual al que remite y la noción de belleza que implica. (shrink)

Thierry fue canciller de la escuela catedralicia de Chartres de 1142-1150. Comentador de Boecio, su obra refleja sin embargo una síntesis personal de fuentes platónicas, neoplatónicas y aristotélicas. Está convencido del valor propedéutico de las artes liberales para la teología, dando amplia cabida también al quadrivium. Este estudio, centrado en su Tractatus de sex dierum operibus, pone de manifiesto que la causalidad es el eje de su comprensión ontológica de la realidad :desde el punto de vista filosófico, la (...) causalidad explica la existencia real de lo múltiple a partir del Uno, y en la perspectiva teológica muestra la creación como obra de Dios Uno y Trino. La causalidad implica, para Thierry, la participación y garantiza por tanto la capacidad causal de los seres naturales, con la consiguiente autonomía real en su orden, pero dependiente de la causa suprema, sin la cual nada existiría. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Perloff’s Wittgenstein: W(h)ither Poetic Theory?David Kellogg (bio)Though Marjorie Perloff has been one of the most powerful forces in contemporary poetry studies for some time, her work has not received the critical attention it warrants. Her latest book, Wittgenstein’s Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strangeness of the Ordinary, provides an opportunity for reflection on a body of writing remarkable both in its consistency and its constant reinvention. Indeed, reading Perloff (...) through Wittgenstein’s Ladder throws her other work over the last twenty years into a new light, as many concepts crucial to her vocabulary—not only theory but also modernism, artifice, avant-garde—are here turned around and forced into new roles. To ask whether and to what extent Wittgenstein’s Ladder constitutes a break in her career is simultaneously to raise the question of critical and poetic theory.Theory Inside and Out“It is in this sense that grammar may be said to replace theory,” writes Marjorie Perloff in the introduction to Wittgenstein’s Ladder [18]. The sense in question is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s, or rather the sense of the late (post-1929) Wittgenstein inflected through Perloff’s post-poststructuralist sensibility. As the sentence preceding this remarkable claim puts it: “For although the later Wittgenstein was to argue that grammar is precisely the key to understanding a given proposition, that there is no essence above and beyond a specific grammatical structure, one nevertheless must ‘distrust’ grammar in the sense of interrogating it as stringently as possible” [17–18].Of course, formulations of theory as a style of distrust have been a commonplace in theoretical discourse for some time. It would not be difficult to argue that Perloff’s explicit advocacy of grammar through Wittgenstein—whose philosophy, she argues, “is indeed intentionally ‘antiphilosophical,’ its purpose being precisely to determine in what circumstances philosophy should be ‘against’ philosophy and why” [12]—is of a piece with recent attempts to think the limits of theory in theory itself. But such a reduction would seriously misread Perloff’s project. We would do well to question, for example, the obvious similarities between Perloff’s description of a duplicity in the project of grammar/theory and the model it might be taken as at once pointedly evoking and evading, Paul de Man’s now-classic essay “The Resistance to Theory.” Despite their apparent similarities, the startling claims of Wittgenstein’s Ladder have little in common with de Man’s suggestion that “resistance may be a built-in constituent of [theoretical] discourse,” and that “the polemical opposition, the systematic non-understanding and misrepresentation, the unsubstantial but eternally recurrent objections, are the displaced symptoms of a resistance inherent in the theoretical enterprise itself” [12].For one thing, de Man explicitly distances his conception of a theoretical project deeply threatening to the claims of knowledge from one rooted in concepts of grammar: [End Page 67][A]s long as it remains grounded in grammar, any theory of language, includ-ing a literary one, does not threaten what we hold to be the underlying principle of all cognitive and aesthetic linguistic systems. Grammar stands in the service of logic which, in turn, allows for the passage to the knowledge of the world. The study of grammar, the first of the artes liberales, is the necessary pre-condition for scientific and humanistic knowledge. As long as it leaves this principle intact, there is nothing threatening about literary theory. The continuity between theory and phenomenalism is asserted and preserved by the system itself. Difficulties occur only when it is no longer possible to ignore the epistemological thrust of the rhetorical dimension of discourse, that is, when it is no longer possible to keep it in its place as a mere adjunct, a mere ornament within the semantic function.[14; emphasis added]In other words, de Man places grammar opposite the project of criticism, which he identifies with rhetoric and ultimately with reading. What de Man refers to as “the latent tension between rhetoric and grammar” is resolved decidedly in favor of the former: “the grammatical decoding of a text leaves a residue of indetermination that has to be, but cannot be, resolved by grammatical means, however... (shrink)

The idea of a firm connection of the seven artes liberales came first into being in Augustine's early concept of education. Whereas this idea has been analyzed primarily in view of its philosophical sources, this paper is supposed to clarify its internal logic. The main feature of Augustine's concept is the distinction between the two projects of a critique of reason and of a metaphysics, and the coordination of these projects within a treatise on theodicy. Augustine systematizes the (...) disciplinae in the perspective of reason's self-recognition. Reason manifests itself in culture and nature. Through the sciences, reason is led to a reflection upon its own products and, finally, to an understanding of them as reason's self-manifestations. Thus, reason becomes able to comprehend itself. Augustine distinguishes language-based disciplinae from number-oriented ones. The first group leads to a critical reflection upon the conditions of knowledge and into the insight to reason's power of creating sciences. The second group helps carry out a metaphysical ascent from the material to the intelligible world. In philosophy, reason comprehends its ability to constitute knowledge as a synthetic capacity that points to a transnumerical unity as the main ontological feature of the intelligible world. The insight into this kind of unity reveals the meaningful interwovenness of all beings and events and, thus, leads to a refutation of all objections against divine providence. (shrink)

Not only in Lithuania, but also in the other countries, there is a growing tendency among young people to choose a legal education. Law is a professional sphere of immense depth and breadth and it is evident that during several years in a school of higher education, designed to grant legal knowledge and skills, it is impossible to convey all aspects and nuances of the law. Legal education in a higher school is only the beginning of a lawyer’s education, while (...) on the other hand it provides a unifying experience among practising lawyers. Consequently, university law schools preparing lawyers certainly provide an important contribution to the creation of a legal state, while providing skills, modelling values and shaping attitudes for future judges, state officials, prosecutors, attorneys and other persons responsible for the implementation of legal mechanisms necessary for the proper functioning of the state. (shrink)

Wilhelm Dilthey und Hans-Georg Gadamer waren wohl die beiden letzten großen Gelehrten, die Philipp Melanchthon als Philosophen ernst genommen hatten. Im 20. Jahrhundert war dieser weitgehend nur ein Thema der Reformationsgeschichte. In den vergangenen wenigen Jahrzehnten hat sich die Forschungssituation jedoch wesentlich verändert. Melanchthon ist in das Blickfeld der allgemeinen Wissenschafts- und Bildungsgeschichte, aber auchvon Einzeldisziplinen wie der Dialektik- und Rhetorikforschung gerückt. Tatsächlich vertrat dieser, 1518 als Gräzist nach Wittenberg berufen, nicht nur mit den "artes liberales", ergänzt durch (...) Geschichte und Literatur, die damaligen Fächer der philosophischen Fakultät. Seine vielfältigen Kommentare, Scholien und Paraphrasen selbst zu den höheren Disziplinen, der Anthropologie und Naturphilosophie, der Ethik und Politik, der Staats- und Rechtsphilosophie weisen ihn als einen universalen Gelehrten des 16. Jahrhunderts aus, der vielfältige Spuren im damaligen Europa hinterließ. (shrink)

Petrus Ramus (Pierre de la Ramée, 1515-1572) fue profesor Real de Elocuencia y Filosofía en el Collège Royal (París). Movido por su vocación pedagógica redefinió el ámbito de las artes liberales, despojando a la retórica de su contenido tradicional. Para Ramus la retórica consiste solo en la elocuti..

Nowadays ethics plays a vital role in numerous professions. Due to social requirements and technical advances, changes in the accreditation rules in legal, economic, medical and engineering education have emerged in many countries, often requiring the inclusion of an ethics requirement in such professional programmes. In this work, the authors demonstrate that such changes are absolutely necessary in the legal profession in Lithuania. Specifically, the record low level of prestige of the judiciary and lawyers in the Lithuanian society and the (...) fact that lawyers are often accused of legal nihilism, clannish behaviour, and protectionism, demand that legal ethics assumes a far greater role in Lithuanian legal education. It is necessary to stress that the topic of lawyers’ ethical violations and the consequences of such violations is discussed in the society in only in a fragmentary, and not transparent manner; moreover, the significance of ethics in the education and training of lawyers has not been properly evaluated either. Especially having in mind Lithuania’s Soviet heritage (during most of the Communist era there was almost no education on those issues), it becomes obvious that legal ethics must be continuously stressed in the legal profession’s education and development. The importance and relevance of this topic is primarily determined by the current evaluation of lawyers in Lithuania, which shows that lawyers do not fulfil the expectations of the society. This raises a question whether law graduates indeed acquire this system of ethical values as part of the process of obtaining the knowledge and skills that are necessary for a modern lawyer. While analysing the Lithuanian legal documents governing the requirements for legal studies, it has been noticed that a course in legal ethics or lawyer’s professional responsibility is not compulsory either in the qualification requirements for judges, or in the Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 20 February 2008 on legal education for those who want to assume the position of a judge according to the order of law. In the description of legal study programmes, courses on professional ethics are designated as an optional non-legal subject, which is quite different from the legal education systems of other countries, where this type of course is compulsory for future lawyers. Even if this course is taught at Lithuanian higher education establishments, it is limited to the analysis of cases and legal regulation. Insufficient attention to this issue obviously creates the erroneous impression that it is of secondary importance for a lawyer. It should be noted that legal ethical standards, the development of lawyers’ value systems and other problematic questions related to legal ethics have not attracted attention of the Lithuanian scholars either. Therefore, this is a question of the utmost importance for legal education and requires additional research. In global educational and other academic literature, much is being discussed about the methods of teaching ethics, and the place of ethical subjects in study programmes and assessment. It is well worth supporting the research on the development of lawyers’ value systems, in that the lack of such values may influence the evaluation of the practicing lawyers’ satisfaction with their job, self-confidence and belief in the importance of their profession. Obtaining social-ethical attitudes and perspectives helps future lawyers gain more trust in their professional identity and the correctness of their professional work. The main conclusions drawn from the research are the following: (1) the university can and needs to contribute to the development of students’ value systems and this is one of the most important content requirements within the legal study programmes; (2) while teaching ethics, the primary focus must be not on the legal acts regulating ethics, which are changing over time, but on the aim of helping that students themselves have an increased sense of selfawareness and sensitivity to ethical issues in law practice, recognise and understand ethical dilemmas arising in the law, recognise the dominant attitudes in the society towards the role of a lawyer and motivate them to reconsider and discuss the value bases of such attitudes and their change; (3) a course on legal ethics – no matter how perfect it would be – is not the only way to develop a personal value system. In this context, the importance of liberal arts education should be accentuated. Given the research conducted, there is a clear link between the development of moral awareness and the person’s education in general. (shrink)

Knjiga, ki ji je posvečena pričujoča recenzija, prinaša prevod dveh krajših Bonaventurovih del, O trojni poti (De triplici via) in Kako se različne umetnosti zvajajo na teologijo (De reductione artium ad theologiam). Prevedla ju je filozofinja in klasična filologinja Nena Bobovnik, ki na KU Leuven pripravlja doktorat iz srednjeveške filozofije. Poleg spremne besede z naslovom »Zaris srednjeveške in skicaBonaventurove filozofije« sta še dva uvoda v piščevo misel. Najprej tri kateheze, ki jih je papež Benedikt XVI. – ki se je na (...) Bonaventurovo teologijo zgodovine osredotočil v habilitacijski nalogi – spomladi leta 2010 posvetil svojemu »prijatelju«, kot se sam izrazi; nato pa še esej »Teološko-filozofska hermenevtika pri sv. Bonaventuru in njen pomen za današnji čas«, ki ga je pripravil Branko Klun s Teološke fakultete UL. (shrink)

The central theme which unites the essays is the fundamental shift, occurring at the end of the twelfth and throughout the thirteenth century, in how knowledge and education were understood. Up to this time human knowledge was classified primarily under the rubric of artes and philosophy was conceived and taught within the schema of the seven artes liberales. During these pivotal decades, however, under the influence of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, the concept of scientia becomes dominant, and the (...) rules and methods productive of scientific knowledge become an ever more prominent theme. Knowledge is now rigorously divided into a plurality of scientiae with the divisions among the individual sciences receiving sophisticated philosophical justifications. This new conception of knowledge finds expression in the rise of the universities as well as in the formation of a separate Arts faculty. Precisely this understanding of science, moreover, with its rigorous method as well as divisions according to the objects studied, represents an enduring contribution of the Middle Ages to succeeding centuries. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag werde ich die Wege untersuchen, auf denen Moraltheoretiker philosophischen Sinn in der These entdecken könnten, daß das Gesetz die moralische Schlechtigkeit von Personen dadurch tolerieren sollte, daß es den Bürgern Rechte zuerkennt, moralisch Falsches zu tun. Dabei vernachlässige ich Fälle, in denen diese Toleranz deshalb angemessen erscheint, weil die Moralität des in Rede stehenden Verhaltens ungewiss oder jedenfalls unter gleichermaßen vernünftigen Personen hinreichend umstritten ist, so daß die Gewährung von Freiheit auch für den Staat als das angemessene (...) Mittel erscheint, die Problematik zu lösen. Stattdessen werde ich mich auf Fälle konzentrieren, in denen der Gesetzgeber davon überzeugt ist, daß das betreffende Verhalten tadelnswert ist, so daß weder Zweifel noch Uneinigkeit über die Bewertung des Verhaltens als ausreichende Gründe dafür genannt werden können, daß der Staat sich der Sache nicht annimmt.Wie ich im 1. Teil zeige, kann sowohl von konsequentialistischen als auch von deontologischen Moraltheorien angenommen werden, daß sie unmoralisches Verhalten erlauben, das keine Verletzung von konsequentialistischen bzw. deontologischen Pflichten darstellt. Regel-Konsequentialisten verlangen Toleranz für akt-konsequentialistisch betrachtete Verstöße, sofern sie im Rahmen ihrer Regeln erfolgen; und Deontologen fordern Toleranz für kategorisch erlaubte Taten, die sub-optimale Konsequenzen haben. Im Hinblick darauf, daß wir eine Tugenpflicht haben könnten, uns zu Personen zu entwickeln, die deontologische Erlaubnisse nicht mißbrauchen, untersuche ich eine Reihe von Gründen, die es nahe legen, daß diejenigen, die sich einer Moraltheorie der Tugendpflichten verbunden fühlen, die die Besorgnis um Handlungen durch eine Besorgnis um den Charakter der Person ersetzt, gleichwohl gute Gründe dafür hat, die Kultivierung eines guten Charakters außerhalb der Reichweite des Staates zu belassen.Die Problematik wird schwieriger, wenn wir von den unmoralischen Handlungen, die keine Pflichten verletzen , zu den unmoralischen Handlungen übergehen, die solche Pflichten verletzen. Kann ein Konsequentialist sich damit einverstanden erklären, daß der Staat Personen die Freiheit zugesteht, etwas zu tun, was konsequentialistisch verboten ist? Kann ein Deontologe nicht nur die Freiheit, Erlaubnisse zu missbrauchen, verteidigen, sondern auch die Freiheit, kategorische Verbote zu verletzen? Im 2. Teil des vorliegenden Beitrages vertrete ich die These, daß es durchaus einleuchtende Gründe dafür geben mag, daß Freiheit entweder intrinsisch oder instrumentell gut ist, um andere intrinsisch gute Dinge zu bewirken, in welchem Fall Konsequentialisten gute Gründe dafür haben, daß der Staat grundsätzlich moralische Schlechtigkeit tolerieren sollte, oder sie zumindest dann tolerieren sollte, wenn dies der Preis dafür ist, größeres Gutes zu befördern. Im 3. Teil behaupte ich, daß selbst unsere beste deontologische Theorie Maximen in sich aufnehmen kann, die es dem Gesetzgeber kategorisch verbieten, den Bürgern die Verletzung kategorischer Maximen zu verbieten. So kann es dem Gesetzgeber z.B. verboten sein, in die Privatsphäre der Bürger einzugreifen, um das Fehlverhalten von Bürgern zu ermitteln. Oder es kann dem Gesetzgeber auferlegt sein, nicht etwas zu verbieten, wenn er dieses Verbot nicht gegenüber allen Bürgern durchsetzen kann.Das Ergebnis meiner Analyse ist, daß die Theorie liberaler Toleranz nicht von der Behauptung vernünftigen Zweifels und der Uneinigkeit zwischen Gesetzgeber und Bürgern abhängt, wie es unter liberalen Politikwissenschaftlern oftmals voraus-gesetzt wird. Selbst dann, wenn vernünftige Personen sich darüber einig sind, daß eine bestimmte Art von Verhalten unmoralisch ist, und selbst dann, wenn bei dem Gesetzgeber kaum Zweifel an der Unmoralität des Verhaltens vorhanden sind, gibt es doch schwerwiegende moralische Gründe dafür, weshalb der Gesetzgeber moralisch verpflichtet sein kann, die Begehung unmoralischer Handlungen zu tolerieren. In this article I explore the ways in which moral theorists might make philosophical sense of the claim that the law ought to tolerate moral wickedness by according citizens legal rights to do moral wrongs. I set aside cases in which tolerance is proper because the morality of the conduct in question is uncertain or sufficiently contested by equally reasonable persons so as to make liberty the appropriate default solution for the state. Instead, I confine my inquiry to cases in which lawmakers are confident that the conduct in question is blameworthy, so that doubt and disagreement cannot be said to be sufficient reasons for staying the hand of the state. As I argue in Part I, both consequentialist and deontological moral theories can be thought to permit immoralities that are not violations of consequentialist or deontological obligations. Rule-consequentialists require tolerance of act-consequential wrongs that are done in the name of their rules; and deontologists require tolerance of consequentially sub-optimal deeds that are categorically permitted. While we may have aretaic obligations to become the kinds of persons who do not abuse deontological permissions, I explore a series of reasons to think that those who subscribe to an aretaic moral theory that substitutes concerns for character for concerns for actions will nevertheless have good grounds to place the cultivation of good character beyond the scope of the state. The question is harder when we move from immoralities that do not violate obligations to immoralities that do violate such obligations. Can consequentialists make sense of the state according persons liberty to do what is consequentially prohibited? Can deontologists defend not just the liberty to misuse permissions but the liberty to violate categorical prohibitions? I argue in Part II that there may be sound arguments for why liberty is either intrinsically good or instrumentally good for the achievement of other intrinsically good things, in which case, consequentialists have sounds reasons for supposing that the state ought to tolerate wickedness, tu cour , or tolerate it when it is a price that purchases greater goods. And I argue in Part III that our best deontological theory may contain within it maxims that categorically prohibit legislators from prohibiting violations of categorical maxims on the part of citizens. For example, they may be enjoined from invading citizens' privacy in the ways required to detect citizens' wrongdoing; or they may be enjoined not to prohibit what they cannot equally enforce against all. The upshot of my analysis is that a theory of liberal tolerance does not depend upon claims of reasonable doubt and disagreement amongst lawmakers and citizens, as is so often supposed amongst liberal political theorists. Even if reasonable persons agree that a kind of conduct is immoral, and even if lawmakers are in little doubt about its immorality, there are powerful moral reasons why lawmakers might be morally obligated to tolerate its persistence. (shrink)

As the idea of culture is conceived in modern times, it has its roots in the ancient teaching on the relation between the Necessary and the Beautiful, and between labor and rest. The stabilizing of modern society, however, ushered in a significant change in the interpretation of this relationship. Cultural values became universally valid and obligatory : each individual, regardless of his place in society, is supposed to share them in equal measure. Culture is cut off from the material processes (...) of social reproduction, as well as from those of civilization, and comes to be regarded as belonging to a higher, purer, better world. The realm of culture comes to be looked upon as the sovereignty of a free moral and intellectual community.The article attempts to indicate the significance of modern culture for the place of the individual in society. For this purpose the author selects some characteristic and fundamental concepts of modern culture : the idea of the soul (the values of the soul receive unconditional preference to the sensual as well as the intellectual values : external conditions and intellectual achievements are less relevant than the inner essence of man), — the idea of beauty (art attains the function of giving to humanity, through the presentation of the beautiful, the enjoyment of a better world),— and the idea of personality (the individual achieves his own happiness only through subordination to the existing order of things). These ideas are analyzed in order to show that culture has absorbed all the forces that were directed towards the achievement of a better existence : humanity, kindliness, solidarity, happiness. Modern culture was the historic framework within which the pursuit of happiness was accomplished in a social order that was without happiness for the majority of mankind.But, by proclaiming all progressive ideas as spiritual or internal ideals, this same culture has distilled from them all their critical, dynamic force. They are taken seriously only as inner spiritual values or as objects of art. In this internalized and transfigured form the human desire for happiness has been diverted from reality and appears to have been set at rest. The individual is trained for renunciation and he has to rationalize in order to believe himself satisfied. In this way, culture serves to take the responsibility for the happiness of the individual from the existing order and to justify the given order of things.In the last period of this development, idealism gives way to a heroic realism of power. In the battle of the authoritarian state against the idealism of the liberal bourgeois culture, the old methods of cultural discipline are to be replaced by more timely ones. The principal function of culture, however, remains unchanged. The hostility of the authoritarian state toward culture in general also serves as a justification for the existing order of things. But in comparison the culture that is being attacked appears as an enlightened, more humane stage of the past ; its progressive tendencies stand forth more clearly in our minds.In conclusion, the idea of bridging the gulf between culture and civilization is outlined : a definite re-incorporation of culture into the general social process, whereby it would lose its justificatory character.L’idée de la culture caractéristique de l’Occident moderne, remonte à la doctrine antique qui a formulé les rapports du nécessaire et du beau, du travail et du plaisir. Avec la stabilisation de la société moderne, intervint un changement décisif dans l’interprétation de ces rapports : les valeurs culturelles deviennent universellement valables et universellement impératives ; chaque individu, quelle que soit sa position sociale, doit également participer à ces valeurs. La culture, monde meilleur, supérieur, plus pur, se détache et du procès matériel de reproduction et de la „civilisation“. Elle est revendiquée comme le règne d’une libre communauté morale et spirituelle.L’étude essaye d’indiquer la répercussion de la culture nouvelle sur la situation de l’individu dans la société. Elle relève quelques-uns des concepts fondamentaux de cette culture : L’idée de l’âme (spiritualisation de la sensibilité), l’idée de la beauté (satisfaction par l’art), et l’idée de la personnalité (accomplissement par le renoncement). La culture a résorbé toutes les forces qui tendaient vers une existence meilleure : humanité, bonté, solidarité, joie. La culture représentait la forme historique sous laquelle le besoin de bonheur trouvait satisfaction dans un ordre social qui privait de bonheur la majorité des hommes. Mais la culture, en hypostasiant toutes les idées progressives en idéals, a dépouillé celles-ci de toute force explosive, qui les eût rendues dangereuses. Elle ne les a prises au sérieux qu’en tant que valeurs intérieures, spirituelles, ou en tant que thèmes de l’art. L’exigence de bonheur trouve sous cette forme intériorisée et transfigurée une satisfaction apparente. Toutes les exigences, l’individu apprend à se les poser à lui-même et à se contenter d’une jouissance rationalisée. Il est élevé en vue du renoncement. Ainsi la culture contribue à décharger et à justifier l’ordre existant.Dans la dernière phase de cette évolution, l'idéalisme de l'intériorité, par un renversement dialectique, devient „réalisme de la force“. Dans le combat de l'État autoritaire contre la culture idéaliste de la bourgeoisie libérale, les vieilles méthodes de discipline culturelle cèdent la place à des méthodes plus adaptées. L'hostilité de l'État autoritaire à la culture est elle- même une justification. Par comparaison, la culture attaquée apparaît comme un passé moins sombre et plus humain : ses tendances progressives s'élèvent plus clairement à la conscience. En conclusion, l'auteur indique l'idée d'un dépassement de l'opposition entre civilisation et culture : la culture, une fois ramenée de façon positive au processus social, perdrait son caractère affirmatif. (shrink)