Despite the recent increase in interest in philosophy about ignorance, little attention has been paid to the question of what makes it possible for a being to become aware of their own ignorance. In this paper, I try to provide such an account by arguing that, for a being to become aware of their own ignorance, they must have the mental capacity to represent something as being unknown to them. For normal adult humans who have mastered a language, mental representation (...) of an unknown is enabled by forming linguistic expressions whose content is grasped, but whose referent is unknown. I provide a neo-Fregean, a neo-Russellian, and then a unified account of this. On that basis, I then argue further that the content of ignorance can always be captured by a question. I then distinguish between propositional ignorance and non-propositional ignorance and argue that propositional ignorance attributions can be of three types, that-ignorance, whether-ignorance, and fact-ignorance. I conclude by arguing that the acquisition of truths, even when it yields knowledge that is certain, does not always eliminate one’s ignorance and that there is a degree of ignorance in almost everything we claim to know. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to understand student perceptions towards plagiarism and identify some factors influencing their plagiarist behaviour to be able to develop successful strategies to promote academic integrity and prevent plagiarism. Although academic dishonesty and plagiarism have been investigated by many researchers, psychometric qualities of these data collection instruments have generally been ignored, which has resulted in a shortage of standardized and validated questionnaires in the literature. Therefore, to address this issue the researcher ran a rigorous psychometric (...) analysis on a previously developed and psychometrically evaluated questionnaire. The modified instrument was conducted on 404 students studying in a private university in Kuwait in March 2022, representing the first administration of a psychometrically established plagiarism scale in the Kuwaiti context. The statistical analysis revealed that students’ perceptions are significantly different according to the high school type they graduated from, their reasons for studying at the university, and their post-graduation career plans, whereas gender, major and year of study do not cause statistically significant differences. (shrink)

What does it mean for a general term to be rigid? It is argued by some that if we take general terms to designate their extensions, then almost no empirical general term will turn out to be rigid; and if we take them to designate some abstract entity, such as a kind, then it turns out that almost all general terms will be rigid. Various authors who pursue this line of reasoning have attempted to capture Kripke’s intent by defining a (...) rigid general term as one that applies to the objects in its extension essentially. I argue that this account is significantly mistaken for various reasons: it conflates a metaphysical notion (essentialism) with a semantic one (rigidity); it fails to countenance the fact that any term can be introduced into a language by stipulating that it be a rigid designator; it limits the extension of rigid terms so much that terms such as ‘meter’, ‘rectangle’, ‘truth’, etc. do not turn out to be rigid, when they obviously are; and it wrongly concentrates on the predicative use of a general term in applying a certain test offered by Kripke to determine whether a term is rigid. (shrink)

Ülfet Görgülü, Fıkıhta Cenin Hukuku, M.Ü. İlahiyat fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2018, 180 s.

A lot has been said about how the notion of reference relates to the notion of knowledge; not much has been said, however, on how the notion of referencerelates to our ability to become aware of what we do not know that allows us to be curious. In this essay I attempt to spell out a certain type of reference I call ‘inostensible’ that I claim to be a fundamental linguistic tool which allows us to become curious of what we (...) do not know. In the first part, I try to explicate the notion of inostensible reference, both for singular and for general terms, as well as full declarative sentences, and in the second part, I argue that our capacity to enjoy conceptual curiosity is essentially based upon our aptitude for inostensible reference. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.

In this paper, we argue against eternalism on the basis of certain phenomenological considerations regarding our experiential life in a relatively novel way. Contrary to well-known phenomenological arguments that attempt to refute tenseless theories of time, our argument that we call the Transcendental Phenomenological Argument against Eternalism is against both tenseless and tensed versions of eternalism. The argument is based on the fact that one experiences a phenomenologicalsuccessionof experiences, and it shows that perdurantist forms of eternalism have to either deny (...) this fact or should embracead hocand metaphysically implausible assumptions about the nature of the mind. As we argue, neither of these options seems to be too promising. (shrink)

It is well-known that Ibn al-Salāh al-Shahrazūrī (d. 643/1245) has an important place in the field of hadith methodology. In this context, it is possible to see Ibn-al Salah’s influence in a large proportion of the hadith terminology. The fact that the term ḥasan was not substantially included in the hadith method studies before Ibn-al Salah and that this concept became widely known in the field after him led to study the contributions of al Salah on the subject of ḥasan (...) hadith and in this regard, his effect on the term ḥasan. As result it was found that authorities such as Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), ʿAlī b. al-Madīnī (d. 234/848-49), Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241/855) used the concept of ḥasan in various meanings before al-Tirmidhī (d. 279/892) who, according to general acceptance, made the term ḥasan famous for its terminological use. However, it is possible to say that ʿAlī b. al-Madīnī was the first to use the terminological meaning of the concept ḥasan. Actually, the fact that Shafii’ used the term ḥasan isnād for an authentic hadith that al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) and Muslim b. Ḥajjāj (d. 261/875) would later unanimously narrate, and Ahmad b. Hanbal used ḥasan as gharib, is evidence for the unsystematic use of the term in the early periods. Even though, thanks to al-Tirmidhī, an important place was opened for the concept in riwāya literature, there was no serious mention of the term in later hadith methodology. Therefore, it has been seen that hadith scholars considered the term ḥasan within the scope of ṣaḥīḥ or ḍaʻīf hadith, since they accepted the term as an intermediate concept, and for this reason they did not include the term ḥasan among the subjects of hadith methodology until Ibn al-Salāh. An examination of the argument, that one can act upon a ḍaʻīf hadith, would show that ḥasan hadith might have been interpreted within the scope of ḍaʻīf hadith. On the other hand, the fact that some scholars such as Mughulṭāy b. Qilīj (d. 762/1361) state that a hadith would be called ṣaḥīḥ if it is maqbūl with any presumption, and that there is no point in calling such a hadith ḥasan shows that the ḥasan hadith is considered within the scope of ṣaḥīḥ hadith. The fact that hadith methodology scholars did not mention ḥasan hadith before Ibn al-Salāh stems from the ambiguity of the subject. Contrary to his predecessors, Ibn al-Salāh tried to save the term ḥasan from its ambiguity by combining the different specifications put forward by al-Tirmidhī, al-Khaṭṭābī (d. 388/998), and Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201). The specifications and interpretations of the term presented by Ibn al-Salāh via his meticulous efforts, have also been adopted by his successors. The term ḥasan hadith has gained an important place in the literature of hadith methodology thanks to the views and definitions built on the descriptions and interpretations of Ibn al-Salāh. In this context, while there are those who agree with Ibn al-Salāh’s descriptions and evaluations of the term, there are also those who criticize his remarks on the subject. However, it has been seen that those who criticize Ibn al-Salāh, along with those who follow him, criticized him by following the path drawn by Ibn al-Salāh. Based on this and similar situations, it was concluded that not only the descriptions and comments that Ibn al-Salāh made, but also his style and methods of handling the subject gave direction to the studies on hadith methodology. In addition, it has been observed that the most compact description of the term ḥasan is put forward by Ibn Hajar and today’s studies are predicated on his description. Within this framework, after emphasizing that there are four degrees of maqbūl hadiths, Ibn Hajar defined the two fields, which were covered by two different descriptions of Ibn al-Salāh, as ḥasan li-zatih and lighairih by Ibn al-Ḥajar. (d. 852/1449) By doing so Ibn al-Ḥajar gave the final shape to the ḥasan hadith terms. He also captured the fundamental point where ḥasan hadith differs from the ṣaḥīḥ hadith because the basic point in question, which was not directly stated before, is a slight flaw in the narrator’s grip. At the end of the study, it was concluded that -as al-Dhahabi (d. 748/1348) also stated- it does not seem possible to determine a comprehensive rule that gathers ḥasan hadiths under a single description. Considering the historical context of the term ḥasan, it has been observed that the most effective description of the ḥasan hadith are the terms ḥasan li-zatih and ḥasan lighairih, which were put forward by Ibn Hajar by transforming the dual division mentioned by Ibn al-Salāh into a more understandable form. (shrink)

Bu çalışma, DKAB öğretmenlerinin pedagojik inançlarını çeşitli değişkenler açısından inceleme amacını taşımaktadır. Pedagojik inanç, öğrenme-öğretme süreçlerine yönelik geliştirilen değer örüntüleridir. Pedagojik inançlar, öğretimin merkezi figürlerinden olan öğretmenlerin iki temel değer örüntülerinden birisidir ve bu sebeple nitelikli bir öğrenme-öğretme ortamı için dikkate alınmalıdır. Çalışma karma desenli bir çalışmadır ve nicel araştırmada model olarak değişkenler arasındaki ilişkiyi ele alan tarama modellerinden olan ilişkisel tarama modeli kullanılmıştır. Veriler, doküman analizi ve tarama yöntemiyle toplanmıştır. Nitel çalışma içinse durum çalışması yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Tarama verilerine göre (...) DKAB öğretmenlerinin pedagojik inançları ile cinsiyet, eğitim durumu, görev yaptıkları okul türü ve kitap okuma alışkanlıkları arasında anlamlı bir ilişki tespit edilmemiştir. Görev süresi ile pedagojik inanç arasında ise anlamlı bir ilişki görülmüştür. Söz konusu tarama verilerinin öznel olarak nasıl anlamlandırıldığını keşfetmek için on öğretmenle mülakat yapılmıştır. Öğretmenlere göre genel olarak DKAB dersi çıktıları yeterli değildir ve bu yetersizliğin en önemli sebepleri olarak sistem ve öğrenci dile getirilmiştir. Katılımcıların ideal DKAB öğretmeni için dile getirdiği nitelikler ise iletişim, alan bilgisi, meslek bilgisi, merhamet, teknolojik araçları kullanmak ve kendini yenilemektir. Katılımcılar için pedagojik inançlardan daha çok gerçek öğrenme-öğretme ortamlarının özellikleri daha önemli görünmektedir ya da daha doğru ifadeyle realist öğretmen kimliği geliştirdikleri söylenebilir. (shrink)

In this study, secondary school DKAB (Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge) lesson’s belief learning domain has been examined structurally. In this context, the basic principles of belief have been discussed according to Māturīdīsm, Ash'arism, Mutazilite and in places according to Shia. The common points and different aspects of the ideas in the domain of belief of these schools have been examined in a comparative way. Subjects such as the attribute of taqwin/creation, which is the main discussion between Māturīdīsm and Ashʿarism, (...) whether Allah can be known by reason, whether the good and the evil are determined by reason or nass/verses are the examples. Additionally existance of the immutable attributes and that whether they are eternal or not, that whether ru’yatullah/seeing God is possible or not and the conditions of the afterlife which have been points of discussion between Mutazilite and Ahl es-Sunnah have been handled in the article. Surely these are matters of extensive discussion; this study evaluated these topics in the pedagogical context of the belief learning domain of the DKAB lesson. Firstly the theological background of the belief learning domain of DKAB lesson has been handled. Then learning outcomes which are the first elements of the curriculum have been classified. And thirdly the text books which are the second dimension of the curriculum have been analyzed. The method of the study is document analysis. Belief is the first of the learning domains designated as worship, morality, Prophet Muhammad and culture, and it is also of great importance because it is the basis of other learning domains. Belief learning domain is in the interest of curriculum designers in terms of having some pedagogical features but it must also be in harmony with theological acceptances as it is one of the basic components of religiosity. The theological background is also directly related to the political and legal context of the lesson, such as doctriner and non-confessional status. Because when various interpretations of religion do not have common points or when the common points are weak, the non-confessional feature will always be a controversial matter. In theological texts God has been described as essential, the almighty, the omniscient and one who intervenes in the history. Discussions between Kalam schools and philosophical schools about God's attributes, or the discussions within the Kalam schools are very important in terms of reflecting God-universe-human relationship. One of the most important problems in this issue is that the conception of God is not decisive, and that the conception of matter and human must be compatible with the conception of God. Developing a theology in the context of God's attributes, excluding matter and human conceptions leads to an over-abstraction of the theological background. Moreover, changes in the conception of matter and human will harm the conception of God, and the contribution of religious education to those who searching for meaning will decrease. The fact that the faith principles of Islamic religion do not vary depending on the sects strengthens the status of non-confessional religous education. In addition, an essential God conceptualization facilitates the management of people their lives. For believers, life has a purpose and it is a preparation for the afterlife. Furthermore in the context of cultural knowledge, gaining in-depth knowledge is a remarkable support for social life. On the other hand, the achievements in the lesson curriculum are at the first levels in terms of taxonomy and this shows that the lesson does not support high level learning and identity formation. Considering the speed and severity of the transformation in social life, it is necessary to provide some qualities that will support the construction of self and personality of those who take religious education. However, the low level of objectives of the curriculum and the one-dimensionality of Bloom's taxonomy used in the curriculum have been an unsolved problem for a long time. This points out the importance of developing a curriculum of religious education, taking into account the theological background and the individual and social dimensions of human beings. On the other hand, it can be thought that there are some problems in the establishment of the relationship between God-universe-human in the textbooks. Although the content is suitable for personal God representation and gives prominence to causality tought, when it comes to the idea of order of the universe, it contradicts with personal God representation and moral development. When the idea of order is over-objectivized in the textbooks, it becomes unclear how God intervenes in the universe. So, it remains suspended that the learners how make sense of events and their actions. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.

In this article, the authors try to review the Paris-Match cover page analyzed by Roland Barthes and introduces a new model of analyzing sign system from a new semiotic approach based on the new definition of the context. This research is based on three layers of the context and shows that understanding the cover page of a magazine or any other kind of text is not only absolute but also somehow relative due to the different background knowledge of the audience. (...) This means that human sees the Context A, or what is designed, in the situation of Context B, or situational context, and interpret based on their Context C, or background knowledge of the audience. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new perspective of analyzing advertising designs from a new semiotic approach based on a new definition of the context. In order to achieve this goal, we will first of all give a definition for advertising design, and then Peirce’s idea about signs and definition of the science called semiotics will be necessary for starting the discussion. This research is based on three levels of context and shows that understanding an advertising design (...) is not absolute but somehow relative because of differences in the background knowledge of the receivers. The conclusion of this research is that people understand advertising design based on their three contexts, which means seeing a so-called Context A, or better, what is designed, the receiver of the message will use a so-called Context B, or the context of situation, and also receives a so-called Context C, or the background knowledge in order to interpret what is selected and combined in Context A. (shrink)

I argue that Millianism has the very odd consequence that there are simple direct questions that Millians can grasp, but they cannot answer them in the positive or the negative, or in some other way, nor could they say that they do not know the answer.

In this paper I respond to the objections put forth by Kresimir Agbaba 22: 1-6) against my earlier paper 20: 7-13) in which I argue that given Donnellan's formulation|as well as Kripke's and Salmon's gen- eralized accounts|an attributive use of a denite description is a very rare linguistic phenomenon.

There are two sorts of singular terms for which we have difficulty applying Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction: complex definite descriptions, and proper names. With respect to the uses of such terms in certain contexts we seem to have conflicting intuitions as to whether they should be classified as referential or attributive. The problem concerning how to apply Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of certain complex definite descriptions has never been debated in the literature. On the other hand there have been attempts (...) to extend Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of proper names, the most popular one being due to Kripke. However the argument Kripke gives to this end in his ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’ seems to be inconsistent with the position he takes in Naming and Necessity. I suggest that the reason we seem to have conflicting intuitions with respect to the uses of such terms, is because there is not one but two separate distinctions inherent in Donnellan’s examples; a pragmatic distinction based on the speaker’s intentions in using a term , and an epistemic one based on the notion of having an object in mind. In the light of this, I argue that the issue of whether there are attributive uses of proper names, in the latter sense, relates to the epistemic problem of whether a speaker can have de re attitudes toward an object that he does not have in mind. On this epistemic issue Kripke and Donnellan are on opposite sides as revealed by their debate over the issue of whether there are contingent a priori propositions. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)