The “official” history of connexive logic was written in 2012 by Storrs McCall who argued that connexive logic was founded by ancient logicians like Aristotle, Chrysippus, and Boethius; that it was further developed by medieval logicians like Abelard, Kilwardby, and Paul of Venice; and that it was rediscovered in the 19th and twentieth century by Lewis Carroll, Hugh MacColl, Frank P. Ramsey, and Everett J. Nelson. From 1960 onwards, connexive logic was finally transformed into non-classical calculi which partly concur (...) with systems of relevance logic and paraconsistent logic. In this paper it will be argued that McCall’s historical analysis is fundamentally mistaken since it doesn’t take into account two versions of connexivism. While “humble” connexivism maintains that connexive properties only apply to “normal” antecedents, “hardcore” connexivism insists that they also hold for “abnormal” propositions. It is shown that the overwhelming majority of the forerunners of connexive logic were only “humble” connexivists. Their ideas concerning connexive implication don’t give rise, however, to anything like a non-classical logic. (shrink)

It is often assumed that Aristotle, Boethius, Chrysippus, and other ancient logicians advocated a connexive conception of implication according to which no proposition entails, or is entailed by, its own negation. Thus Aristotle claimed that the proposition ‘if B is not great, B itself is great […] is impossible’. Similarly, Boethius maintained that two implications of the type ‘If p then r’ and ‘If p then not-r’ are incompatible. Furthermore, Chrysippus proclaimed a conditional to be ‘sound when the (...) contradictory of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent’, a view which, in the opinion of S. McCall, entails the aforementioned theses of Aristotle and Boethius. Now a critical examination of the historical sources shows that the ancient logicians most likely meant their theses as applicable only to ‘normal’ conditionals with antecedents which are not self-contradictory. The corresponding restrictions of Aristotle’s and Boethius’ theses to such self-consistent antecedents, however, turn out to be theorems of ordinary modal logic and thus don’t give rise to any non-classical system of genuinely connexive logic,. (shrink)

In dieser Studie wird erstmals der Versuch unternommen, die bei der Klassifikation von Musik zur Anwendung gelangenden Kriterien und ihre Interdependenzen systematisch zu erfassen und zu beschreiben. Als Quellen dienen dabei Typologien der Musik aus der Zeit vom sechsten (Boethius) bis zum neunzehnten Jahrhundert (A.B. Marx und Ferdinand Hand) sowie die bisherigen musikwissenschaftliche Ansatze einer Gattungstheorie. Unter Einbeziehung von Erkenntnissen aus der Literaturwissenschaft werden insgesamt acht Grundkriterien der Klassifikation erlautert. Mit ihrer Hilfe lassen sich die vorliegenden Definitionen und Typologien (...) vergleichend analysieren und in Beziehung zueinander setzen. AbschlieBend geht die Studie der Frage nach, ob der Gattungsbegriff in der zeitgenossischen Kunstmusik tatsachlich - wie von einigen Autoren postuliert - obsolet geworden ist. Die Antwort darauf ist negativ: Als Verstandnishilfe fur die Rezipienten von zeitgenossischer Kunstmusik sind Gattungen heute womoglich wichtiger als jemals zuvor. Dr. phil. (Univ. Hamburg) Wolfgang Marx, geboren 1967 in Bremen, studierte Historische und Systematische Musikwissenschaft sowie Philosophie an der Universitat Hamburg. Nach Abschluss des Studiums Horspielautor und Product Manager in der Tontragerindustrie, Abteilungsleiter eines Internet-Musikvertriebs. Seit 2002 Dozent am Department of Music des University College Dublin. Aufsatze u.a. zu Orgeltabulaturen des Mittelalters, zum Werk Gyorgy Ligetis, zum Requiem als musikalischer Gattung sowie zu Methoden und Inhalten musikwissenschaftlicher Forschung und Lehre. Mitherausgeber der "Frankfurter Zeitschrift fur Musikwissenschaft" sowie des "Journal of the Society for Musicology in Ireland". This study tries, for the first time, exhaustively to collect and describe the criteria used to classify music and to consider the interrelationship between these criteria in a systematic way. Typologies of music from the sixth century (Boethius) to the nineteenth (A.B. Marx and Ferdinand Hand) serve as sources for this study, as well as musicological writings on genre theory. Partly by exploiting the findings of literary criticism, eight basic criteria of classification are developed. They allow a comparative analysis of all existing musical definitions and typologies. Finally, the study discusses whether or not genres have become obsolete in contemporary art music (as some scholars have proclaimed). The answer is negative: genres today are perhaps more important in supporting an adequate reception of contemporary art music than at any other time in history. Wolfgang Marx was born in 1967 in Bremen. He studied Historical and Systematic Musicology and Philosophy at Hamburg University where he took the Dr phil in 2002. He was Product Manager for Berlin Classics in 1998 and Catalogue Manager of an internet music retailer in Hamburg in 2000. Since 2002, he has held a permanent Lectureship in Musicology at University College Dublin. He has co-edited a volume on Gyorgy Ligeti, published on Medieval organ tablatures and the requiem as a musical genre, and is co-editor of the Frankfurter Zeitschrift fur Musikwissenschaft and the Journal of the Society for Musicology in Ireland. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Possibility and Necessity in the Time of Peter Abelard by Irene BininiWolfgang LenzenIrene Binini. Possibility and Necessity in the Time of Peter Abelard. Investigating Medieval Philosophy Series. Leiden: Brill, 2021. Pp. xii + 326. Hardback, $166.00.This book is an impressive work written by a young Italian scholar who received her PhD only five years ago in Pisa. It is divided into three parts. Part 1 gives a survey (...) of "Early 12th-Century Debates on Modal Propositions"; part 2 is devoted to "Abelard's Modal Logic"; [End Page 327] part 3 deals with the views of "Abelard on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Modalities." The author displays a profound knowledge of the relevant literature. The primary sources comprise twenty manuscripts preserved in various European libraries, plus forty-eight printed works (from Abelard to William of Sherwood). The list of secondary sources contains altogether 136 items from A (Astroh) to Z (Zagzebski), but, interestingly, it does not mention a monograph that, by its very title, claims to give an exposition of Abelard's logic, namely Maria Teresa Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli's La Logica di Abelardo (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1964).As far as I can judge (as a nonnative English-speaker), the linguistic quality of Binini's book is quite good. The explanations in the main text, including the translations from Latin sources, are easily comprehensible, and the many quotations (distributed over no less than 655 footnotes) are almost without any fault. Thus, the book rightly deserves inclusion in the prestigious series Investigating Medieval Philosophy. Yet, at least according to my taste, the book contains many redundancies. Again and again, the author first explains a certain issue at some length, then confirms the correctness of her interpretation by means of a longer (English) quotation, and finally reconfirms it by fully quoting the Latin text in the footnotes.As Binini explains in the book's concluding chapter, her aim is to present "an all-encompassing reflection on [Abelard's] works on modalities" and "a comparison between these works and the parallel reflections advanced by other masters and logicians in the early 12th century" (308). She undoubtedly achieves this goal. The comparison of Abelard's views on possibility and necessity with the views of other logicians is mainly carried out in chapters 1–3. Ancient and early medieval logicians such as, in particular, the Stoics and Boethius favored the basic idea that "something," p, is necessary if and only if p is always the case (or true). Accordingly, p is possible if and only if p is at least sometime the case. Abelard, however, was not willing to accept that each possibility has to become realized at some time. He instead offered a "nature-based characterization of possibility" that can "account for unrealized, past, counterfactual, and even unactualizable possibilities" (308). Abelard's idea is that something, x, is possibly a P if and only if the property of being P is compatible with the nature of x. Hence this view basically amounts to a de re conception of possibility that attributes modalities to things, while the temporal view attributes modal properties primarily to propositions (or states of affairs) and hence can be labeled de dicto (or de sensu).Let us now turn to Binini's twofold aim (as formulated on the back cover of her book) to present a "uniform and consistent" reassessment of Abelard's theory of modalities and of his modal logic. The former task is tackled in chapters 8–10. After summarizing, in chapter 8, Abelard's general views on "Nature and Modalities," chapter 9 is devoted to a detailed discussion of the "Many Senses of Possibility." In five consecutive sections, Binini investigates the conception of (1) possibility as "non-repugnancy with nature" (illustrated by the thesis that "any man can be a bishop" [235]); (2) unrealizable but "conceivable" possibilities (such as the existence of humans lacking the ability to laugh [240]); (3) determinate potencies (like that of an amputee who nevertheless "can walk" [248]); (4) past and counterfactual potencies (like that of a blind person who might be able to see); and (5) other puzzling de re possibilities (such as "irrational humans" [261]).The final... (shrink)

This book claims that the combined treatment of human freedom and divine creation in the third antinomy is crucial for Kant's solution of the freedom and determinism issue. The idea of the world originating in God's creative reason has a twofold task: (i) to justify the determinism thesis within the regulative use of theoretical reason, (ii) to establish a variant of compatibilism both similar and superior to Boethius's account. Kant's theory of time and his strictly moral conception of the (...) notion of the best possible world allows him to even grant the ability to do otherwise to human beings. (shrink)

I examine two recent accounts of Kant's version of compatibilism, i.e., Hudson's reconstruction of Kant as an "anomalous monist" avant la lettre, and Wood's interpretation along the lines of a modified version of Boethius's "eternity solution". To retain the advantages of both strategies, yet avoid their respective shortcomings, I suggest approaching Kant's doctrine from his theology lectures and their concept of universal providence. This (probably Molinist) notion, an integral element of the regulative use of reason, allows Kant to regard, (...) in part, the actual laws of nature as a function of the individual characters of human beings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Abaelards Logik by Wolfgang LenzenSten EbbesenWolfgang Lenzen. Abaelards Logik. Paderborn: Brill | mentis, 2021. Pp. 206. Hardback, €59.00.According to its author, this book aims at reconstructing key parts of Abelard's logic while denying him a role as a hero of connexive logic or more generally as one of history's greatest logicians. At the end of the preface, we are told that "Abaelard hat die Logik seiner Zeit (...) nicht revolutioniert; er hat keine Kalküle konstruiert; und er hat auch nicht die Logik seiner Zeit auf ein höheres Niveau gehoben" (xiv).The book is divided into twenty-three chapters with titles such as "'Destruierende' versus 'separierende' Negation," "Vollkommene und unvollkommne Folgerungen," and "'Leere' Begriffe." As the titles show, it ranges over a large field. The results of Lenzen's analyses of Abelard's argumentation are presented in modern logical notation. There are many fine analyses, and despite Lenzen's refusal to see Abelard as a genius, he, too, seems to have been quite impressed by the old logician. However, at the end of the day, I am not sure that I have become any wiser about Abelard's contribution to the history of logic.Lenzen is a newcomer to the study of twelfth-century logic, and the book is marked by this in several ways. Thus, he informs the reader that "Spätestens seit Prantls Publikation der 'Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande' steht fest, dass Abaelards Traktat 'De Sillogismis Ypoteticis' sich stark an das Werk 'De syllogismo hypothetico' von Boethius (470–524) anlehnt" (165). This is quite true, but anything else would have been very remarkable, so the reference to Prantl serves no purpose.Unsurprisingly, the main source texts used are Abelard's Dialectica and his Glosae super Peri hermeneias, a part of the series of commentaries on the Ars vetus that go under the common name of Logica ingredientibus. Lenzen displays a cavalier attitude to philology. He quotes the Dialectica from De Rijk's second edition (1970), but in the bibliography he mentions that there are two editions without stating explicitly which one he quotes. In the case of the Glosae, he uses the obsolete editio princeps by Bernhard Geyer from 1927, and he does not even mention its replacement, Klaus Jacobi and Christian Strub's much superior 2010 edition in the series Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis. This is inexplicable, for in his preface Lenzen describes his book as the child of a research project he began several years after the publication of the new edition. Now, fortunately, the use of Geyer does not have disastrous consequences for Lenzen's interpretation of Abelard, but had he used Jacobi and Strub's edition, he would not have had to propose a textual emendation in one place (88n17), nor would he have needed to quote, in another place, a Latin text (which he does not translate) with a nonsensical significantem instead of figurative (94n1o).Lenzen sometimes proposes textual emendations, but not always in a perspicuous way, and they are not all felicitous. For example, a quotation of L. M. de Rijk's edition of Introductiones Montane Minores in Logica Modernorum (LM) II.2 (1967) contains the phrase aliquod opposit[or]um (127n2). An unsuspecting reader would think this means De Rijk had conjecturally emended oppositorum into oppositum, for this is what opposit[or]um would mean in LM II.2. In fact, De Rijk just prints oppositum, so Lenzen's opposit[or]um must mean that he wants to correct De Rijk's text by inserting 'or,' but he forgets to tell us that he does not [End Page 520] faithfully reproduce the text quoted and that his square brackets mean something different from what they do in De Rijk's edition. This issue aside, his conjecture is superfluous, as proven by a parallel passage in LM II.2: 118. Similarly, he quotes Abelard as saying "alterum istorum [est]: vel nox vel dies" (152). The "[est]" is Lenzen's own, again superfluous, contribution to the text. By contrast, elsewhere he proposes to insert a non at LM II.2: 64.2. This time, he explains what he is doing, and I think his conjecture... (shrink)

First published in 1986 and reprinted in 2010 in the Routledge Revivals series, this book presents the first detailed confrontation between the Austrian school of economics and Austrian philosophy, especially the philosophy of the Brentano school. It contains a study of the roots of Austrian economics in the liberal political theory of the nineteenth-century Hapsburg empire, and a study of the relations between the general theory of value underlying Austrian economics and the new economic approach to human behaviour propounded by (...) Gary Becker and others in Chicago. In addition, it considers the connections between Austrian methodology and contemporary debates in the philosophy of the social sciences. (shrink)

The present essay seeks, by way of the Austrian example, to make a contribution to what might be called the philosophy of the supranational state. More specifically, we shall attempt to use certain ideas on the philosophy of Gestalten as a basis for understanding some aspects of that political and cultural phenomenon which was variously called the Austrian Empire, the Habsburg Empire, the Danube Monarchy or Kakanien.

"A Survey of Ranking Theory": The paper gives an up-to-date survey of ranking theory. It carefully explains the basics. It elaborates on the ranking theoretic explication of reasons and their balance. It explains the dynamics of belief statable in ranking terms and indicates how the ranks can thereby be measured. It suggests how the theory of Bayesian nets can be carried over to ranking theory. It indicates what it might mean to objectify ranks. It discusses the formal and the philosophical (...) aspects of the tight relation and the complementarity of ranks and probabilities. It closes with comparative remarks on predecessors and other philosophical proposals as well as formal models developed in AI. (shrink)

The ontology of marketing, particularly the question of what products and brands are, is still largely unexplored. The ontological status of brands hinges on their relationship with products. Idealists about brands see perceptual or cognitive acts of consumers grouped under the heading ‘brand awareness’ or ‘brand image’ as constitutive for the existence of brands so that, in their view, tools of the marketing mix can influence relevant mental dispositions and attitudes. Brand realists, on the other hand, reject the view of (...) brands as mere marks or names and interpret them as emergent products with properties that afford branding in the sense of Gibson’s ecological psychology. Brand strength is a function of the degree to which brands occupy defensible niches in product space. Branding as a process involves changing external or internal boundaries of products. Several arguments are proposed in favor of brand realism. The fragments of an ontology of marketing are developed in a broadly Aristotelian framework. Brand realism has significant implications for a new understanding of issues ranging from the effects of advertising to financial brand valuation, the nature of trademarks, and marketing strategy in general. It permits one to treat brand equity as a real phenomenon not dependent on associations, attitudinal states such as brand loyalty, or spurious constructs such as brand character or personality. (shrink)

Concentrating upon applications that are most relevant to modern physics, this valuable book surveys variational principles and examines their relationship to dynamics and quantum theory. Stressing the history and theory of these mathematical concepts rather than the mechanics, the authors provide many insights into the development of quantum mechanics and present much hard-to-find material in a remarkably lucid, compact form. After summarizing the historical background from Pythagoras to Francis Bacon, Professors Yourgrau and Mandelstram cover Fermat's principle of least time, the (...) principle of least action of Maupertuis, development of this principle by Euler and Lagrange, and the equations of Lagrange and Hamilton. Equipped by this thorough preparation to treat variational principles in general, they proceed to derive Hamilton's principle, the Hamilton-Jacobi equation, and Hamilton's canonical equations. An investigation of electrodynamics in Hamiltonian form covers next, followed by a resume of variational principles in classical dynamics. The authors then launch into an analysis of their most significant topics: the relation between variational principles and wave mechanics, and the principles of Feynman and Schwinger in quantum mechanics. Two concluding chapters extend the discussion to hydrodynamics and natural philosophy. Professional physicists, mathematicians, and advanced students with a strong mathematical background will find this stimulating volume invaluable reading. Extremely popular in its hardcover edition, this volume will find even wider appreciation in its first fine inexpensive paperbound edition. (shrink)

Ranking theory delivers an account of iterated contraction; each ranking function induces a specific iterated contraction behavior. The paper shows how to reconstruct a ranking function from its iterated contraction behavior uniquely up to multiplicative constant and thus how to measure ranks on a ratio scale. Thereby, it also shows how to completely axiomatize that behavior. The complete set of laws of iterated contraction it specifies amend the laws hitherto discussed in the literature.

Recently, Bengt Hansson presented a paper about dyadic deontic logic,2 criticizing some purely axiomatic systems of dyadic deontic logic and proposing three purely semantical systems of dyadic deontic logic which he confidently called dyadic standard systems of deontic logic (DSDL1–3). Here I shall discuss the third by far most interesting system DSDL3 which is operating with preference relations. First, I shall describe this semantical system (Sections 1.1–1.3). Then I shall give an axiomatic system (Section 1.4) which is proved to be (...) correct (Section 2) and complete (Section 3) with respect to Hansson's semantics. Finally, in face of these results Hansson's semantics will be discussed from a more intuitive standpoint. After emphasizing its intuitive attractiveness (Section 4.1) I will show that two objections often discussed in connection with preference relations do not apply to it (Section 4.2 and 4.3); more precisely, I will show that the connectedness condition for preference relations can be dropped and that, in a sense, it is not necessary to compare two possible worlds differing in infinitely many respects. (What exactly is meant by this, will become clear later on.) Yet there is a third objection to Hansson's semantics which points to a real intuitive inadequacy of DSDL3. A way of removing this inadequacy, which corresponds to Hansson's own intuitions as well as to familiar metaethical views, is suggested, but not technically realized (Section 4.4). In the last section (section 4.5) I shall briefly show that DSDL3 is decidable, as expected. (shrink)

& The functional equivalence of overt movements and dynamic imagery is of fundamental importance in neuroscience. Here, we investigated the participation of the neocortical motor areas in a classic task of dynamic imagery, Shepard and Metzler's mental rotation task, by time-resolved single-trial functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). The subjects performed the mental-rotation task 16 times, each time with different object pairs. Functional images were acquired for each pair separately, and the onset times and..

The paper argues that Gareth Evans’ argument for transparent self-knowledge is based on a conflation of doxastic transparency with ascriptive transparency. Doxastic transparency means that belief about one’s own doxastic state, e.g., the belief that one thinks that it will rain, can be warranted by ordinary empirical observation, e.g., of the weather. In contrast, ascriptive transparency says that self-ascriptions of belief, e.g., “I believe it will rain”, can be warranted by such observation. We first show that the thesis of doxastic (...) transparency is ill-motivated and then offer a non-epistemic interpretation of ascriptive transparency by reference to the theory of explicit expressive acts: “I think it will rain” requires attendance to the weather because the utterance expresses a belief about the weather, not about ourselves. This will allow us to avoid what is often called “the puzzle of transparent self-knowledge” while remaining faithful to Evans’ linguistic observations. (shrink)

Analogical reasoning addresses the question how evidence from various phenomena can be combined and made relevant for theory development and prediction. In the first part of my contribution, I review some influential accounts of analogical reasoning, both historical and contemporary, focusing in particular on Keynes, Carnap, Hesse, and more recently Bartha. In the second part, I sketch a general framework. To this purpose, a distinction between a predictive and a conceptual type of analogical reasoning is introduced. I then take up (...) a common intuition according to which analogical inferences hold if the differences between source and target concern only irrelevant circumstances. I attempt to make this idea more precise by addressing possible objections and in particular by specifying a notion of causal irrelevance based on difference making in homogeneous contexts. (shrink)

This paper attempts to develop a projectivistic understanding of chance or objective probability or partial determination. It does so by critically examining David Lewis’ philosophy of probability and his defense of Humean Supervenience, building thereupon the constructive projectivistic alternative, which will basically be a suitable reinterpretation of de Finetti’s position. Any treatment of the topic must show how it extends to natural necessity or deterministic laws or full determination in perfect parallel. The paper indicates at the end how this demand (...) can be met. (shrink)

We define classes Φnof formulae of first-order arithmetic with the following properties:(i) Everyφϵ Φnis classically equivalent to a Πn-formula (n≠ 1, Φ1:= Σ1).(ii)(iii)IΠnandiΦn(i.e., Heyting arithmetic with induction schema restricted to Φn-formulae) prove the same Π2-formulae.We further generalize a result by Visser and Wehmeier. namely that prenex induction within intuitionistic arithmetic is rather weak: After closing Φnboth under existential and universal quantification (we call these classes Θn) the corresponding theoriesiΘnstill prove the same Π2-formulae. In a second part we consideriΔ0plus collection-principles. We (...) show that both the provably recursive functions and the provably total functions ofare polynomially bounded. Furthermore we show that the contrapositive of the collection-schema gives rise to instances of the law of excluded middle and hence. (shrink)

Biomedical and social scientists are increasingly calling the biological sex into question, arguing that sex is a graded spectrum rather than a binary trait. Leading science journals have been adopting this relativist view, thereby opposing fundamental biological facts. While we fully endorse efforts to create a more inclusive environment for gender‐diverse people, this does not require denying biological sex. On the contrary, the rejection of biological sex seems to be based on a lack of knowledge about evolution and it champions (...) species chauvinism, inasmuch as it imposes human identity notions on millions of other species. We argue that the biological definition of the sexes remains central to recognising the diversity of life. Humans with their unique combination of biological sex and gender are different from non‐human animals and plants in this respect. Denying the concept of biological sex, for whatever cause, ultimately erodes scientific progress and may open the flood gates to “alternative truths.”. (shrink)

On the consequences of the interplay between the diversity of ethnic, national, cultural and linguistic groupings in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The existence of a Catholic Intellectual Tradition (CIT) is not a given, as arguments contra are in balance with arguments pro. An intellectual tradition consists of a style of thought and of a worldview, as its formal and material modes. The former defines the way knowledge is appropriated, processed, and passed on whereas the latter amounts to its applications to various regions of reality – God, man, morality, society, the Church, etc. A model of the CIT is proposed that consists (...) of principles differentiated by the degree of centrality they have in a topological structure. The paper asserts the existence of a CIT because a non-stipulative, non-trivial, and non-circular case can be made for it. (shrink)

This paper deals with Hans Reichenbach's common cause principle. It was propounded by him in, and has been developed and widely applied by Wesley Salmon, e.g. in and. Thus, it has become one of the focal points of the continuing discussion of causation. The paper addresses five questions. Section 1 asks: What does the principle say? And section 2 asks: What is its philosophical significance? The most important question, of course, is this: Is the principle true? To answer that question, (...) however, one must first consider how one might one argue about it at all. One can do so by way of examples, the subject of section 3, or more theoretically, which is the goal of section 4. Based on an explication of probabilistic causation proposed by me in,, and, section 4 shows that a variant of the principle is provable within a classical framework. The question naturally arises whether the proved variant is adequate, or too weak. This is pursued in section 5. My main conclusion will be that some version of Reichenbach's principle is provably true, and others may be. This may seem overly ambitious, but it is not. The paper does not make any progress on essential worries about the common cause principle arising in the quantum domain; it only establishes more rigorously what has been thought to be plausible at least within a classical framework. (shrink)

The paper proposes two principles of coherence (thus taking up work started in Spohn (1991) "A Reason for Explanation: Explanations Provide Stable Reasons"). The latter indeed serves as a weak, but precise explication of the notion of coherence as it is used in the current epistemological discussion. After discussing their epistemological setting, the paper considers four ways of establishing these principles. They may be inferred neither from enumerative induction, nor from the nature of propositions as objects of belief, nor in (...) a Kantian way from self-consciousness. Rather, I propose a fairly rigorous way to infer them from an even more fundamental rationality principle of non-dogmatism and an elementary theory of perception. (shrink)

We examine the performance of some standard causal discovery algorithms, both constraint-based and score-based, from the perspective of how robust they are against failures of the Causal Faithfulness Assumption. For this purpose, we make only the so-called Triangle-Faithfulness assumption, which is a fairly weak consequence of the Faithfulness assumption, and otherwise allows unfaithful distributions. In particular, we allow violations of Adjacency-Faithfulness and Orientation-Faithfulness. We show that the PC algorithm, a representative constraint-based method, can be made more robust against unfaithfulness by (...) incorporating elements of the GES algorithm, a representative score-based method; similarly, the GES algorithm can be made less error-prone by incorporating elements of the conservative PC algorithm. As our simulations demonstrate, the increased robustness seems to matter even when faithfulness is not exactly violated, for with only finite sample, distributions that are not exactly unfaithful may be sufficiently close to being unfaithful to make trouble. (shrink)

Modern theory of rationality has truly grown into a science of its own. Still, the general topic remained a genuinely philosophical one. This essay is concerned with giving a brief overview. Section 2 explains the fundamental scheme of all rationality assessments. With its help, a schematic order of the main questions concerning the theory of rationality can be given; the questions turn out to be quite unevenly addressed in the literature. Section 3 discusses the fundamental issue that the theory of (...) rationality seems to be both a normative and an empirical theory. Section 4, finally, shows how the unity of the theory of rationality can nevertheless be maintained. (shrink)

The paper is based on ranking theory, a theory of degrees of disbelief (and hence belief). On this basis, it explains enumerative induction, the confirmation of a law by its positive instances, which may indeed take various schemes. It gives a ranking theoretic explication of a possible law or a nomological hypothesis. It proves, then, that such schemes of enumerative induction uniquely correspond to mixtures of such nomological hypotheses. Thus, it shows that de Finetti's probabilistic representation theorems may be transformed (...) into an account of confirmation of possible laws and that enumerative induction is equivalent to such an account. The paper concludes with some remarks about the apriority of lawfulness or the uniformity of nature. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether managerial rhetoric in the Management Discussion and Analysis section of 10-K filings can help gauge the level of managerial opportunism in a firm. We find that the use of trust-related words is connected to inefficient investment decisions and poor operating performance. Furthermore, firms making more frequent use of trust-related words are subject to less monitoring by institutional investors or analysts. Their accounting also relies more heavily on discretionary accruals. These results are consistent with the notion that (...) managerial rhetoric to advertise trustworthiness points towards agency problems plaguing the firm. (shrink)

An abridged and translated edition of two of Wolfgang Ernst’s major works, representing the ambitious claim of a comprehensive knowledge-oriented analysis of media temporalities.

The central claim of the paper is, roughly, that the fact that it looks to somebody as if p is a defeasibly a priori reason for assuming that p (and vice versa), for any person, even for the perceiver himself. As a preparation, it outlines a doxastic conception suitable to explicate this claim and explains how to analyse dispositions within this conception. Since an observable p has the disposition to look as if p, this analysis generalizes to the central claim (...) which is then argued to be at the bottom of coherentism. Thus, the defense of the claim supports coherentism as opposed to foundationalism and at the same time provides an answer to skepticism about the external world. (shrink)

The Dialectica-style functional interpretation of Kripke-Platek set theory with infinity ( $\hbox{\sf KP} \omega$ ) given in [1] uses a choice functional (which is not a definable set function of ( $hbox{\sf KP} \omega$ ). By means of a Diller-Nahm-style interpretation (cf. [4]) it is possible to eliminate the choice functional and give an interpretation by set functionals primitive recursive in $x\mapsto\omega$ . This yields the following characterization: The class of $\Sigma$ -definable set functions of $\hbox{\sf KP} \omega$ coincides with (...) the collection of set functionals of type 1 primitive recursive in $x\mapsto \omega$. (shrink)

In the present paper we give a functional interpretation of Aczel's constructive set theories CZF − and CZF in systems T ∈ and T ∈ + of constructive set functionals of finite types. This interpretation is obtained by a translation × , a refinement of the ∧ -translation introduced by Diller and Nahm 49–66) which again is an extension of Gödel's Dialectica translation. The interpretation theorem gives characterizations of the definable set functions of CZF − and CZF in terms of (...) constructive set functionals. In a second part we introduce constructive set theories in all finite types. We expand the interpretation to these theories and give a characterization of the translation × . We further show that the simplest non-trivial axiom of extensionality is not interpretable by functionals of T ∈ and T ∈ + . We obtain this result by adapting Howard's notion of hereditarily majorizable functionals to set functionals. Subject of the last section is the translation ∨ that is defined in Burr for an interpretation of Kripke-Platek set theory with infinity. (shrink)

Phylogenetically controlled studies across multiple species correct for taxonomic confounds in physiological performance traits. Therefore, they are preferred over comparisons of two or few closely‐related species. Funding bodies, referees and journal editors nowadays often even reject to consider detailed comparisons of two or few closely related species. Here, we plea for a less dogmatic stance on such comparisons, because phylogenetic studies come with their own limitations similar in magnitude as those of two‐species comparisons. Two‐species comparisons are particularly relevant and instructive (...) for understanding physiological pathways and de novo mutations in three contexts: in a purely mechanistic context, when differences in the regulation of a trait are the focus of investigation, when a physiological trait lacks a direct connection to fitness, and when physiological measures cannot easily be standardized among laboratories. In conclusion, phylogenetic comparative and two‐species studies have different strengths and weaknesses and combining these complementary approaches will help integrating biology. (shrink)