This paper reinvents Freire’s concepts of ‘banking education’ and ‘literacy’ within the context of the exponential growth of digital instruction in the 21st century. We argue that digital learning (i.e. online or technology enhanced) undoubtedly increases access to education globally, but also can intensify some of the worst problems described in Freire’s banking model. Accordingly, we draw from postdigital theory to scrutinize the specific structures and functions of common digital Learning Management Systems (LMSs) used by schools (i.e. Blackboard and Google (...) Classroom) to reveal a type of learning that further exacerbates the teacher-student dichotomy without liberating either party in a Freirean sense. We then use a Foucauldian lens to bring an awareness to how the accelerated use of these systems at scale, in part caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, can further entrench a data-driven, dehumanized educational experience which increases corporate profitability perhaps over the needs of students. Finally, we use these insights to modernize Freire’s concept of ‘literacy’ by building on Critical Medial Literacy (CML) in order to help educators address LMSs, (mis)information facilitated by digital content, and schooling in a (post)pandemic and postdigital world. (shrink)

More than 5 billion people in the world own a smartphone. More than half of these have been used to collect and process health-related data. As such, the existing volume of potentially exploitable health data is unprecedentedly large and growing rapidly. Mobile health applications (apps) on smartphones are some of the worst offenders and are increasingly being used for gathering and exchanging significant amounts of personal health data from the public. This data is often utilized for health research purposes and (...) for algorithm training. While there are advantages to utilizing this data for expanding health knowledge, there are associated risks for the users of these apps, such as privacy concerns and the protection of their data. Consequently, gaining a deeper comprehension of how apps collect and crowdsource data is crucial. To explore how apps are crowdsourcing data and to identify potential ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI), we conducted an examination of the Apple App Store and the Google Play Store in North America and Europe to identify apps that could potentially gather health data through crowdsourcing. Subsequently, we analyzed their privacy policies, terms of use, and other related documentation to gain insights into the utilization of users’ data and the possibility of repurposing it for research or algorithm training purposes. More specifically, we reviewed privacy policies to identify clauses pertaining to the following key categories: research, data sharing, privacy/confidentiality, commercialization, and return of findings. Based on the results of these app search, we developed an App Atlas that presents apps which crowdsource data for research or algorithm training. We identified 46 apps available in the European and Canadian markets that either openly crowdsource health data for research or algorithm training or retain the legal or technical capability to do so. This app search showed an overall lack of consistency and transparency in privacy policies that poses challenges to user comprehensibility, trust, and informed consent. A significant proportion of applications presented contradictions or exhibited considerable ambiguity. For instance, the vast majority of privacy policies in the App Atlas contain ambiguous or contradictory language regarding the sharing of users’ data with third parties. This raises a number of ethico-legal concerns which will require further academic and policy attention to ensure a balance between protecting individual interests and maximizing the scientific utility of crowdsourced data. This article represents a key first step in better understanding these concerns and bringing attention to this important issue. (shrink)

Chinese listed companies have a two-tier governance structure that comprises a supervisory board/committee and the board of directors. However, as there is no hierarchical relationship between them, the two boards are independent. This is different from the governance mechanism in Continental Europe in which the SB appoints the directors of the management board; in this sense, the Chinese two-tier governance structure is unique. We investigate the impact of governance characteristics and ownership structure on gender diversity of both the BoD and (...) the SB for a sample of 892 Chinese Initial Public Offerings floated in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. We find that the average proportion of female directors and female SB members on the BoD and the SB are 10 and 22 %, respectively. Using both static and dynamic panel data methods, we find that there is no significant impact of board structure on gender diversity in China. However, we find a positive and significant relationship between SB size and gender diversity. We also find that the higher the state ownership, the lower the female representation on both boards. Finally, our findings show that there is a bi-directional relationship between financial performance and the proportion of female directors sitting on the BoD. (shrink)

The Vital Roots of European Enlightenment is a collection of essays dealing with the influence of Ibn Tufayl, a 12th-century Arab philosopher from Spain, on major European thinkers. Had Edward Said known about the impact of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan on Europe throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, he might have reached different conclusions in his book Orientalism.

The Vital Roots of European Enlightenment is a collection of essays dealing with the influence of Ibn Tufayl, a 12th-century Arab philosopher from Spain, on major European thinkers. Had Edward Said known about the impact of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan on Europe throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, he might have reached different conclusions in his book Orientalism.

Where did the right to privacy come from and what does it mean? Grappling with the critical issues involving women and gays that relate to the current Supreme Court appointment, Vincent J. Samar develops a definition of legal privacy, discusses the reasons why and the degree to which privacy should be protected, and shows the relationship between privacy and personal autonomy. He answers former Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork's questions about scope, content, and legal justification for a general right (...) to privacy and pays particular attention to issues involving gays and lesbians. (shrink)

A central question that arises when interpreting the U.S. Constitution is which theory of interpretation is the best? In his recent book, “How to Interpret the Constitution,” Cass Sunstein reviews various theories of constitutional interpretation currently in vogue and then offers what he believes would be the best approach going forward. In this Article, I want to take up a more basic question presupposed by the very idea of a theory of interpretation. That is, whether it is even possible to (...) arrive at more than a provisional understanding of what would be the best interpretation in any given area of study, including constitutional law. That said, I do believe some of the interpretations suggested by Cass Sunstein and elsewhere by myself and others to be more persuasive than most others, even if only partially so. For, as Sunstein himself points out, no theory seems perfect to figure out the Constitution’s meaning in every possible world in which we could imagine it to exist. So, we best just focus on our own world or what we take to matter in our world. In keeping with this idea, I plan to begin by looking first at how we might interpret the world around us based on our past experiences by considering a somewhat imaginative recent experience of my own. Next, I consider some recent studies in the neurosciences and a previous but highly influential article by the philosopher Donald Davidson concerning conceptual schemes and whether we could ever hope to make any sense of a scheme radically different from our own. Here it should be pointed out that I will use the word “scheme” when referring to a very broad system of thought for which there may not be much outside, versus when I use the word “framework,” as referencing something far narrower than a whole system of thought, even if what is referenced might purport to be a significant part of a still larger system. My goal is to eventually adopt John Rawls’ public reason method to separate out non-workable systems of thought as might be part of a particular religious or philosophical tradition that cannot be easily tied to any other system of thought easily imagined within a pluralistic society. I plan to do this by relating how Rawls’ public reason might allow for the creation of a moral interpretation of the Constitution adopting the moral theory of Alan Gewirth. The latter I adopt because its grounding does not presuppose any prior moral or religious framework. I then apply that interpretative method to five cases Sunstein believes are fixed points in our current constitutional understanding. In short, I plan to isolate out an area of human rights where even very different understandings of the world might be able to meet, while acknowledging that there will still be other areas that simply evade any common connection. I hope what I offer here to be of help for a theory of constitutional interpretation that focuses on morality, without having to compete with various religious frameworks going forward. (shrink)

AIDS and the Politician’s Right to Privacy.

A Gerwithian Framework for Protecting the Basic Human Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) People.

A Moral Justification for Gay and Lesbian Civil Rights Legislation.

At the Intersection of Due Process and Equal Protection: Expanding the Range of Protected Interests.

The unexpected passing of United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia left a vacancy on the Court in the midst of a presidential election year. As a result, the appointment process did not proceed in the same fashion as previous appointments. Instead, the Senate declared shortly after Justice Scalia’s death that it would not consider any candidate to fill the vacancy until the next president is elected. The Senate remained steadfast in this decision throughout the remainder of President Obama’s term. (...) -/- This Article analyzes the constitutional questions surrounding the Senate’s refusal to consider any nominee and argues the Senate has a duty to advise and consent in a timely manner. Additionally, it demonstrates how a politically-motivated delay threatens the integrity of the constitutional process for selecting judges, violates separation of powers concerns by politicizing the Court, and contradicts the express intent of the Framers of the Constitution. (shrink)

This Article examines recent claims that the fetus be afforded the status of a person under the Fourteenth Amendment. It shows that such claims do not carry the necessary objectivity to operate reasonably in a pluralistic society. It then goes on to afford what a better view of personhood that could so operate might actually look like. Along the way, this Article takes seriously the real deep concerns many have for the sanctity of human life. By the end, it attempts (...) to find a balance for those concerns with the view of personhood offered that should engage current debates about abortion and women’s rights. (shrink)

In June 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that there is a fundamental right to marriage that extends to same-sex couples. This Article analyzes the Obergefell decision in light of the Court’s 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby regarding religious protections that might by analogy be afforded under state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts. In particular, the article considers whether a government official may claim the right to religious freedom to deny issuing marriage (...) licenses to same-sex couples. Additionally, the article suggests that a new standard for the separation of church and state may be required. Although the 2015 decision prevents the government from denying marriage to same-sex couples, the decision does not directly affect private businesses that choose not to provide services for same-sex weddings. It may, however, have an important indirect effect if laws are already present that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Therefore, the article explores possible avenues for protection from private. (shrink)

The Right to Privacy and the Right to Use the Bathroom Consistent with One’s Gender Identity.

In this article I review the Supreme Court’s current use of its major questions doctrine to see if the justifications commonly offered for its existence can explain its current use. In the process of doing so, I examine what the doctrine is about, how it came into existence and how the Court has applied it, especially in context to two recent cases, West Virginia v. EPA and Biden v. Nebraska. As both of these cases implicate the regulatory state, I place (...) the primary focus of this article on how the doctrine should apply in context to judicial evaluation of the regulatory state. In so doing, I discover that the Court’s current reliance on constitutional separation of powers and checks and balances analyses seem too narrow both with respect to the concerns of the founding generation but also, and perhaps more importantly, to the Constitution’s goals for the kind of government it sought to establish going into the future. (shrink)

In an era where conditions for education are rapidly changing globally, online assessment presents several opportunities as well as challenges in the higher education landscape. The forceful transition from face-to-face to online assessments, as part of the emergency implementation of online learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic, has affected teaching, learning, and assessment experiences worldwide. This study explores how faculty members in Saudi universities secured their online assessment during phase one of the COVID-19 pandemic. The research aims were: 1) identifying (...) faculty assessment practices before the onset of COVID-19 and comparing these with practices during the pandemic, and 2) identifying the major challenges faced by the faculty members of the study in securing their online assessment to ensure that academic integrity and assessment standards remained intact. Data were collected from seven university professors through a self-reporting survey, followed by semi-structured interviews. The faculty members found the pandemic period to be the best time to change their assessment methods, and incorporate innovative ideas that conformed to both their own beliefs and students’ needs. The factors that influenced the faculty’s assessment alterations were their personal beliefs and learnings from others’ experiences, in addition to the guidelines issued by Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Education. The results of this study have implications for the development of post-COVID-19 assessment practices and professional development priorities. (shrink)

The Supreme Court’s antiabortion opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., which overruled Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, on the one-hand suggests that the Court may be moving toward eliminating all non-enumerated fundamental rights not deeply rooted in the Nation’s longstanding history and tradition. On the other hand, it may suggest only that the Court might be just opening the door to overruling specific non-enumerated rights with which it no longer agrees. Either way, (...) many long-recognized, non-enumerated, human rights, beyond abortion that are essential to individual autonomy and human dignity are now up for grabs. Such rights in the area of privacy law will most likely include not just abortion, but also contraception, interracial marriage, and the Court’s more recent recognition of same-sex marriage, and possibly still other precedents, including whether states can criminalize adult consensual same-sex behavior in private. More importantly, the proposed foundation for this Court’s potential departure from its past case precedents cannot be justified even by claiming such rights are not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition. As I hope to show in this article, neither from the point of view of looking to this Nation’s longstanding history and traditions, if properly understood, nor from the point of view of allowing Equal Protection to aide in identifying forms of discrimination not previously recognized or afforded much attention, can departures from past human rights precedents based in autonomy be justified. (shrink)

The First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses were meant to guarantee freedom of religion for all persons living in the United States. This was to be done by ensuring that government could not establish a state religion nor interfere with individual practices and beliefs so long as they did not violate public morals. The idea was to have the two clauses operate together to ensure state separation in matters of religion. However, recent caselaw involving government accommodations to religious organizations (...) has emphasized the Free Exercise Clause with little or no attention afforded the Establishment Clause. As a result, intermediate factors like entanglement, endorsement, general applicability, and neutrality, that previously were used to assist the separation of church and state, are now called into question. This Article attempts to rekindle these factors by attaching a public/private distinction to the way the two clauses are understood, to ensure a more certain and clearer basis for the separation of church and state. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that public education should provide a constructive forum for discussing aspects of lesbian and gay lifestyles in both primary and secondary schools. My argument is that such action is necessary to offset the way the dominant culture limits the capacities of gays and lesbians to achieve human self-fulfillment. In making this argument, I recognize that I am going beyond merely promoting social tolerance to legitimizing an actual place for discussion of the needs and interests of (...) gays and lesbians in the society at large. The principles I will apply to make this argument are not specifically situated in legal philosophy (concerning the nature of law and its evaluation), but rather, principles of normative political philosophy (concerning ethical justifications of governmental institutions) as we might find in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948. (shrink)

Is the current state of international governance by the United Nations and related organizations a preface to what eventually might become a world government? Is it at all similar to what was the structure of government in the United States after the adoption of the Articles of Confederation in 1781 and before adoption of the Constitution of 1787? Are changes in the way international institutions like the United Nations operate related to changes in our conceptions of the role of these (...) institutions in providing international governance? When governmental institutions prove to be too weak to adequately perform the tasks expected of them is there a natural evolution toward greater centralization of power? If so, might an early sign of this evolution be decisions by public officials that afford greater deference to the decrees of international institutions that previously might have been sidestepped? (shrink)

More than thirty-four years after the United States Supreme Court initially recognized a woman’s constitutional right to choose whether or not to terminate a pregnancy (at least within the first two trimesters) in its landmark abortion decision Roe v. Wade, the issue of whether women ought to have this right continues to affect public debate. Presidential candidates are asked about the issue, and potential Supreme Court nominees and their prior judicial decisions, academic writings, and speeches are thoroughly scrutinized for any (...) inkling of how they would likely rule in a future case on the issue. Perhaps even more important is the way the debate over this issue has impacted federal funding for stem cell research in the United States. Because of moral concerns regarding the personhood status and level of dignity owed to the human embryo as a form of human life, in September of 1999, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission recommended against providing federal funding for the use and derivation of embryonic stem (ES) cells and embryonic germ (EG) cells except when obtained from “cadaveric fetal tissue” or “embryos remaining after infertility treatment.” In this article, I will suggest that the abortion debate and its offshoots into embryonic medical research persist because of a failure to properly separate human personhood from human biology. I will argue further that a proper analysis of the problem will not only enlighten the abortion and fetal tissue research debate, but will have implications for end-of-life issues as well. (shrink)

Is there an independent legal method separate from the political process for handling a constitutional amendment that may be inconsistent with, or contrary to, the basic structure and rights the Federal Constitution currently inaugurates, or are courts stuck with having to accept the amendment on its face? This problem is not unique to the United States. Nor is it the same problem as whether a state constitutional amendment may violate the Federal Constitution. While I initially focus on the U.S. Constitution, (...) I plan, before the end of this piece, to broaden out to other national constitutions as well, and certainly some of the arguments might also apply to state constitutional amendments, as we see with the controversy over the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8. In this vein, it will make sense to consider cases from other nations, like Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, in which the Supreme Court of India held that the judiciary could strike down amendments to the constitution passed by Parliament that conflict with the constitution’s “basic structure.” The U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed what constitutes the basic structure of the U.S. Constitution. This is the question addressed in this article. (shrink)

Large-scale data brokers collect massive amounts of highly personal consumer information to be sold to whoever will pay their price, even at the expense of sacrificing individual privacy and autonomy in the process. In this Article, I will show how a proper understanding and justification for a right to privacy, in context to both protecting private acts and safeguarding information and states of affairs for the performance of such acts, provides a necessary background framework for imposing legal restrictions on such (...) collections. This problem, which has already gained some attention in literature, now becomes even more worrisome, as government itself becomes a consumer of this information to fight off a domestic instantiation of the global Covid-19 pandemic. This Article proposes some definite ways in which the courts and Congress might limit both the private sector and the government’s use of such data to ensure individual autonomy will not be sacrificed. (shrink)

The article argues that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) rights are a particular instantiation of human rights. But in order to make this argument several things must be done first. Preliminarily, it should be noted that some transgendered issues fall under the rubric "gay rights," even though strictly speaking, they center most prominently on gender and not sexual orientation. Still, there gender aspects are often ignored because of concerns related to sexual orientation, such as whether a transgendered female can (...) use a woman's washroom. Arguably, the reverse may also be true of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, as many of society's concerns regarding this group involve their following gender roles, even though the discrimination against them is not usually seen as sex discrimination. Bearing that in mind, among the various responsibilities of this article is to define--in the broad sense--what gay and lesbian rights are. This is followed by a similar set of expressions defining what human rights are and an argument for how such rights get justified. Once that is done, the connection between gay and lesbian rights and human rights is pursued within the context of a theory of political morality that establishes the centrality of human rights to all moral concerns. (shrink)

This Article discusses what a “super-precedent” is in American Constitutional Law. Additionally, it describes the current criteria used to identify super-precedents and the limitations of these criteria. It then mentions the various precedents that have been afforded this august title and suggests the need for an additional criterion to ensure the continued protection of those precedents most closely associated with the protection of human rights. Finally, the article identifies three additional precedents, beyond those usually recognized, that ought to be ranked (...) super-precedents and provides a basis for ranking all precedents, grounded in autonomy, when they either conflict with one another or encounter a compelling state interest. (shrink)

In this essay, I maintain that the issue of whether the right to die is viable as a constitutionally protectable right remains open. I intend to reconcile the Supreme Court's holdings in Glucksberg and Quill by examining the different rationales the Justices offered for their decisions. I do not believe this issue can be resolved simply by asserting that the intention of the actor is different when assisting suicide, as compared to when life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn. Rather, the right to (...) die continues to be viable due to the level of abstraction at which the Court chose to frame the issue in these cases. (shrink)

In this Article, I take up the thesis that international and comparative law sources are relevant to interpreting the U.S. Constitution because the Constitution itself warrants respect only insofar as it is a means for achieving minimal protections for human dignity. I argue a narrow version of this thesis: Our domestic constitutional interpretations should be checked by looking to the minimal set of rights recognized in other systems that share certain contents. And I take up the problem that what may (...) appear as shared values at one level may reflect different understandings at a deeper, more reflective level. For example, the framers of our Constitution clearly sought to advance liberty. But the liberty they sought to advance may not have been the same liberty that became of concern during the Fourteenth Amendment's period of ratification, and in the subsequent history of Supreme Court constitutional cases following its adoption. In this article I propose to consider the set of rationally based aspirations that our system of constitutional rights and many other related systems seem to presuppose as a ground for developing a growing conception of liberty and dignity that the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt. (shrink)

We propose a Lorentz-covariant deformed algebra describing a -dimensional quantized spacetime, which in the nonrelativistic limit leads to undeformed one. The deformed Poincaré transformations leaving the algebra invariant are identified. In the classical limit the Lorentz-covariant deformed algebra yields the deformed Lorentz-covariant Poisson brackets. Kepler problem with the deformed Lorentz-covariant Poisson brackets is studied. We obtain that the precession angle of an orbit of the relativistic particle in the gravitational field depends on the mass of the particle, i.e. equivalence principle (...) is violated. We propose a condition for the recovery of the equivalence principle in the space with the deformed Poisson brackets. Comparing our analytical result with the experimental data for the precession angle of Mercury’s orbit we provide an estimation of minimal length. (shrink)

I here advance the thesis that if there is a general right to privacy, it follows that each person has a right not to be intruded upon in respect to their HIV status. I shall call this right RNIH (the Right to Non-Intrusion on HIV Status). Closely related to RNIH is society's compelling interest to protect against the spread of a fatal disease. In cases where the two conflict, the state's interest dominates but only to a point. In this article (...) I sketch out a theoretical basis for believing RNIH exists. I also provide a serious legal mechanism for the protection of the right to privacy in the context of AIDS. (shrink)