Neue Musik ist eine Verkörperungsform von Aufklärungskultur und somit im akustischen Medium tätige Vernunft. René Thun erweist die Stichhaltigkeit dieser musikphilosophischen Perspektive, indem er statt von einer rein begrifflich deduzierten Ontologie vorrangig von einer medientheoretischen Pragmatik in ideengeschichtlicher Hinsicht ausgeht. Seine interdisziplinäre Verschränkung von Philosophie, Musik und Musikwissenschaft ermöglicht es, die kritischen Bezüge Neuer Musik zu Begriffen wie Aufklärung, Tradition, Natur sowie zur Politik, Anthropologie und Musikpädagogik zu explizieren. Der innovative Ansatz erlaubt es zudem, einen Ausblick auf eine mögliche Musikkultur (...) geben zu können. (shrink)

The article poses the question to what extend Josef Koenig’s aesthetic approach represents a continuation of the Kantian approach by means of philosophy of language. Its starting point is Kant’s notion of aesthetic ideas for which concepts – in their metaphorical use – are an indespensable condition. Both authors presuppose the free play of cognitive faculties as a foundational principle of aesthetic experience. While for Kant beauty immediately results from pleasure concerning a perception, for Koenig this pleasure is mediated by (...) the purposiveness of a description of an aesthetic impression. A description is purposeful if it is expressed by an appropriate metaphor. Hence its interpersonal validity is only verifiable by resonance. (shrink)

In his hermeneutic of the self, which he is working out in his Oneself as another , Ricœur writes about the constitutive conditions of conscience as a dimension of the experience of passivity. For the following considerations, I will argue that Ricœur is very right in maintaining the moral impact of the notion of conscience; but if we on the other hand remember older writings by Ricœur like Fallible Man we have to admit that something is missed in the chapter (...) about conscience in Oneself as Another . And that means, that in Oneself as Another he neglects the affective dimension of conscience. This affective dimension is - I think - the notion of shame. Dans Soi-même comme un autre où s'élabore son herméneutique du soi, Paul Ricœur réfléchit sur les conditions constitutives de la conscience comme expérience de la passivité. Pour les considerations suivantes, je souhaiterai montrer que Ricœur a tout à fait raison de plaider pour la dimension morale de la notion de conscience. Mais, d'un autre côté,si l'on se souvient des écrits plus anciens de Ricoeur sur l'Homme faillible , nous sommes tenus d'admettre que, au cours du chapitre sur la conscience dans Soi-même comme un autre , quelque chose est perdu de vue. Nous voulons signifier que, dans ce chapitre, il néglige la dimension affective de la conscience. Cette dimension affective est, nous semble-t-il, la notion de honte.  . (shrink)

Our estimation of art works we sometimes express by calling them felicitous. This ascription is problematic since the criteria are not governed by descriptive properties but by possible ascriptions. Thus, some problems result for an aesthetic realist concerning the provability of an artwork’s felicitousness and the validity of this judgement. An artwork’s status as a felicitous one depends not only on descriptive criteria with cognitive force to agree with this judgement. Rather, this ascription takes place on a background of a (...) communicatively anchored aesthetical acceptance. (shrink)