La siguiente es una reseña del estudio realizado por el profesor Francisco Rodríguez Valls de la Universidad de Sevilla respecto a la incertidumbre que supone la naturaleza y la condiciónn de la realidad humana. El análisis se avoca a una visión paranorámica del trabajo del profesor Valls, y de manera introductoria apunta los aspecto claves de su texto a fin de que el lector pueda hacerse una idea clara y concisa de la propia postura del autor.

Canguilhem’s take on the normal and the pathological offers an interesting insight to elaborate on a phenomenological account of illness and the medical encounter within the scope of Heidegger’s Daseinanalysis from Being and Time. Fredrik Svenaeus has drawn from the latter a definition of illness as an “unhomelike being in the world”. In this paper, I will elaborate on these concepts through the tale of Adriana, a cancer fighter that got diagnosed at age 26. Through her story, I will try (...) to illustrate Canguilhem’s main criticism against medicine's current state, as well as describe phenomenologically what it means to be ill, and what illness does to the patient's being-in-the-world. (shrink)

Andreu Nin defines fascism and analyses its class nature, challenging the notion that fascism’s aims match its rhetoric. While recruiting from among Italy’s middle classes, the petite bourgeoisie, it ultimately serves the big bourgeoisie objectively.

Como ha ocurrido con la COVID-19, el significado que se le ha dado a los conceptos de salud y, aún más, de enfermedad, ha sido el médico, clínico para ser más preciso. Lo cual es comprensible. No en vano son muchos los siglos de curar y cuidar a las personas dolientes o impedidas, o de tratar de hacerlo. Pero comprensible no es del todo sinónimo de lógico. Porque se trata de términos, sino polisémicos, por lo menos anfibológicos. Incluso desde el (...) ámbito mismo de la sanidad. (shrink)

The aim of the present study is to shed light on why the citation taken from Saraha’s Dohākośagīti and occurring in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, chapter 7, opens the door to some fundamental reflections concerning the authority and the “nature” of this latter text. On the basis of a historical and doctrinal analysis, here a new interpretation is put forward, according to which the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa should be considered a tenth century CE handbook, written by some unknown Buddhist teacher perhaps as a manual (...) for his lessons. The primary purpose of this teacher seems to have been the discussion—in the light of textual sources compiled up to this time—of the doctrinal and philosophical perspectives contained in the sixth century CE Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and Tarkajvālā. The Madhyamakaratnapradīpa could have been composed on the basis of notes written down for the benefit of this teacher’s students. Moreover, the analysis of the general style and quotes or references of the text, on the one hand, compared with the passage containing the quote from Saraha, on the other hand, lead us to take seriously into consideration the possibility that the citation borrowed from the Dohākośagīti could have been embedded into the text a little after its composition, by someone different from its original author. (shrink)

Pese a pertenecer a tradiciones distintas y haberse originado en momentos diferentes, la filosofía de la individuación de Gilbert Simondon y la corriente conocida en la filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas con el nombre de enactivismo comparten algunas características e intereses comunes. Ambas coinciden en su voluntad de integrar diferentes dominios del conocimiento, así como en algunos elementos de su aproximaciones a nociones como las de de emergencia y autonomía, y en su tratamiento general de las relaciones entre cognición, percepción (...) y acción. Mediante una comparación entre las ideas fundamentales los dos enfoques, trato de mostrar que el enactivismo podría beneficiarse de un acercamiento a las ideas expuestas por Simondon en sus obras fundamentales a diferentes niveles: por un lado, en la medida en la que la filosofía de la individuación ofrece una ontología fundamental más adecuada a los planteamientos enactivistas que la ontología individualista implícita en mucha de la filosofía de la mente contemporánea; pero también a un nivel más específico y concreto, ya que Simondon plantea con cierto detalle en sus obras algunas cuestiones importantes que el enactivismo ha empezado a abordar en los últimos años. (shrink)

In Āryadevapāda’s Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi we find a problematic passage in which some Cārvāka theories are expounded. The problem here lies in the fact that, according to Āryadevapāda, the Cārvākas—who did not admit rebirth—would have upheld that happiness in this life can be gained by worshipping gods and defeating demons. As the Cārvākas were materialists, the reference to gods and demons does not fit so much with their philosophical perspective. In this paper, by taking into account several passages from Pāli and Sanskrit (...) Buddhist sources, I have tried to demonstrate that Āryadevapāda is here probably following the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, where mention is made of some Lokāyatikas who are said to have been able to infatuate gods and demons. In both the Pāli Canon and the Mahāyāna sūtras, however, the term lokāyata does not refer to “materialism”. It rather conveys the meaning of “art of disputation”, and is generally used in the description of brāhmaṇas well versed in the Vedas, in the recitation of mantras and in dialectic methods in general. It is the Laṅkāvatārasūtra that introduces the idea—corroborated also by a passage from the Mahābhārata—that these brāhmaṇas, skilled in lokāyata, would have indulged in some materialistic tenet. When the two terms, Cārvāka and Lokāyata, came both to mean “materialism”, around the IV century CE, it is highly probable that non-Cārvāka thinkers and commentators—as could be the case of Āryadevapāda—had in some occasion assimilated and integrated certain points of view, originally belonging to the ancient lokāyata perspective (for instance, the references to gods and demons), into what they believed Cārvāka philosophy had to be. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 96 Heft: 1 Seiten: 291-295.

Introduzione, edizione del testo tibetano e traduzione annotata del Madhyamakārthasamgraha attribuito a Bhāviveka.

Abstract: This article shows how in the Pāli Nikāyas, after having defined Eternalism and Nihilism as two opposed positions, Gotama makes a dialectical use of Eternalism as means to eliminate Nihilism, upheld to be the worst point of view because of its denial of kammic maturation in terms of puñña and pāpa. Assuming, from an Eternalist perspective, that actions have effects also beyond the present life, Gotama underlines the necessity of betting on the validity of moral kammic retribution. Having thus (...) demonstrated the central ethical error of Nihilism, he subtly introduces peculiar Buddhist moral concepts (kusala/akusala) to purify the Eternalist vision from the doctrine of a real existing self (attāvāda) and from the puñña/pāpa dichotomy. We can summarize this dialectical course as follows: Nihilism is pāpa/akusala because it denies kamman, Eternalism is puñña/not-akusala because it upholds kamman from a non-Buddhist perspective, Buddhism is kusala because it admits the law of kamman not centred on a theory of a real existing self (anattāvāda). (shrink)

In this article an attempt is made to detect what could have been the dialectical reasons that impelled the Cār-vāka thinker Udbhatabhatta to revise and reformulate the classical materialistic concept of cognition. If indeed according to ancient Cārvākas cognition is an attribute entirely dependent on the physical body, for Udbhatabhatta cognition is an independent principle that, of course, needs the presence of a human body to manifest itself and for this very reason it is said to be a peculiarity of (...) the body. Therefore, Udbhatabhatta seems to de-scribe the cognizing faculty according to a double ontology: it is both a principle and a characteristic, both inde-pendent and dependent. Two philosophical contexts—Vaisesika and Nyāya schools—are here taken into account as possible anti-Cārvāka fault-finding points of view that spured Udbhatabhatta to reconsider the Cārvāka per-spective. Although we do not have so much textual material on this particular aspect of the ancient and medieval philosophical debate in India, it nonetheless can be supposed that Udbhatabhatta’s reformulation of the concept of cognition was a tentative response to the Vaisesika idea that cognition is not an attribute of the body, rather of the mind (which is here supposed to be eternal), and to the Naiyāyika perspective according to which cognition would be an attribute of an everlasting self. In the case of the Nyāya school, fortunately we have at our disposal the criticism put forward by Vātsyāyana against the materialistic conception of cognition during this time. By examining some Vātsyāyana’s objections, it will emerge that Udbhatabhatta’s idea of cognition really seems to have the aspect of a consistent answer to them, from a renewed materialistic point of view. (shrink)

ATTI DEL IV «SEMINARIO POPOLARE SUL PENSIERO DELL'ESTREMO ORIENTE», TERMINI IMERESE (5-6 MAGGIO 2012).

In the twenty-first century, with steadily increasing production and consumption of the zombie genre, academic interest in it is also growing. Scholars seek to explain the phenomenon, frequently focusing on the living dead and mostly seeing the figure of the zombie as an expression of the anxieties besetting contemporary society. In particular, its popularity can be interpreted as a response to the escalating climate of terror since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, after which media reporting has routinely been permeated with (...) images of death and destruction,1 constantly drawing attention to the insecurity that threatens to turn the American dream into a nightmare.2There is no shortage of authors who have emphasized the... (shrink)

Krishna Del Toso offre una penetrante analisi della cultura indiana sotto la particolare prospettiva della pratica marziale e della dimensione agonistica, riconducendole alla grande matrice di senso che è l’azione sacrificale sullo sfondo del grande testo classico Ṛgveda.

Margarita Diaz-Andreu offers an innovative history of archaeology during the nineteenth century, encompassing all its fields from the origins of humanity to the medieval period, and all areas of the world. The development of archaeology is placed within the framework of contemporary political events, with a particular focus upon the ideologies of nationalism and imperialism. Diaz-Andreu examines a wide range of issues, including the creation of institutions, the conversion of the study of antiquities into a profession, public memory, (...) changes in archaeological thought and practice, and the effect on archaeology of racism, religion, the belief in progress, hegemony, and resistance. (shrink)

The primary aim of this article is to provide a case study of textual hermeneutics in the context of Vedic literature. It will be shown how some interpretative pitfalls, into which contemporary translators have fallen, can be avoided if we broaden the perspective beyond the semantics of words and apply a principle of plausibility. The case study concerns the analysis of Ṛgveda 10.28, with special reference to the wildlife episodes depicted in verses 10cd-11ab. A few modern translations in Western languages (...) of 10cd are here considered. Some of them show that a principle of plausibility has been actually taken into account by their authors while approaching the text, albeit the result does not seem always entirely satisfactory. Some other translations seem not to carefully consider the broader context, therefore failing to convincingly make sense of the original text. After an introduction on the general subject of the hymn as it emerges from verses 1-9, i.e., the Vedic sacrifice and the subsequent consumption of the sacrificial offerings, arguments and textual evidence are provided in order to show how the reading of 10cd acquires a cogent and very plausible meaning if regarded in light of verse 11ab. (shrink)

Estas páginas plantean una serie de problemas que, a mi parecer, los sujetos de la emancipación colectiva deben de tener muy presentes para reconstruir sus idearios en el umbral del tercer milenio, después de las derrotas y de los fracasos del siglo XX. Aprovechando que se cumplen diez años de la muerte de Raymond Williams (1921-1988), he creído oportuno homenajear a este testigo excepcional de nuestro siglo haciendo una revisión de los problemas que acordó en los últimos años de su (...) vida. Problemas que ensombrecen más, si cabe, las perspectivas de conseguir una humanidad justa en un planeta habitable. Me estoy refiriendo a la manipulación informativa, a la mercantilización de la cultura y a los nefastos efectos antropológicos que la industria audiovisual puede ocasionar al estar controlada por grupos de poder intrínsecamente antidemocráticos. Estos n u e v o s problemas son los que, a mi juicio, dificultan la tarea de construir respuestas colectivas a los viejos problemas. Raymond Williams supo acotar sus análisis con rigor e intentó vislumbrar soluciones -siempre relativas y parciales- con humildad y cautela. (shrink)

An interview with Ramkrishna Bhattacharya on Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophy.

In this paper, Nāgārjuna’s philosophical interpretation of the terms kāraṇa and kārya is analysed after having methodologically confined the specific field of interest to the MMK. From the study of all the occurrences of kāraṇa and kārya in the MMK (listed in paragraph 2), it emerges that Nāgārjuna makes use of these two terms to refer to skandhas as causes (kāraṇa) of further skandhas as effects (kārya), hence conveying with this words the idea of, so to speak, subjectivity and (re)birth. (...) From the principal commentaries on the MMK (particularly Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti), we know also that, even when the reference of kāraṇa and kārya to skandhas is not explicitly pointed out by Nāgārjuna, it nonetheless can be inferred from the peculiar context in which these terms are employed. This conclusion seems to be confirmed also by the crosscheck analysis of the philosophical usage of the parallel terms hetu and phala, which refer either to, so to speak, objective (i.e., concerning general bhāvas) causes and effects, or – in the case of phala as consequence of karman/kriyā – to moral results (these two meanings are confirmed also by some passages from the Vigrahavyāvartanī), but in no cases Nāgārjuna makes recurse to hetu and phala to refer to what could be called a subjective (i.e., concerning skandhas) level of causality. To the paper an addendum is added, in which the commentaries on MMK 8.4 are taken into consideration. From this excursus it appears that at least Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, by ‘overinterpreting’ the meaning of hetu in the kārika, are consequently forced to readapt the philosophical significance of kāraṇa and kārya in a way that does not fit so much with Nāgārjuna’s original message. (shrink)

In the Dunhuang manuscript IOL Tib J 709, which is a collection of writings concerning meditation, we come across a short text attributed to a Tibetan master called Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ (allegedly eighth-ninth centuries CE). In his work, Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ exposes a method of meditation that seems to be strongly indebted to Indian Mahāyāna scriptural sources. Besides, also a Chinese Chan influence is here detectable. Therefore, the method of meditation taught by Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ seems to represent a commingling of different elements from different contexts. (...) After a general introduction to the manuscript IOL Tib J 709, this study focuses on Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ’s text, discussing and analysing the following topics: its author and date, the Indian Mahāyāna possible sources, Chinese Chan elements, the meditational path described. An annotated translation of the text, along with its transliteration and the reproduction of the fac-simile of the corresponding portion of the manuscript, concludes the study. (shrink)

Edition of the Tibetan text of the Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha attributed to Bhāviveka (based on the Co-ne, sDe-dge, dGa’-ldan and sNar-thaṅ versions), along with an Italian translation and an introductory philosophical study.

This article deals with the meaning and function of saññā in perception according to the Suttapiṭaka. As regards its meaning, the discussion stresses the fact that the renderings “perception” and “apperception” seem to overinterpret the actual function/activity of saññā. Also the translations “idea” and “ideation” should be used cautiously, in order to avoid misunderstandings, since these terms are fraught with very specific philosophical and psychological implications in the Western context. Moreover, though “cognition” could be a good rendering, “recognition” seems to (...) be a more adequate translation for saññā, because it conveys the meaning of both cognizing and naming, which are the two main activities carried out by saññā. In this sense, cognition should be envisaged as a recording process that labels (and gives names to) the data coming from the senses. As regards its role in perception, saññā takes place after contact (phassa) and sensation (vedanā). Its task is to collect the not yet well-defined information provided by phassa and vedanā, and to organize this information into a datum that can be made available to, and handled by, the consciousness (viññāṇa). The task of viññāṇa, in its turn, is to interpret this datum according to sujbective “values”. The present study stresses also the fact that the recognition carried out by saññā can be either simple (colors, tastes, etc.) or complex (danger, death, etc.). For this reason, after having dealt with simple perceptions, a section is devoted to the analysis and possible explanation of complex recognitions. Moreover, since the textual sources record the fact that saññā can fail its task to recognize things, another section is added, in which incorrect recognitions are taken into consideration. (shrink)

The article discusses Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpavṛtti and Avalokitavrata’s Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā commentaries on the “not without a cause” (nāpy ahetutaḥ) alternative of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 1.1ab, from which it emerges that at least two distinct theories of causality can be attributed to the Lokāyata school. The first one is a physicalist theory that confines all causal relations within the sphere of material elements and is assimilated to accidentalism. The second one is a naturalist theory that attributes causal power to inner nature (svabhāva). The paper (...) discusses the theoretical differences between these two approaches, considers Bhāviveka’s and Avalokitavrata’s counter-arguments and concludes that some of the conjectures that modern scholars have put forward on the relation between svabhāvavāda, accidentalism and Lokāyata should be revised. (shrink)

Analisi di un aspetto di "circolarità" delle funzioni implicate nella teoria psicologica del buddhismo antico.

Introduzione, edizione del testo tibetano e traduzione del Madhyamakabhramaghāta, opera attribuita ad Āryadeva.

This article presents the first annotated English translation and edition of the Tibetan text of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, chapter 5, whose original Sanskrit is to be considered lost. The Introduction contains a primary analysis of contents and aims of the chapter, together with general observations on the epoch and compositional style of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa. It is suggested that the text is probably a 10 th century explanatory handbook of Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvālā for beginner students. Chapter 5, in particular, relying strongly upon the (...) “two truths” dialectics, focuses on how students can consistently respond to the main objections opponents used to raise against the Madhyamaka standpoint. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente artículo consiste en analizar el trasfondo de las matemáticas empleadas por Aristóteles en el libro V de la _Ética a Nicómaco_ con el propósito de esclarecer las nociones de aritmética y geometría en relación con la justicia y la ética. Expongo brevemente la concepción de algunos estudiosos de Aristóteles que proponen una incompatibilidad radical entre ambos modelos matemáticos, y a partir de ello indico por qué esa lectura es equivocada. Finalmente, defiendo una interpretación integracionista, especialmente a (...) partir de la comprensión de la virtud como _enérgeia_ y _entelécheia_. (shrink)

Ciò che qui chiamo Materialismo indiano non deve intendersi come scuola filosofica unica ed univocamente impostata, bensì come insieme di correnti di pensiero, propugnanti differenti punti di vista, ma tutte collocate entro l’orizzonte concettuale che nega ciò che in Occidente si usa chiamare Trascendente. Inoltre, com’è ovvio, bisogna distinguere tra un Materialismo filosofico – che prenderò in considerazione qui – ed un Materialismo, per così dire, popolare – al quale mi riferirò solo se necessario. Due sono le impostazioni materialiste che (...) intendo trattare: l’una riguarda i sostenitori dell’esistenza di cinque elementi materiali (bhūtapañcakavādin) che chiamerò, seguendo Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, proto-Materialisti, l’altra concerne i sostenitori dell’esistenza di quattro elementi materiali (bhūtacatuṣṭayavādin), tra cui i Cārvāka. (shrink)