Early last year, the GenEthics Consortium (GEC) of the Washington Metropolitan Area convened at George Washington University to consider a complex case about genetic testing for Alzheimer disease (AD). The GEC consists of scientists, bioethicists, lawyers, genetic counselors, and consumers from a variety of institutions and affiliations. Four of the 8 co-authors of this paper delivered presentations on the case. Supplemented by additional ethical and legal observations, these presentations form the basis for the following discussion.

1 Evidence-based policy requires researchers to provide the answers to ecological questions that are of interest to policy makers. To find out what those questions are in the UK, representatives from 28 organizations involved in policy, together with scientists from 10 academic institutions, were asked to generate a list of questions from their organizations. 2 During a 2-day workshop the initial list of 1003 questions generated from consulting at least 654 policy makers and academics was used as a basis for (...) generating a short list of 100 questions of significant policy relevance. Short-listing was decided on the basis of the preferences of the representatives from the policy-led organizations. 3 The areas covered included most major issues of environmental concern in the UK, including agriculture, marine fisheries, climate change, ecosystem function and land management. 4 The most striking outcome was the preference for general questions rather than narrow ones. The reason is that policy is driven by broad issues rather than specific ones. In contrast, scientists are frequently best equipped to answer specific questions. This means that it may be necessary to extract the underpinning specific question before researchers can proceed. 5 Synthesis and applications. Greater communication between policy makers and scientists is required in order to ensure that applied ecologists are dealing with issues in a way that can feed into policy. It is particularly important that applied ecologists emphasize the generic value of their work wherever possible. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DULLES AND AQUINAS ON REVELATION 1. Beginning the Dialogue RESPECT FOR Avery Dulles' achievement in Models of Revelation 1 need not oonsist entirely in "enthusiastic recognition of its many merits " 2 even though it is " the mature reflection of an experienced teacher " and " as of now... the most comprehensive treatment on revelation in the English"'speaking world ".3 Learning from it involves recognizing the " worthwhileness (...) of dialogue with Dulles ' work ".4 In this questions,are essential to advancing the discussion. This article will proceed in appreciative dialogue by means of critical questions and wiH move in the direction of modifying aspects of Dulles' basic principle in Models of Revelation. Dialogue, according to the hermeneutical work of H.-G. Gadamer,5 is not first of all a genre for organizing,and presenting themes and ideas already attained. It belongs to the act of understanding itself, occurs in reading a text, always takes place in and through tradition and is one of the ways in which interpretation enters into every experience. In this light, the Summa Theologiae 6 of St. Thomas Aquinas belongs to a read1 Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983). 2 Bernard Cooke, " God Revealing in Symbol", OommonweaZ 110: 308, May 20, 1983. 3 Dermot Lane, "A Review Essay: Dulles on Revelation", The Living Light, 21:74-76, Oct. 1984; p. 74. 4 William Loewe, review in New Catholic World, 226:185, July-August, 1983. 5 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth wnd Method (New York: Crossroad, 1982); pp. 325-341, 345-351. 6 St. Thomas.Aquinas, Summa Theofogiae, Vol. 45, Prophecy and Other 445 446 THOMAS HUGHSON, S.J. ing of 211odels of Revelation, despite the absence of evidence that it influenced Dulles' theology of revelation. It does not belong to it, that is, because it served as a source for 211odels of Revelation. Nevertheless, the Summa is within, and has significantly changed, the theological tradition shared by 211odels of Revelation. Reading Dulles' book in light of its tradition, then, brings Aquinas into the dialogue 7 in a way that would not be appropriate for a strictly historical-theological analysis of influences upon Dulles' theology of revelation. The Summa stands as a classic 8 work in the Catholic theological tradition. The inescapable magnitude of Aquinas' achievement makes it pertinent to every part of that tradition. Karl Rahner judged that, " Thomas Aquinas is to be immbered among the great figures of theology with whom any contemporary theology must engage in a genuine dialogue ".9 Rahner observed, too, the way in which attitudes toward Aquinas have changed. He noted, "From being the teacher of theology in the theological schools themselves, Thomas has acquired the status of a Father of the Church ".10 In this new and somewhat reduced condition, Aquina:s' text's can assume their true proportions as theological classics whose claim upon generation after generation arises not so much from official sanction as from their self-evidencing power to speak about subject-matter whose intr:insic significance brings it before a succession of eras and to a variety of cultures. It is easy Charisms (2a2ae, 171-8), Latin text; English translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices & Glossary by Roland Potter, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969). English translations and Latin text will be from Vol. 45 through-out this article; references will be to parts of Aquinas' article. 7 M.-D. Chenu's Toward Understanding Et. Thomas, translated by A-M Landry & D. Hughes (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964), it is true, places the modern reader in dialogue with medieval texts through careful recovery of their contexts. But the relationship tends to lead into Aquinas's texts and their meaning rather than back from them to contemporary themes. s H.-G. Gaclamer, pp. 253-258. 9 Karl Rahner, "On Recognizing the Importance of Thomas Aquinas", Theological Investigationg Vol. XIII, translated by D. Bourke (New York: Seabury Press, 1975); pp. 3-12, 6-7. 10 Rahner, p. 4. DULLES AND AQUINAS ON REVELATION 447 enough to see that dirulogue with Aquinas inspired the work of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan as well as the early writings of Edward Schillebeeckx and Johann Baptist Metz. Yet this is not to... (shrink)

Thinking about God often leads to thinking about ‘God’. And it has never been completely clear how best to understand this little English word. Traditionally, ‘God’ has been taken to be either a description or a name. However, a third option has recently captured the attention of philosophical theologians. It is claimed that just as one should think of, say, ‘humanity’ as a kind term, so one should think of ‘God’, or perhaps ‘divinity’, as a kind term. But given the (...) tight link between semantics and metaphysics, if one is tempted to understand ‘humanity’ or ‘divinity’ as kind terms, then one will naturally begin to think of humanity and divinity as kinds. Characterizing divinity this way, a primary task of philosophical theology is to give a characterization of the divine kind-essence. In this paper, I want to consider the claim that divinity is profitably construed as a kind-essence, and argue that the way that this has typically been understood is not altogether adequate. I shall then present and develop an alternative understanding of this kind-essence approach that takes the analogy of `supernatural kinds’ and natural kinds much more seriously. I will conclude by considering some objections. (shrink)

In this clear and up-to-date introduction, Thomas D. Senor lays the philosophical foundation needed to understand the justification of memory belief. This book explores traditional accounts of the justification of memory belief and examines the resources that prominent positions in contemporary epistemology have to offer theories of the memorial justification. Along the way, epistemic conservatism, evidentialism, foundationalism, phenomenal conservatism, reliabilism, and preservationism all feature. Study Questions and annotated Further Reading guides at the end of each chapter make this book (...) ideal for classroom use and independent study. Written in very clear prose, A Critical Introduction to the Epistemology of Memory is a valuable resource for students approaching epistemology for the first time or those looking to advance their understanding of a core area of philosophy. (shrink)

Detection theory has been applied to a host of varied problems (for example, measuring the accuracy of diagnostic systems or reliability of lie detection tests) and extends far beyond the detection of signals. This book is a primer on the subject.

In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epistemic (...) status of our justified nonoccurrent beliefs, and hence are drastically incomplete. (shrink)

In a pair of recent articles, Brian Leftow and Eleonore Stump offer independent, although similar, accounts of the metaphysics of the Incarnation. Both believe that their Aquinas-inspired theories can offer solutions to the kind of Leibniz’s Law problems that can seem to threaten the logical possibility of this traditional Christian doctrine. In this paper, I’ll have a look at their compositional account of the nature of God incarnate. In the end, I believe their position can be seen to have unacceptable (...) philosophical and theological implications, and that is it inadequate to solve the Leibniz’s law problems that motivate it in the first place. (shrink)

In this paper I present and defend two arguments which purport to show that the doctrines of timelessness and the Incarnation are incompatible. An argument similar to the first argument I consider is briefly discussed by Stump and Kretzmann in their paper "Eternity." I argue that their treatment of this type of objection is inadequate. The second argument I present is, as far as I know, original; it depends on a certain subtlety in the doctrine of the Incarnation, viz., that (...) the Son took on or assumed a human nature. It seems that there is no way to understand what it is for the Son to take on a human nature that doesn’t entail his mutability; and mutability entails temporality. Thus, since Christ is said to take on a human nature, an orthodox Christology must maintain that the Son is temporal. I conclude by considering whether the Son’s temporality entails the temporality of the Godhead. (shrink)

The term “euthanasia” is used in conflicting ways in the bioethical literature, as is the term “assisted suicide,” resulting in definitional confusion, ambiguities, and biases which are counterproductive to ethical and legal discourse. I aim to rectify this problem in two parts. Firstly, I explore a range of conflicting definitions and identify six disputed definitional factors, based on distinctions between (1) killing versus letting die, (2) fully intended versus partially intended versus merely foreseen deaths, (3) voluntary versus nonvoluntary versus involuntary (...) decisions, (4) terminally ill versus non-terminally ill patients, (5) patients who are fully conscious versus those in permanent comas or persistent vegetative states, and (6) patients who are suffering versus those who are not. Secondly, I distil these factors into six “building blocks” and combine them to develop an unambiguous, value-neutral taxonomy of “end-of-life practices.” I hope that this taxonomy provides much-needed clarification and a solid foundation for future ethical and legal discourse. (shrink)

This book is the first study to focus on the reception of Paul's link between resurrection and salvation, revealing its profound effect on early Christian theology - not only eschatology, but also anthropology, pneumatology, ethics, and soteriology. Thomas D. McGlothlin traces the roots of the strong tension on the matter in ancient Judaism and then offers deep readings of the topic by key theologians of pre-Nicene Christianity, who argued on both sides of the issue of the fleshliness of the (...) resurrected body. McGlothlin unravels the surprising continuities that emerge between Irenaeus, Origen, and the Valentinians, as well as deep disagreements between allies like Irenaeus and Tertullian. (shrink)

According to Eric Funkhouser, omnipotence and necessary moral perfection (what Funkhouser calls "impeccability") are not compatible. Funkhouser gives two arguments for this claim. In this paper, I argue that neither of Funkhouser's arguments is sound. The traditional theist can reasonably claim that, contra Funkhouser, (i) there is no possible being who possesses all of God's attributes sans impeccability, and (ii) the fact that there are things that God cannot do does not entail that God lacks omnipotence. Armed with (i) and (...) (ii), the theist has all that is needed to refute Funkhouser's arguments. (shrink)

The New Demon World Objection claims that reliabilist accounts of justification are mistaken because there are justified empirical beliefs at demon worlds— worlds at which the subjects are systematically deceived by a Cartesian demon. In this paper, I defend strongly verific (but not necessarily reliabilist) accounts of justification by claiming that there are two ways to construct a theory of justification: by analyzing our ordinary concept of justification or by taking justification to be a theoretic term defined by its role (...) in the theory of knowledge. The former route is not promising because of the splintered nature of our ordinary concept of justification—or perhaps because there is no single such concept. On the other hand, if justification is defined by the role it plays in the theory of knowledge, then there is good reason to think that justification must be strongly truth-conductive since the term was introduced by Edmund Gettier to play the primary role in converting true belief into knowledge. And if that is right, then there will be no justified empirical belief at demon worlds. The real lesson of the demon world is then turned on its head: justification does not supervene on what one shares with one’s deceived doppelganger. (shrink)

The commonly held view that Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion entails an irrationalist defense of religion known as 'fideism' loses plausibility when contrasted with recent scholarship on Wittgenstein's corpus, biography, and other sources. This book reevaluates the place of Wittgenstein in the philosophy of religion and charts a path forward for the subfield by advancing three themes. The first is that philosophers of religion should question received interpretations of philosophers, such as Wittgenstein, as well as the meanings of key terms used (...) in interpretations, such as 'fideism'. The second theme is that Wittgenstein's philosophy, across his corpus, pursues a particular end: a searching clarity or perspicuity. The third theme is that with the rise of various religious movements within societies and around the world in recent decades, philosophy of religion has important tasks in clarifying global conversations on living well amidst human diversities and contemplating philosophy as a vocation. (shrink)

Condorcet's jury theorem shows that when the members of a group have noisy but independent information about what is best for the group as a whole, majority decisions tend to outperform dictatorial ones. When voting is supplemented by communication, however, the resulting interdependencies between decision makers can strengthen or undermine this effect: they can facilitate information pooling, but also amplify errors. We consider an intriguing non-human case of independent information pooling combined with communication: the case of nest-site choice by honeybee (...) (Apis mellifera) swarms. It is empirically well documented that when there are different nest sites that vary in quality, the bees usually choose the best one. We develop a new agent-based model of the bees' decision process and show that its remarkable reliability stems from a particular interplay of independence and interdependence between the bees. (shrink)

Our technologies are progressively developing into algorithmic devices that seamlessly interface with digital personhood. This text discusses the ways in which technology is increasingly becoming a part of personhood and the resulting ethical issues. It extends upon the framework for a brain-based cyberpsychology outlined by the author's earlier book Cyberpsychology and the Brain: The Interaction of Neuroscience and Affective Computing. Using this framework, Thomas D. Parsons investigates the ethical issues involved in cyberpsychology research and praxes, which emerge in algorithmically (...) coupled people and technologies. The ethical implications of these ideas are important as we consider the cognitive enhancements that can be afforded by our technologies. If people are intimately linked to their technologies, then removing or damaging the technology could be tantamount to a personal attack. On the other hand, algorithmic devices may threaten autonomy and privacy. This book reviews these and other issues. (shrink)

In his recent book, Jaegwon Kim argues thatpsychophysical supervenience withoutpsychophysical reduction renders mentalcausation `unintelligible'. He also claimsthat, contrary to popular opinion, his argumentagainst supervenient mental causation cannot begeneralized so as to threaten the causalefficacy of other `higher-level' properties:e.g., the properties of special sciences likebiology. In this paper, I argue that none ofthe considerations Kim advances are sufficientto keep the supervenience argument fromgeneralizing to all higher-level properties,and that Kim's position in fact entails thatonly the properties of fundamental physicalparticles are causally efficacious.

Philosophers and theologians acknowledge that "fideism" is difficult to define but rarely agree on what the best characterization of the term is. In this article, I investigate the history of use of "fideism" to explore why its meaning has been so contested and thus why it has not always been helpful for resolving philosophical problems. I trace the use of the term from its origins in French theology to its current uses in philosophy and theology, concluding that "fideism" is helpful (...) in resolving philosophical problems only when philosophers scrupulously acknowledge the tradition of use that informs their understanding of the word. (shrink)

Traditionally, the term ’God’ has been understood either as a proper name or as a description. However, according to a new view, the term God’ in a sentence like "Jesus Christ is God" functions as a kind term, much as the term ’tiger’ functions in the sentence "Tigger is a tiger." In this paper I examine the claim that divinity can be construed as a ’supernatural’ kind, developing the outlines of an account of the semantics of God’ along these lines, (...) and suggest that it might solve an important philosophical problem concerning the Incarnation. (shrink)

The current study examined whether pigeons could learn to use abstract concepts as the basis for conditionally switching behavior as a function of time. Using a mid-session reversal task, experienced pigeons were trained to switch from matching-to-sample (MTS) to non-matching-to-sample (NMTS) conditional discriminations within a session. One group had prior training with MTS, while the other had prior training with NMTS. Over training, stimulus set size was progressively doubled from 3 to 6 to 12 stimuli to promote abstract concept development. (...) Prior experience had an effect on the initial learning at each of the set sizes but by the end of training there were no group differences, as both groups showed similar within-session linear matching functions. After acquiring the 12-item set, abstract-concept learning was tested by placing novel stimuli at the beginning and end of a test session. Prior matching and non-matching experience affected transfer behavior. The matching experienced group transferred to novel stimuli in both the matching and non-matching portion of the sessions using a matching rule. The non-matching experienced group transferred to novel stimuli in both portions of the session using a non-matching rule. The representations used as the basis for mid-session reversal of the conditional discrimination behaviors and subsequent transfer behavior appears to have different temporal sources. The implications for the flexibility and organization of complex behaviors are considered. (shrink)

D.O. Thomas; VI*—The Duty to Trust, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 June 1979, Pages 89–102, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian.

In his recent book, Jaegwon Kim argues thatpsychophysical supervenience withoutpsychophysical reduction renders mentalcausation `unintelligible'. He also claimsthat, contrary to popular opinion, his argumentagainst supervenient mental causation cannot begeneralized so as to threaten the causalefficacy of other `higher-level' properties:e.g., the properties of special sciences likebiology. In this paper, I argue that none ofthe considerations Kim advances are sufficientto keep the supervenience argument fromgeneralizing to all higher-level properties,and that Kim's position in fact entails thatonly the properties of fundamental physicalparticles are causally efficacious.

Despite the growth in research in philosophy of religion over the past several decades, recent years have seen a number of critical studies of this subfield in an effort to redirect the methods and topics of inquiry. This article argues that in addition to problems of religious parochialism described by critics such as Wesley Wildman, the subfield is facing a problem of relevance. In responding to this problem, it suggests that philosophers of religion should do three things: first, be critically (...) self-aware about their aims of inquiry; second, investigate concepts used by other philosophers, scientists, and religious studies scholars to identify and dispel confusion about religions; and third, following the model of applied ethics, work to clarify concepts and advance arguments of contemporary practical urgency. (shrink)

Can an act harm someone—a future someone, someone who does not exist yet but will—if that person would never exist but for that very action? This is one question raised by the non-identity problem. Many would argue that the answer is No: an action harms someone only insofar as it is worse for her, and an action cannot be worse for someone if she would not exist without it. The first part of this paper contends that the plausibility of the (...) ‘no harm’ argument stems from an equivocation. The second half argues for an account of harm that is both causal and contrastive. Finally, the paper contends that the contrastive account disarms the no harm argument and furthermore neutralizes a related argument that has been problematic for some previously proposed solutions to the non-identity problem. (shrink)

Father Williams explains how the conscience is formed through our training and experiences and informed by the Holy Spirit, making it an essential tool for daily living. He uses familiar and surprising characters to illustrate the positive choices conscience can direct--and the disaster that results when a conscience is undeveloped or ignored. Questions he tackles include "Is it more important to be smart or good?""Is there a morally right thing to do in every situation?" and "Is the Christian moral life (...) an exciting adventure, or a necessary burden?" Rich, provocative, and practical for everyday decision making, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG is a must-read for all who hunger for personal holiness. (shrink)