In this book Gerald Vision argues for a new causal theory, one that engages provocatively with direct realism and makes no use of a now discredited subjectivism.

In Veritas, Gerald Vision defends the correspondence theory of truth -- the theory that truth has a direct relationship to reality -- against recent attacks, and critically examines its most influential alternatives. The correspondence theory, if successful, explains one way in which we are cognitively connected to the world; thus, it is claimed, truth -- while relevant to semantics, epistemology, and other studies -- also has significant metaphysical consequences. Although the correspondence theory is widely held today, Vision points (...) to an emerging orthodoxy in philosophy that claims that truth as such carries no significant weight in philosophical explanations. He devotes much of the book to a criticism of that outlook and to a less vulnerable formulation of the correspondence theory.Vision defends the correspondence theory by both presenting evidence for correspondence and examining the claims made by such alternative theories as deflationism, minimalism, and pluralism. The techniques of the argument are thoroughly analytic, but the problem confronted is broadly humanistic. The question examined -- how we, as thinking beings, are connected to and manage to cope in a world that was not designed for our comfort or convenience -- is more likely to be raised by continentalists, but is approached here with the tools of clarity and precision more highly prized in analytic philosophy. The book seeks to avoid both the obscurantism that infects much continental thought and the overly technical concerns and methodology that limit the interest of much work in analytic philosophy. It thus provides a rigorous but largely nontechnical treatment of the topic that will be of interest not only to readers familiar with philosophy but also to those with a background in literary theory and linguistics. (shrink)

The evidence of blindsight is occasionally used to argue that we can see things, and thus have perceptual belief, without the distinctive visual awareness accompanying normal sight; thereby displacing phenomenality as a component of the concept of vision. I maintain that arguments to this end typically rely on misconceptions about blindsight and almost always ignore associated visual (or visuomotor) pathologies relevant to the lessons of such cases. More specifically, I conclude, first, that the phenomena very likely do not result (...) from dissociations within a single system, but from the interaction of evolutionarily distinct, if interacting, systems; second, that a closer study of spared motor abilities indicates that verbal responses of patients result not from degraded vision but from proprioception; and, finally, above chance verbal responses, being forced guesses, are not tentative beliefs and cannot become beliefs just by training patients to have more confidence in their responses. (shrink)

I INTRODUCTION - THE TOPIC EXPLAINED 1 GENERAL DIFFERENCES From its inception to the present, philosophy may be viewed as a series of struggles between ...

On the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is real, and ruling out Cartesian isolation from the non-mental world, we have two choices for its introduction: either it comes about in the course of the development of the non-conscious realm or it was there from the beginning. The latter comprises versions of panpsychism, a recently trending view in some quarters. In their view the former are broadly taken to be versions of emergentism, embracing even non-eliminatiivist materialisms. After producing what seem to me (...) to be powerful objections to panpsychism, I defend emergentism against pansychist attacks on it. As I explain, my version is also dualist. Finally, with respect to both outlooks I briefly review the prospects of a rapidly advancing AI for expanding the current population of natural mental subjects. (shrink)

Parmenides didn't mention reference as such, but if he had he would have undoubtedly agreed with the philosophers who nowadays hold what is called "the axiom of existence": that one can only refer to what exists. The sources of possible support for this view are examined and rejected. Primary support for the axiom is given by two sorts of argument; one concerning quantification, the other summarizing a standard Parmenidean puzzle. Weaknesses in both are exposed. Finally, the relations between the axiom (...) and connected claims about predication and truth are probed, and an attempt is made to determine the limits of the mutual support these claims give one another. (shrink)

Parmenides didn't mention reference as such, but if he had he would have undoubtedly agreed with the philosophers who nowadays hold what is called "the axiom of existence": that one can only refer to what exists. The sources of possible support for this view are examined and rejected. Primary support for the axiom is given by two sorts of argument; one concerning quantification, the other summarizing a standard Parmenidean puzzle. Weaknesses in both are exposed. Finally, the relations between the axiom (...) and connected claims about predication and truth are probed, and an attempt is made to determine the limits of the mutual support these claims give one another. (shrink)

Under the title of ‘the axiom of existence’, hereafter, John R. Searle has reduced to compact dictum a view to which many philosophers subscribe: ‘Whatever is referred to must exist’. In this paper I shall offer two major arguments against adopting, at least on certain assumptions. There have been a number of defenses of, among them those arguing that it is fundamental to any systematic philosophy of language or logic. With the exception of discussing some of Searle's remarks in (...) part Ill of this paper I shall not comment on any of these defenses. (shrink)

Some philosophers believe that the doctrine that individuals have (nominal) essences is supported by arguments designed to show that proper names have senses. Three such arguments are extracted from recent pieces of philosophy: one from the absurdity of bare particulars, A second from the necessary conditions for identifying bearers of proper names, And a third from the ability to replace proper names in discourse with the help of sortal terms. All three arguments are rejected upon examination. The bearing this (...) rejection has for our conception of how we identify particulars through time is briefly discussed. Finally, An attempt to revive this sort of essentialism vis-A-Vis semantic categories is criticized. (shrink)

Problems concerning identity in possible worlds and the view that proper names are rigid designators pose no threat to the doctrine that names of fictional characters (fictional names) are referential. Some philosophers, notably Saul Kripke and David Kaplan, have held otherwise; but a close examination of their arguments discovers fatal flaws in them. Furthermore, the most readily available proposals for the alternative functions of fictional names — that is, proposals in which fictional names are not referential — are open to (...) objections of a principled kind. This raises serious doubts that any such alternative could work. (shrink)

Problems concerning identity in possible worlds and the view that proper names are rigid designators pose no threat to the doctrine that names of fictional characters (fictional names) are referential. Some philosophers, notably Saul Kripke and David Kaplan, have held otherwise; but a close examination of their arguments discovers fatal flaws in them. Furthermore, the most readily available proposals for the alternative functions of fictional names — that is, proposals in which fictional names are not referential — are open to (...) objections of a principled kind. This raises serious doubts that any such alternative could work. (shrink)

Parmenides didn't mention reference as such, but if he had he would have undoubtedly agreed with the philosophers who nowadays hold what is called "the axiom of existence": that one can only refer to what exists. The sources of possible support for this view are examined and rejected. Primary support for the axiom is given by two sorts of argument; one concerning quantification, the other summarizing a standard Parmenidean puzzle. Weaknesses in both are exposed. Finally, the relations between the axiom (...) and connected claims about predication and truth are probed, and an attempt is made to determine the limits of the mutual support these claims give one another. (shrink)

I defend the view that justified belief is preferable to plain belief only because the former enhances the likelihood that the belief is true: call that sort of justification truth-linked. A collection of philosophical theories either state outright that this is not so, imply it via other doctrines, or adopt a notion of truth that renders the link innocuous. The discussion proceeds as follows. Issues and various positions are outlined, and needed qualifications are entered (parts I-III). We then note general (...) shortcomings of all views rejecting the truth-link, and critically examine a powerful thought experiment underlying the rejection (part IV). In the final sections we explore two other challenges to the truth-link. First (part V), we consider forms of idealized justification theory that would imply the independence of justification from the relevant sort of truth conduciveness; next (part VI) we investigate a view, Pragmatism, which maintains that epistemic justification is sanctioned by ends other than a tendency towards truth. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 2, Page 402-405, June 2012.

Whereas it appears that direct, or causal, theories dominate philosophy’s theories of reference, and it is widely held that they present an insuperable obstacle for a fictional character’s name to refer, I attempt to show not only that they can be easily made compatible with such theories, but that reference to the fictional fits rather smoothly into the distinctive articles of current theories of direct reference. However, the issues about reference to fictional characters goes well beyond those points, so (...) its compatibility with direct referential theories is not a demonstration that names of fictional things in fact refer. This essay argues only that certain popular objections to fictional reference are unsound. Moreover, if those references were to occur, it would remove a serious self-inflicted conundrum over negative existentials, one from which those raising it seem unable to extract themselves credibly. (shrink)

Those accustomed to the thoroughness, exactitude, and incisiveness of Alston’s epistemological forays will not be disappointed by this work. Once more, Alston takes a keen-edged scalpel to various central issues such as externalism versus internalism, reliabilism, foundationalism, coherence, truth-conduciveness, epistemic virtue, skepticism, contextualism, and epistemic probability. However, his central thesis is that researchers should replace the notion of “justified belief” with a series of positive distinctively epistemic features of beliefs, called “epistemic desiderata” or “EDs.” He maintains that philosophers have been (...) bamboozled by focusing on the question of when a belief is justified. The field is much more crowded. Although not every petitioner warrants entrance, a number of candidate EDs deserve consideration. (shrink)

Luc Deneulin et Johan Swinnen se sont entretenus avec sept philosophes français et belges à propos de la philosophie qui entre dans les salles de cinéma. La caverne de Platon a permis de déchiffrer une partie du cerveau humain ; raconter des images sous la forme de films est demeuré pendant longtemps un phénomène inconnu et sous-estimé. Le résultat débouche sur un ouvrage surprenant qui fait la part belle à un certain nombre de films conventionnels ou non, présentant une diversité (...) inattendue de thèmes. Visions - Philosophie et cinéma nous fait comprendre comment chaque époque éprouve le besoin d'avoir ses propres films. Leur valeur ne semble pas dépendre des qualités esthétiques en elles-mêmes mais de leur impact sur le spectateur. Les penseurs qui se penchent sur les images de film nous amènent à une nature profonde et surprenante des images comme matière à penser et à la possibilité d'une réconciliation avec la vie grâce au réconfort de la beauté et de la profondeur de l'image. (shrink)

Colour fascinates all of us, and scientists and philosophers have sought to understand the true nature of colour vision for many years. In recent times, investigations into colour vision have been one of the main success stories of cognitive science, for each discipline within the field - neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, computer science and artificial intelligence, and philosophy - has contributed significantly to our understanding of colour. Evan Thompson's book is a major contribution to this interdisciplinary project. Colour (...) Vision provides an accessible review of the current scientific and philosophical discussions of colour vision. Thompson steers a course between the subjective and objective positions on colour, arguing for a relational account. This account develops a novel `ecological' approach to colour vision in cognitive science and the philosophy of perception. It is vital reading for all cognitive scientists and philosophers whose interests touch upon this central area. (shrink)

This book is a major contribution to the interdisciplinary project of investigating the true nature of color vision.

Hamlet tells Horatio that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in his philosophy. In Double Vision, philosopher and literary critic Tzachi Zamir argues that there are more things in Hamlet than are dreamt of--or at least conceded--by most philosophers. Making an original and persuasive case for the philosophical value of literature, Zamir suggests that certain important philosophical insights can be gained only through literature. But such insights cannot be reached if literature is (...) deployed merely as an aesthetic sugaring of a conceptual pill. Philosophical knowledge is not opposed to, but is consonant with, the literariness of literature. By focusing on the experience of reading literature as literature and not philosophy, Zamir sets a theoretical framework for a philosophically oriented literary criticism that will appeal both to philosophers and literary critics. Double Vision is concerned with the philosophical understanding induced by the aesthetic experience of literature. Literary works can function as credible philosophical arguments--not ones in which claims are conclusively demonstrated, but in which claims are made plausible. Such claims, Zamir argues, are embedded within an experiential structure that is itself a crucial dimension of knowing. Developing an account of literature's relation to knowledge, morality, and rhetoric, and advancing philosophical-literary readings of Richard III, Macbeth, Romeo and Juliet, Othello, Antony and Cleopatra, Hamlet, and King Lear, Zamir shows how his approach can open up familiar texts in surprising and rewarding ways. (shrink)

Prior to the nineteenth century, those who are now regarded as scientists were referred to as natural philosophers. With empiricism, science was claimed to be a superior form of knowledge to philosophy, and natural philosophy was marginalized. This claim for science was challenged by defenders of natural philosophy, and this debate has continued up to the present. The vast majority of mainstream scientists are comfortable in the belief that through applying the scientific method, knowledge will continue to (...) accumulate, and that claims to knowledge outside science apart from practical affairs should not be taken seriously. This is referred to as scientism. It is incumbent on those who defend natural philosophy against scientism not only to expose the illusions and incoherence of scientism, but to show that natural philosophers can make justifiable claims to advancing knowledge. By focusing on a recent characterization and defense of natural philosophy along with a reconstruction of the history of natural philosophy, showing the nature and role of Schelling’s conception of dialectical thinking, I will attempt to identify natural philosophy as a coherent tradition of thought and defend it as something different from science and as essential to it, and essential to the broader culture and to civilization. (shrink)

本书以宽广的哲学视野,分析了法治与德治及其相互关系的历史演变,指出了两者之间存在着“合—分—合”的历史运动,社会主义社会中法治与德治之间是一个不可分割的“法治—人—德治”双向动互动关系链条,坚持“以人 为本”进行法治与德治建设是构建社会主义和谐社会的必然选择。.

A collection of works, many of them classics, on the orthodox view of visual perception.

_Philosophy and the Vision of Language_ explores the history and enduring significance of the twentieth-century turn to language as a specific object of investigation and resource for philosophical reflection. It traces the implications of the access to language in some of the most prominent projects and results of the historical and contemporary tradition of analytic philosophy, including the projects of Frege, Wittgenstein, Sellars, Quine, Brandom, and Cavell. Additionally, it demonstrates the deep and enduring connections between the analytic tradition’s (...) inquiry into language and the parallel inquiries of phenomenology, critical theory, and deconstruction over the course of the twentieth century. Finally, it documents some of the enduring consequences of philosophy’s inquiry into language for contemporary questions of social and political life. The book provides a clear, accessible and widely inclusive introduction to the relevance of language for analytic and continental philosophy in the twentieth century and is readable by non-specialist audiences. It should contribute to a growing historical sense of the location of the analytic tradition in a broader geography of social, political and critical thought. Furthermore, it contributes to building bridges between this tradition and the neighboring continental ones from which it has all too often been estranged. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the possibility of some other analytic political philosophy, in contrast to what is usually given this label. I do so by rejecting what I call the dualism between craftsmanship and vision.

Characterizations of philosophy abound. It is ‘the queen of the sciences’, a grand and sweeping metaphysical endeavour; or, less regally, it is a sort of deep anthropology or ‘descriptive metaphysics’, uncovering the general presuppositions or conceptual schemes that lurk beneath our words and thoughts. A different set of images portray philosophy as a type of therapy, or as a spiritual exercise, a way of life to be followed, or even as a special branch of poetry or politics. Then (...) there is a group of characterizations that include philosophy as linguistic analysis, as phenomenological description, as conceptual geography, or as genealogy in the sense proposed by Nietzsche and later taken up by Foucault. (shrink)

When William of Ockham lectured on Lombard's Sentences in 1317-1319, he articulated a new theory of knowledge. Its reception by fourteenth-century scholars was, however, largely negative, for it conflicted with technical accounts of vision and with their interprations of Duns Scotus. This study begins with Roger Bacon, a major source for later scholastics' efforts to tie a complex of semantic and optical explanations together into an account of concept formation, truth and the acquisition of certitude. After considering the challenges (...) of Peter Olivi and Henry of Ghent, Part I concludes with a discussion of Scotus's epistemology. Part II explores the alternative theories of Peter Aureol and William of Ockham. Part III traces the impact of Scotus, and then of Aureol, on Oxford thought in the years of Ockham's early audience, culminating with the views of Adam Wodeham. Part IV concerns Aureol's intellectual legacy at Paris, the introduction of Wodeham's thought there, and Autrecourt's controversies. (shrink)

The first of three volumes of essays by Quentin Skinner, one of the world's leading intellectual historians. This collection includes some of his most important philosophical and methodological statements written over the past four decades, each carefully revised for publication in this form. In a series of seminal essays Professor Skinner sets forth the intellectual principles that inform his work. Writing as a practising historian, he considers the theoretical difficulties inherent in the pursuit of knowledge and interpretation, and elucidates the (...) methodology which finds its expression in his two successive volumes. All of Professor Skinner's work is characterised by philosophical power, limpid clarity, and elegance of exposition; these essays, many of which are now recognised classics, provide a fascinating and convenient digest of the development of his thought. (shrink)

This paper explores the philosophy of tertiary civic education in Hong Kong. It does not only investigate the role of tertiary education that can play in civic education, but also explores the way to achieve the aim of integrating liberal democratic citizenship and collective national identity in the context of persistent conflicts between two different identity politics in Hong Kong: politics of assimilation and politics of difference. As Hong Kong is part of China and is inevitably getting closer cooperation (...) with the mainland in the future, I argue that Hong Kong citizenship should affirm its own distinctiveness while also identifying with Chinese nationality. Thus, tertiary civic education should foster a trans-cultural political vision so that the two different horizons can be synthesized and the political framework and identity can be transformed in order to reduce conflicts between the two peoples. (shrink)

Early analytic philosophy -- Radical translation and intersubjective practice -- Critical outcome.

_Philosophy and Vision_ argues that clear thinking and imaginative understanding are necessary qualities as we try to deal with the problems that confront us in our daily life. The book discusses history, the environment, religion, personal and corporate morality, freedom, the concept of person, poetry, and post-modernism attempts to show that as a philosophic vision is brought to bear on all of these, we will grasp them more completely and more constructively. The issues which challenge most of us seldom (...) have straightforward answers, but they require some answers, some response other than failing out of our emotions. Attempting to see these philosophically, to adopt a philosophic vision, is no panacea, but it may make the difference between being overwhelmed and being able to cope. The book has a crisp enjoyable style, and while it is a philosophical work it draws upon movies, fiction, poetry, and life's experiences in developing its arguments. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Oakeshott's Educational Vision The Three Criticisms Conclusion Notes References.

In this article an attempt is made to provide a re-vision of philosophy of education that will redress the legacy of the past in South Africa, and contribute to laying the foundations of a critical civil society with a culture of tolerance, public debate and accommodation of differences and competing interests. This re-vision of philosophy of education, which finds its roots in developments in philosophy in the twentieth century, and especially in the discourse of postmodernism, (...) directs attention to a pluralistic problem-centred approach to philosophy of education. (shrink)