Collective migration is a key process that is critical during development, as well as in physiological and pathophysiological processes including tissue repair, wound healing and cancer. Studies in genetic model organisms have made important contributions to our current understanding of the mechanisms that shape cells into different tissues during morphogenesis. Recent advances in high‐resolution and live‐cell‐imaging techniques provided new insights into the social behavior of cells based on careful visual observations within the context of a living tissue. In this review, (...) we will compare Drosophila testis nascent myotube migration with established in vivo model systems, elucidate similarities, new features and principles in collective cell migration. (shrink)

Responding to the critical comments by the symposiasts Julien Dutant, Niccolò Rossi, Martin Smith, Daniel Waxman, and Yiwen Zhan, I further elaborate, refine, and defend the account of epistemic justification I advanced in my book Justification as Ignorance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021). Central issues tackled here include logical omniscience and non-normal epistemic logics, the luminosity of epistemic justification, methods for telling what one is in no position to know, and the relation between doxastic and propositional justification.

When is it morally acceptable to expose others to risk? Most moral philosophers have had very little to say in answer to that question, but here is a moral philosopher who puts it at the centre of his investigations.

This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification.

The introduction of self-driving vehicles gives rise to a large number of ethical issues that go beyond the common, extremely narrow, focus on improbable dilemma-like scenarios. This article provides a broad overview of realistic ethical issues related to self-driving vehicles. Some of the major topics covered are as follows: Strong opinions for and against driverless cars may give rise to severe social and political conflicts. A low tolerance for accidents caused by driverless vehicles may delay the introduction of driverless systems (...) that would substantially reduce the risks. Trade-offs will arise between safety and other requirement on the road traffic system. Over-reliance on the swift collision-avoiding reactions of self-driving vehicles can induce people to take dangerous actions, such as stepping out in front of a car, relying on its fast braking. Children travelling alone can violate safety instructions such as the use of seatbelts. Digital information about routes and destinations can be used to convey commercial and political messages to car users. If fast passage can be bought, then socio-economic segregation of road traffic may result. Terrorists and other criminals can hack into a vehicle and make it crash. They can also use self-driving vehicles for instance to carry bombs to their designed places of detonation or to wreak havoc on a country’s road system. (shrink)

Fresh look at how Jewish intellectuals thought about Judaism within a German philosophical tradition.

This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his belief in p and his justification for believing p covary with the truth of p through a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is that p's truth-maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the justification is grounded in. This position is dubbed ‘identificationism.’.

Empathy is an integral aspect of human existence. Without at least a basic ability to access others’ affective life, social interactions would be well-nigh impossible. Yet, recent studies seem to show that the means we have acquired to access others’ emotional life no longer function well in what has become our everyday business – technologically mediated interactions in digital spaces. If this is correct, there are two important questions: (1) What makes empathy for frequent internet users so difficult? and (2) (...) What can we do to alleviate the negative consequences? Correspondingly, the aim of this paper is twofold. First, we identify structural differences between offline and technologically mediated interactions that can explain why digital empathy is harder to achieve. Second, drawing on the literature on ‘situated affectivity,’ we consider the idea of modifying digital spaces in ways specifically designed to ‘scaffold’ empathy where our evolved mechanisms fail. Section 2 argues that empathy is requires interpreting the behavior of embodied subjects. Section 3 identifies three factors that are crucial for this interpretative endeavor: the empathizer’s affective repertoire, their perceptual input, and their background knowledge. Section 4 argues that technologically mediated interactions differ from face-to-face interactions with regard to these factors in ways which render our evolved empathy mechanisms less effective in the digital world. Section 5 introduces the idea that situational factors can serve as ‘empathic scaffolds,’ i.e., as ‘tools’ that can ‘shape’ people’s empathic reactions. Section 6 wraps up the main line of reasoning, responds to objections and invites further scholarship. (shrink)

Ethicists have investigated ethical problems in other disciplines, but there has not been much discussion of the ethics of their own activities. Research in ethics has many ethical problems in common with other areas of research, and it also has problems of its own. The researcher’s integrity is more precarious than in most other disciplines, and therefore even stronger procedural checks are needed to protect it. The promotion of some standpoints in ethical issues may be socially harmful, and even our (...) decisions as to which issues we label as “ethical” may have unintended and potentially harmful social consequences. It can be argued that ethicists have an obligation to make positive contributions to society, but the practical implications of such an obligation are not easily identified. This article provides an overview of ethical issues that arise in research into ethics and in the application of such research. It ends with a list of ten practical proposals for how these issues should be dealt with. (shrink)

Tyler Burge and other externalists about mental content have tried to accommodate privileged self-knowledge and to neutralize skepticism about one's ability to authoritatively know one's present thoughts. I show that, though Burgean compatibilism explains knowing it is p I believe, it doesn't explain how I can have privileged knowledge that the state I occupy is a state of believing rather than, say, a state of doubting. Moreover, given externalism, self-knowledge of attitudinal component is vulnerable to a certain kind of error (...) and so doesn't have the same kind of privilege as self-knowledge of current content. (shrink)

What purpose can be served by empirically unsubstantiated speculation in ethics? In answering that question, we need to distinguish between the major branches of ethics. In foundational moral philosophy, the use of speculative examples is warranted to the extent that ethical principles and theories are assumed to be applicable even under the extreme circumstances referred to in these examples. Such an assumption is in need of justification, and it cannot just be taken for granted. In applied ethics, the use of (...) unrealistic scenarios is more difficult to justify. It can be positively harmful if it diverts our attention from more urgent issues. Neuroethics is one of the areas of applied ethics where speculative scenarios have taken up much of the attention that could instead have been devoted to problems that are relevant for the treatment and care of patients. Speculative ethics has often been defended with mere possibility arguments that may at first hand seem difficult to refute. It is shown with examples how such claims can be defeated with a combination of science and argumentation analysis. (shrink)

In this paper I argue in favor of the compatibility of semantic externalism with privileged self-knowledge by showing that an argument for incompatibilism from switching scenarios fails. Given the inclusion theory of self-knowledge, the hypothesis according to which I am having twater thoughts while thinking that I have water thoughts simply isn't a (entertainable) possibility. When I am on Earth thinking earthian concepts, I cannot believe that I am thinking that twater is wet for I don't have the concept of (...) twater available; so this concept cannot figure in any of my mental states. Analogously, when I am on Twin Earth, I cannot mistakenly believe that I am entertaining water thoughts. No matter how often I am switched between Earth and Twin Earth, I will never erroneously think that I am having water thoughts while in fact I am having twater thoughts and vice versa. Privileged self-knowledge is therefore immune to skeptical arguments from switching and twinning scenarios. (shrink)

Written in 1932, just before the fall of the Weimar Republic and on the eve of the Nazi accession to power, Ernst Jünger’s The Worker: Dominion and Form articulates a trenchant critique of bourgeois liberalism and seeks to identify the form characteristic of the modern age. Jünger’s analyses, written in critical dialogue with Marx, are inspired by a profound intuition of the movement of history and an insightful interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy. -/- Martin Heidegger considered Jünger “the only genuine follower (...) of Nietzsche,” singularly providing “an interpretation which took shape in the domain of that metaphysics which already determines our epoch, even against our knowledge; this metaphysics is Nietzsche's doctrine of the ‘will to power.’” In The Worker, Jünger examines some of the defining questions of that epoch: the nature of individuality, society, and the state; morality, justice, and law; and the relationships between freedom and power and between technology and nature. -/- This work, appearing in its entirety in English translation for the first time, is an important contribution to debates on work, technology, and politics by one of the most controversial German intellectuals of the twentieth century. Not merely of historical interest, The Worker carries a vital message for contemporary debates about world economy, political stability, and equality in our own age, one marked by unsettling parallels to the 1930s. (shrink)

This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels.

Multiple contraction (simultaneous contraction by several sentences) and iterated contraction are investigated in the framework of specified meet contraction (s.m.c.) that is extended for this purpose. Multiple contraction is axiomatized, and so is finitely multiple contraction (contraction by a finite set of sentences). Two ways to reduce finitely multiple contraction to contraction by single sentences are introduced. The reduced operations are axiomatically characterized and their properties are investigated. Furthermore, it is shown how iterated contraction can be reduced to single-step, single-sentence (...) contraction. However, in this framework the outcome of iterated contraction depends unavoidably on the order in which the inputs are received. This order-dependence makes it impossible to treat two inputs on an equal footing. Therefore it is often preferable to perform changes involving several pieces of information as multiple rather than iterated change. (shrink)

This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, Memory and Identity , Fred Adams, Husker Du? , and Sanford Goldberg The Metasemantics of Memory.

BackgroundWith the increased use of implanted medical devices follows a large number of explantations. Implants are removed for a wide range of reasons, including manufacturing defects, recovery making the device unnecessary, battery depletion, availability of new and better models, and patients asking for a removal. Explantation gives rise to a wide range of ethical issues, but the discussion of these problems is scattered over many clinical disciplines.MethodsInformation from multiple clinical disciplines was synthesized and analysed in order to provide a comprehensive (...) approach to the ethical issues involved in the explantation of medical implants.ResultsDiscussions and recommendations are offered on pre-implantation information about a possible future explantation, risk–benefit assessments of explantation, elective explantations demanded by the patient, explantation of implants inserted for a clinical trial, patient registers, quality assurance, routines for investigating explanted implants, and demands on manufacturers to prioritize increased service time in battery-driven implants and to market fewer but more thoroughly tested models of implants.ConclusionSpecial emphasis is given to the issue of control or ownership over implants, which underlies many of the ethical problems concerning explantation. It is proposed that just like transplants, implants that fulfil functions normally carried out by biological organs should be counted as supplemented body parts. This means that the patient has a strong and inalienable right to the implant, but upon explantation it loses that status. (shrink)

This paper develops a novel interpretation of Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts to the effect that the representations of space and time are intuitions rather than concepts. When properly understood, the argument anticipates the contemporary position whereby the meaning of indexicals cannot be captured by descriptive contents.

ABSTRACT John Rawls proposed two criteria for the delimitation of acceptable inequalities. The universal gain principle requires inequalities to be beneficial for all, and the difference principle requires them to be beneficial for the least advantaged. These principles are commonly believed to have originated in Rawls’s work, but they were both clearly expressed in the writings of Nicolas de Condorcet. Contrary to Rawls, Condorcet did not imbed them in the framework of a social contract, but instead sought their foundations in (...) natural rights. Whereas Rawls recommends us to find out what social arrangements rational reasoners would choose in a hypothetical pre-social situation, Condorcet proposes that we ask the underprivileged in our society whether or not they consider themselves to benefit from the prevailing social and economic inequalities. Thus, Condorcet’s original version of the difference principle puts social inequalities to a different test than its latter-day, hypothetical version. (shrink)

The public defence of science has never been more important than now. However, it is a difficult task with many pitfalls, and there are mechanisms that can make it counterproductive. This article offers advice for science defenders, summarized in ten commandments that warn against potentially ineffective or even backfiring practices in the defence of science: Do not portray science as a unique type of knowledge. Do not underestimate scientific uncertainty. Do not describe science as infallible. Do not deny the value-ladenness (...) of science. Do not associate with power. Do not blame the victims of disinformation. Do not aim at convincing the anti-scientific propagandists. Do not contribute to the legitimization of pseudoscience. Do not attack religion when it does not conflict with science. Do not call yourself a “sceptic”. (shrink)

Kants Position zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis liegt zwischen den beiden Polen des Cartesianismus und des Behaviorismus. Hinsichtlich des Wissens um die eigenen Maximeninhalte vertritt Kant die cartesische Direktheitsthese und m.E. auch die Unfehlbarkeitsthese. Die beiden anderen Aspekte der moralischen Selbsterkenntnis – das Wissen um die Pflichtgemäßheit der Maximen und das Wissen um die Handlungsmotive – sind Kant zufolge allerdings weder infallibel, noch unbezweifelbar, noch direkt. Und obgleich Überzeugungen hinsichtlich der eigenen Handlungsmotive in Zweifel gezogen werden und sich als falsch erweisen können, (...) sind sie dennoch verläßlicher als Überzeugungen hinsichtlich der Handlungsmotive anderer. (shrink)

Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing that neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism.

This paper addresses the question whether introspection plus externalism about mental content warrant an a priori refutation of external-world skepticism and ontological solipsism. The suggestion is that if thought content is partly determined by affairs in the environment and if we can have non-empirical knowledge of our current thought contents, we can, just by reflection, know about the world around us -- we can know that our environment is populated with content-determining entities. After examining this type of transcendental argument and (...) discussing various objections found in the literature, I argue that the notion of privileged self-knowledge underlying this argument presupposes that we can learn, via introspection, that our so-called thoughts are propositional attitudes rather than contentless states. If, however, externalism is correct and thought content consists in the systematic dependency of internal states on relational properties, we cannot know non-empirically whether or not we have propositional attitudes. Self-knowledge (apropositional attitude) is consistent with us lacking the ability to rule out, via introspection, the possibility that we don't have any propositional attitudes. Self-knowledge provides us with knowledge of what is in our minds, but not that we have minds. Hence, the combination of externalism with the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge does not allow for an a priori refutation of skepticism and is therefore unproblematic. (shrink)

According to the standard view, the causal process connecting a past representation and its subsequent recall involves intermediary memory traces. Yet Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein held that since the physiological evidence for memory traces isn't quite conclusive, it is prudent to come up with an account of memory causation-referred to as nmemic causation—that manages without the stipulation of memory traces. Given mnemic causation, a past representation is directly causally active over a temporal distance. I argue that the stipulation of (...) memory traces is indeed indispensable for analyzing mernory causation. (shrink)

In spite of their practical importance, the connections between technology and mathematics have not received much scholarly attention. This article begins by outlining how the technology–mathematics relationship has developed, from the use of simple aide-mémoires for counting and arithmetic, via the use of mathematics in weaving, building and other trades, and the introduction of calculus to solve technological problems, to the modern use of computers to solve both technological and mathematical problems. Three important philosophical issues emerge from this historical résumé: (...) how mathematical knowledge depends on technology, the definition of the hybrid concept of a computation, and the usefulness of mathematics in technology. Each of these issues is briefly discussed, and it is shown that in order to analyze them, we need to combine tools and ideas from both the philosophy of technology and the philosophy of mathematics. In conclusion, it is argued that much more of interest can be found in the historically and philosophically unexplored terrains of the technology–mathematics relationship. (shrink)

After a review of previous uses of the term “pseudotechnology”, a definition is proposed: “A pseudotechnology is an alleged technology that is irreparably dysfunctional for its intended purpose since it is based on construction principles that cannot be made to work”. The relationship between pseudotechnology and pseudoscience is discussed, and so is the relationship between pseudotechnology and the much weaker concept of technological malfunction. An explanation is offered of why pseudotechnology is much more seldom referred to than pseudoscience: dysfunctional technology (...) usually reveals itself when put to use, whereas dysfunctional science tends to be more difficult to disclose. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Historical Perspective Progressivism: Five Themes Progressivism Today.

This volume is the first extensive study of the historical and philosophical connections between technology and mathematics. Coverage includes the use of mathematics in ancient as well as modern technology, devices and machines for computation, cryptology, mathematics in technological education, the epistemology of computer-mediated proofs, and the relationship between technological and mathematical computability. The book also examines the work of such historical figures as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Charles Babbage, Ada Lovelace, and Alan Turing.

The article is devoted to the problem of the naming crisis of modern society. The sequences by which the social and cultural history of the West is ordered, represented by the evolution of economics, technology, religion, forms of capital and wealth, communications, following the technological acceleration of time, coexist with each other, compete for primacy, creating a society of atomized subjects who have ceased to understand their place in the history of society. This situation is described in the article as (...) an identity crisis. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate the gaps that have been discovered in attempts to identify society, which are the object of criticism. The article refers to the tradition of explanatory modeling of social interactions in terms of psychopathology and psychiatry. The crisis of the identity of society is illustrated through the images of madness in modern art culture. The article hypothesizes that there is an unspoken ban on naming a society associated with the crisis of capitalism in the transition from disciplinary societies to control societies. Culture's interest in insanity serves as an indicator of a social crisis. The evolution of cultural interest in the figure of a madman from a frightening "outcast" to an attractive "rebel" is shown. The article suggests the tasks of critical philosophy that coincide with the tasks of caring for social health. The idea of the need for the deprivation of mental illness is expressed. Mental health care is considered as a social task. (shrink)

This paper raises two objections to Tyler Burge's externalist theory of privileged self-knowledge. The first point is that Burge owes us an account of external content-determining factors of our belief concept. The second point is that that Burge can reconcile externalism with self-knowledge only at the price of abandoning Frege's insight concerning the referential opacity of propositional attitudes.

This paper argues that, given the representational theory of mind, one cannot know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to being incapable of having any knowledge states; but one can know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to some other proposition q.

This paper argues that there is a tension between the two components of Davidson's anomalous monism--the supervenience of the mental on the physical and the anomalism of the mental. While the anomalism of the mental denies the possibility of strict psychophysical laws, the principle of supervenience sometimes suggests that such laws do exist and that they are responsible for the dependence of the mental on the physical.

This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, “Memory and Identity”, Fred Adams, “Husker Du?”, and Sanford Goldberg “The Metasemantics of Memory”.

Après un examen des emplois antérieurs du terme « pseudotechnologie », une définition est proposée : « Une pseudotechnologie est une technologie présumée, irrémédiablement dysfonctionnelle pour l’usage auquel elle est destinée, puisqu’elle est basée sur des principes de construction qui ne peuvent pas être mis en œuvre ». La relation entre la pseudotechnologie et la pseudoscience est examinée, tout comme la relation entre la pseudotechnologie et le concept beaucoup plus faible de malfonction technologique. Une explication est proposée de la raison (...) pour laquelle la pseudotechnologie est beaucoup plus rarement mentionnée que la pseudoscience : le dysfonctionnement d’une technologie se manifeste généralement au moment de son utilisation, tandis que le dysfonctionnement d’une science est généralement plus difficile à établir. (shrink)