Dossier: Religion and Demography Editorial - vol. 12, no. 36, Out./Dec. 2014.

Theory of Literature was originally published in 1949. It is not a textbook introducing the young to the elements of literary appreciation nor a survey of the techniques employed in scholarly research. The authors have sought to unite "poetics" (or literary theory) and "criticism" (evaluation of literature) with "scholarship" ("research") and "literary history" (the "dynamics"of literature, in contrast to the "statics" of theory and criticism).

There has been recent discussion of a puzzle posed by emotions that are backward looking. Though our emotions commonly diminish over time, how can they diminish fittingly if they are an accurate appraisal of an event that is situated in the past? Agnes Callard (2017) has offered a solution by providing an account of anger in which anger is both backwards looking and resolvable, yet her account depends upon contrition to explain anger’s fitting diminishment. My aim is to explain how (...) anger can fittingly diminish even when there is lack of contrition. I propose a permissivism about fittingness by showing that both anger and compassion are fitting responses to blameworthy behaviour. I argue that anger is rendered fitting because it accurately appraises the behaviour, whereas compassion becomes fitting as a valuational response to what the behaviour reveals about the lived experience of the offender. I then respond to some worries my account raises, and I clarify details of my account to show that it is not unrealistic to the way some of our anger actually does diminish. I end with a proposal that our anger can fittingly diminish through the act of forgiveness when compassion is not a forthcoming affective response. (shrink)

Existenzphilosophie fragt nach dem Sinn menschlichen Lebens. Für den Konstruktivismus ist diese Frage schon beantwortet, ja, sinnlos: Für ihn ist die Wirklichkeit des Einzelnen ohnehin die ganze Wirklichkeit - es gibt keine »Objektivität«. So fremd sich beide Denkweisen also gegenüberstehen, so nahe sind sie sich in ihrer radikalen Subjektivität. René Weiland nimmt diese fremde Nähe in den Blick, indem er sich von der Kategorie der Innen-Außen-Differenz als eines Schaltbegriffs leiten lässt, der beide Denkweisen untergründig miteinander verbindet: als Nahtstelle alles (...) Systemischen wie als Nadelöhr unserer Individuationen. Ein Buch für Philosophen und Psychologen - und für Resilienz-Forscher. (shrink)

Existenzphilosophie fragt nach dem Sinn menschlichen Lebens. Für den Konstruktivismus ist diese Frage schon beantwortet, ja, sinnlos: Für ihn ist die Wirklichkeit des Einzelnen ohnehin die ganze Wirklichkeit - es gibt keine »Objektivität«. So fremd sich beide Denkweisen also gegenüberstehen, so nahe sind sie sich in ihrer radikalen Subjektivität. René Weiland nimmt diese fremde Nähe in den Blick, indem er sich von der Kategorie der Innen-Außen-Differenz als eines Schaltbegriffs leiten lässt, der beide Denkweisen untergründig miteinander verbindet: als Nahtstelle alles (...) Systemischen wie als Nadelöhr unserer Individuationen. Ein Buch für Philosophen und Psychologen - und für Resilienz-Forscher. (shrink)

Neue Musik ist eine Verkörperungsform von Aufklärungskultur und somit im akustischen Medium tätige Vernunft. René Thun erweist die Stichhaltigkeit dieser musikphilosophischen Perspektive, indem er statt von einer rein begrifflich deduzierten Ontologie vorrangig von einer medientheoretischen Pragmatik in ideengeschichtlicher Hinsicht ausgeht. Seine interdisziplinäre Verschränkung von Philosophie, Musik und Musikwissenschaft ermöglicht es, die kritischen Bezüge Neuer Musik zu Begriffen wie Aufklärung, Tradition, Natur sowie zur Politik, Anthropologie und Musikpädagogik zu explizieren. Der innovative Ansatz erlaubt es zudem, einen Ausblick auf eine mögliche (...) Musikkultur geben zu können. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Thomas Reid on MemoryRené van Woudenbergthis paper is a discussion of Thomas Reid’s views on memory as an “avenue of knowledge.” Part 1 deals with various remarks Reid makes concerning memory, knowledge, and belief which he holds to be “obvious and certain.” Part contains a more detailed discussion of Reid’s thesis that “memory is unaccountable.” Part 3 inquires how Reid’s critique of the Way of Ideas fits with his (...) own views on memory.Reid’s dealings with memory are part of his broader inquiries into the intellectual faculties of the human mind. In the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man Reid discusses not only memory, but other avenues of knowledge as well, such as perception and reasoning. In these essays Reid is doing straight epistemology. This is not to deny that Reid addresses other topics as well. In the essay on memory, for instance, Reid criticizes John Locke’s account of personal identity. But even then his discussion focusses on epistemological matters; one of his conclusions, for example, is that Locke confounded personal identity with the evidence we have of our personal identity, a thesis, Reid points out, that is bristled with absurd consequences. Although, then, Reid’s views on memory are related with his views on personal identity, I will abstain from a discussion of the latter. His epistemology of memory, I think, warrants attention in its own right.11. memory, knowledge, and beliefI.IIn Essay III of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man [1784],2 entitled “Of Memory,” Reid writes: [End Page 117]It is by memory that we have an immediate knowledge of things past. The senses give us information of things only as they exist in the present moment.(EIP 339)Memory, says Reid, gives us knowledge of things past, whereas sense perception gives us knowledge of things present. Reid takes it to be “obvious and certain” (as the title of the first chapter of Essay III indicates) that “The object of memory, or thing remembered, must be something that is past; as the object of perception... must be something which is present. What now is, cannot be an object of memory; neither can that which is past and gone be an object of perception” (EIP 340).These remarks may, however, occasion some doubts. One way of explaining Reid’s remark that the object of memory is something that is past, is that whenever someone, S, remembers something, viz., that p, p will be a proposition about something that is past.3 This explanation gives the right result for such propositions as there was snowfall in late August, and she once visited Finland4 But, as Norman Malcolm has observed, it does not always give the right results.5 For, he says, there are cases of S remembering that p, where p is not a proposition about the past. Let p be his telephone number is 2 79-289-59 75, or his car is in the garage. What is remembered, in these cases, is a proposition about something that is not past, but present (or: about what is presently the case). It is, so it seems at least, possible for S to remember the present.It even seems possible for S “to remember the future” (something Aristotle deemed impossible).6 S can remember, for instance, that the game starts at 8:00 P.M., or that there will be elections next year.No doubt some will find these suggestions preposterous. Still, we say such things as “I remember my telephone number” and “I remember the game starts at 8:00 P.M.” Someone who balks at the suggestion that we can remember present and even future things, therefore, has to find a way of dealing with these quite common modes of saying. One way would be to argue that these manners of saying are incorrect, another that they are elliptical. Since the first thesis is unconvincing (it is, after all, correct, i.e., correct English to use the expressions under consideration), we are left with the second, viz., that these modes of saying are elliptical. Can this be made acceptable? Let us see.Might... (shrink)

The avant-garde has been popular for some time, but its popularity has tended to fly under the radar. This ¿popular avant-garde,¿ conceived as the meeting ground of the avant-garde and popular, avoids the divorce of art and praxis of which the avant-garde has been accused. The Popular Avant-Garde takes stock of the debates about both the ¿historical¿ (¿modernist¿) and posterior avant-gardes, and sets them in relation to popular culture and art forms. With a critical introduction that examines the concepts of (...) ¿the avant-garde,¿ ¿the popular,¿ and ¿the popular avant-garde,¿ the series of essays analyzes the way in which the avant-garde employs popular genres for political purposes, as well as how the popular acquires a critical function with respect to the avant-garde. Each of the volume¿s three sections considers a different aspect of the productive exchange between the avant-garde and popular: the popular avant-garde as a culturally hybrid and cross-border phenomenon; the play between the popular avant-garde and developments in media and technology; and the popular avant-garde¿s upending of conventional ideas about ¿the people¿ and ¿the popular.¿ The Popular Avant-Garde takes a fresh look at the now canonical Dadaist, Futurist, and Surrealist movements from the perspectives of gender and sexuality, and cultural and critical theory, while at the same time exploring less well-known avant-garde work in literature, film, television, music, photography, dance, sculpture, and the graphic arts. This volume¿s coverage of the American and Afro-American, Luso-Brazilian and Latin-American, East-European, and Scandinavian avant-gardes, in addition to the vanguards of Spain and other parts of Western Europe, will appeal to all those interested in avant-garde and popular art forms. (shrink)

Die Arbeit formuliert einen zeitgemassen Bildungsbegriff, der sich dennoch nicht in dem technologischen Kompetenzdenken erschopft, das den gegenwartigen Mainstream von Bildungstheorie und Didaktik so nachhaltig pragt. Dies erfolgt auf der Grundlage des hermeneutischen Verfahrens, welches Hannah Arendts Kant-Rezeption zugrunde liegt. Bildung wird als praktischer Prozess verstanden, durch den Formen der Weltorientierung erschlossen werden. Zudem wird deutlich gemacht, auf welche Weise philosophische Bildung eine wichtige Rolle fur die politische Bildung von Schulerinnen, Schulern und allen sich Bildenden uberhaupt spielt. Diese genuin politische (...) Perspektive schliesst eine Lucke in der philosophiedidaktischen Forschung der letzten Jahrzehnte. (shrink)

Over the last two decades foundationalism has been severely criticized. In response to this various alternatives to it have been advanced, notably coherentism. At the same time new versions of foundationalism were crafted, that were claimed to be immune to the earlier criticisms. This volume contains 12 papers in which various aspects of this dialectic are covered. A number of papers continue the trend to defend foundationalism, and foundationalism's commitment to basic beliefs and basic knowledge, against various attacks. Others aim (...) to show that one important objection against coherentism, viz. that the notion of 'coherence' is too vague to be useful, can be countered. (shrink)

This Article outlines a vision of responsible innovation and outlines a public policy and implementation strategy for it.

Sextus Empiricus (IIe-IIIe s. ap. J.-C.) est le dernier philosophe sceptique de l'Antiquite et le seul dont l'uvre soit en grande partie conservee. Son Contre les dogmatiques prend pour cible la connaissance philosophique. Cet ensemble de traites tres argumente est articule suivant la distinction, d'epoque hellenistique, entre trois parties de la philosophie, la logique, la physique et l'ethique. On donne ici la premiere traduction francaise de la premiere et plus importante partie de cet ouvrage, le Contre les logiciens, qui conteste (...) la possibilite meme de connaitre. Prenant appui sur la distinction entre " choses apparentes " et " choses cachees ", Sextus Empiricus traite en premier lieu du " critere de la verite " ou des voies d'acces a la connaissance des choses apparentes. Un long developpement doxographique qui conduit des philosophes presocratiques aux Stoiciens, aux Epicuriens et aux Academiciens precede l'expose des arguments qui plaident en faveur de l'inexistence d'un tel critere. Au livre II, Sextus Empiricus met en question, a propos des choses cachees, le " vrai " lui-meme, avant de faire ressortir la faiblesse de l'inference semiotique et celle de la demonstration. L'ouvrage porte ainsi a notre connaissance tout a la fois des doctrines dogmatiques - comme la logique stoicienne - auxquelles nous aurions moins acces sans son temoignage, et une bonne partie de l'argumentaire sceptique deploye depuis la renaissance du pyrrhonisme, a l'epoque d'Enesideme, qui serait autrement perdue. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In convential democratic decison making, a contradiction has evolved between the demands of long term planning and democratic participation. In this article I will analyse, in how far new modes of decison making, such as national ethics committees, consensus conferences and participatory policy making on the basis of a precautionary principle, has been succesfull in coping with this contradiction. I will conclude that only participatory policy making could meet.

Law-enforcement agencies are increasingly able to leverage crime statistics to make risk predictions for particular individuals, employing a form of inference that some condemn as violating the right to be “treated as an individual.” I suggest that the right encodes agents’ entitlement to a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the rule of law. Rather than precluding statistical prediction, it requires that citizens be able to anticipate which variables will be used as predictors and act intentionally to avoid (...) them. Furthermore, it condemns reliance on various indexes of distributive injustice, or unchosen properties, as evidence of law-breaking. (shrink)

This study evaluated the integration of psychology ethics into an introductory psychology course. Students in two general psychology sections were exposed to an infusion of psychology ethics in teaching, research, and clinical practice, whereas students in two sections were exposed to traditional course content. Students completed a pre and post-test assessment including a psychology ethics questionnaire and open-ended responses to three ethics case studies. Students in the ethics group displayed a statistically significant increase in scores on both measures from pre (...) to post-test. However, students in the traditional group showed no improvement in scores. (shrink)

Presentation times of study words presented in the Deese/Roediger and McDermott (DRM) paradigm varied from 20 to 2000 ms per word in an attempt to replicate the false memory effect following extremely short presentations reported by . Both in a within-subjects design (Experiment 1) and in a between-subjects design (Experiment 2) subjects showed memory for studied words as well as a false memory effect for related critical lures in the 2000-ms condition. However, in the conditions with shorter presentation times (20 (...) ms in Experiment 1; 20 and 40 ms in Experiment 2) no memory for studied words, nor a false memory effect was found. We argue that there is at present no strong evidence supporting the claim for a nonconscious basis of the false memory effect. (shrink)