Poser ces questions, est-il soutenu dans ce recueil qui explore les référents culturels et les imaginaires paysagers issus de l'histoire, des pratiques d'aménagement et des politiques du paysage au Canada et en Europe, n'est-ce pas se ...

Les professeurs d'espérance n'ont qu'un seul argument : lorsque le danger ou la douleur atteignent un certain degré, la conscience se réveille et l'être humain s'adapte, c'est-à-dire qu'il opte pour des comportements favorables à sa survie. La conscience : un guide sûr! Un argument en apparence très fragile. Il suffit habituellement d'un sourire pour qu'il s'écroule dans le scepticisme ou l'indifférence du jour. Pour avancer sur un tel chemin, il faut croire en la conscience, en la pensée et en la (...) vie, trois formes de lumière qui ont perdu toute recevabilité dans notre monde soi-disant postmoderne. Pourtant, l'auteur soutient ici que le mouvement de la société civile en faveur de l'écologie n'est pas une mode, mais la manifestation d'une conscience en marche, elle-même constitutive de la vie. Solidement enraciné dans la physique contemporaine et l'histoire de la pensée, cet essai propose un fondement métaphysique à l'espérance, un changement de mentalité nécessaire à notre avenir, et une pratique courageuse de la participation à la vie. On trouvera ici un étonnant traité sur la conscience dans son sens le plus large et le plus engageant. (shrink)

O poeta francês Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867) foi também tradutor, ensaísta e crítico de arte. Em relação à produção poética, é considerado o precursor do simbolismo, a partir da sua obra LesFleursdu mal, de 1857; na figura do ensaísta, elaborou o conceito de modernidade, referência para a criação artística, os Estudos Literários e a Filosofia. O presente trabalho explora a influência da linguagem poética no seu trabalho de ensaísta e crítico, e vice-versa, buscando compreender a noção das "Correspondências" exposta no poema (...) homônimo do livro de 1857. Analisaremos, com ênfase nos textos sobre a obra do pintor EugèneDelacroix (1798-1863), de que maneira as correspondências e transposições entre pintura, poesia e música já estavam presentes no olhar do jovem crítico de arte.Palavras-chave: Poesia. Pintura. Correspondências. Sinestesia. (shrink)

This article explores the justice of the family. From the perspective of justice, the family causes serious concerns, for it causes severe inequalities between individuals. Several justice theorists remark that by its mere existence the family impedes the access to equality of life chances. The paper examines whether this means that justice requires the abolition of the family. It asks whether everyone, and, in particular, the worst off, would prefer the family to a generalized well-run orphanage. This thought-experiment is used (...) to inquire which value, if any, is such that (a) it would be menaced by the abolition of the family, and (b) in a just society, it would to prioritized over the principle of equality of life chances. (shrink)

Is the principal concern of political philosophy the source of political authority? And, if so, can this source be located in individual consent? In this article I draw on Rousseau to answer the second question negatively; and in rejecting that answer, why we might answer the first question in the negative as well. We should be concerned with questions of legitimacy rather than with the source of authority and political obligation. Our principal concern, that is, should be with the question (...) how well political institutions meet the needs of individuals. I pursue these issues in the context of interpreting Rousseau's distinctive contribution to political thought. I start out by asking the question ‘What problem is the General Will designed to solve?’ I argue that Rousseau's challenge to Hobbes represents a crucial step in the move from the source of authority and political obligation to a focus on legitimacy. (shrink)

Is the principal concern of political philosophy the source of political authority? And, if so, can this source be located in individual consent? In this article I draw on Rousseau to answer the second question negatively; and in rejecting that answer, why we might answer the first question in the negative as well. We should be concerned with questions of legitimacy rather than with the source of authority and political obligation. Our principal concern, that is, should be with the question (...) how well political institutions meet the needs of individuals. I pursue these issues in the context of interpreting Rousseau's distinctive contribution to political thought. I start out by asking the question ‘What problem is the General Will designed to solve?’ I argue that Rousseau's challenge to Hobbes represents a crucial step in the move from the source of authority and political obligation to a focus on legitimacy. (shrink)

In this paper, I concentrate on two themes: to what extent numbers bear on an agent's duties, and how numbers should relate to social policy. In the first half of the paper I consider the abstract case of a choice between saving two people and saving one, and my focus is on the contrast between a duty to act and a reason which merely makes an action intelligible. In the second half, I turn to the issue of social policy and (...) investigate how if at all numbers can have a bearing there, if there is no obvious duty on individuals to save the greater number. My proposal is that it is not the bare numbers themselves (or even the ratio of claimants on either side of the dilemma) which explain our intuitions in such cases, but rather considerations of the extent to which each of us can make a reasonable claim on others. In short, I argue: numbers don't count, people do. (shrink)

In this paper, I concentrate on two themes: to what extent numbers bear on an agent's duties, and how numbers should relate to social policy. In the first half of the paper I consider the abstract case of a choice between saving two people and saving one, and my focus is on the contrast between a duty to act and a reason which merely makes an action intelligible. In the second half, I turn to the issue of social policy and (...) investigate how if at all numbers can have a bearing there, if there is no obvious duty on individuals to save the greater number. My proposal is that it is not the bare numbers themselves which explain our intuitions in such cases, but rather considerations of the extent to which each of us can make a reasonable claim on others. In short, I argue: numbers don't count, people do. (shrink)

How can certain cultural goods (for example, museums, ice rinks, opera, the study of humanities) make a claim on our joint resources when there are other urgent needs to be met? Most of us resist the claim that one should sacrifice such cultural goods in the face of urgent needs and their priority as a concern for social justice. At the same time, in refusing the consequence, we are not inclined to think cultural goods more important than the urgent needs (...) of other human beings. What, then, justifies our resistance? (shrink)

In this review essay, I fijirst analyze the main tenets of Larry Temkin’s Rethinking the Good and, in particular, his claim that the goodness of state of afffairs may not be transitive. I examine one of the key examples of the book, and how it is intended to underwrite this claim. Next I describe the diffference between the threat of non-transitivity and the idea of incommensurability. I also consider the plausibility of what Temkin calls the Essentially Comparative View, and explore (...) possible responses to examples of seeming non-transitivity. I also raise some doubts regarding Temkin’s interpretation of ‘the separateness of persons’ and Rawls’ complaints against utilitarians. Finally, I envisage whether Temkin’s theoretical perspective helps us understand practical dilemmas that organizations such as the World Health Organization face. (shrink)

This article presents an analysis of the role that the idea of fraternity plays in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. Many commentators, G.A. Cohen for example, have taken as their target the role of fraternity in understanding the difference principle. The article highlights the neglected connection between Rawls’s principle of fraternity and the role of sentiments in A Theory of Justice. I focus, in particular, on the third part of A Theory of Justice, which has received less attention in (...) the secondary literature. The main idea put forward is that, contrary to what his egalitarian critics contend, the Rawlsian conception of fraternity constitutes the most plausible version of this political ideal: one which is properly egalitarian. (shrink)

Is the principal concern of political philosophy the source of political authority? And, if so, can this source be located in individual consent? In this article I draw on Rousseau to answer the second question negatively; and in rejecting that answer, why we might answer the first question in the negative as well. We should be concerned with questions of legitimacy rather than with the source of authority and political obligation. Our principal concern, that is, should be with the question (...) how well political institutions meet the needs of individuals. I pursue these issues in the context of interpreting Rousseau's distinctive contribution to political thought. I start out by asking the question 'What problem is the General Will designed to solve?' I argue that Rousseau's challenge to Hobbes represents a crucial step in the move from the source of authority and political obligation to a focus on legitimacy. (shrink)

Institutions, if unjust, ought to be reformed or even abolished. This radical Rawlsian thought leads to the question of whether the family ought to be abolished, given its negative impact on the very possibility of delivering equality of life chances. In this article, we address questions regarding the justice of the family, and of marriage, and reflect on rights, equality, and the provision of social goods by institutions. There is a temptation to justify our social institutions in terms which highlight (...) their universal accessibility and benefits. But we may best understand the claim of some of our most important institutions where we recognize that they are forms of social good which may legitimately benefit some without having to benefit all. Their abolition is unjustified where there is sufficient value in them given our collective needs that it is unreasonable for some to refuse the means to maintain and promote these goods. (shrink)

[ Samuel Scheffler] Some egalitarian liberals have proposed a division of moral labour between social institutions and individual agents, but the division-of-labour metaphor has been understood in different ways. This paper aims to disentangle some of these different understandings, with an eye to clarifying the appeal of the egalitarian-liberal project and the challenges that it faces. The idea of a division of moral labour is best understood as the expression of a strategy for accommodating diverse values. It is not an (...) apology for economic self-interest or a device for justifying personal acquisitiveness. /// [Véronique Munoz-Dardé] Are there distinctively political values? Certain egalitarians seem to think that equality is one such value. Scheffler's contribution to the symposium seeks to articulate a division of moral labour between norms of personal morality and the principles of justice that regulate social institutions, and using this suggests that the egalitarian critique of Rawls can be deflected. In this paper, instead, I question the status of equality as an intrinsic value. I argue that an egalitarianism which focuses on the status of equality as valuable in itself embraces a theory of value with the worst elements of utilitarianism while leaving behind any of the intuitive appeal that utilitarianism has. In its place I press that we need a political conception of egalitarianism which stresses the role we engage beyond those found in the norms of personal morality. (shrink)

La position originelle a une élégance et un attrait qui vont au-delà de la plupart des figures philosophiques. Il s’agit peut-être de l’aspect de la théorie rawlsienne qui ait le plus fasciné les lecteurs de Théorie de la justice. Bien que très étudiée, réinterprétée et critiquée, la position originelle est souvent présentée de façon erronée. En particulier, la méthode de raisonnement de John Rawls derrière le voile d’ignorance est souvent comprise comme si les conclusions qu’elle induit se situaient dans le (...) seul cadre du choix rationnel. Il y a donc différentes interprétations de la position originelle, correspondant à des perspectives plus ou moins proches d’une perspective éthique dans le cadre du choix rationnel, que ce soit le conséquentialisme ou l’utilitarisme. Mon but dans cet article est de clarifier le but de la position originelle rawlsienne. J’explique la différence entre une interprétation qui part du choix rationnel et des préférences des individus pour définir ce qui est exigé par la justice distributive et une interprétation qui met au contraire l’accent sur la justification raisonnable. Je montre que même si nous renonçons à l’ambition d’arriver à des principes de justice dans la seule perspective du choix rationnel, nous devons retenir plutôt qu’abandonner la position originelle. Je conclus en montrant que la principale différence entre l’utilitarisme et la théorie rawlsienne réside non dans la distribution que ces deux théories recommandent, mais dans la stratégie de justification qu’elles adoptent. (shrink)

Les auteurs visent à faire constater l'importance accordée à la pratique épistémologique dans la compréhension du monde politique et à nous interroger sur le rôle du savoir dans la construction d'un ordre social. [SDM].

L’article établit un contraste entre deux conceptions de la justice distributive (toutes deux libérales et égalitariennes), en vertu de leur attitude respective à l’égard des choix et de la responsabilité. Un premier type de théories établit la distribution des ressources en fonction de la distinction entre choix des agents et circonstances dans lesquelles ces choix s’opèrent : quiconque est responsable en vertu de ses choix de son manque de ressource est considéré avoir renoncé au droit à une compensation. Or cette (...) théorie part d’une conception erronée de la notion de responsabilité. Les considérations légitimes de réciprocité qui la sous-tendent doivent être envisagées dans le contexte d’une doctrine reposant également sur la notion de responsabilité, mais qui part d’une division des responsabilités entre institutions et individus. Cette seconde conception est développée dans le contexte de la distinction établie par Thomas Scanlon entre responsabilité attributive et responsabilité substantielle. Nous demandons ensuite si les principes de justice fondamentaux dont les institutions sont responsables devraient accorder la priorité à l’égalité équitable des chances et concluons en analysant les effets de la remarque de Rawls selon laquelle l’égalité des chances ne peut être réalisée sans abolir la famille. (shrink)

Book description:* Contributions from leading scholars in the field * Timely and important contribution to the moral and political debate about the status of children * Hot Topic The book contains contributions from thirteen distinguished moral and political philosophers on the subject of children. These are new essays and are devoted to a subject that until recently has not been extensively discussed by philosophers. Too often philosophers restrict themselves to the consideration only of the relations between adults. Yet the topic (...) of children is an important one for moral and political philosophy. Recent years have seen an increased concern with the needs and interests of young people. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which accords a wide range of fundamental rights to children was adopted in 1989 and many states have subsequently ratified the Convention. In this context it is timely and appropriate to ask various questions. If children do not have rights what exactly is their moral status? If they do have rights do they have all the rights that adults have? What rights if any do parents have over children and what is their justification? What duties do parents have towards their own children and towards others in society? How should we educate those who will be the future citizens and workers of our society? What values and what dispositions of character is it appropriate to instil in children? Is the family an obstacle to the realisation of full social justice? Can we in pursuit of justice contemplate the abolition of the family? The book covers the themes of children's rights, parental rights and duties, the family and justice, and civic education. (shrink)

John Rawls is regarded as the most important political philosopher of the twentieth century. His seminal work, _A Theory of Justice_, transformed the study of political philosophy and shaped the political thought of a generation. _Rawls on Justice_ demystifies this difficult text by introducing and assessing: Rawls’ life and the background to his philosophy The key concepts of _A Theory of Justice_, including the ‘orginal position’, the ‘veil of ignorance’, and the two principles of justice Rawls’ continuing importance to contemporary (...) philosophy and influence on political thought Ideal for those coming to Rawls for the first time, _Rawls on Justice_ is an invaluable guide for students of philosophy, political thought, economics and law. (shrink)

Le transhumanisme contemporain est souvent rapproché de précédents dans l'entre-deux-guerres. En effet, dans l'espace européen, entre les deux conflits mondiaux, nombre de penseurs ont porté le voeu d'élever l'homme au-delà de sa condition 'naturelle' par différentes techniques, que celles-ci modifient les comportements, les corps, ou les aspirations humaines. Des intellectuels, des scientifiques, des industriels et politiques ont concouru à l'élaboration de discours qui configurent différemment les rapports entre politique et technologie. Ces discours ne se réduisent pas aisément aux catégories bien (...) identifiées de l''homme nouveau,' de l'eugénisme ou de projets d'ordre technocratique. L''Ultra-humain' de Teilhard de Chardin, le 'post-humain' de Julian Huxley, le 'super-homme' de Voronoff, le 'surhumain' de Jean Rostand, l'homme 'minotaure' d'Ortega y Gasset : autant de tentatives pour nommer une humanité qui a perdu de son évidence en face de la machine et qui, par le même et paradoxal mouvement, découvre sa part d'artificialité. En ces temps troublés, l'idée d'un homme augmenté est une idée commune en Europe.--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Are there distinctively political values? Certain egalitarians seem to think that equality is one such value. Scheffler 's contribution to the symposium seeks to articulate a division of moral labour between norms of personal morality and the principles of justice that regulate social institutions, and using this suggests that the egalitarian critique of Rawls can be deflected. In this paper, instead, I question the status of equality as an intrinsic value. I argue that an egalitarianism which focuses on the status (...) of equality as valuable in itself embraces a theory of value with the worst elements of utilitarianism while leaving behind any of the intuitive appeal that utilitarianism has. In its place I press that we need a political conception of egalitarianism which stresses the role of equality as a political ideal without presupposing any values with which we engage beyond those found in the norms of personal morality. (shrink)

„Krumme Touren“ in der Wirtschaft werden in der aktuellen Debatte oft bemängelt. Doch wer zieht die Grenzlinie zwischen legitimem und illegitimem Verhalten von Unternehmern und Firmen? Diese Fragestellung verfolgen die Autoren des Bandes anhand von europäischen Beispielen aus dem 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Dabei zeigt sich, dass unternehmerische Handlungsnormen weder konstant noch unumstritten waren. Die Beiträge richten den Blick auf öffentliche Kritik und Skandale, Gerichtsprozesse, unternehmerische Selbstregulierung und staatliche Maßnahmen. Dabei tritt ein Spannungsverhältnis zwischen dem Prinzip der Gewinnmaximierung einerseits und (...) Werten wie Gemeinwohl, Transparenz oder politischen Idealen andererseits zutage. (shrink)

Munoz-Dardé (2009) argues that a social contract theory must meet Rousseau's 'liberty condition': that, after the social contract, each 'nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before'. She claims that Rousseau's social contract does not meet this condition, for reasons that suggest that no other social contract theory could. She concludes that political philosophy should turn away from social contract theory's preoccupation with authority and obedience, and focus instead on what she calls the 'legitimacy' of social arrangements. I (...) raise questions about each of these claims. (shrink)

Munoz-Dardé (2009) argues that a social contract theory must meet Rousseau's ‘liberty condition’: that, after the social contract, each ‘nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before’. She claims that Rousseau's social contract does not meet this condition, for reasons that suggest that no other social contract theory could. She concludes that political philosophy should turn away from social contract theory's preoccupation with authority and obedience, and focus instead on what she calls the ‘legitimacy’ of social arrangements. I (...) raise questions about each of these claims. (shrink)

Munoz-Dardé (2009) argues that a social contract theory must meet Rousseau's ‘liberty condition’: that, after the social contract, each ‘nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before’. She claims that Rousseau's social contract does not meet this condition, for reasons that suggest that no other social contract theory could. She concludes that political philosophy should turn away from social contract theory's preoccupation with authority and obedience, and focus instead on what she calls the ‘legitimacy’ of social arrangements. I (...) raise questions about each of these claims. (shrink)

author. University Professor in the School of Law, Columbia University. (From July 2006, Professor of Law, New York University.) Earlier versions of this Essay were presented at the Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy at University College London, at a law faculty workshop at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and at a constitutional law conference at Harvard Law School. I am particularly grateful to Ronald Dworkin, Ruth Gavison, and Seana Shiffrin for their formal comments on those occasions and also to (...) James Allan, Aharon Barak, Richard Bellamy, Aileen Cavanagh, Arthur Chaskalson, Michael Dorf, Richard Fallon, Charles Fried, Andrew Geddis, Stephen Guest, Ian Haney-Lopez, Alon Harel, David Heyd, Sam Issacharoff, Elena Kagan, Kenneth Keith, Michael Klarman, John Manning, Andrei Marmor, Frank Michelman, Henry Monaghan, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, John Morley, Matthew Palmer, Richard Pildes, Joseph Raz, Carol Sanger, David Wiggins, and Jo Wolff for their suggestions and criticisms. Hundreds of others have argued with me about this issue over the years: This Essay is dedicated to all of them, collegially and with thanks. (shrink)

(Tye 2006) presents us with the following scenario: John and Jane are both stan- dard human visual perceivers (according to the Ishihara test or the Farnsworth test, for example) viewing the same surface of Munsell chip 527 in standard conditions of visual observation. The surface of the chip looks “true blue” to John (i.e., it looks blue not tinged with any other colour to John), and blue tinged with green to Jane.¹ Tye then in effect poses a multiple choice question.

An exposition in five parts of the character of existentialist philosophy, including an analysis of the theories of Jean-Paul Sartre. Author Gabriel Marcel, a famous French dramatist, philosopher, and author of Le Dard, was a leading exponent of Christian existentialism.

The aim of this paper is to address a longstanding concern about the linguistic ‘relativ- ity’ of ontological categories, and resulting limitations in the scope of ontological theo- ries. Given recent evidence on the influence of language on cognitive dispositions, do we have empirical reasons to doubt that there are ontological categories that have uni- versal scope across languages? I argue that this is the case, at least if we retain the stan- dard ‘inferential’ approach within analytical ontology, i.e., if (...) we evaluate ontological interpretations of L-sentences relative to certain material inferences in L. Research in linguistic typology suggests that types of entities postulated for the domain of Indo- European languages cannot capture the ontological commitments of the (much larger group of) non-Indo-European languages. Ontological category theory thus seems to have three options. The first option is to abandon the standard ‘inferential’ approach to ontological category theory. Alternatively, if we stay with the inferential approach, we face the following choice. Either ontology must let go of its ambitions to provide general domain descriptions for any language and settle for the more modest project of reconstructing the ontological commitments of a group of natural languages. Or else analytical ontologists should turn to linguistic typology in order to accommodate the diversity of inferential structures embedded in natural languages. I recommend and ex- plore this third option, illustrating a strategy for how to construct a domain theory that can be used across languages. In a first step I show how linguistic research on the se- mantics of verbs and nouns (studies on so-called “Aktionsarten” and “Seinsarten”) can be used to identify the inferential patterns of ten basic concepts of modes of existence in time and space. In a second step I show how these inferential data can be inter- preted ontologically within General Process Theory, an ontological framework based on nonparticular individuals (“dynamics”). -/- . (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the development of well-founded conceptual models for Service Management, Accounting Information Systems and Financial Reporting. Economic ex- changes are a central notion in these areas and they occupy a prominent position in frameworks such as the Resource-Event Action (REA) ISO Standard, service core ontologies (e.g., UFO-S) as well as financial stan- dards (e.g. OMG’s Financial Industry Business Ontology - FIBO). We present a core ontology for economic exchanges inspired by a (...) recent view on this phenomenon. According to this view, economic exchanges are based on an agreement on the actions that the agents are committed to perform. This view enables a unified treatment of economic exchanges, regardless the object of the transaction. We ground our core ontology on the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO), discussing its formal and conceptual aspects, instantiating it as a reusable OntoUML model, and confronting it with the REA standard and the UFO-S service ontology. (shrink)