Despite the recent increase in interest in philosophy about ignorance, little attention has been paid to the question of what makes it possible for a being to become aware of their own ignorance. In this paper, I try to provide such an account by arguing that, for a being to become aware of their own ignorance, they must have the mental capacity to represent something as being unknown to them. For normal adult humans who have mastered a language, mental representation (...) of an unknown is enabled by forming linguistic expressions whose content is grasped, but whose referent is unknown. I provide a neo-Fregean, a neo-Russellian, and then a unified account of this. On that basis, I then argue further that the content of ignorance can always be captured by a question. I then distinguish between propositional ignorance and non-propositional ignorance and argue that propositional ignorance attributions can be of three types, that-ignorance, whether-ignorance, and fact-ignorance. I conclude by arguing that the acquisition of truths, even when it yields knowledge that is certain, does not always eliminate one’s ignorance and that there is a degree of ignorance in almost everything we claim to know. (shrink)

In der aktuellen Diskussion werden die Begriffe "Vernunft" und "Rationalität" in Frage gestellt. Mit der "Rationalität" einer Handlung, einer Haltung oder einer Organisation bezeichnet man im Allgemeinen den Erfolg bei der Verwirklichung eines bestimmten Zweckes. Die "instrumentale Rationalität" als Grundlage einer Ethik, für die das Nachdenken über den Wert der Zwecke ohne Belang ist, wurde seit jeher heftig kritisiert. Kant verwendet das Wort "rational" in Bezug auf die Bestimmungsgründe des Willens. Nach Kant sind die Bestimmungsgründe des Willens entweder „subjektiv und (...) empirisch" oder „objektiv und rational". Wenn der Wille "rational" bestimmt wird, so hat dies zur Folge, dass die Personen andere Personen nicht nur als Mittel, sondern auch als Zweck behandeln. Also in der Kantische Ethik weist das Wort "rational" auf ein Wesen hin, das selbst ein Zweck ist und deshalb als solcher behandelt werden soll. Schließlich bedeutet in der Kantischen Ethik das Wort "rational" eine "Rationalität" der Zwecke. (shrink)

In der aktuellen Diskussion werden die Begriffe "Vernunft" und "Rationalität" in Frage gestellt. Mit der "Rationalität" einer Handlung, einer Haltung oder einer Organisation bezeichnet man im Allgemeinen den Erfolg bei der Verwirklichung eines bestimmten Zweckes. Die "instrumentale Rationalität" als Grundlage einer Ethik, für die das Nachdenken über den Wert der Zwecke ohne Belang ist, wurde seit jeher heftig kritisiert. Kant verwendet das Wort "rational" in Bezug auf die Bestimmungsgründe des Willens. Nach Kant sind die Bestimmungsgründe des Willens entweder „subjektiv und (...) empirisch" oder „objektiv und rational". Wenn der Wille "rational" bestimmt wird, so hat dies zur Folge, dass die Personen andere Personen nicht nur als Mittel, sondern auch als Zweck behandeln. Also in der Kantische Ethik weist das Wort "rational" auf ein Wesen hin, das selbst ein Zweck ist und deshalb als solcher behandelt werden soll. Schließlich bedeutet in der Kantischen Ethik das Wort "rational" eine "Rationalität" der Zwecke. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to understand student perceptions towards plagiarism and identify some factors influencing their plagiarist behaviour to be able to develop successful strategies to promote academic integrity and prevent plagiarism. Although academic dishonesty and plagiarism have been investigated by many researchers, psychometric qualities of these data collection instruments have generally been ignored, which has resulted in a shortage of standardized and validated questionnaires in the literature. Therefore, to address this issue the researcher ran a rigorous psychometric (...) analysis on a previously developed and psychometrically evaluated questionnaire. The modified instrument was conducted on 404 students studying in a private university in Kuwait in March 2022, representing the first administration of a psychometrically established plagiarism scale in the Kuwaiti context. The statistical analysis revealed that students’ perceptions are significantly different according to the high school type they graduated from, their reasons for studying at the university, and their post-graduation career plans, whereas gender, major and year of study do not cause statistically significant differences. (shrink)

The subject of human acts has been one of the controversial topics of kalām since the first centuries of Islam. A lot of concerning human acts –from divine attributes to divine decree and destiny, from the issue of good and evil (ḥusn and Qubḥ) to the boundaries of the reasoning, from the accountability with impossible things to the rational accountability, from the topics of substance and accident to causality- has been said and written in the history of Islamic tought. In (...) this study, the subject was discussed especially within the scope of man’s on his own action in connection with the divine knowledge, will, and power. On this issue, the Muʻtazila argues that human beings are independent in doing their good and evil acts with the power that God has given to them because of His will and wisdom, and that the evil actions that they have done cannot be associated with the divine attributes in any way. Sunnī theologians assert that God creates human actions through man’s orginated power. They also arguethat evil acts are not independent of the Divine Creation although human beings are the reason of evil in terms of thier acquisition (kasb) and will (irāda). Nevertheless, the representetives of the Sunnī kalām (Asharites and Māturīdis) differ on their account of acquisition, which expresses man’s agency in his acts. In contrary to the Mātūrīdiya, the Ashʻariya holds that acquisition is a created act of God. On the other hand, the Mashshai (peripatetic) philosophers, who are opposed by teologians on some issues such as divine attributes and the working of activity/acts in nature, consider human’s actions part of the eternal chain of cause-effect that emanate (al fayḍ) from the First Principle. However, according to them, every link of this chain is formed by the divine providence (al-ināyah). They also attribute morally evil acts not to the First Principle which is complete (tām) and full good (hayr), but to agents in the cause-effect chain. In summary, according to both teologians and philosophers, the ultimate source of human acts is the divine will and power. The acts that are morally or religiously evil, are not independent of man’s will. Thus, human beings are accountable for their actions. Philosophers and teologians, who agree on these issues, have explained their views and build their opinions on different concepts and principles. They have shown a very different attitude in their discourse and secondary principles, while all of them basically try to express the same idea. This difference has revealed within the frame of the following questions: Is man’s accountability for his actions because of his created power or will? Can evil actions, which are willed by human beings and therefore created by God, attributed to Him? Does the fact that the world emanates from God, the First Principle, due to His knowledge and essence, necessitate Him to be a willless and ineffective agent, and therefore to be a cause cause that has no effect on man's actions?Although teologians and philosophers have put forward different views in the context of the answers to these questions, they agree on the issues we have mentioned above. As this study shows, there is actually a common purpose in this subject, man’s actions, which causes deep divisions between theologians and philosophers in Islamic history. Primary sources of the study are the basic texts of the schools mentioned above. Additionally, the study were limited to the subject the effect of human on acts. It consists of two parts: the main part and the conclusion part. In the main section, the approaches of schools were examined from two aspects, in in terms of divine attribute and human effectiveness, and in the conclusion section, the common purposes behind the discussions were determined. (shrink)

In the context of change to the “new modernity” described in Beck’s work, companies develop management modes and methods that focus more and more on individuals. Constitutive of the individualization process, human resources practices have become ambivalent as the process itself. This contribution examines how a managerial and organizational innovation as telework contributes to the process of individualization, and the paradoxes it addresses to management. At the interface of the social and the technical, teleworking appears as a flexible arrangement, meeting (...) employees’ and employer’s demands – which is a characteristic of the process of individualization – by simultaneously fragmenting collectivity, exposing individuals to social risk, and producing exclusion. The authors focus on two consecutive paradoxes of such individualized managerial practices: the individual–collective dilemma and the autonomy–control paradox. Finally, the paper reveals HRM as a new institution of individualization in a world where regulation functions are more and more transferred to individuals themselves. (shrink)

What does it mean for a general term to be rigid? It is argued by some that if we take general terms to designate their extensions, then almost no empirical general term will turn out to be rigid; and if we take them to designate some abstract entity, such as a kind, then it turns out that almost all general terms will be rigid. Various authors who pursue this line of reasoning have attempted to capture Kripke’s intent by defining a (...) rigid general term as one that applies to the objects in its extension essentially. I argue that this account is significantly mistaken for various reasons: it conflates a metaphysical notion (essentialism) with a semantic one (rigidity); it fails to countenance the fact that any term can be introduced into a language by stipulating that it be a rigid designator; it limits the extension of rigid terms so much that terms such as ‘meter’, ‘rectangle’, ‘truth’, etc. do not turn out to be rigid, when they obviously are; and it wrongly concentrates on the predicative use of a general term in applying a certain test offered by Kripke to determine whether a term is rigid. (shrink)

Religious education is a communication process between teacher and student. Martin Buber is one of the philosophers who attach importance to the communication and relationship that should be established between teachers and students in education. In Buber's dialogue philosophy, it is underlined that a reciprocal relationship should be established between teacher and student. Our study from this point aims to draw attention to the efforts of a sound communication opportunity between teacher and student in religious education in the light of (...) Martin Buber's thoughts. In this study designed as a qualitative research, the document analysis method was used. In this sense, the main theme of our study is Buber's books and articles translated into Turkish and English. Besides, the studies of Cohen, Friedman, Blenkinsop, and Boschki have also been studied. The relationship of the individual with the world in Buber's philosophy of dialogue takes place in two styles. The first is the I-S/He relationship style. The person who has this level of a relationship sees the world as an object to be experienced only for himself/herself. For this reason, there is no reciprocity in their relations and experience takes place within the individual. According to Buber, the second type of relationship is based on the I-You perspective. The individual who has this form of relationship makes the world meaningful in an open, sincere, and mutual relationship. In the education based on I-S/He behavior style, the teacher has a one-way relationship with students, which is not based on reciprocity. In this process, the teacher focuses more on the subject the student will tell. Buber criticizes this kind of education, which is avoided and not related to the student. According to Buber, education should be done according to the I-You behavior style. In this way, it is possible to realize the unique existence of the child and to unite with his/her inner and outer world with the power of mutual relationship and participation. In order for the learners to establish a sound relationship with the world in general and religious and moral phenomena in particular, the learners should be in contact with religious educators in the first place. In religious education, it is necessary to establish a relationship by the teacher in which religious beliefs and values are not imposed on the student and the authenticity of a student is respected. This relationship is only possible if the student trusts the teacher and knows that the teacher is really with him/her in person. The religious educator should provide the learner with real experiences that s/he can experience and feel and should be able to follow the inner world and thoughts of the learner in this process. In this context, it is necessary to turn onto the reality, problems, and needs of the period in which students live more than the future and adulthood. The tradition should be handled as a living organism that touches the student's life, not in the form of dull, finished events and stories, and focused more on principles and messages than events and people. As a result, education should aim not only to improve cognitive development and creativity but also to develop and excel in all aspects of the person. For this reason, emotional and social phenomena should be a part of religious education. The best way to include emotional and social phenomena in religious education lies in the relationship between teachers and students. For this reason, we think that it is necessary to concentrate more on relations theoretically between religious educators and learners. In fact, we also aim to remove the issue of communication from a technical issue and place it in an ontological issue perspective. This study aims to be a humble beginning for these purposes. (shrink)

A lot has been said about how the notion of reference relates to the notion of knowledge; not much has been said, however, on how the notion of referencerelates to our ability to become aware of what we do not know that allows us to be curious. In this essay I attempt to spell out a certain type of reference I call ‘inostensible’ that I claim to be a fundamental linguistic tool which allows us to become curious of what we (...) do not know. In the first part, I try to explicate the notion of inostensible reference, both for singular and for general terms, as well as full declarative sentences, and in the second part, I argue that our capacity to enjoy conceptual curiosity is essentially based upon our aptitude for inostensible reference. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.

Sadece dış dünya değil, düşünülebilir şeyler de ‘var’dır. Bu durumda Varlık ile belirlenmemiş olan, yolu Varlık’tan geçmemiş olan bir şey düşünülemez. Düşünülebilir şeyler arasında yalnızca Hiç’e varlık atfedilemez, zira ona varlık atfedildiği anda o, artık Hiç olmayacaktır. Bu nedenle Heidegger Hiç için ‘Hiçer’ ifadesini kullanır. Yine de bu, Hiçin Varlık soruşturmasında dışarıda bırakılması gerektiği anlamına gelmez. Hiç tam da ‘varlık-sız’ olduğundan Varlığın anlamını soruşturmak için önemli bir perspektif imkânı sunar. Heidegger, ‘varolanlar vardır’ denildiğinde, asıl üzerinde durulması gerekenin ‘vardır’ ifadesi olduğunu (...) düşündüğünden Varlığın anlamını, ‘varolanlardan soyarak’ daha önce yapılmamış bir tarzda soruşturur. Biz de burada onun bu soruşturmada başvurduğu en önemli kavramlardan biri olan Hiç üzerinde duracağız. Heidegger, Varlığın anlamını soruşturmak için Hiçi öyle bir tarzda ele alır ki bu Hiçin sonunda Hiç olarak kalıp kalmayacağından şüphe edebilir ve şunu sorabiliriz: Bir fenomen olarak ele alınan Hiç, tamamen boş ve hatta üzerinde düşünülemeyecek bir Hiçliği mi işaret eder, yoksa o, bir şekilde ele geçirilebilir bir ‘şey’ midir? Bir şekilde tecrübe edilebiliyorsa o, artık Hiç olarak kalabilir mi? Heidegger’e göre Hiç, bir şekilde dünyaya gelerek insan varlığında ele geçirilebilir, öyleyse biz de burada onun Hiçi, Hiç olarak bırakmadığını ve Varlığa taşıdığını savunacağız. (shrink)

This paper examines student teachers? perceptions of the course of school experience in a teacher education programme in Turkey. Data were obtained through interviewing student teachers in Canakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Turkey. In order to analyse the data, Strauss and Corbin?s grounded theory methodology was adapted. The analysis revealed that although the current teacher education programme put emphasis on effective practical training, in some circumstances student teachers feel that their chances of gaining real teaching experiences are minimal. The study suggests (...) that there is a need for further strengthening the existing school?university partnership in teacher education. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue against eternalism on the basis of certain phenomenological considerations regarding our experiential life in a relatively novel way. Contrary to well-known phenomenological arguments that attempt to refute tenseless theories of time, our argument that we call the Transcendental Phenomenological Argument against Eternalism is against both tenseless and tensed versions of eternalism. The argument is based on the fact that one experiences a phenomenologicalsuccessionof experiences, and it shows that perdurantist forms of eternalism have to either deny (...) this fact or should embracead hocand metaphysically implausible assumptions about the nature of the mind. As we argue, neither of these options seems to be too promising. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.

I argue that Millianism has the very odd consequence that there are simple direct questions that Millians can grasp, but they cannot answer them in the positive or the negative, or in some other way, nor could they say that they do not know the answer.

In this paper I respond to the objections put forth by Kresimir Agbaba 22: 1-6) against my earlier paper 20: 7-13) in which I argue that given Donnellan's formulation|as well as Kripke's and Salmon's gen- eralized accounts|an attributive use of a denite description is a very rare linguistic phenomenon.

There are two sorts of singular terms for which we have difficulty applying Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction: complex definite descriptions, and proper names. With respect to the uses of such terms in certain contexts we seem to have conflicting intuitions as to whether they should be classified as referential or attributive. The problem concerning how to apply Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of certain complex definite descriptions has never been debated in the literature. On the other hand there have been attempts (...) to extend Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of proper names, the most popular one being due to Kripke. However the argument Kripke gives to this end in his ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’ seems to be inconsistent with the position he takes in Naming and Necessity. I suggest that the reason we seem to have conflicting intuitions with respect to the uses of such terms, is because there is not one but two separate distinctions inherent in Donnellan’s examples; a pragmatic distinction based on the speaker’s intentions in using a term , and an epistemic one based on the notion of having an object in mind. In the light of this, I argue that the issue of whether there are attributive uses of proper names, in the latter sense, relates to the epistemic problem of whether a speaker can have de re attitudes toward an object that he does not have in mind. On this epistemic issue Kripke and Donnellan are on opposite sides as revealed by their debate over the issue of whether there are contingent a priori propositions. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)